-SUBDIRS=digests kdfs macs ciphers
+SUBDIRS=digests ciphers
$GOAL=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[$GOAL]=defltprov.c
INCLUDE[$GOAL]=include
+++ /dev/null
-$GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
-SOURCE[$GOAL]=scrypt.c sshkdf.c x942kdf.c
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include "crypto/evp.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
-#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
-#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
-
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_scrypt_new;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_scrypt_free;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_scrypt_reset;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_scrypt_derive;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params;
-
-static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
- uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256);
-
-typedef struct {
- void *provctx;
- unsigned char *pass;
- size_t pass_len;
- unsigned char *salt;
- size_t salt_len;
- uint64_t N;
- uint64_t r, p;
- uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
- EVP_MD *sha256;
-} KDF_SCRYPT;
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx);
-
-static void *kdf_scrypt_new(void *provctx)
-{
- KDF_SCRYPT *ctx;
-
- ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- ctx->provctx = provctx;
- ctx->sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx),
- "sha256", NULL);
- if (ctx->sha256 == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA256);
- return NULL;
- }
- kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
- return ctx;
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_free(void *vctx)
-{
- KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
-
- EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha256);
- kdf_scrypt_reset(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_reset(void *vctx)
-{
- KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
-
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
- kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx)
-{
- /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
- * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
- * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
- */
- ctx->N = 1 << 20;
- ctx->r = 8;
- ctx->p = 1;
- ctx->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
-}
-
-static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
- const OSSL_PARAM *p)
-{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
- if (p->data_size == 0) {
- if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (p->data != NULL) {
- *buffer = NULL;
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
-{
- KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
-
- if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return scrypt_alg((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len, ctx->salt,
- ctx->salt_len, ctx->N, ctx->r, ctx->p,
- ctx->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen, ctx->sha256);
-}
-
-static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
-{
- return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- const OSSL_PARAM *p;
- KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = vctx;
- uint64_t u64_value;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
- if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
- if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N))
- != NULL) {
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value)
- || u64_value <= 1
- || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
- return 0;
- ctx->N = u64_value;
- }
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R))
- != NULL) {
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
- return 0;
- ctx->r = u64_value;
- }
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P))
- != NULL) {
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
- return 0;
- ctx->p = u64_value;
- }
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM))
- != NULL) {
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
- return 0;
- ctx->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
- };
- return known_settable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
- return -2;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
- };
- return known_gettable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_scrypt_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_new },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_free },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_reset },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_derive },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
-
-#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
-static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
-{
- int i;
- uint32_t x[16];
-
- memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
- for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
- x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
- x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
- x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
- x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
- x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
- x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
- x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
- x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
- x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
- x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
- x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
- x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
- x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
- x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
- x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
- x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
- x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
- x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
- x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
- x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
- x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
- x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
- x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
- x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
- x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
- x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
- x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
- x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
- x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
- x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
- x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
- x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
- inout[i] += x[i];
- OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
-}
-
-static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
-{
- uint64_t i, j;
- uint32_t X[16], *pB;
-
- memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
- pB = B;
- for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
- X[j] ^= *pB++;
- salsa208_word_specification(X);
- memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
- }
- OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
-}
-
-static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
- uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
-{
- unsigned char *pB;
- uint32_t *pV;
- uint64_t i, k;
-
- /* Convert from little endian input */
- for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
- *pV = *pB++;
- *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
- *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
- *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
- }
-
- for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
- scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
-
- scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
-
- for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
- uint32_t j;
- j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
- pV = V + 32 * r * j;
- for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
- T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
- scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
- }
- /* Convert output to little endian */
- for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
- uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
- *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
- *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
- *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
- *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
- }
-}
-
-#ifndef SIZE_MAX
-# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
- * most (all?) platforms.
- */
-
-#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
-
-/*
- * Maximum value of p * r:
- * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
- * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
- * p * r <= (2^30-1)
- */
-
-#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
-
-static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
- uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256)
-{
- int rv = 0;
- unsigned char *B;
- uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
- uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
-
- /* Sanity check parameters */
- /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
- if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
- return 0;
- /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
- if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
- * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
- */
-
- if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
- if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
-
- /*
- * B size in section 5 step 1.S
- * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
- * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
- */
- Blen = p * 128 * r;
- /*
- * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
- * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
- */
- if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
- * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
- */
- i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
- if (N + 2 > i / r) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
- Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
-
- /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
- if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
- if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
- maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
-
- if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
- if (key == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
- if (B == NULL) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
- T = X + 32 * r;
- V = T + 32 * r;
- if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, sha256,
- (int)Blen, B) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
- scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
-
- if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, sha256,
- keylen, key) == 0)
- goto err;
- rv = 1;
- err:
- if (rv == 0)
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
- return rv;
-}
-
-#endif
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "crypto/evp.h"
-#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
-#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
-#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-# include "internal/provider_util.h"
-
-/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_sshkdf_new;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_sshkdf_free;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_sshkdf_reset;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_sshkdf_derive;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params;
-
-static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
- const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
- char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
-
-typedef struct {
- void *provctx;
- PROV_DIGEST digest;
- unsigned char *key; /* K */
- size_t key_len;
- unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
- size_t xcghash_len;
- char type; /* X */
- unsigned char *session_id;
- size_t session_id_len;
-} KDF_SSHKDF;
-
-static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
-{
- KDF_SSHKDF *ctx;
-
- if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->provctx = provctx;
- return ctx;
-}
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_free(void *vctx)
-{
- KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
-
- kdf_sshkdf_reset(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(void *vctx)
-{
- KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
-
- ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
-}
-
-static int sshkdf_set_membuf(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
- const OSSL_PARAM *p)
-{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
- *dst = NULL;
- return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)dst, 0, dst_len);
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
-{
- KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
- const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
-
- if (md == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->key == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->xcghash == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->session_id == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->type == 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
- return 0;
- }
- return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
- ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
- ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
- ctx->type, key, keylen);
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- const OSSL_PARAM *p;
- KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
- OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
- int t;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
- if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->key, &ctx->key_len, p))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH))
- != NULL)
- if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->xcghash, &ctx->xcghash_len, p))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID))
- != NULL)
- if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->session_id, &ctx->session_id_len, p))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE))
- != NULL) {
- if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
- return 0;
- t = *(unsigned char *)p->data;
- if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->type = (char)t;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
- };
- return known_settable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
- return -2;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
- };
- return known_gettable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_new },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_free },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_reset },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_derive },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
-
-static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
- const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
- char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
- unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int dsize = 0;
- size_t cursize = 0;
- int ret = 0;
-
- md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
- goto out;
-
- if (okey_len < dsize) {
- memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
- ret = 1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
-
- for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
- goto out;
-
- if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
- memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
- ret = 1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-out:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- return ret;
-}
-
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <stdarg.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-# include <openssl/cms.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-# include <openssl/x509.h>
-# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-# include "internal/numbers.h"
-# include "crypto/evp.h"
-# include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
-# include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
-# include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-# include "internal/provider_util.h"
-
-# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
-
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params;
-
-typedef struct {
- void *provctx;
- PROV_DIGEST digest;
- unsigned char *secret;
- size_t secret_len;
- int cek_nid;
- unsigned char *ukm;
- size_t ukm_len;
- size_t dkm_len;
-} KDF_X942;
-
-/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
-static const struct {
- int nid;
- size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
-} kek_algs[] = {
- { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
- { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
-};
-
-/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
-static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
-{
- int i, tag, xclass;
- long tmplen;
- const unsigned char *q = *pp;
-
- i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
- if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
- return 0;
- if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
- q += tmplen;
- *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
- *plen -= q - *pp;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Encode the other info structure.
- *
- * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
- *
- * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
- * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
- * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
- * }
- *
- * KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
- * }
- *
- * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
- * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
- * suppPubInfo (in bits).
- * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
- * can be NULL.
- * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
- * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
- * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
- * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
- * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
- *
- * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
- * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
- */
-static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
- unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
- unsigned char **out_ctr)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
- int ret = 0, encoded_len;
- long tlen;
- /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
- static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
- X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
- ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
-
- /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
- ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
- alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
- ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (ksi == NULL
- || alg_oid == NULL
- || ctr_oct == NULL
- || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
- || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
- goto err;
- /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
- alg_oid = NULL;
- ctr_oct = NULL;
-
- /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
- if (ukm != NULL) {
- ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (ukm_oct == NULL)
- goto err;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
- }
- /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
- encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
- if (encoded_len <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
- p = encoded;
- tlen = (long)encoded_len;
- if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
- && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
- *out_ctr = p;
- *der = encoded;
- *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
- ret = 1;
- }
-err:
- if (ret != 1)
- OPENSSL_free(encoded);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
- X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
- const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
- const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
- unsigned char *ctr,
- unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
-{
- int ret = 0, hlen;
- size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
- unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *out = derived_key;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
-
- if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
- || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
- || derived_key_len == 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
- if (hlen <= 0)
- return 0;
- out_len = (size_t)hlen;
-
- ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
- goto end;
-
- for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
- /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
- ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
- ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
- ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
- ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
-
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
- goto end;
- if (len >= out_len) {
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
- goto end;
- out += out_len;
- len -= out_len;
- if (len == 0)
- break;
- } else {
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
- goto end;
- memcpy(out, mac, len);
- break;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
-end:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void *x942kdf_new(void *provctx)
-{
- KDF_X942 *ctx;
-
- if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->provctx = provctx;
- return ctx;
-}
-
-static void x942kdf_reset(void *vctx)
-{
- KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
-
- ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len);
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
-}
-
-static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx)
-{
- KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
-
- x942kdf_reset(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
- const OSSL_PARAM *p)
-{
- if (p->data_size == 0 || p->data == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_free(*out);
- *out = NULL;
- return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
-}
-
-static size_t x942kdf_size(KDF_X942 *ctx)
-{
- int len;
- const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
-
- if (md == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- len = EVP_MD_size(md);
- return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
-{
- KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
- const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
- int ret = 0;
- unsigned char *ctr;
- unsigned char *der = NULL;
- size_t der_len = 0;
-
- if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
- return 0;
- }
- if (md == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->ukm != NULL && ctx->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
- /*
- * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
- * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
- */
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (keylen != ctx->dkm_len) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
- return 0;
- }
- /* generate the otherinfo der */
- if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->cek_nid, ctx->dkm_len,
- ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len,
- &der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
- der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- const OSSL_PARAM *p;
- KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx;
- OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
- size_t i;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
- || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
- if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM)) != NULL)
- if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ukm, &ctx->ukm_len, p))
- return 0;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG)) != NULL) {
- if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
- return 0;
- ctx->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p->data);
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++)
- if (kek_algs[i].nid == ctx->cek_nid)
- goto cek_found;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
- return 0;
-cek_found:
- ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
- };
- return known_settable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
- OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
- return -2;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
- };
- return known_gettable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_derive },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void(*)(void))x942kdf_settable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_set_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void(*)(void))x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_get_ctx_params },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/params.h>
-
-#include "internal/blake2.h"
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
-#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-
-/*
- * Forward declaration of everything implemented here. This is not strictly
- * necessary for the compiler, but provides an assurance that the signatures
- * of the functions in the dispatch table are correct.
- */
-static OSSL_OP_mac_newctx_fn blake2_mac_new;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_dupctx_fn blake2_mac_dup;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_freectx_fn blake2_mac_free;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_gettable_ctx_params_fn blake2_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_get_ctx_params_fn blake2_get_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_settable_ctx_params_fn blake2_mac_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_set_ctx_params_fn blake2_mac_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_init_fn blake2_mac_init;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_update_fn blake2_mac_update;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_final_fn blake2_mac_final;
-
-struct blake2_mac_data_st {
- BLAKE2_CTX ctx;
- BLAKE2_PARAM params;
- unsigned char key[BLAKE2_KEYBYTES];
-};
-
-static size_t blake2_mac_size(void *vmacctx);
-
-static void *blake2_mac_new(void *unused_provctx)
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*macctx));
-
- if (macctx != NULL) {
- BLAKE2_PARAM_INIT(&macctx->params);
- /* ctx initialization is deferred to BLAKE2b_Init() */
- }
- return macctx;
-}
-
-static void *blake2_mac_dup(void *vsrc)
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *dst;
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *src = vsrc;
-
- dst = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dst));
- if (dst == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- *dst = *src;
- return dst;
-}
-
-static void blake2_mac_free(void *vmacctx)
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
-
- if (macctx != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(macctx->key, sizeof(macctx->key));
- OPENSSL_free(macctx);
- }
-}
-
-static int blake2_mac_init(void *vmacctx)
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
-
- /* Check key has been set */
- if (macctx->params.key_length == 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return BLAKE2_INIT_KEY(&macctx->ctx, &macctx->params, macctx->key);
-}
-
-static int blake2_mac_update(void *vmacctx,
- const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen)
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
-
- return BLAKE2_UPDATE(&macctx->ctx, data, datalen);
-}
-
-static int blake2_mac_final(void *vmacctx,
- unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
- size_t outsize)
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
-
- return BLAKE2_FINAL(out, &macctx->ctx);
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *blake2_gettable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- return known_gettable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int blake2_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, blake2_mac_size(vmacctx));
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *blake2_mac_settable_ctx_params()
-{
- return known_settable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-/*
- * ALL parameters should be set before init().
- */
-static int blake2_mac_set_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
- const OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
- size_t size;
-
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &size)
- || size < 1
- || size > BLAKE2_OUTBYTES) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_DIGEST_LENGTH(&macctx->params, (uint8_t)size);
- }
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
- size_t len;
- void *key_p = macctx->key;
-
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &key_p, BLAKE2_KEYBYTES, &len)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Pad with zeroes at the end */
- memset(macctx->key + len, 0, BLAKE2_KEYBYTES - len);
-
- BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_KEY_LENGTH(&macctx->params, (uint8_t)len);
- }
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM))
- != NULL) {
- /*
- * The OSSL_PARAM API doesn't provide direct pointer use, so we
- * must handle the OSSL_PARAM structure ourselves here
- */
- if (p->data_size > BLAKE2_PERSONALBYTES) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CUSTOM_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_PERSONAL(&macctx->params, p->data, p->data_size);
- }
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
- /*
- * The OSSL_PARAM API doesn't provide direct pointer use, so we
- * must handle the OSSL_PARAM structure ourselves here as well
- */
- if (p->data_size > BLAKE2_SALTBYTES) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_SALT(&macctx->params, p->data, p->data_size);
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static size_t blake2_mac_size(void *vmacctx)
-{
- struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
-
- return macctx->params.digest_length;
-}
-
-const OSSL_DISPATCH BLAKE2_FUNCTIONS[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_new },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_dup },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_free },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_INIT, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_update },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FINAL, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_final },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))blake2_gettable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))blake2_get_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_settable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_set_ctx_params },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-/* Constants */
-#define BLAKE2_CTX BLAKE2B_CTX
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM BLAKE2B_PARAM
-#define BLAKE2_KEYBYTES BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES
-#define BLAKE2_OUTBYTES BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES
-#define BLAKE2_PERSONALBYTES BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES
-#define BLAKE2_SALTBYTES BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES
-
-/* Function names */
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_INIT blake2b_param_init
-#define BLAKE2_INIT_KEY blake2b_init_key
-#define BLAKE2_UPDATE blake2b_update
-#define BLAKE2_FINAL blake2b_final
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_DIGEST_LENGTH blake2b_param_set_digest_length
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_KEY_LENGTH blake2b_param_set_key_length
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_PERSONAL blake2b_param_set_personal
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_SALT blake2b_param_set_salt
-
-/* OSSL_DISPATCH symbol */
-#define BLAKE2_FUNCTIONS blake2bmac_functions
-
-#include "blake2_mac_impl.c"
-
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-/* Constants */
-#define BLAKE2_CTX BLAKE2S_CTX
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM BLAKE2S_PARAM
-#define BLAKE2_KEYBYTES BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES
-#define BLAKE2_OUTBYTES BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES
-#define BLAKE2_PERSONALBYTES BLAKE2S_PERSONALBYTES
-#define BLAKE2_SALTBYTES BLAKE2S_SALTBYTES
-
-/* Function names */
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_INIT blake2s_param_init
-#define BLAKE2_INIT_KEY blake2s_init_key
-#define BLAKE2_UPDATE blake2s_update
-#define BLAKE2_FINAL blake2s_final
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_DIGEST_LENGTH blake2s_param_set_digest_length
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_KEY_LENGTH blake2s_param_set_key_length
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_PERSONAL blake2s_param_set_personal
-#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_SALT blake2s_param_set_salt
-
-/* OSSL_DISPATCH symbol */
-#define BLAKE2_FUNCTIONS blake2smac_functions
-
-#include "blake2_mac_impl.c"
+++ /dev/null
-$GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
-
-IF[{- !$disabled{blake2} -}]
- SOURCE[$GOAL]=blake2b_mac.c blake2s_mac.c
-ENDIF
-
-IF[{- !$disabled{siphash} -}]
- SOURCE[$GOAL]=siphash_prov.c
-ENDIF
-
-IF[{- !$disabled{poly1305} -}]
- SOURCE[$GOAL]=poly1305_prov.c
-ENDIF
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/params.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "crypto/poly1305.h"
-/*
- * TODO(3.0) when poly1305 has moved entirely to our providers, this
- * header should be moved to the provider include directory. For the
- * moment, crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ameth.c has us stuck.
- */
-#include "../../../crypto/poly1305/poly1305_local.h"
-
-#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
-#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-
-/*
- * Forward declaration of everything implemented here. This is not strictly
- * necessary for the compiler, but provides an assurance that the signatures
- * of the functions in the dispatch table are correct.
- */
-static OSSL_OP_mac_newctx_fn poly1305_new;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_dupctx_fn poly1305_dup;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_freectx_fn poly1305_free;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_gettable_params_fn poly1305_gettable_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_get_params_fn poly1305_get_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_settable_ctx_params_fn poly1305_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_set_ctx_params_fn poly1305_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_init_fn poly1305_init;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_update_fn poly1305_update;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_final_fn poly1305_final;
-
-struct poly1305_data_st {
- void *provctx;
- POLY1305 poly1305; /* Poly1305 data */
-};
-
-static size_t poly1305_size(void);
-
-static void *poly1305_new(void *provctx)
-{
- struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
-
- ctx->provctx = provctx;
- return ctx;
-}
-
-static void poly1305_free(void *vmacctx)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(vmacctx);
-}
-
-static void *poly1305_dup(void *vsrc)
-{
- struct poly1305_data_st *src = vsrc;
- struct poly1305_data_st *dst = poly1305_new(src->provctx);
-
- if (dst == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- dst->poly1305 = src->poly1305;
- return dst;
-}
-
-static size_t poly1305_size(void)
-{
- return POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE;
-}
-
-static int poly1305_init(void *vmacctx)
-{
- /* initialize the context in MAC_ctrl function */
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int poly1305_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data,
- size_t datalen)
-{
- struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
-
- /* poly1305 has nothing to return in its update function */
- Poly1305_Update(&ctx->poly1305, data, datalen);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int poly1305_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
- size_t outsize)
-{
- struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
-
- Poly1305_Final(&ctx->poly1305, out);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *poly1305_gettable_params(void)
-{
- return known_gettable_params;
-}
-
-static int poly1305_get_params(OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, poly1305_size());
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *poly1305_settable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- return known_settable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int poly1305_set_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM *params)
-{
- struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
- const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
- if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING
- || p->data_size != POLY1305_KEY_SIZE) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- Poly1305_Init(&ctx->poly1305, p->data);
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-const OSSL_DISPATCH poly1305_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))poly1305_new },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))poly1305_dup },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))poly1305_free },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_INIT, (void (*)(void))poly1305_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))poly1305_update },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FINAL, (void (*)(void))poly1305_final },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))poly1305_gettable_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GET_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))poly1305_get_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))poly1305_settable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))poly1305_set_ctx_params },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/params.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "crypto/siphash.h"
-/*
- * TODO(3.0) when siphash has moved entirely to our providers, this
- * header should be moved to the provider include directory. For the
- * moment, crypto/siphash/siphash_ameth.c has us stuck.
- */
-#include "../../../crypto/siphash/siphash_local.h"
-
-#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
-#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-
-/*
- * Forward declaration of everything implemented here. This is not strictly
- * necessary for the compiler, but provides an assurance that the signatures
- * of the functions in the dispatch table are correct.
- */
-static OSSL_OP_mac_newctx_fn siphash_new;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_dupctx_fn siphash_dup;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_freectx_fn siphash_free;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_gettable_ctx_params_fn siphash_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_get_ctx_params_fn siphash_get_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_settable_ctx_params_fn siphash_settable_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_set_ctx_params_fn siphash_set_params;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_size_fn siphash_size;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_init_fn siphash_init;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_update_fn siphash_update;
-static OSSL_OP_mac_final_fn siphash_final;
-
-struct siphash_data_st {
- void *provctx;
- SIPHASH siphash; /* Siphash data */
-};
-
-static void *siphash_new(void *provctx)
-{
- struct siphash_data_st *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
-
- ctx->provctx = provctx;
- return ctx;
-}
-
-static void siphash_free(void *vmacctx)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(vmacctx);
-}
-
-static void *siphash_dup(void *vsrc)
-{
- struct siphash_data_st *ssrc = vsrc;
- struct siphash_data_st *sdst = siphash_new(ssrc->provctx);
-
- if (sdst == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- sdst->siphash = ssrc->siphash;
- return sdst;
-}
-
-static size_t siphash_size(void *vmacctx)
-{
- struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
-
- return SipHash_hash_size(&ctx->siphash);
-}
-
-static int siphash_init(void *vmacctx)
-{
- /* Not much to do here, actual initialization happens through controls */
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int siphash_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data,
- size_t datalen)
-{
- struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
-
- SipHash_Update(&ctx->siphash, data, datalen);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int siphash_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
- size_t outsize)
-{
- struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
- size_t hlen = siphash_size(ctx);
-
- if (outsize < hlen)
- return 0;
-
- *outl = hlen;
- return SipHash_Final(&ctx->siphash, out, hlen);
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *siphash_gettable_ctx_params(void)
-{
- return known_gettable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int siphash_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, siphash_size(vmacctx));
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *siphash_settable_params(void)
-{
- return known_settable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int siphash_set_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM *params)
-{
- struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
- const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
-
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
- size_t size;
-
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &size)
- || !SipHash_set_hash_size(&ctx->siphash, size))
- return 0;
- }
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
- if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING
- || p->data_size != SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE
- || !SipHash_Init(&ctx->siphash, p->data, 0, 0))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-const OSSL_DISPATCH siphash_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))siphash_new },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))siphash_dup },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))siphash_free },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_INIT, (void (*)(void))siphash_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))siphash_update },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FINAL, (void (*)(void))siphash_final },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))siphash_gettable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))siphash_get_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))siphash_settable_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))siphash_set_params },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
$KBKDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$PBKDF2_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$SSKDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$SCRYPT_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$SSHKDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$X942KDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
SOURCE[$TLS1_PRF_GOAL]=tls1_prf.c
SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=pbkdf2_fips.c
SOURCE[$SSKDF_GOAL]=sskdf.c
+
+SOURCE[$SCRYPT_GOAL]=scrypt.c
+SOURCE[$SSHKDF_GOAL]=sshkdf.c
+SOURCE[$X942KDF_GOAL]=x942kdf.c
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_scrypt_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_scrypt_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_scrypt_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_scrypt_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params;
+
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256);
+
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
+ unsigned char *pass;
+ size_t pass_len;
+ unsigned char *salt;
+ size_t salt_len;
+ uint64_t N;
+ uint64_t r, p;
+ uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
+ EVP_MD *sha256;
+} KDF_SCRYPT;
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx);
+
+static void *kdf_scrypt_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx;
+
+ ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ ctx->sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx),
+ "sha256", NULL);
+ if (ctx->sha256 == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA256);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_free(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha256);
+ kdf_scrypt_reset(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
+ kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx)
+{
+ /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
+ * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
+ * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
+ */
+ ctx->N = 1 << 20;
+ ctx->r = 8;
+ ctx->p = 1;
+ ctx->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
+}
+
+static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
+ if (p->data_size == 0) {
+ if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (p->data != NULL) {
+ *buffer = NULL;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return scrypt_alg((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len, ctx->salt,
+ ctx->salt_len, ctx->N, ctx->r, ctx->p,
+ ctx->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen, ctx->sha256);
+}
+
+static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
+{
+ return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = vctx;
+ uint64_t u64_value;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
+ if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
+ if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value)
+ || u64_value <= 1
+ || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->N = u64_value;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->r = u64_value;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->p = u64_value;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_scrypt_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
+static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t x[16];
+
+ memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
+ for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
+ x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
+ x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
+ x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
+ x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
+ x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
+ x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
+ x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
+ x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
+ x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
+ x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
+ x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
+ x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
+ x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
+ x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
+ x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
+ x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
+ x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
+ x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
+ x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
+ x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
+ x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
+ x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
+ x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
+ x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
+ x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
+ x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
+ x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
+ x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
+ x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
+ x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
+ x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
+ x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+ inout[i] += x[i];
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
+}
+
+static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
+{
+ uint64_t i, j;
+ uint32_t X[16], *pB;
+
+ memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
+ pB = B;
+ for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+ X[j] ^= *pB++;
+ salsa208_word_specification(X);
+ memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
+}
+
+static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
+ uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
+{
+ unsigned char *pB;
+ uint32_t *pV;
+ uint64_t i, k;
+
+ /* Convert from little endian input */
+ for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
+ *pV = *pB++;
+ *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
+ *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
+ *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
+ scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
+
+ scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
+ uint32_t j;
+ j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
+ pV = V + 32 * r * j;
+ for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
+ T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
+ scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
+ }
+ /* Convert output to little endian */
+ for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
+ uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
+ *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
+ * most (all?) platforms.
+ */
+
+#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum value of p * r:
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
+ * p * r <= (2^30-1)
+ */
+
+#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
+
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *B;
+ uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
+ uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
+
+ /* Sanity check parameters */
+ /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
+ if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
+ return 0;
+ /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
+ if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
+ * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
+ */
+
+ if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
+ if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
+
+ /*
+ * B size in section 5 step 1.S
+ * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
+ * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
+ */
+ Blen = p * 128 * r;
+ /*
+ * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
+ * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
+ */
+ if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
+ * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
+ */
+ i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ if (N + 2 > i / r) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+ /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
+ if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
+ if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
+ maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
+
+ if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
+ T = X + 32 * r;
+ V = T + 32 * r;
+ if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, sha256,
+ (int)Blen, B) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
+ scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
+
+ if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, sha256,
+ keylen, key) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (rv == 0)
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+# include "internal/provider_util.h"
+
+/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_sshkdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_sshkdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_sshkdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_sshkdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params;
+
+static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
+ const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
+ char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
+
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
+ PROV_DIGEST digest;
+ unsigned char *key; /* K */
+ size_t key_len;
+ unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
+ size_t xcghash_len;
+ char type; /* X */
+ unsigned char *session_id;
+ size_t session_id_len;
+} KDF_SSHKDF;
+
+static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx;
+
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void kdf_sshkdf_free(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+ kdf_sshkdf_reset(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+ ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+static int sshkdf_set_membuf(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
+ *dst = NULL;
+ return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)dst, 0, dst_len);
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+ const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->key == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->xcghash == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->session_id == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->type == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
+ ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
+ ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
+ ctx->type, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
+ OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ int t;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+ if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->key, &ctx->key_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH))
+ != NULL)
+ if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->xcghash, &ctx->xcghash_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID))
+ != NULL)
+ if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->session_id, &ctx->session_id_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
+ return 0;
+ t = *(unsigned char *)p->data;
+ if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_VALUE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->type = (char)t;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
+ const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
+ char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dsize = 0;
+ size_t cursize = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (okey_len < dsize) {
+ memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
+
+ for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
+ memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+out:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <stdarg.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "internal/numbers.h"
+# include "crypto/evp.h"
+# include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+# include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+# include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+# include "internal/provider_util.h"
+
+# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params;
+
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
+ PROV_DIGEST digest;
+ unsigned char *secret;
+ size_t secret_len;
+ int cek_nid;
+ unsigned char *ukm;
+ size_t ukm_len;
+ size_t dkm_len;
+} KDF_X942;
+
+/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
+static const struct {
+ int nid;
+ size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
+} kek_algs[] = {
+ { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
+ { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
+};
+
+/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
+static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
+{
+ int i, tag, xclass;
+ long tmplen;
+ const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+
+ i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
+ if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ q += tmplen;
+ *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
+ *plen -= q - *pp;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode the other info structure.
+ *
+ * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
+ *
+ * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
+ * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ *
+ * KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
+ * }
+ *
+ * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
+ * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
+ * suppPubInfo (in bits).
+ * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
+ * can be NULL.
+ * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
+ * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
+ * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
+ * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
+ * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
+ * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
+ */
+static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
+ unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
+ unsigned char **out_ctr)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
+ int ret = 0, encoded_len;
+ long tlen;
+ /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
+ static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
+ X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
+
+ /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
+ ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
+ ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (ksi == NULL
+ || alg_oid == NULL
+ || ctr_oct == NULL
+ || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
+ || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
+ goto err;
+ /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
+ alg_oid = NULL;
+ ctr_oct = NULL;
+
+ /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
+ if (ukm != NULL) {
+ ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (ukm_oct == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
+ }
+ /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
+ encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
+ if (encoded_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
+ p = encoded;
+ tlen = (long)encoded_len;
+ if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
+ *out_ctr = p;
+ *der = encoded;
+ *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+err:
+ if (ret != 1)
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
+ X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
+ const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
+ const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
+ unsigned char *ctr,
+ unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0, hlen;
+ size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
+ unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *out = derived_key;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
+
+ if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
+ if (hlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ out_len = (size_t)hlen;
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
+ goto end;
+
+ for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
+ /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
+ ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
+ ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
+ ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
+
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
+ goto end;
+ if (len >= out_len) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ out += out_len;
+ len -= out_len;
+ if (len == 0)
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ memcpy(out, mac, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+end:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void *x942kdf_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx;
+
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+
+ ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+
+ x942kdf_reset(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+ if (p->data_size == 0 || p->data == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(*out);
+ *out = NULL;
+ return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
+}
+
+static size_t x942kdf_size(KDF_X942 *ctx)
+{
+ int len;
+ const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+ const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *ctr;
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ size_t der_len = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->ukm != NULL && ctx->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
+ /*
+ * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
+ * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
+ */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (keylen != ctx->dkm_len) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* generate the otherinfo der */
+ if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->cek_nid, ctx->dkm_len,
+ ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len,
+ &der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+ der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx;
+ OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
+ || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+ if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM)) != NULL)
+ if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ukm, &ctx->ukm_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p->data);
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++)
+ if (kek_algs[i].nid == ctx->cek_nid)
+ goto cek_found;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+cek_found:
+ ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))x942kdf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+
+#include "internal/blake2.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+/*
+ * Forward declaration of everything implemented here. This is not strictly
+ * necessary for the compiler, but provides an assurance that the signatures
+ * of the functions in the dispatch table are correct.
+ */
+static OSSL_OP_mac_newctx_fn blake2_mac_new;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_dupctx_fn blake2_mac_dup;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_freectx_fn blake2_mac_free;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_gettable_ctx_params_fn blake2_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_get_ctx_params_fn blake2_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_settable_ctx_params_fn blake2_mac_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_set_ctx_params_fn blake2_mac_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_init_fn blake2_mac_init;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_update_fn blake2_mac_update;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_final_fn blake2_mac_final;
+
+struct blake2_mac_data_st {
+ BLAKE2_CTX ctx;
+ BLAKE2_PARAM params;
+ unsigned char key[BLAKE2_KEYBYTES];
+};
+
+static size_t blake2_mac_size(void *vmacctx);
+
+static void *blake2_mac_new(void *unused_provctx)
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*macctx));
+
+ if (macctx != NULL) {
+ BLAKE2_PARAM_INIT(&macctx->params);
+ /* ctx initialization is deferred to BLAKE2b_Init() */
+ }
+ return macctx;
+}
+
+static void *blake2_mac_dup(void *vsrc)
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *dst;
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *src = vsrc;
+
+ dst = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dst));
+ if (dst == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *dst = *src;
+ return dst;
+}
+
+static void blake2_mac_free(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
+
+ if (macctx != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(macctx->key, sizeof(macctx->key));
+ OPENSSL_free(macctx);
+ }
+}
+
+static int blake2_mac_init(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
+
+ /* Check key has been set */
+ if (macctx->params.key_length == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return BLAKE2_INIT_KEY(&macctx->ctx, &macctx->params, macctx->key);
+}
+
+static int blake2_mac_update(void *vmacctx,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
+
+ return BLAKE2_UPDATE(&macctx->ctx, data, datalen);
+}
+
+static int blake2_mac_final(void *vmacctx,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ size_t outsize)
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
+
+ return BLAKE2_FINAL(out, &macctx->ctx);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+static const OSSL_PARAM *blake2_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int blake2_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, blake2_mac_size(vmacctx));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+static const OSSL_PARAM *blake2_mac_settable_ctx_params()
+{
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ALL parameters should be set before init().
+ */
+static int blake2_mac_set_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+ size_t size;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &size)
+ || size < 1
+ || size > BLAKE2_OUTBYTES) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_DIGEST_LENGTH(&macctx->params, (uint8_t)size);
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
+ size_t len;
+ void *key_p = macctx->key;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &key_p, BLAKE2_KEYBYTES, &len)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Pad with zeroes at the end */
+ memset(macctx->key + len, 0, BLAKE2_KEYBYTES - len);
+
+ BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_KEY_LENGTH(&macctx->params, (uint8_t)len);
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM))
+ != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The OSSL_PARAM API doesn't provide direct pointer use, so we
+ * must handle the OSSL_PARAM structure ourselves here
+ */
+ if (p->data_size > BLAKE2_PERSONALBYTES) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CUSTOM_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_PERSONAL(&macctx->params, p->data, p->data_size);
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The OSSL_PARAM API doesn't provide direct pointer use, so we
+ * must handle the OSSL_PARAM structure ourselves here as well
+ */
+ if (p->data_size > BLAKE2_SALTBYTES) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_SALT(&macctx->params, p->data, p->data_size);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t blake2_mac_size(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ struct blake2_mac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
+
+ return macctx->params.digest_length;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH BLAKE2_FUNCTIONS[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_dup },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_INIT, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FINAL, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))blake2_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))blake2_get_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))blake2_mac_set_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Constants */
+#define BLAKE2_CTX BLAKE2B_CTX
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM BLAKE2B_PARAM
+#define BLAKE2_KEYBYTES BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES
+#define BLAKE2_OUTBYTES BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES
+#define BLAKE2_PERSONALBYTES BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES
+#define BLAKE2_SALTBYTES BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES
+
+/* Function names */
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_INIT blake2b_param_init
+#define BLAKE2_INIT_KEY blake2b_init_key
+#define BLAKE2_UPDATE blake2b_update
+#define BLAKE2_FINAL blake2b_final
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_DIGEST_LENGTH blake2b_param_set_digest_length
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_KEY_LENGTH blake2b_param_set_key_length
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_PERSONAL blake2b_param_set_personal
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_SALT blake2b_param_set_salt
+
+/* OSSL_DISPATCH symbol */
+#define BLAKE2_FUNCTIONS blake2bmac_functions
+
+#include "blake2_mac_impl.c"
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Constants */
+#define BLAKE2_CTX BLAKE2S_CTX
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM BLAKE2S_PARAM
+#define BLAKE2_KEYBYTES BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES
+#define BLAKE2_OUTBYTES BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES
+#define BLAKE2_PERSONALBYTES BLAKE2S_PERSONALBYTES
+#define BLAKE2_SALTBYTES BLAKE2S_SALTBYTES
+
+/* Function names */
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_INIT blake2s_param_init
+#define BLAKE2_INIT_KEY blake2s_init_key
+#define BLAKE2_UPDATE blake2s_update
+#define BLAKE2_FINAL blake2s_final
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_DIGEST_LENGTH blake2s_param_set_digest_length
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_KEY_LENGTH blake2s_param_set_key_length
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_PERSONAL blake2s_param_set_personal
+#define BLAKE2_PARAM_SET_SALT blake2s_param_set_salt
+
+/* OSSL_DISPATCH symbol */
+#define BLAKE2_FUNCTIONS blake2smac_functions
+
+#include "blake2_mac_impl.c"
$HMAC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$KMAC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$CMAC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$BLAKE2_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$SIPHASH_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$POLY1305_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
SOURCE[$GMAC_GOAL]=gmac_prov.c
SOURCE[$HMAC_GOAL]=hmac_prov.c
IF[{- !$disabled{cmac} -}]
SOURCE[$CMAC_GOAL]=cmac_prov.c
ENDIF
+
+$GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+
+IF[{- !$disabled{blake2} -}]
+ SOURCE[$BLAKE2_GOAL]=blake2b_mac.c blake2s_mac.c
+ENDIF
+
+IF[{- !$disabled{siphash} -}]
+ SOURCE[$SIPHASH_GOAL]=siphash_prov.c
+ENDIF
+
+IF[{- !$disabled{poly1305} -}]
+ SOURCE[$POLY1305_GOAL]=poly1305_prov.c
+ENDIF
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "crypto/poly1305.h"
+/*
+ * TODO(3.0) when poly1305 has moved entirely to our providers, this
+ * header should be moved to the provider include directory. For the
+ * moment, crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ameth.c has us stuck.
+ */
+#include "../../../crypto/poly1305/poly1305_local.h"
+
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+/*
+ * Forward declaration of everything implemented here. This is not strictly
+ * necessary for the compiler, but provides an assurance that the signatures
+ * of the functions in the dispatch table are correct.
+ */
+static OSSL_OP_mac_newctx_fn poly1305_new;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_dupctx_fn poly1305_dup;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_freectx_fn poly1305_free;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_gettable_params_fn poly1305_gettable_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_get_params_fn poly1305_get_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_settable_ctx_params_fn poly1305_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_set_ctx_params_fn poly1305_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_init_fn poly1305_init;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_update_fn poly1305_update;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_final_fn poly1305_final;
+
+struct poly1305_data_st {
+ void *provctx;
+ POLY1305 poly1305; /* Poly1305 data */
+};
+
+static size_t poly1305_size(void);
+
+static void *poly1305_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void poly1305_free(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(vmacctx);
+}
+
+static void *poly1305_dup(void *vsrc)
+{
+ struct poly1305_data_st *src = vsrc;
+ struct poly1305_data_st *dst = poly1305_new(src->provctx);
+
+ if (dst == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ dst->poly1305 = src->poly1305;
+ return dst;
+}
+
+static size_t poly1305_size(void)
+{
+ return POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE;
+}
+
+static int poly1305_init(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ /* initialize the context in MAC_ctrl function */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int poly1305_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
+
+ /* poly1305 has nothing to return in its update function */
+ Poly1305_Update(&ctx->poly1305, data, datalen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int poly1305_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ size_t outsize)
+{
+ struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
+
+ Poly1305_Final(&ctx->poly1305, out);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+static const OSSL_PARAM *poly1305_gettable_params(void)
+{
+ return known_gettable_params;
+}
+
+static int poly1305_get_params(OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, poly1305_size());
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+static const OSSL_PARAM *poly1305_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int poly1305_set_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ struct poly1305_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING
+ || p->data_size != POLY1305_KEY_SIZE) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ Poly1305_Init(&ctx->poly1305, p->data);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH poly1305_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))poly1305_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))poly1305_dup },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))poly1305_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_INIT, (void (*)(void))poly1305_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))poly1305_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FINAL, (void (*)(void))poly1305_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))poly1305_gettable_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GET_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))poly1305_get_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))poly1305_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))poly1305_set_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "crypto/siphash.h"
+/*
+ * TODO(3.0) when siphash has moved entirely to our providers, this
+ * header should be moved to the provider include directory. For the
+ * moment, crypto/siphash/siphash_ameth.c has us stuck.
+ */
+#include "../../../crypto/siphash/siphash_local.h"
+
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+/*
+ * Forward declaration of everything implemented here. This is not strictly
+ * necessary for the compiler, but provides an assurance that the signatures
+ * of the functions in the dispatch table are correct.
+ */
+static OSSL_OP_mac_newctx_fn siphash_new;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_dupctx_fn siphash_dup;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_freectx_fn siphash_free;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_gettable_ctx_params_fn siphash_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_get_ctx_params_fn siphash_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_settable_ctx_params_fn siphash_settable_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_set_ctx_params_fn siphash_set_params;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_size_fn siphash_size;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_init_fn siphash_init;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_update_fn siphash_update;
+static OSSL_OP_mac_final_fn siphash_final;
+
+struct siphash_data_st {
+ void *provctx;
+ SIPHASH siphash; /* Siphash data */
+};
+
+static void *siphash_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ struct siphash_data_st *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void siphash_free(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(vmacctx);
+}
+
+static void *siphash_dup(void *vsrc)
+{
+ struct siphash_data_st *ssrc = vsrc;
+ struct siphash_data_st *sdst = siphash_new(ssrc->provctx);
+
+ if (sdst == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ sdst->siphash = ssrc->siphash;
+ return sdst;
+}
+
+static size_t siphash_size(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
+
+ return SipHash_hash_size(&ctx->siphash);
+}
+
+static int siphash_init(void *vmacctx)
+{
+ /* Not much to do here, actual initialization happens through controls */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int siphash_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
+
+ SipHash_Update(&ctx->siphash, data, datalen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int siphash_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ size_t outsize)
+{
+ struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
+ size_t hlen = siphash_size(ctx);
+
+ if (outsize < hlen)
+ return 0;
+
+ *outl = hlen;
+ return SipHash_Final(&ctx->siphash, out, hlen);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+static const OSSL_PARAM *siphash_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int siphash_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, siphash_size(vmacctx));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+static const OSSL_PARAM *siphash_settable_params(void)
+{
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int siphash_set_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ struct siphash_data_st *ctx = vmacctx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+ size_t size;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &size)
+ || !SipHash_set_hash_size(&ctx->siphash, size))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING
+ || p->data_size != SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE
+ || !SipHash_Init(&ctx->siphash, p->data, 0, 0))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH siphash_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))siphash_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))siphash_dup },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))siphash_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_INIT, (void (*)(void))siphash_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))siphash_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FINAL, (void (*)(void))siphash_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))siphash_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))siphash_get_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))siphash_settable_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))siphash_set_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff