-SUBDIRS=digests ciphers macs exchange keymgmt
+SUBDIRS=digests ciphers macs kdfs exchange keymgmt
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
provider_err.c provlib.c
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH camellia128ctr_functions[];
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
-/* MACs */
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2bmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2smac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH cmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH gmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH hmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac128_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac256_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH siphash_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH poly1305_functions[];
-
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH tdes_ede3_ecb_functions[];
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH tdes_ede3_cbc_functions[];
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH tdes_wrap_cbc_functions[];
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+/* MACs */
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2bmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2smac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH cmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH gmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH hmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac128_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac256_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH siphash_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH poly1305_functions[];
+
+/* KDFs / PRFs */
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_pbkdf2_functions[];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_scrypt_functions[];
+#endif
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_tls1_prf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sskdf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x963_kdf_functions[];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[];
+#endif
+
+
/* Key management */
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH dh_keymgmt_functions[];
-$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c
+$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c
LIBS=../../../libcrypto
-SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=$COMMON sshkdf.c x942kdf.c
+SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=$COMMON
INCLUDE[../../../libcrypto]=. ../../../crypto
IF[{- !$disabled{fips} -}]
/*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
-static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_hkdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_hkdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_hkdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_hkdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
+
static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
int mode;
- const EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
unsigned char *key;
size_t key_len;
unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
size_t info_len;
-};
+} KDF_HKDF;
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_hkdf_new(void)
+static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+ KDF_HKDF *ctx;
- if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return impl;
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ else
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
}
-static void kdf_hkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_hkdf_free(void *vctx)
{
- kdf_hkdf_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
+ KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
-static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+ kdf_hkdf_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
-static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
{
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->md = md;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE:
- impl->mode = va_arg(args, int);
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- impl->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (impl->salt == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->salt_len = len;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
- impl->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (impl->key == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->key_len = len;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_HKDF_INFO:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
- impl->info_len = 0;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if (len > (HKDF_MAXBUF - impl->info_len))
- return 0;
+ KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
- memcpy(impl->info + impl->info_len, p, len);
- impl->info_len += len;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
-static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (strcmp(type, "mode") == 0) {
- int mode;
-
- if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0)
- mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
- else if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0)
- mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
- else if (strcmp(value, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0)
- mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
- else
- return 0;
-
- return call_ctrl(kdf_hkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE, mode);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
- value);
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
{
int sz;
- if (impl->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
+ if (ctx->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
return SIZE_MAX;
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- sz = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
+ sz = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
return sz;
}
-static int kdf_hkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
+static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- if (impl->key == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
+ if (ctx->key == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
return 0;
}
- switch (impl->mode) {
+ switch (ctx->mode) {
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
- return HKDF(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
- impl->key_len, impl->info, impl->info_len, key,
+ return HKDF(ctx->md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
+ ctx->key_len, ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key,
keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
- return HKDF_Extract(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
- impl->key_len, key, keylen);
+ return HKDF_Extract(ctx->md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
+ ctx->key_len, key, keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
- return HKDF_Expand(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len, impl->info,
- impl->info_len, key, keylen);
+ return HKDF_Expand(ctx->md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len, ctx->info,
+ ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
default:
return 0;
}
}
-const EVP_KDF hkdf_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_HKDF,
- kdf_hkdf_new,
- kdf_hkdf_free,
- kdf_hkdf_reset,
- kdf_hkdf_ctrl,
- kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str,
- kdf_hkdf_size,
- kdf_hkdf_derive
+static int kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_HKDF *ctx = vctx;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ int n;
+ const char *properties = NULL;
+
+ /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ properties = p->data;
+ }
+ /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+ properties);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = md;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0) {
+ ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0) {
+ ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0) {
+ ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
+ } else {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &n)) {
+ if (n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND
+ && n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY
+ && n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->mode = n;
+ } else {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+ ctx->key = NULL;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->key, 0,
+ &ctx->key_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_size != 0 && p->data != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+ ctx->salt = NULL;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->salt, 0,
+ &ctx->salt_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* The info fields concatenate, so process them all */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
+ ctx->info_len = 0;
+ for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
+ OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) {
+ const void *q = ctx->info + ctx->info_len;
+ size_t sz = 0;
+
+ if (p->data_size != 0
+ && p->data != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
+ HKDF_MAXBUF - ctx->info_len,
+ &sz))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->info_len += sz;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, kdf_hkdf_size(ctx));
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
};
/*
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
return 0;
}
/* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
/* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS 112
# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 0
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_pbkdf2_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_pbkdf2_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params;
+
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+ const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
unsigned char *pass;
size_t pass_len;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
- int iter;
- const EVP_MD *md;
+ uint64_t iter;
+ EVP_MD *md;
int lower_bound_checks;
-};
+} KDF_PBKDF2;
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx);
+
+static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provctx)
{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+ KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx;
- impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
- if (impl == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
- return impl;
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
+ return ctx;
}
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(void *vctx)
{
- kdf_pbkdf2_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
+ KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
+
+ kdf_pbkdf2_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(void *vctx)
{
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
- kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
+ KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
}
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
{
- impl->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
- impl->md = EVP_sha1();
- impl->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
+ ctx->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
+ ctx->md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), SN_sha1,
+ NULL);
+ ctx->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
}
static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
- const unsigned char *new_buffer,
- size_t new_buflen)
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
{
- if (new_buffer == NULL)
- return 1;
-
OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
+ if (p->data_size == 0) {
+ if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (p->data != NULL) {
+ *buffer = NULL;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen)
+{
+ KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
- if (new_buflen > 0) {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
- } else {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
+ return 0;
}
- if (*buffer == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
return 0;
}
- *buflen = new_buflen;
- return 1;
+ return pbkdf2_derive((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len,
+ ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->iter,
+ ctx->md, key, keylen, ctx->lower_bound_checks);
}
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
- int iter, pkcs5, min_iter;
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE:
- pkcs5 = va_arg(args, int);
- impl->lower_bound_checks = (pkcs5 == 0) ? 1 : 0;
- return 1;
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 && len < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = vctx;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ int pkcs5;
+ uint64_t iter, min_iter;
+ const char *properties = NULL;
+
+ /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
return 0;
- }
- return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER:
- iter = va_arg(args, int);
- min_iter = impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
- if (iter < min_iter) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+ properties = p->data;
+ }
+ /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
return 0;
- }
- impl->iter = iter;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+ properties);
if (md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
-
- impl->md = md;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = md;
}
-}
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (value == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5)) != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pkcs5))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
}
- if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
+ if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
+ return 0;
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
+ if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
+ && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len,p))
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER)) != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &iter))
+ return 0;
+ min_iter = ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
+ if (iter < min_iter) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->iter = iter;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
- if (strcmp(type, "iter") == 0)
- return call_ctrl(kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER,
- atoi(value));
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
- if (strcmp(type, "pkcs5") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE, value);
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
return -2;
}
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(void)
{
- if (impl->pass == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (impl->salt == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return pbkdf2_derive((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len,
- impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->iter,
- impl->md, key, keylen, impl->lower_bound_checks);
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
-const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_PBKDF2,
- kdf_pbkdf2_new,
- kdf_pbkdf2_free,
- kdf_pbkdf2_reset,
- kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
- kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str,
- NULL,
- kdf_pbkdf2_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_pbkdf2_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
};
/*
* - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
*/
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+ const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
- int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
+ int cplen, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
+ uint64_t j;
unsigned long i = 1;
HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
* results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
*/
if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (lower_bound_checks) {
- if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
- return 0;
- }
- if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
+ if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
- }
- if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
- return 0;
- }
+ }
+ if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result);
-static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
- uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
- unsigned char *pass;
- size_t pass_len;
- unsigned char *salt;
- size_t salt_len;
- uint64_t N;
- uint32_t r, p;
- uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
-};
-
-/* Custom uint64_t parser since we do not have strtoull */
-static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
-{
- uint64_t value = 0;
-
- while (*nptr) {
- unsigned int digit;
- uint64_t new_value;
-
- if ((*nptr < '0') || (*nptr > '9')) {
- return 0;
- }
- digit = (unsigned int)(*nptr - '0');
- new_value = (value * 10) + digit;
- if ((new_value < digit) || ((new_value - digit) / 10 != value)) {
- /* Overflow */
- return 0;
- }
- value = new_value;
- nptr++;
- }
- *result = value;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_scrypt_new(void)
-{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
- impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
- if (impl == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
- return impl;
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- kdf_scrypt_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
- kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
- * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
- * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
- */
- impl->N = 1 << 20;
- impl->r = 8;
- impl->p = 1;
- impl->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
-}
-
-static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
- const unsigned char *new_buffer,
- size_t new_buflen)
-{
- if (new_buffer == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
-
- if (new_buflen > 0) {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
- } else {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
- }
- if (*buffer == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- *buflen = new_buflen;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
-{
- return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
- uint64_t u64_value;
- uint32_t value;
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N:
- u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
- if ((u64_value <= 1) || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
- return 0;
-
- impl->N = u64_value;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R:
- value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
- if (value < 1)
- return 0;
-
- impl->r = value;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P:
- value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
- if (value < 1)
- return 0;
-
- impl->p = value;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES:
- u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
- if (u64_value < 1)
- return 0;
-
- impl->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
- const char *value)
-{
- int int_value = atoi(value);
-
- if (int_value < 0 || (uint64_t)int_value > UINT32_MAX) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, (uint32_t)int_value);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
- const char *value)
-{
- uint64_t u64_value;
-
- if (!atou64(value, &u64_value)) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, u64_value);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (value == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "N") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "r") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "p") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "maxmem_bytes") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES,
- value);
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
-{
- if (impl->pass == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (impl->salt == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return scrypt_alg((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len, impl->salt,
- impl->salt_len, impl->N, impl->r, impl->p,
- impl->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen);
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF scrypt_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_SCRYPT,
- kdf_scrypt_new,
- kdf_scrypt_free,
- kdf_scrypt_reset,
- kdf_scrypt_ctrl,
- kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str,
- NULL,
- kdf_scrypt_derive
-};
-
-#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
-static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
-{
- int i;
- uint32_t x[16];
-
- memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
- for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
- x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
- x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
- x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
- x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
- x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
- x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
- x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
- x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
- x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
- x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
- x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
- x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
- x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
- x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
- x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
- x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
- x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
- x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
- x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
- x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
- x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
- x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
- x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
- x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
- x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
- x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
- x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
- x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
- x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
- x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
- x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
- x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
- inout[i] += x[i];
- OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
-}
-
-static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
-{
- uint64_t i, j;
- uint32_t X[16], *pB;
-
- memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
- pB = B;
- for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
- X[j] ^= *pB++;
- salsa208_word_specification(X);
- memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
- }
- OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
-}
-
-static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
- uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
-{
- unsigned char *pB;
- uint32_t *pV;
- uint64_t i, k;
-
- /* Convert from little endian input */
- for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
- *pV = *pB++;
- *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
- *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
- *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
- }
-
- for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
- scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
-
- scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
-
- for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
- uint32_t j;
- j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
- pV = V + 32 * r * j;
- for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
- T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
- scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
- }
- /* Convert output to little endian */
- for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
- uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
- *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
- *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
- *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
- *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
- }
-}
-
-#ifndef SIZE_MAX
-# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
- * most (all?) platforms.
- */
-
-#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
-
-/*
- * Maximum value of p * r:
- * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
- * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
- * p * r <= (2^30-1)
- */
-
-#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
-
-static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
- uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
-{
- int rv = 0;
- unsigned char *B;
- uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
- uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
-
- /* Sanity check parameters */
- /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
- if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
- return 0;
- /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
- if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
- * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
- */
-
- if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
- if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
-
- /*
- * B size in section 5 step 1.S
- * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
- * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
- */
- Blen = p * 128 * r;
- /*
- * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
- * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
- */
- if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
- * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
- */
- i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
- if (N + 2 > i / r) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
- Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
-
- /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
- if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
- if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
- maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
-
- if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
- if (key == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
- if (B == NULL) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
- T = X + 32 * r;
- V = T + 32 * r;
- if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
- (int)Blen, B) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
- scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
-
- if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
- keylen, key) == 0)
- goto err;
- rv = 1;
- err:
- if (rv == 0)
- EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
- return rv;
-}
-
-#endif
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2018-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
- const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
- char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- unsigned char *key; /* K */
- size_t key_len;
- unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
- size_t xcghash_len;
- char type; /* X */
- unsigned char *session_id;
- size_t session_id_len;
-};
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_sshkdf_new(void)
-{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
- if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return impl;
-}
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- kdf_sshkdf_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->xcghash, impl->xcghash_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->session_id, impl->session_id_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
- va_list args)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
-
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
- *dst = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (*dst == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- *dst_len = len;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
- int t;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- impl->md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
- if (impl->md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
- return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->key,
- &impl->key_len, args);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH:
- return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->xcghash,
- &impl->xcghash_len, args);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID:
- return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->session_id,
- &impl->session_id_len, args);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE:
- t = va_arg(args, int);
- if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- impl->type = (char)t;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
-
- }
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (value == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
- /* alias, for historical reasons */
- if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "xcghash") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexxcghash") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "session_id") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsession_id") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "type") == 0) {
- if (strlen(value) != 1) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return call_ctrl(kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE,
- (int)value[0]);
- }
-
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE);
- return -2;
-}
-
-static size_t kdf_sshkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- return SIZE_MAX;
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
-{
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->key == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->xcghash == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->session_id == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->type == 0) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_TYPE);
- return 0;
- }
- return SSHKDF(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len,
- impl->xcghash, impl->xcghash_len,
- impl->session_id, impl->session_id_len,
- impl->type, key, keylen);
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF sshkdf_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_SSHKDF,
- kdf_sshkdf_new,
- kdf_sshkdf_free,
- kdf_sshkdf_reset,
- kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
- kdf_sshkdf_ctrl_str,
- kdf_sshkdf_size,
- kdf_sshkdf_derive,
-};
-
-static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
- const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
- char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
- unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int dsize = 0;
- size_t cursize = 0;
- int ret = 0;
-
- md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
- goto out;
-
- if (okey_len < dsize) {
- memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
- ret = 1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
-
- for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
- goto out;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
- goto out;
-
- if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
- memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
- ret = 1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-out:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- return ret;
-}
-
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
EVP_MAC *mac; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
- const EVP_MD *md; /* H(x) = hash OR when H(x) = HMAC_hash */
+ EVP_MD *md; /* H(x) = hash OR when H(x) = HMAC_hash */
unsigned char *secret;
size_t secret_len;
unsigned char *info;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
-};
+} KDF_SSKDF;
#define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
#define SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (168 - 4)
/* KMAC uses a Customisation string of 'KDF' */
static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x963kdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn sskdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn sskdf_get_ctx_params;
+
/*
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x)
return ret;
}
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *sskdf_new(void)
+static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx;
- if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return impl;
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
}
-static void sskdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->info, impl->info_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->salt, impl->salt_len);
- EVP_MAC_free(impl->mac);
-#if 0 /* TODO(3.0) When we switch to fetched MDs */
- EVP_MD_meth_free(impl->md);
-#endif
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-}
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
-static void sskdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- sskdf_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
+ EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
-static int sskdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
+static void sskdf_free(void *vctx)
{
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
-
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
- return 1;
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
- OPENSSL_free(*out);
- *out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (*out == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- *out_len = len;
- return 1;
+ sskdf_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
-static int sskdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static int sskdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
{
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
- return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO:
- return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->info, &impl->info_len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
-#if 0 /* TODO(3.0) When we switch to fetched MDs */
- EVP_MD_meth_free(impl->md);
-#endif
- impl->md = md;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC:
- {
- const char *name;
- EVP_MAC *mac;
-
- name = va_arg(args, const char *);
- if (name == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- EVP_MAC_free(impl->mac);
- impl->mac = NULL;
-
- /*
- * TODO(3.0) add support for OPENSSL_CTX and properties in KDFs
- */
- mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, name, NULL);
- if (mac == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->mac = mac;
- return 1;
- }
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
- return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->salt, &impl->salt_len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE:
- impl->out_len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-static int sskdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "mac") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
-
- if (strcmp(type, "maclen") == 0) {
- int val = atoi(value);
- if (val < 0) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return call_ctrl(sskdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE,
- (size_t)val);
- }
- return -2;
+ OPENSSL_free(*out);
+ *out = NULL;
+ return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
}
-static size_t sskdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static size_t sskdf_size(KDF_SSKDF *ctx)
{
int len;
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
+ len = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
}
-static int sskdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
- if (impl->secret == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
- if (impl->mac != NULL) {
+ if (ctx->mac != NULL) {
/* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
int ret;
const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
* Why does KMAC require a salt length that's shorter than the MD
* block size?
*/
- macname = EVP_MAC_name(impl->mac);
+ macname = EVP_MAC_name(ctx->mac);
if (strcmp(macname, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC) == 0) {
/* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- default_salt_len = EVP_MD_block_size(impl->md);
+ default_salt_len = EVP_MD_block_size(ctx->md);
if (default_salt_len <= 0)
return 0;
} else if (strcmp(macname, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128) == 0
else
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
} else {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* If no salt is set then use a default_salt of zeros */
- if (impl->salt == NULL || impl->salt_len <= 0) {
- impl->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
- if (impl->salt == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ctx->salt == NULL || ctx->salt_len <= 0) {
+ ctx->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
+ if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- impl->salt_len = default_salt_len;
+ ctx->salt_len = default_salt_len;
}
- ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(impl->mac, impl->md,
- custom, custom_len, impl->out_len,
- impl->salt, impl->salt_len,
- impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
- impl->info, impl->info_len, key, keylen);
+ ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(ctx->mac, ctx->md,
+ custom, custom_len, ctx->out_len,
+ ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
+ ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+ ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
return ret;
} else {
/* H(x) = hash */
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
- impl->info, impl->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
+ return SSKDF_hash_kdm(ctx->md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+ ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
}
}
-static int x963kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
- if (impl->secret == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
- if (impl->mac != NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ if (ctx->mac != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
} else {
/* H(x) = hash */
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return SSKDF_hash_kdm(ctx->md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+ ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
+ }
+}
+
+static int sskdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx = vctx;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MAC *mac;
+ size_t sz;
+ const char *properties = NULL;
+
+ /* Grab search properties, should be before the digest and mac lookups */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ properties = p->data;
+ }
+ /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+ properties);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
- impl->info, impl->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = md;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC)) != NULL) {
+ EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+ ctx->mac = NULL;
+
+ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+ properties);
+ if (mac == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+ ctx->mac = mac;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
+ || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+ if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL)
+ if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->info, &ctx->info_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
+ if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz) || sz == 0)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->out_len = sz;
}
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
-const EVP_KDF ss_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_SS,
- sskdf_new,
- sskdf_free,
- sskdf_reset,
- sskdf_ctrl,
- sskdf_ctrl_str,
- sskdf_size,
- sskdf_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))sskdf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
};
-const EVP_KDF x963_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_X963,
- sskdf_new,
- sskdf_free,
- sskdf_reset,
- sskdf_ctrl,
- sskdf_ctrl_str,
- sskdf_size,
- x963kdf_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
};
/*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_tls1_prf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_prf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params;
+
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *sha1,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
/* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
/* Digest to use for PRF */
- const EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ /* Second digest for the MD5/SHA-1 combined PRF */
+ EVP_MD *sha1;
/* Secret value to use for PRF */
unsigned char *sec;
size_t seclen;
/* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
size_t seedlen;
-};
+} TLS1_PRF;
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void)
+static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+ TLS1_PRF *ctx;
- if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return impl;
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
}
-static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
{
- kdf_tls1_prf_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
+ TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+
+ kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha1);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
-static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+ TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
-static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen)
{
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
+ TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
- impl->md = md;
- return 1;
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->sec == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->seedlen == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SEED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->md, ctx->sha1, ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
+ ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
+ key, keylen);
+}
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
- impl->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (impl->sec == NULL)
+static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
+ EVP_MD *md, *sha = NULL;
+ const char *properties = NULL, *name;
+
+ /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
return 0;
-
- impl->seclen = len;
- return 1;
-
- /* TODO: This is only ever called from pkey_kdf and only as part of setting the TLS secret
- consider merging the twe two?? */
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_TLS_SEED:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
- impl->seedlen = 0;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if (len > (TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - impl->seedlen))
+ properties = p->data;
+ }
+ /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
return 0;
+ name = p->data;
+ if (strcasecmp(name, SN_md5_sha1) == 0) {
+ sha = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), SN_sha1,
+ properties);
+ if (sha == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ name = SN_md5;
+ }
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), name,
+ properties);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(sha);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha1);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = md;
+ ctx->sha1 = sha;
+ }
- memcpy(impl->seed + impl->seedlen, p, len);
- impl->seedlen += len;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+ ctx->sec = NULL;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->sec, 0, &ctx->seclen))
+ return 0;
}
+ /* The seed fields concatenate, so process them all */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
+ ctx->seedlen = 0;
+
+ for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
+ OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) {
+ const void *q = ctx->seed + ctx->seedlen;
+ size_t sz = 0;
+
+ if (p->data_size != 0
+ && p->data != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
+ TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - ctx->seedlen,
+ &sz))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->seedlen += sz;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
}
-static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
- const char *type, const char *value)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(void)
{
- if (value == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
- value);
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
- if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
- value);
+static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
return -2;
}
-static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
{
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->sec == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->seedlen == 0) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SEED);
- return 0;
- }
- return tls1_prf_alg(impl->md, impl->sec, impl->seclen,
- impl->seed, impl->seedlen,
- key, keylen);
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
-const EVP_KDF tls1_prf_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF,
- kdf_tls1_prf_new,
- kdf_tls1_prf_free,
- kdf_tls1_prf_reset,
- kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
- kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str,
- NULL,
- kdf_tls1_prf_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_tls1_prf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
};
/*
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
*/
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *sha1,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
- if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if (sha1 != NULL) {
/* TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 */
size_t i;
unsigned char *tmp;
size_t L_S1 = (slen + 1) / 2;
size_t L_S2 = L_S1;
- if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, L_S1,
+ if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, L_S1,
seed, seed_len, out, olen))
return 0;
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
+ if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(sha1, sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
return 0;
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <stdarg.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-# include <openssl/cms.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-# include <openssl/x509.h>
-# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-# include "internal/evp_int.h"
-# include "kdf_local.h"
-
-# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- unsigned char *secret;
- size_t secret_len;
- int cek_nid;
- unsigned char *ukm;
- size_t ukm_len;
- size_t dkm_len;
-};
-
-/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
-static const struct {
- int nid;
- size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
-} kek_algs[] = {
- { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
- { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
-};
-
-/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
-static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
-{
- int i, tag, xclass;
- long tmplen;
- const unsigned char *q = *pp;
-
- i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
- if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
- return 0;
- if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
- q += tmplen;
- *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
- *plen -= q - *pp;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Encode the other info structure.
- *
- * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
- *
- * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
- * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
- * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
- * }
- *
- * KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
- * }
- *
- * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
- * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
- * suppPubInfo (in bits).
- * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
- * can be NULL.
- * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
- * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
- * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
- * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
- * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
- *
- * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
- * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
- */
-static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
- unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
- unsigned char **out_ctr)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
- int ret = 0, encoded_len;
- long tlen;
- /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
- static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
- X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
- ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
-
- /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
- ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
- alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
- ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (ksi == NULL
- || alg_oid == NULL
- || ctr_oct == NULL
- || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
- || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
- goto err;
- /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
- alg_oid = NULL;
- ctr_oct = NULL;
-
- /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
- if (ukm != NULL) {
- ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (ukm_oct == NULL)
- goto err;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
- }
- /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
- encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
- if (encoded_len <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
- p = encoded;
- tlen = (long)encoded_len;
- if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
- && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
- *out_ctr = p;
- *der = encoded;
- *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
- ret = 1;
- }
-err:
- if (ret != 1)
- OPENSSL_free(encoded);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
- X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
- const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
- const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
- unsigned char *ctr,
- unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
-{
- int ret = 0, hlen;
- size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
- unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *out = derived_key;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
-
- if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
- || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
- || derived_key_len == 0) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_HASH_KDM, KDF_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
- if (hlen <= 0)
- return 0;
- out_len = (size_t)hlen;
-
- ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
- goto end;
-
- for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
- /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
- ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
- ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
- ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
- ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
-
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
- goto end;
- if (len >= out_len) {
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
- goto end;
- out += out_len;
- len -= out_len;
- if (len == 0)
- break;
- } else {
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
- goto end;
- memcpy(out, mac, len);
- break;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
-end:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
- return ret;
-}
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *x942kdf_new(void)
-{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
- if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return impl;
-}
-
-static void x942kdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-}
-
-static void x942kdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- x942kdf_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
-
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_free(*out);
- *out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (*out == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- *out_len = len;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
- const EVP_MD *md;
- char *alg_str = NULL;
- size_t i;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->md = md;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
- return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM:
- return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->ukm, &impl->ukm_len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG:
- alg_str = va_arg(args, char *);
- if (alg_str == NULL)
- return 0;
- impl->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(alg_str);
- for (i = 0; i < (size_t)OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); ++i) {
- if (kek_algs[i].nid == impl->cek_nid) {
- impl->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_CTRL, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
- return 0;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "ukm") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexukm") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "cekalg") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG,
- value);
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-static size_t x942kdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- int len;
-
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
- return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- unsigned char *ctr;
- unsigned char *der = NULL;
- size_t der_len = 0;
-
- if (impl->secret == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->ukm != NULL && impl->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
- /*
- * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
- * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
- */
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_INAVLID_UKM_LEN);
- return 0;
- }
- if (keylen != impl->dkm_len) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
- return 0;
- }
- /* generate the otherinfo der */
- if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(impl->cek_nid, impl->dkm_len,
- impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len,
- &der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_BAD_ENCODING);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
- der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return ret;
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF x942_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_X942,
- x942kdf_new,
- x942kdf_free,
- x942kdf_reset,
- x942kdf_ctrl,
- x942kdf_ctrl_str,
- x942kdf_size,
- x942kdf_derive
-};
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
SUBDIRS=digests macs ciphers
+SUBDIRS=digests kdfs macs ciphers
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
defltprov.c
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
+static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_kdfs[] = {
+ { "HKDF", "default=yes", kdf_hkdf_functions },
+ { "SSKDF", "default=yes", kdf_sskdf_functions },
+ { "PBKDF2", "default=yes", kdf_pbkdf2_functions },
+ { "SSHKDF", "default=yes", kdf_sshkdf_functions },
+ { "X963KDF", "default=yes", kdf_x963_kdf_functions },
+ { "TLS1-PRF", "default=yes", kdf_tls1_prf_functions },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+ { "X942KDF", "default=yes", kdf_x942_kdf_functions },
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+ { "id-scrypt", "default=yes", kdf_scrypt_functions },
+#endif
+ { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_keyexch[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
{ "dhKeyAgreement", "default=yes", dh_keyexch_functions },
return deflt_ciphers;
case OSSL_OP_MAC:
return deflt_macs;
+ case OSSL_OP_KDF:
+ return deflt_kdfs;
case OSSL_OP_KEYMGMT:
return deflt_keymgmt;
case OSSL_OP_KEYEXCH:
--- /dev/null
+LIBS=../../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=scrypt.c sshkdf.c x942kdf.c
+INCLUDE[../../../libcrypto]=. ../../../crypto
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_scrypt_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_scrypt_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_scrypt_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_scrypt_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params;
+
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256);
+
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
+ unsigned char *pass;
+ size_t pass_len;
+ unsigned char *salt;
+ size_t salt_len;
+ uint64_t N;
+ uint64_t r, p;
+ uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
+ EVP_MD *sha256;
+} KDF_SCRYPT;
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx);
+
+static void *kdf_scrypt_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx;
+
+ ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ ctx->sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx),
+ "sha256", NULL);
+ if (ctx->sha256 == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA256);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_free(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+ kdf_scrypt_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha256);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx)
+{
+ /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
+ * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
+ * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
+ */
+ ctx->N = 1 << 20;
+ ctx->r = 8;
+ ctx->p = 1;
+ ctx->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
+}
+
+static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
+ if (p->data_size == 0) {
+ if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (p->data != NULL) {
+ *buffer = NULL;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen)
+{
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return scrypt_alg((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len, ctx->salt,
+ ctx->salt_len, ctx->N, ctx->r, ctx->p,
+ ctx->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen, ctx->sha256);
+}
+
+static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
+{
+ return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = vctx;
+ uint64_t u64_value;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
+ if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
+ if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value)
+ || u64_value <= 1
+ || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->N = u64_value;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->r = u64_value;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->p = u64_value;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_scrypt_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
+static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t x[16];
+
+ memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
+ for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
+ x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
+ x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
+ x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
+ x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
+ x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
+ x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
+ x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
+ x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
+ x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
+ x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
+ x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
+ x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
+ x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
+ x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
+ x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
+ x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
+ x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
+ x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
+ x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
+ x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
+ x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
+ x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
+ x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
+ x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
+ x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
+ x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
+ x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
+ x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
+ x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
+ x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
+ x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
+ x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+ inout[i] += x[i];
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
+}
+
+static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
+{
+ uint64_t i, j;
+ uint32_t X[16], *pB;
+
+ memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
+ pB = B;
+ for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+ X[j] ^= *pB++;
+ salsa208_word_specification(X);
+ memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
+}
+
+static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
+ uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
+{
+ unsigned char *pB;
+ uint32_t *pV;
+ uint64_t i, k;
+
+ /* Convert from little endian input */
+ for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
+ *pV = *pB++;
+ *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
+ *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
+ *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
+ scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
+
+ scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
+ uint32_t j;
+ j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
+ pV = V + 32 * r * j;
+ for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
+ T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
+ scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
+ }
+ /* Convert output to little endian */
+ for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
+ uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
+ *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
+ * most (all?) platforms.
+ */
+
+#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum value of p * r:
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
+ * p * r <= (2^30-1)
+ */
+
+#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
+
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *B;
+ uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
+ uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
+
+ /* Sanity check parameters */
+ /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
+ if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
+ return 0;
+ /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
+ if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
+ * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
+ */
+
+ if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
+ if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
+
+ /*
+ * B size in section 5 step 1.S
+ * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
+ * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
+ */
+ Blen = p * 128 * r;
+ /*
+ * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
+ * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
+ */
+ if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
+ * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
+ */
+ i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ if (N + 2 > i / r) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+ /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
+ if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
+ if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
+ maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
+
+ if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
+ T = X + 32 * r;
+ V = T + 32 * r;
+ if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, sha256,
+ (int)Blen, B) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
+ scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
+
+ if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, sha256,
+ keylen, key) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (rv == 0)
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_sshkdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_sshkdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_sshkdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_sshkdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params;
+
+static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
+ const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
+ char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
+
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char *key; /* K */
+ size_t key_len;
+ unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
+ size_t xcghash_len;
+ char type; /* X */
+ unsigned char *session_id;
+ size_t session_id_len;
+} KDF_SSHKDF;
+
+static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx;
+
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void kdf_sshkdf_free(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+ kdf_sshkdf_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+static int sshkdf_set_membuf(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
+ *dst = NULL;
+ return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)dst, 0, dst_len);
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen)
+{
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->key == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->xcghash == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->session_id == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->type == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return SSHKDF(ctx->md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
+ ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
+ ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
+ ctx->type, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ int t;
+ const char *properties = NULL;
+
+ /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ properties = p->data;
+ }
+ /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+ properties);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = md;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+ if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->key, &ctx->key_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH))
+ != NULL)
+ if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->xcghash, &ctx->xcghash_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID))
+ != NULL)
+ if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->session_id, &ctx->session_id_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
+ return 0;
+ t = *(unsigned char *)p->data;
+ if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_VALUE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->type = (char)t;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
+ const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
+ char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dsize = 0;
+ size_t cursize = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (okey_len < dsize) {
+ memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
+
+ for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
+ memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+out:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <stdarg.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "internal/numbers.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+# include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+# include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params;
+
+typedef struct {
+ void *provctx;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char *secret;
+ size_t secret_len;
+ int cek_nid;
+ unsigned char *ukm;
+ size_t ukm_len;
+ size_t dkm_len;
+} KDF_X942;
+
+/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
+static const struct {
+ int nid;
+ size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
+} kek_algs[] = {
+ { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
+ { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
+};
+
+/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
+static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
+{
+ int i, tag, xclass;
+ long tmplen;
+ const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+
+ i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
+ if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ q += tmplen;
+ *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
+ *plen -= q - *pp;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode the other info structure.
+ *
+ * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
+ *
+ * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
+ * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ *
+ * KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
+ * }
+ *
+ * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
+ * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
+ * suppPubInfo (in bits).
+ * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
+ * can be NULL.
+ * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
+ * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
+ * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
+ * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
+ * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
+ * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
+ */
+static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
+ unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
+ unsigned char **out_ctr)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
+ int ret = 0, encoded_len;
+ long tlen;
+ /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
+ static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
+ X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
+
+ /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
+ ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
+ ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (ksi == NULL
+ || alg_oid == NULL
+ || ctr_oct == NULL
+ || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
+ || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
+ goto err;
+ /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
+ alg_oid = NULL;
+ ctr_oct = NULL;
+
+ /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
+ if (ukm != NULL) {
+ ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (ukm_oct == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
+ }
+ /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
+ encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
+ if (encoded_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
+ p = encoded;
+ tlen = (long)encoded_len;
+ if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
+ *out_ctr = p;
+ *der = encoded;
+ *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+err:
+ if (ret != 1)
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
+ X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
+ const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
+ const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
+ unsigned char *ctr,
+ unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0, hlen;
+ size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
+ unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *out = derived_key;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
+
+ if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
+ if (hlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ out_len = (size_t)hlen;
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
+ goto end;
+
+ for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
+ /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
+ ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
+ ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
+ ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
+
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
+ goto end;
+ if (len >= out_len) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ out += out_len;
+ len -= out_len;
+ if (len == 0)
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ memcpy(out, mac, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+end:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void *x942kdf_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx;
+
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+
+ x942kdf_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+ if (p->data_size == 0 || p->data == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(*out);
+ *out = NULL;
+ return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
+}
+
+static size_t x942kdf_size(KDF_X942 *ctx)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
+ return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *ctr;
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ size_t der_len = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->ukm != NULL && ctx->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
+ /*
+ * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
+ * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
+ */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (keylen != ctx->dkm_len) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* generate the otherinfo der */
+ if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->cek_nid, ctx->dkm_len,
+ ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len,
+ &der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(ctx->md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+ der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ const char *properties = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ properties = p->data;
+ }
+ /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+ properties);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = md;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
+ || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+ if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM)) != NULL)
+ if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ukm, &ctx->ukm_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG)) != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p->data);
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++)
+ if (kek_algs[i].nid == ctx->cek_nid)
+ goto cek_found;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+cek_found:
+ ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))x942kdf_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void(*)(void))x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_get_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
/* TODO(3.0): Needed for dummy_evp_call(). To be removed */
#include <openssl/sha.h>
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_MD *sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA256", NULL);
+ EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "pbkdf2", NULL);
char msg[] = "Hello World!";
const unsigned char exptd[] = {
0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
EC_KEY *key = NULL;
#endif
- if (ctx == NULL || sha256 == NULL || drbg == NULL)
+ if (ctx == NULL || sha256 == NULL || drbg == NULL || kdf == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, sha256, NULL))
BN_CTX_end(bnctx);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MD_free(sha256);
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
+static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_kdfs[] = {
+ { "HKDF", "fips=yes", kdf_hkdf_functions },
+ { "SSKDF", "fips=yes", kdf_sskdf_functions },
+ { "PBKDF2", "fips=yes", kdf_pbkdf2_functions },
+ { "TLS1-PRF", "fips=yes", kdf_tls1_prf_functions },
+ { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
static const OSSL_ALGORITHM *fips_query(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
int operation_id,
int *no_cache)
return fips_ciphers;
case OSSL_OP_MAC:
return fips_macs;
+ case OSSL_OP_KDF:
+ return fips_kdfs;
}
return NULL;
}
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff