Update CHANGES and NEWS for release

Add details about the latest issues into CHANGES and NEWS ready for the
next release.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index e03c46f921edc35fed6425f1c89037ead88a9b3d..d090d75579fb79bebc05e547c879102d621843c3 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,49 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) DH small subgroups
+
+     Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+     primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+     generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
+     support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+     application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
+     not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
+     DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
+     handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
+     this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
+     reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+
+     OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
+     TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
+     reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
+     would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
+     applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+
+     The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
+     available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
+     only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
+     ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+
+     Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
+     default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
+     (CVE-2016-0701)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+
+     A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+     the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+     been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+     SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+     and Sebastian Schinzel.
+     (CVE-2015-3197)
+     [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
   *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits.
      [Kurt Roeckx]
 

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 6d32f751a94ad7c638268af24724e2592364bb3d..5b7e2ec3edbffe574f1d51bbe8d09fa9b6012d42 100644 (file)
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [under development]
 
-      o
+      o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)
+      o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197)
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]