accordance with RFC2560.
Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.7 [xx XXX 2000]
+ *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified
+ in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the
+ certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate
+ or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the
+ OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key
+ usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP
+ signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash
+ in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify()
and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate
verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify error (%d)\n", i);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
}
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n");
ret = 0;
#define OCSP_F_CERT_STATUS_NEW 103
#define OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE 109
#define OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY 113
+#define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED 117
+#define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS 114
+#define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER 115
#define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_NONCE 112
+#define OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID 116
#define OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC 111
#define OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO 110
#define OCSP_F_REQUEST_VERIFY 104
#define OCSP_R_FAILED_TO_OPEN 109
#define OCSP_R_FAILED_TO_READ 110
#define OCSP_R_FAILED_TO_STAT 111
+#define OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE 131
#define OCSP_R_MISSING_VALUE 112
#define OCSP_R_NONCE_MISSING_IN_RESPONSE 121
#define OCSP_R_NONCE_VALUE_MISMATCH 122
#define OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE 120
#define OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATE 102
+#define OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN 128
#define OCSP_R_NO_CONTENT 115
#define OCSP_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY 103
#define OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA 104
#define OCSP_R_NO_SIGNATURE 105
+#define OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA 129
#define OCSP_R_REVOKED_NO_TIME 106
#define OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED 127
#define OCSP_R_SERVER_READ_ERROR 116
#define OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE 124
#define OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND 125
#define OCSP_R_UNEXPECTED_NONCE_IN_RESPONSE 123
+#define OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST 130
#define OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID 107
#define OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION 113
#define OCSP_R_VALUE_ALREADY 114
{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_CERT_STATUS_NEW,0), "CERT_STATUS_NEW"},
{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE,0), "D2I_OCSP_NONCE"},
{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,0), "OCSP_basic_verify"},
+{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED,0), "OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED"},
+{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,0), "OCSP_CHECK_IDS"},
+{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER,0), "OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER"},
{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_NONCE,0), "OCSP_check_nonce"},
+{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,0), "OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID"},
{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC,0), "OCSP_response_get1_basic"},
{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,0), "OCSP_sendreq_bio"},
{ERR_PACK(0,OCSP_F_REQUEST_VERIFY,0), "REQUEST_VERIFY"},
{OCSP_R_FAILED_TO_OPEN ,"failed to open"},
{OCSP_R_FAILED_TO_READ ,"failed to read"},
{OCSP_R_FAILED_TO_STAT ,"failed to stat"},
+{OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE ,"missing ocspsigning usage"},
{OCSP_R_MISSING_VALUE ,"missing value"},
{OCSP_R_NONCE_MISSING_IN_RESPONSE ,"nonce missing in response"},
{OCSP_R_NONCE_VALUE_MISMATCH ,"nonce value mismatch"},
{OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE ,"not basic response"},
{OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATE ,"no certificate"},
+{OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN ,"no certificates in chain"},
{OCSP_R_NO_CONTENT ,"no content"},
{OCSP_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY ,"no public key"},
{OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA ,"no response data"},
{OCSP_R_NO_SIGNATURE ,"no signature"},
+{OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA,"response contains no revocation data"},
{OCSP_R_REVOKED_NO_TIME ,"revoked no time"},
{OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED ,"root ca not trusted"},
{OCSP_R_SERVER_READ_ERROR ,"server read error"},
{OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE ,"signature failure"},
{OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND ,"signer certificate not found"},
{OCSP_R_UNEXPECTED_NONCE_IN_RESPONSE ,"unexpected nonce in response"},
+{OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST ,"unknown message digest"},
{OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID ,"unknown nid"},
{OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION ,"unsupported option"},
{OCSP_R_VALUE_ALREADY ,"value already"},
static X509 *ocsp_find_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags);
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret);
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
/* Verify a basic response message */
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto end;
}
- if(!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
{
EVP_PKEY *skey;
skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
goto end;
}
}
- if(!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
{
if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
goto end;
}
/* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
- * need to verify it against the OCSP criteria.
+ * need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
*/
-#if 0
- if(ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags))
- {
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
+ ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);
+
+ /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
+ if (ret != 0) goto end;
/* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
* check for explicit trust
X509 *x;
/* Easy if lookup by name */
- if(id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
+ if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
/* Lookup by key hash */
/* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
- if(id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
+ if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
/* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
- for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
key = x->cert_info->key->public_key;
}
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
+ X509 *signer, *sca;
+ OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
+ int i;
+ sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
+ i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
+
+ /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
+ if (i <= 0) return i;
+
+ signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1)
+ {
+ sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
+ i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
+ if (i < 0) return i;
+ if (i)
+ {
+ /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
+ if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
+ return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
+ }
+
+
+/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
+ * algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
+ * If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
+ {
+ OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
+ int i, idcount;
+
+ idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
+ if (idcount <= 0)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
+
+ *ret = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++)
+ {
+ tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
+ /* Check to see if IDs match */
+ if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid))
+ {
+ /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
+ if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm,
+ cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))
+ return 2;
+ /* Else mismatch */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
+ *ret = cid;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
+ {
+ /* If only one ID to match then do it */
+ if(cid)
+ {
+ const EVP_MD *dgst;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ X509_NAME *iname;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
+ int mdlen;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)))
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
+ (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
+ return 0;
+ iname = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
+ if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
+ return -1;
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
+ return 0;
+ ikey = cert->cert_info->key->public_key;
+
+ EVP_DigestInit(&ctx,dgst);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ikey->data, ikey->length);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,md,NULL);
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We have to match the whole lot */
+ int i, ret;
+ OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++)
+ {
+ tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
+ ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
+ if (ret <= 0) return ret;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
+ {
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) &&
+ (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
+ return 1;
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff