Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.7 [xx XXX 2001]
- Both OpenSSL 0.9.6a (bugfix release, 5 Apr 2001) and OpenSSL 0.9.7
- are based on OpenSSL 0.9.6.
+ OpenSSL 0.9.6a/0.9.6b (bugfix releases, 5 Apr 2001 and 9 July 2001)
+ and OpenSSL 0.9.7 were developped in parallel, based on OpenSSL 0.9.6.
+
Change log entries are tagged as follows:
- -) applies to 0.9.6a (/0.9.6b) only
- *) applies to 0.9.6a (/0.9.6b) and 0.9.7
+ -) applies to 0.9.6a/0.9.6b only
+ *) applies to 0.9.6a/0.9.6b and 0.9.7
+) applies to 0.9.7 only
+ -) OpenSSL 0.9.6b released [9 July 2001]
+
+ *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c)
+ to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by
+ Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>:
+ PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of
+ one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on
+ 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests
+ to traverse all of 'state'.
+
+ 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md')
+ during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous
+ 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output.
+
+ 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash
+ independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested.
+
+ The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid
+ Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred
+ to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the
+ half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always
+ assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second
+ measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never
+ mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically
+ further strengthens the PRNG.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+) Speed up EVP routines.
Before:
encrypt
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
+ int num_ceil;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
}
#endif
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
*
* For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
*
- * Input into the hash function the top 10 bytes from the
- * local 'md' (which is initialized from the global 'md'
- * before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are
- * to be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the
- * 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output
- * (which is kept in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are
- * returned to the caller and the bottom (up to) 10 bytes are xored
- * into the 'state'.
+ * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+ * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+ * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+ * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+ * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+ * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+ *
* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
* caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
if (do_stir_pool)
{
- /* Our output function chains only half of 'md', so we better
- * make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly distributed'
- * through 'state', our randomness pool. The input function
- * (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
- * suitable for this purpose.
+ /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret,
+ * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets
+ * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool.
+ * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md',
+ * which makes it more suitable for this purpose.
*/
int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
- state_index+=num;
+ state_index+=num_ceil;
if (state_index > state_num)
state_index %= state_num;
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % st_num]
+ /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
* are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
md_count[0] += 1;
while (num > 0)
{
+ /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
num-=j;
MD_Init(&m);
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
- MD_Update(&m,&(local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+ MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
#ifndef PURIFY
MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
#endif
- k=(st_idx+j)-st_num;
+ k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
+ MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
+ MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
MD_Final(&m,local_md);
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
{
state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
- *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
if (st_idx >= st_num)
st_idx=0;
+ if (i < j)
+ *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
}
}
When bytes are extracted from the RNG, the following process is used.
For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
-Input into the hash function the top 10 bytes from the local 'md'
-(which is initialized from the global 'md' before any bytes are
-generated), the bytes that are to be overwritten by the random bytes,
-and bytes from the 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this
-digest output (which is kept in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are
-returned to the caller and the bottom (up to) 10 bytes are xored into
-the 'state'.
+Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+(incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the caller,
'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' are fed
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