{
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
- unsigned char *p = &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
- int len;
+ int xlen;
if (frag_off == 0)
{
l2n3(0,p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- len = ret;
+ xlen = ret;
}
else
{
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- len = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, len);
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
}
if (ret == s->init_num)
* the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
{
- unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data;
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
/* reconstruct message header as if it was
if (al==0) /* no alert */
{
- unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
}
if ( frag_len > 0)
{
- unsigned char *p=s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
&p[frag_off],frag_len,0);