Add KDFs to providers
authorPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Wed, 21 Aug 2019 03:09:10 +0000 (13:09 +1000)
committerPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Fri, 6 Sep 2019 09:27:57 +0000 (19:27 +1000)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)

17 files changed:
providers/common/build.info
providers/common/include/internal/provider_algs.h
providers/common/kdfs/build.info
providers/common/kdfs/hkdf.c
providers/common/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
providers/common/kdfs/scrypt.c [deleted file]
providers/common/kdfs/sshkdf.c [deleted file]
providers/common/kdfs/sskdf.c
providers/common/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
providers/common/kdfs/x942kdf.c [deleted file]
providers/default/build.info
providers/default/defltprov.c
providers/default/kdfs/build.info [new file with mode: 0644]
providers/default/kdfs/scrypt.c [new file with mode: 0644]
providers/default/kdfs/sshkdf.c [new file with mode: 0644]
providers/default/kdfs/x942kdf.c [new file with mode: 0644]
providers/fips/fipsprov.c

index 4c977d3f256c8c2753ce94faa56c43b420103bce..4d87b15e8dbcbd94075224d5b3308748230e1771 100644 (file)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-SUBDIRS=digests ciphers macs exchange keymgmt
+SUBDIRS=digests ciphers macs kdfs exchange keymgmt
 
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
         provider_err.c provlib.c
index e66c0523e7d7ef1bb1f777036933000a1bbe334c..b9d257649f5a45c393a71d876f0e8fae5ee1c357 100644 (file)
@@ -115,17 +115,6 @@ extern const OSSL_DISPATCH camellia192ctr_functions[];
 extern const OSSL_DISPATCH camellia128ctr_functions[];
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
 
-/* MACs */
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2bmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2smac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH cmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH gmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH hmac_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac128_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac256_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH siphash_functions[];
-extern const OSSL_DISPATCH poly1305_functions[];
-
 extern const OSSL_DISPATCH tdes_ede3_ecb_functions[];
 extern const OSSL_DISPATCH tdes_ede3_cbc_functions[];
 
@@ -144,6 +133,32 @@ extern const OSSL_DISPATCH tdes_desx_cbc_functions[];
 extern const OSSL_DISPATCH tdes_wrap_cbc_functions[];
 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */
 
+/* MACs */
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2bmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH blake2smac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH cmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH gmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH hmac_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac128_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kmac256_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH siphash_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH poly1305_functions[];
+
+/* KDFs / PRFs */
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_pbkdf2_functions[];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_scrypt_functions[];
+#endif
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_tls1_prf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sskdf_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x963_kdf_functions[];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[];
+#endif
+
+
 /* Key management */
 extern const OSSL_DISPATCH dh_keymgmt_functions[];
 
index 422cf7471ec69591c11f123e97405a9996244de8..a881fa00b9046e536f60a439967840af6d3ce04e 100644 (file)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c
+$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c
 
 LIBS=../../../libcrypto
-SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=$COMMON sshkdf.c x942kdf.c
+SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=$COMMON
 INCLUDE[../../../libcrypto]=. ../../../crypto
 
 IF[{- !$disabled{fips} -}]
index 33c74da86ad601623d79927459c68358711a502a..f5d0295ae3db4728073305149640c48f507143e6 100644 (file)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
 
 #define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
 
-static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_hkdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_hkdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_hkdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_hkdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
+
 static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
                 const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
                 const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
@@ -35,209 +47,236 @@ static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
                        const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
                        unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
 
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+    void *provctx;
     int mode;
-    const EVP_MD *md;
+    EVP_MD *md;
     unsigned char *salt;
     size_t salt_len;
     unsigned char *key;
     size_t key_len;
     unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
     size_t info_len;
-};
+} KDF_HKDF;
 
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_hkdf_new(void)
+static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
 {
-    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+    KDF_HKDF *ctx;
 
-    if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return impl;
+    if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    else
+        ctx->provctx = provctx;
+    return ctx;
 }
 
-static void kdf_hkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_hkdf_free(void *vctx)
 {
-    kdf_hkdf_reset(impl);
-    OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
+    KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
 
-static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
-    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+    kdf_hkdf_reset(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
-static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
 {
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t len;
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
-        md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
-        if (md == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->md = md;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE:
-        impl->mode = va_arg(args, int);
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
-            return 1;
-
-        OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
-        impl->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
-        if (impl->salt == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->salt_len = len;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
-        impl->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
-        if (impl->key == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->key_len  = len;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_HKDF_INFO:
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
-        impl->info_len = 0;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
-            return 1;
-
-        if (len > (HKDF_MAXBUF - impl->info_len))
-            return 0;
+    KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
 
-        memcpy(impl->info + impl->info_len, p, len);
-        impl->info_len += len;
-        return 1;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
-    }
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 }
 
-static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
-                             const char *value)
-{
-    if (strcmp(type, "mode") == 0) {
-        int mode;
-
-        if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0)
-            mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
-        else if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0)
-            mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
-        else if (strcmp(value, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0)
-            mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
-        else
-            return 0;
-
-        return call_ctrl(kdf_hkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE, mode);
-    }
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
-        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
-                            value);
-
-    return -2;
-}
-
-static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
 {
     int sz;
 
-    if (impl->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
+    if (ctx->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
         return SIZE_MAX;
 
-    if (impl->md == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
         return 0;
     }
-    sz = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
+    sz = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
     if (sz < 0)
         return 0;
 
     return sz;
 }
 
-static int kdf_hkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
-                           size_t keylen)
+static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
 {
-    if (impl->md == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+    KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
+
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (impl->key == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
+    if (ctx->key == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
         return 0;
     }
 
-    switch (impl->mode) {
+    switch (ctx->mode) {
     case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
-        return HKDF(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
-                    impl->key_len, impl->info, impl->info_len, key,
+        return HKDF(ctx->md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
+                    ctx->key_len, ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key,
                     keylen);
 
     case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
-        return HKDF_Extract(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
-                            impl->key_len, key, keylen);
+        return HKDF_Extract(ctx->md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
+                            ctx->key_len, key, keylen);
 
     case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
-        return HKDF_Expand(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len, impl->info,
-                           impl->info_len, key, keylen);
+        return HKDF_Expand(ctx->md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len, ctx->info,
+                           ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
 
     default:
         return 0;
     }
 }
 
-const EVP_KDF hkdf_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_HKDF,
-    kdf_hkdf_new,
-    kdf_hkdf_free,
-    kdf_hkdf_reset,
-    kdf_hkdf_ctrl,
-    kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str,
-    kdf_hkdf_size,
-    kdf_hkdf_derive
+static int kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    KDF_HKDF *ctx = vctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    int n;
+    const char *properties = NULL;
+
+    /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        properties = p->data;
+    }
+    /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+                          properties);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+        ctx->md = md;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+            if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0) {
+                ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
+            } else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0) {
+                ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
+            } else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0) {
+                ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
+            } else {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else if (OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &n)) {
+            if (n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND
+                && n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY
+                && n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY) {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            ctx->mode = n;
+        } else {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+        ctx->key = NULL;
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->key, 0,
+                                         &ctx->key_len))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_size != 0 && p->data != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+            ctx->salt = NULL;
+            if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->salt, 0,
+                                             &ctx->salt_len))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* The info fields concatenate, so process them all */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
+        ctx->info_len = 0;
+        for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
+                                                      OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) {
+            const void *q = ctx->info + ctx->info_len;
+            size_t sz = 0;
+
+            if (p->data_size != 0
+                && p->data != NULL
+                && !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
+                                                HKDF_MAXBUF - ctx->info_len,
+                                                &sz))
+                return 0;
+            ctx->info_len += sz;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
+    OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, kdf_hkdf_size(ctx));
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
 };
 
 /*
@@ -325,7 +364,7 @@ static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
     if (sz < 0)
         return 0;
     if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
         return 0;
     }
     /* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
index d41689773c9bb40c9ab447d6537d6df907ad0aca..e0b4550d6271a5bb394166fdbe2bfdd61d0dc7f7 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
 
 /* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
 #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS  112
 # define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 0
 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */
 
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_pbkdf2_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_pbkdf2_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params;
+
 static int  pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
-                          const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                          const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
                           const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
                           size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
 
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+    void *provctx;
     unsigned char *pass;
     size_t pass_len;
     unsigned char *salt;
     size_t salt_len;
-    int iter;
-    const EVP_MD *md;
+    uint64_t iter;
+    EVP_MD *md;
     int lower_bound_checks;
-};
+} KDF_PBKDF2;
 
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx);
+
+static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provctx)
 {
-    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx;
 
-    impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
-    if (impl == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
     }
-    kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
-    return impl;
+    ctx->provctx = provctx;
+    kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
+    return ctx;
 }
 
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(void *vctx)
 {
-    kdf_pbkdf2_reset(impl);
-    OPENSSL_free(impl);
+    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
+
+    kdf_pbkdf2_reset(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(void *vctx)
 {
-    OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
-    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-    kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
+    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+    kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
 }
 
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
 {
-    impl->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
-    impl->md = EVP_sha1();
-    impl->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
+    ctx->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
+    ctx->md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), SN_sha1,
+                           NULL);
+    ctx->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
 }
 
 static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
-                             const unsigned char *new_buffer,
-                             size_t new_buflen)
+                             const OSSL_PARAM *p)
 {
-    if (new_buffer == NULL)
-        return 1;
-
     OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
+    if (p->data_size == 0) {
+        if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (p->data != NULL) {
+        *buffer = NULL;
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+                             size_t keylen)
+{
+    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
 
-    if (new_buflen > 0) {
-        *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
-    } else {
-        *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+    if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
+        return 0;
     }
-    if (*buffer == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+    if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
         return 0;
     }
 
-    *buflen = new_buflen;
-    return 1;
+    return pbkdf2_derive((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len,
+                         ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->iter,
+                         ctx->md, key, keylen, ctx->lower_bound_checks);
 }
 
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
-    int iter, pkcs5, min_iter;
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t len;
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE:
-        pkcs5 = va_arg(args, int);
-        impl->lower_bound_checks = (pkcs5 == 0) ? 1 : 0;
-        return 1;
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        if (impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 && len < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = vctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    int pkcs5;
+    uint64_t iter, min_iter;
+    const char *properties = NULL;
+
+    /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
             return 0;
-        }
-        return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER:
-        iter = va_arg(args, int);
-        min_iter = impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
-        if (iter < min_iter) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+        properties = p->data;
+    }
+    /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
             return 0;
-        }
-        impl->iter = iter;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
-        md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
+        md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+                          properties);
         if (md == NULL) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
             return 0;
         }
-
-        impl->md = md;
-        return 1;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+        ctx->md = md;
     }
-}
 
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
-                               const char *value)
-{
-    if (value == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
-        return 0;
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5)) != NULL) {
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pkcs5))
+            return 0;
+        ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
     }
 
-    if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
-                            value);
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
+        if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
+            return 0;
 
-    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
-                            value);
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
+        if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
+            && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len,p))
+            return 0;
+    }
 
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
-                            value);
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER)) != NULL) {
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &iter))
+            return 0;
+        min_iter = ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
+        if (iter < min_iter) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->iter = iter;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
 
-    if (strcmp(type, "iter") == 0)
-        return call_ctrl(kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER,
-                         atoi(value));
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
 
-    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
-        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    OSSL_PARAM *p;
 
-    if (strcmp(type, "pkcs5") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE, value);
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
     return -2;
 }
 
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
-                             size_t keylen)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(void)
 {
-    if (impl->pass == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (impl->salt == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return pbkdf2_derive((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len,
-                         impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->iter,
-                         impl->md, key, keylen, impl->lower_bound_checks);
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 }
 
-const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_PBKDF2,
-    kdf_pbkdf2_new,
-    kdf_pbkdf2_free,
-    kdf_pbkdf2_reset,
-    kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
-    kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str,
-    NULL,
-    kdf_pbkdf2_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_pbkdf2_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
 };
 
 /*
@@ -234,13 +259,14 @@ const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
  *  - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
  */
 static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
-                         const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                         const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
                          const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
                          size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
 {
     int ret = 0;
     unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
-    int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
+    int cplen, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
+    uint64_t j;
     unsigned long i = 1;
     HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
 
@@ -253,23 +279,23 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
      * results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
      */
     if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
         return 0;
     }
 
     if (lower_bound_checks) {
-         if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
-             KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
-             return 0;
-         }
-         if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
-             KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
+        if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
             return 0;
-         }
-         if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
-             KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
-             return 0;
-         }
+        }
+        if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+            return 0;
+        }
     }
 
     hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/scrypt.c b/providers/common/kdfs/scrypt.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 29ceeb3..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result);
-static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
-                      const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
-                      uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
-                      unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
-    unsigned char *pass;
-    size_t pass_len;
-    unsigned char *salt;
-    size_t salt_len;
-    uint64_t N;
-    uint32_t r, p;
-    uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
-};
-
-/* Custom uint64_t parser since we do not have strtoull */
-static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
-{
-    uint64_t value = 0;
-
-    while (*nptr) {
-        unsigned int digit;
-        uint64_t new_value;
-
-        if ((*nptr < '0') || (*nptr > '9')) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-        digit = (unsigned int)(*nptr - '0');
-        new_value = (value * 10) + digit;
-        if ((new_value < digit) || ((new_value - digit) / 10 != value)) {
-            /* Overflow */
-            return 0;
-        }
-        value = new_value;
-        nptr++;
-    }
-    *result = value;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_scrypt_new(void)
-{
-    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
-    impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
-    if (impl == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
-    return impl;
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    kdf_scrypt_reset(impl);
-    OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
-    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-    kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
-     * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
-     * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
-     */
-    impl->N = 1 << 20;
-    impl->r = 8;
-    impl->p = 1;
-    impl->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
-}
-
-static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
-                             const unsigned char *new_buffer,
-                             size_t new_buflen)
-{
-    if (new_buffer == NULL)
-        return 1;
-
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
-
-    if (new_buflen > 0) {
-        *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
-    } else {
-        *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
-    }
-    if (*buffer == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    *buflen = new_buflen;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
-{
-    return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
-    uint64_t u64_value;
-    uint32_t value;
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t len;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N:
-        u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
-        if ((u64_value <= 1) || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->N = u64_value;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R:
-        value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
-        if (value < 1)
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->r = value;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P:
-        value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
-        if (value < 1)
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->p = value;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES:
-        u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
-        if (u64_value < 1)
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
-        return 1;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
-    }
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
-                                  const char *value)
-{
-    int int_value = atoi(value);
-
-    if (int_value < 0 || (uint64_t)int_value > UINT32_MAX) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, (uint32_t)int_value);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
-                                  const char *value)
-{
-    uint64_t u64_value;
-
-    if (!atou64(value, &u64_value)) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, u64_value);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
-                               const char *value)
-{
-    if (value == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "N") == 0)
-        return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "r") == 0)
-        return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "p") == 0)
-        return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "maxmem_bytes") == 0)
-        return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES,
-                                      value);
-
-    return -2;
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
-                             size_t keylen)
-{
-    if (impl->pass == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (impl->salt == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return scrypt_alg((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len, impl->salt,
-                      impl->salt_len, impl->N, impl->r, impl->p,
-                      impl->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen);
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF scrypt_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_SCRYPT,
-    kdf_scrypt_new,
-    kdf_scrypt_free,
-    kdf_scrypt_reset,
-    kdf_scrypt_ctrl,
-    kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str,
-    NULL,
-    kdf_scrypt_derive
-};
-
-#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
-static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
-{
-    int i;
-    uint32_t x[16];
-
-    memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
-    for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
-        x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
-        x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
-        x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
-        x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
-        x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
-        x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
-        x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
-        x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
-        x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
-        x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
-        x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
-        x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
-        x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
-        x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
-        x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
-        x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
-        x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
-        x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
-        x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
-        x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
-        x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
-        x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
-        x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
-        x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
-        x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
-        x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
-        x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
-        x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
-        x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
-        x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
-        x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
-        x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
-        inout[i] += x[i];
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
-}
-
-static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
-{
-    uint64_t i, j;
-    uint32_t X[16], *pB;
-
-    memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
-    pB = B;
-    for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
-        for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
-            X[j] ^= *pB++;
-        salsa208_word_specification(X);
-        memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
-    }
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
-}
-
-static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
-                        uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
-{
-    unsigned char *pB;
-    uint32_t *pV;
-    uint64_t i, k;
-
-    /* Convert from little endian input */
-    for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
-        *pV = *pB++;
-        *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
-        *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
-        *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
-        scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
-
-    scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
-
-    for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
-        uint32_t j;
-        j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
-        pV = V + 32 * r * j;
-        for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
-            T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
-        scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
-    }
-    /* Convert output to little endian */
-    for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
-        uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
-        *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
-        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
-        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
-        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
-    }
-}
-
-#ifndef SIZE_MAX
-# define SIZE_MAX    ((size_t)-1)
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
- * most (all?) platforms.
- */
-
-#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX         (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
-
-/*
- * Maximum value of p * r:
- * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
- * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
- * p * r <= (2^30-1)
- */
-
-#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX   ((1 << 30) - 1)
-
-static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
-                      const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
-                      uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
-                      unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
-{
-    int rv = 0;
-    unsigned char *B;
-    uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
-    uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
-
-    /* Sanity check parameters */
-    /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
-    if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
-        return 0;
-    /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
-    if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
-     * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
-     */
-
-    if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
-        if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
-            EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
-
-    /*
-     * B size in section 5 step 1.S
-     * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
-     * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
-     */
-    Blen = p * 128 * r;
-    /*
-     * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
-     * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
-     */
-    if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
-     * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
-     */
-    i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
-    if (N + 2 > i / r) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
-
-    /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
-    if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
-    if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
-        maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
-
-    if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
-    if (key == NULL)
-        return 1;
-
-    B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
-    if (B == NULL) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
-    T = X + 32 * r;
-    V = T + 32 * r;
-    if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
-                          (int)Blen, B) == 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
-        scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
-
-    if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
-                          keylen, key) == 0)
-        goto err;
-    rv = 1;
- err:
-    if (rv == 0)
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
-
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
-    return rv;
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/sshkdf.c b/providers/common/kdfs/sshkdf.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 4701c9c..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2018-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
-                  const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
-                  const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
-                  const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
-                  char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-    unsigned char *key; /* K */
-    size_t key_len;
-    unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
-    size_t xcghash_len;
-    char type; /* X */
-    unsigned char *session_id;
-    size_t session_id_len;
-};
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_sshkdf_new(void)
-{
-    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
-    if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return impl;
-}
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    kdf_sshkdf_reset(impl);
-    OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->xcghash, impl->xcghash_len);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->session_id, impl->session_id_len);
-    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
-                                       va_list args)
-{
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t len;
-
-    p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-    len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
-    *dst = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
-    if (*dst == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
-    *dst_len = len;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
-    int t;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
-        impl->md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
-        if (impl->md == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
-        return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->key,
-                                           &impl->key_len, args);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH:
-        return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->xcghash,
-                                           &impl->xcghash_len, args);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID:
-        return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->session_id,
-                                           &impl->session_id_len, args);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE:
-        t = va_arg(args, int);
-        if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        impl->type = (char)t;
-        return 1;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
-
-    }
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
-                               const char *value)
-{
-    if (value == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
-        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-    /* alias, for historical reasons */
-    if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0)
-        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "xcghash") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexxcghash") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "session_id") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsession_id") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "type") == 0) {
-        if (strlen(value) != 1) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        return call_ctrl(kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE,
-                         (int)value[0]);
-    }
-
-    KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE);
-    return -2;
-}
-
-static size_t kdf_sshkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    return SIZE_MAX;
-}
-
-static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
-                             size_t keylen)
-{
-    if (impl->md == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->key == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->xcghash == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->session_id == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->type == 0) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_TYPE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return SSHKDF(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len,
-                  impl->xcghash, impl->xcghash_len,
-                  impl->session_id, impl->session_id_len,
-                  impl->type, key, keylen);
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF sshkdf_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_SSHKDF,
-    kdf_sshkdf_new,
-    kdf_sshkdf_free,
-    kdf_sshkdf_reset,
-    kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
-    kdf_sshkdf_ctrl_str,
-    kdf_sshkdf_size,
-    kdf_sshkdf_derive,
-};
-
-static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
-                  const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
-                  const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
-                  const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
-                  char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
-{
-    EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
-    unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    unsigned int dsize = 0;
-    size_t cursize = 0;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    if (md == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
-        goto out;
-
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
-        goto out;
-
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
-        goto out;
-
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
-        goto out;
-
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
-        goto out;
-
-    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
-        goto out;
-
-    if (okey_len < dsize) {
-        memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
-        ret = 1;
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
-
-    for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
-
-        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
-            goto out;
-
-        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
-            goto out;
-
-        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
-            goto out;
-
-        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
-            goto out;
-
-        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
-            goto out;
-
-        if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
-            memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
-            ret = 1;
-            goto out;
-        }
-
-        memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
-    }
-
-    ret = 1;
-
-out:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-    return ret;
-}
-
index b20eff2865fbb2dbdb8c0ab82ec697304b2e0a10..61e4607bee88512c5dd4ab15adb24c55fe9b0c15 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/params.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
 
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+    void *provctx;
     EVP_MAC *mac;       /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
-    const EVP_MD *md;   /* H(x) = hash OR when H(x) = HMAC_hash */
+    EVP_MD *md;         /* H(x) = hash OR when H(x) = HMAC_hash */
     unsigned char *secret;
     size_t secret_len;
     unsigned char *info;
@@ -56,7 +60,7 @@ struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
     unsigned char *salt;
     size_t salt_len;
     size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
-};
+} KDF_SSKDF;
 
 #define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
 #define SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (168 - 4)
@@ -65,6 +69,16 @@ struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
 /* KMAC uses a Customisation string of 'KDF' */
 static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
 
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x963kdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn sskdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn sskdf_get_ctx_params;
+
 /*
  * Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
  * Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x)
@@ -287,172 +301,69 @@ end:
     return ret;
 }
 
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *sskdf_new(void)
+static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
 {
-    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+    KDF_SSKDF *ctx;
 
-    if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return impl;
+    if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ctx->provctx = provctx;
+    return ctx;
 }
 
-static void sskdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
 {
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->info, impl->info_len);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->salt, impl->salt_len);
-    EVP_MAC_free(impl->mac);
-#if 0                    /* TODO(3.0) When we switch to fetched MDs */
-    EVP_MD_meth_free(impl->md);
-#endif
-    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-}
+    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
 
-static void sskdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    sskdf_reset(impl);
-    OPENSSL_free(impl);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
+    EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 }
 
-static int sskdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
+static void sskdf_free(void *vctx)
 {
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t len;
-
-    p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-    len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-    if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
-        return 1;
+    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
 
-    OPENSSL_free(*out);
-    *out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
-    if (*out == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
-    *out_len = len;
-    return 1;
+    sskdf_reset(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+    EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
-static int sskdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static int sskdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
+                            const OSSL_PARAM *p)
 {
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
-        return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO:
-        return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->info, &impl->info_len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
-        md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
-        if (md == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-#if 0                    /* TODO(3.0) When we switch to fetched MDs */
-        EVP_MD_meth_free(impl->md);
-#endif
-        impl->md = md;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC:
-        {
-            const char *name;
-            EVP_MAC *mac;
-
-            name = va_arg(args, const char *);
-            if (name == NULL)
-                return 0;
-
-            EVP_MAC_free(impl->mac);
-            impl->mac = NULL;
-
-            /*
-             * TODO(3.0) add support for OPENSSL_CTX and properties in KDFs
-             */
-            mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, name, NULL);
-            if (mac == NULL)
-                return 0;
-
-            impl->mac = mac;
-            return 1;
-        }
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
-        return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->salt, &impl->salt_len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE:
-        impl->out_len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+    if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
         return 1;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
-    }
-}
-
-static int sskdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
-                          const char *value)
-{
-    if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
-         return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-                             value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
-        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "mac") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "maclen") == 0) {
-        int val = atoi(value);
-        if (val < 0) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        return call_ctrl(sskdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE,
-                         (size_t)val);
-    }
-    return -2;
+    OPENSSL_free(*out);
+    *out = NULL;
+    return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
 }
 
-static size_t sskdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static size_t sskdf_size(KDF_SSKDF *ctx)
 {
     int len;
 
-    if (impl->md == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
         return 0;
     }
-    len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
+    len = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
     return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
 }
 
-static int sskdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
 {
-    if (impl->secret == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+
+    if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (impl->mac != NULL) {
+    if (ctx->mac != NULL) {
         /* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
         int ret;
         const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
@@ -465,14 +376,14 @@ static int sskdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
          * Why does KMAC require a salt length that's shorter than the MD
          * block size?
          */
-        macname = EVP_MAC_name(impl->mac);
+        macname = EVP_MAC_name(ctx->mac);
         if (strcmp(macname, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC) == 0) {
             /* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */
-            if (impl->md == NULL) {
-                KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+            if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
                 return 0;
             }
-            default_salt_len = EVP_MD_block_size(impl->md);
+            default_salt_len = EVP_MD_block_size(ctx->md);
             if (default_salt_len <= 0)
                 return 0;
         } else if (strcmp(macname, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128) == 0
@@ -485,74 +396,181 @@ static int sskdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
             else
                 default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
         } else {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
             return 0;
         }
         /* If no salt is set then use a default_salt of zeros */
-        if (impl->salt == NULL || impl->salt_len <= 0) {
-            impl->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
-            if (impl->salt == NULL) {
-                KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        if (ctx->salt == NULL || ctx->salt_len <= 0) {
+            ctx->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
+            if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 return 0;
             }
-            impl->salt_len = default_salt_len;
+            ctx->salt_len = default_salt_len;
         }
-        ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(impl->mac, impl->md,
-                            custom, custom_len, impl->out_len,
-                            impl->salt, impl->salt_len,
-                            impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
-                            impl->info, impl->info_len, key, keylen);
+        ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(ctx->mac, ctx->md,
+                            custom, custom_len, ctx->out_len,
+                            ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
+                            ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                            ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
         return ret;
     } else {
         /* H(x) = hash */
-        if (impl->md == NULL) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
             return 0;
         }
-        return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
-                              impl->info, impl->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
+        return SSKDF_hash_kdm(ctx->md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                              ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
     }
 }
 
-static int x963kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
 {
-    if (impl->secret == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+
+    if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (impl->mac != NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    if (ctx->mac != NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
         return 0;
     } else {
         /* H(x) = hash */
-        if (impl->md == NULL) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return SSKDF_hash_kdm(ctx->md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                              ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
+    }
+}
+
+static int sskdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = vctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    EVP_MAC *mac;
+    size_t sz;
+    const char *properties = NULL;
+
+    /* Grab search properties, should be before the digest and mac lookups */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        properties = p->data;
+    }
+    /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+                          properties);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
             return 0;
         }
-        return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
-                              impl->info, impl->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+        ctx->md = md;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC)) != NULL) {
+        EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+        ctx->mac = NULL;
+
+        mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+                            properties);
+        if (mac == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+        ctx->mac = mac;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
+        || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+        if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL)
+        if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->info, &ctx->info_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
+        if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz) || sz == 0)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->out_len = sz;
     }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+    OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 }
 
-const EVP_KDF ss_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_SS,
-    sskdf_new,
-    sskdf_free,
-    sskdf_reset,
-    sskdf_ctrl,
-    sskdf_ctrl_str,
-    sskdf_size,
-    sskdf_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))sskdf_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
 };
 
-const EVP_KDF x963_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_X963,
-    sskdf_new,
-    sskdf_free,
-    sskdf_reset,
-    sskdf_ctrl,
-    sskdf_ctrl_str,
-    sskdf_size,
-    x963kdf_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
 };
index 3c553e8900a874ab8f0b0297cb81daf07524327f..5d7e599e64e0030fa1a22a25411805806f4fe6cb 100644 (file)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/params.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_tls1_prf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_prf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params;
+
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *sha1,
                         const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
                         const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
                         unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
@@ -65,149 +75,184 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
 #define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
 
 /* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+typedef struct {
+    void *provctx;
     /* Digest to use for PRF */
-    const EVP_MD *md;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    /* Second digest for the MD5/SHA-1 combined PRF */
+    EVP_MD *sha1;
     /* Secret value to use for PRF */
     unsigned char *sec;
     size_t seclen;
     /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
     unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
     size_t seedlen;
-};
+} TLS1_PRF;
 
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void)
+static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
 {
-    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+    TLS1_PRF *ctx;
 
-    if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return impl;
+    if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ctx->provctx = provctx;
+    return ctx;
 }
 
-static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
 {
-    kdf_tls1_prf_reset(impl);
-    OPENSSL_free(impl);
+    TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+
+    kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha1);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
-static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
 {
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
-    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+    TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 }
 
-static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+                               size_t keylen)
 {
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t len;
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
-        md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
-        if (md == NULL)
-            return 0;
+    TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
 
-        impl->md = md;
-        return 1;
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->sec == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->seedlen == 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SEED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->md, ctx->sha1, ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
+                        ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
+                        key, keylen);
+}
 
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
-        impl->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
-        if (impl->sec == NULL)
+static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
+    EVP_MD *md, *sha = NULL;
+    const char *properties = NULL, *name;
+
+    /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
             return 0;
-
-        impl->seclen = len;
-        return 1;
-
-    /* TODO: This is only ever called from pkey_kdf and only as part of setting the TLS secret
-    consider merging the twe two?? */
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_TLS_SEED:
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
-        impl->seedlen = 0;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED:
-        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-        if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
-            return 1;
-
-        if (len > (TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - impl->seedlen))
+        properties = p->data;
+    }
+    /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
             return 0;
+        name = p->data;
+        if (strcasecmp(name, SN_md5_sha1) == 0) {
+            sha = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), SN_sha1,
+                               properties);
+            if (sha == NULL) {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA1);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            name = SN_md5;
+        }
+        md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), name,
+                          properties);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(sha);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha1);
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+        ctx->md = md;
+        ctx->sha1 = sha;
+    }
 
-        memcpy(impl->seed + impl->seedlen, p, len);
-        impl->seedlen += len;
-        return 1;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+        ctx->sec = NULL;
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->sec, 0, &ctx->seclen))
+            return 0;
     }
+    /* The seed fields concatenate, so process them all */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
+        ctx->seedlen = 0;
+
+        for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
+                                                      OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) {
+            const void *q = ctx->seed + ctx->seedlen;
+            size_t sz = 0;
+
+            if (p->data_size != 0
+                && p->data != NULL
+                && !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
+                                                TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - ctx->seedlen,
+                                                &sz))
+                return 0;
+            ctx->seedlen += sz;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
 
-static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
-                                 const char *type, const char *value)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(void)
 {
-    if (value == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
-        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
-                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
-                            value);
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
 
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
-                            value);
+static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    OSSL_PARAM *p;
 
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
     return -2;
 }
 
-static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
-                               size_t keylen)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
 {
-    if (impl->md == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->sec == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->seedlen == 0) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SEED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return tls1_prf_alg(impl->md, impl->sec, impl->seclen,
-                        impl->seed, impl->seedlen,
-                        key, keylen);
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 }
 
-const EVP_KDF tls1_prf_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF,
-    kdf_tls1_prf_new,
-    kdf_tls1_prf_free,
-    kdf_tls1_prf_reset,
-    kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
-    kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str,
-    NULL,
-    kdf_tls1_prf_derive
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_tls1_prf_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
 };
 
 /*
@@ -337,12 +382,12 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
  *
  *   PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
  */
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *sha1,
                         const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
                         const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
                         unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
 {
-    if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
+    if (sha1 != NULL) {
         /* TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 */
         size_t i;
         unsigned char *tmp;
@@ -350,15 +395,15 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
         size_t L_S1 = (slen + 1) / 2;
         size_t L_S2 = L_S1;
 
-        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, L_S1,
+        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, L_S1,
                              seed, seed_len, out, olen))
             return 0;
 
         if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             return 0;
         }
-        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
+        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(sha1, sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
                              seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
             OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
             return 0;
diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/common/kdfs/x942kdf.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index ce9ad61..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,407 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <stdarg.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-# include <openssl/cms.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-# include <openssl/x509.h>
-# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-# include "internal/evp_int.h"
-# include "kdf_local.h"
-
-# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-    unsigned char *secret;
-    size_t secret_len;
-    int cek_nid;
-    unsigned char *ukm;
-    size_t ukm_len;
-    size_t dkm_len;
-};
-
-/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
-static const struct {
-    int nid;
-    size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
-} kek_algs[] = {
-    { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
-    { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
-    { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
-    { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
-    { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
-    { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
-    { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
-    { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
-};
-
-/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
-static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
-{
-    int i, tag, xclass;
-    long tmplen;
-    const unsigned char *q = *pp;
-
-    i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
-    if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
-        return 0;
-    if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
-        q += tmplen;
-    *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
-    *plen -= q - *pp;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Encode the other info structure.
- *
- *  RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
- *
- *  OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- *      keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
- *      partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
- *      suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
- *  }
- *
- *  KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- *      algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- *      counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
- *  }
- *
- * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
- * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
- * suppPubInfo (in bits).
- * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
- * can be NULL.
- * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
- * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
- * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
- * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
- * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
- *
- * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
- * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
- */
-static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
-                                 const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
-                                 unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
-                                 unsigned char **out_ctr)
-{
-    unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
-    int ret = 0, encoded_len;
-    long tlen;
-    /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
-    static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
-    X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
-    ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
-
-    /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
-    ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
-    alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
-    ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
-    if (ksi == NULL
-        || alg_oid == NULL
-        || ctr_oct == NULL
-        || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
-        || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
-        goto err;
-    /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
-    alg_oid = NULL;
-    ctr_oct = NULL;
-
-    /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
-    if (ukm != NULL) {
-        ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
-        if (ukm_oct == NULL)
-            goto err;
-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
-    }
-    /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
-    encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
-    if (encoded_len <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
-    p = encoded;
-    tlen = (long)encoded_len;
-    if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
-        && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
-        && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
-        && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
-        && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
-        *out_ctr = p;
-        *der = encoded;
-        *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
-        ret = 1;
-    }
-err:
-    if (ret != 1)
-        OPENSSL_free(encoded);
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
-    ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
-    X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
-                            const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
-                            const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
-                            unsigned char *ctr,
-                            unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
-{
-    int ret = 0, hlen;
-    size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
-    unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    unsigned char *out = derived_key;
-    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
-
-    if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
-            || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
-            || derived_key_len == 0) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_HASH_KDM, KDF_R_BAD_LENGTH);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
-    if (hlen <= 0)
-        return 0;
-    out_len = (size_t)hlen;
-
-    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-    ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-    if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
-        goto end;
-
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
-        goto end;
-
-    for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
-        /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
-        ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
-        ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
-        ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
-        ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
-
-        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
-            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
-            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
-            goto end;
-        if (len >= out_len) {
-            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
-                goto end;
-            out += out_len;
-            len -= out_len;
-            if (len == 0)
-                break;
-        } else {
-            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
-                goto end;
-            memcpy(out, mac, len);
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    ret = 1;
-end:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *x942kdf_new(void)
-{
-    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
-    if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return impl;
-}
-
-static void x942kdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len);
-    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-}
-
-static void x942kdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    x942kdf_reset(impl);
-    OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
-{
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t len;
-
-    p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
-    len = va_arg(args, size_t);
-    if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
-        return 1;
-
-    OPENSSL_free(*out);
-    *out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
-    if (*out == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
-    *out_len = len;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-    char *alg_str = NULL;
-    size_t i;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
-        md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
-        if (md == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-        impl->md = md;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
-        return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM:
-        return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->ukm, &impl->ukm_len);
-
-    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG:
-        alg_str = va_arg(args, char *);
-        if (alg_str == NULL)
-            return 0;
-        impl->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(alg_str);
-        for (i = 0; i < (size_t)OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); ++i) {
-            if (kek_algs[i].nid == impl->cek_nid) {
-                impl->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
-                return 1;
-            }
-        }
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_CTRL, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
-        return 0;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
-    }
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
-                            const char *value)
-{
-    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
-        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
-         return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-                             value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "ukm") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexukm") == 0)
-        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
-                            value);
-
-    if (strcmp(type, "cekalg") == 0)
-        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG,
-                            value);
-
-    return -2;
-}
-
-static size_t x942kdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
-    int len;
-
-    if (impl->md == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
-    return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
-}
-
-static int x942kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    unsigned char *ctr;
-    unsigned char *der = NULL;
-    size_t der_len = 0;
-
-    if (impl->secret == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->md == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (impl->ukm != NULL && impl->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
-        /*
-         * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
-         * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
-         */
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_INAVLID_UKM_LEN);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (keylen != impl->dkm_len) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    /* generate the otherinfo der */
-    if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(impl->cek_nid, impl->dkm_len,
-                               impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len,
-                               &der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_BAD_ENCODING);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
-                           der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
-    OPENSSL_free(der);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF x942_kdf_meth = {
-    EVP_KDF_X942,
-    x942kdf_new,
-    x942kdf_free,
-    x942kdf_reset,
-    x942kdf_ctrl,
-    x942kdf_ctrl_str,
-    x942kdf_size,
-    x942kdf_derive
-};
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
index f0a6c5c7425ee91428ffbf6c8eaf41ef90d4f64c..ca78cce0a827d374f7c26bc35a8b489044b02abb 100644 (file)
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUBDIRS=digests macs ciphers
+SUBDIRS=digests kdfs macs ciphers
 LIBS=../../libcrypto
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
         defltprov.c
index c481171a789378e8c16e0111a431a3906f57f8c2..8a950482c83e7cc02b43cb870f341ec24097179d 100644 (file)
@@ -211,6 +211,22 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_macs[] = {
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
+static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_kdfs[] = {
+    { "HKDF", "default=yes", kdf_hkdf_functions },
+    { "SSKDF", "default=yes", kdf_sskdf_functions },
+    { "PBKDF2", "default=yes", kdf_pbkdf2_functions },
+    { "SSHKDF", "default=yes", kdf_sshkdf_functions },
+    { "X963KDF", "default=yes", kdf_x963_kdf_functions },
+    { "TLS1-PRF", "default=yes", kdf_tls1_prf_functions },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    { "X942KDF", "default=yes", kdf_x942_kdf_functions },
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    { "id-scrypt", "default=yes", kdf_scrypt_functions },
+#endif
+   { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_keyexch[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     { "dhKeyAgreement", "default=yes", dh_keyexch_functions },
@@ -237,6 +253,8 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM *deflt_query(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
         return deflt_ciphers;
     case OSSL_OP_MAC:
         return deflt_macs;
+    case OSSL_OP_KDF:
+        return deflt_kdfs;
     case OSSL_OP_KEYMGMT:
         return deflt_keymgmt;
     case OSSL_OP_KEYEXCH:
diff --git a/providers/default/kdfs/build.info b/providers/default/kdfs/build.info
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..27047c5
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=scrypt.c sshkdf.c x942kdf.c
+INCLUDE[../../../libcrypto]=. ../../../crypto
diff --git a/providers/default/kdfs/scrypt.c b/providers/default/kdfs/scrypt.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..57dc317
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_scrypt_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_scrypt_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_scrypt_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_scrypt_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params;
+
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+                      const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+                      uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+                      unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256);
+
+typedef struct {
+    void *provctx;
+    unsigned char *pass;
+    size_t pass_len;
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    size_t salt_len;
+    uint64_t N;
+    uint64_t r, p;
+    uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
+    EVP_MD *sha256;
+} KDF_SCRYPT;
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx);
+
+static void *kdf_scrypt_new(void *provctx)
+{
+    KDF_SCRYPT *ctx;
+
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ctx->provctx = provctx;
+    ctx->sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx),
+                               "sha256", NULL);
+    if (ctx->sha256 == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA256);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_free(void *vctx)
+{
+    KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+    kdf_scrypt_reset(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha256);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+    KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+    kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx)
+{
+    /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
+     * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
+     * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
+     */
+    ctx->N = 1 << 20;
+    ctx->r = 8;
+    ctx->p = 1;
+    ctx->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
+}
+
+static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
+                             const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
+    if (p->data_size == 0) {
+        if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (p->data != NULL) {
+        *buffer = NULL;
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+                             size_t keylen)
+{
+    KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
+
+    if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return scrypt_alg((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len, ctx->salt,
+                      ctx->salt_len, ctx->N, ctx->r, ctx->p,
+                      ctx->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen, ctx->sha256);
+}
+
+static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
+{
+    return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = vctx;
+    uint64_t u64_value;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
+        if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
+        if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value)
+            || u64_value <= 1
+            || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
+            return 0;
+        ctx->N = u64_value;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->r = u64_value;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->p = u64_value;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_scrypt_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
+static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
+{
+    int i;
+    uint32_t x[16];
+
+    memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
+    for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
+        x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
+        x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
+        x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
+        x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
+        x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
+        x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
+        x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
+        x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
+        x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
+        x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
+        x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
+        x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
+        x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
+        x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
+        x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
+        x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
+        x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
+        x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
+        x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
+        x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
+        x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
+        x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
+        x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
+        x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
+        x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
+        x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
+        x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
+        x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
+        x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
+        x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
+        x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
+        x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+        inout[i] += x[i];
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
+}
+
+static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
+{
+    uint64_t i, j;
+    uint32_t X[16], *pB;
+
+    memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
+    pB = B;
+    for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
+        for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+            X[j] ^= *pB++;
+        salsa208_word_specification(X);
+        memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
+    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
+}
+
+static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
+                        uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
+{
+    unsigned char *pB;
+    uint32_t *pV;
+    uint64_t i, k;
+
+    /* Convert from little endian input */
+    for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
+        *pV = *pB++;
+        *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
+        *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
+        *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
+        scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
+
+    scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
+        uint32_t j;
+        j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
+        pV = V + 32 * r * j;
+        for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
+            T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
+        scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
+    }
+    /* Convert output to little endian */
+    for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
+        uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
+        *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
+        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
+        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
+        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+# define SIZE_MAX    ((size_t)-1)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
+ * most (all?) platforms.
+ */
+
+#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX         (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum value of p * r:
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
+ * p * r <= (2^30-1)
+ */
+
+#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX   ((1 << 30) - 1)
+
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+                      const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+                      uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+                      unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned char *B;
+    uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
+    uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
+
+    /* Sanity check parameters */
+    /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
+    if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
+        return 0;
+    /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
+    if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
+     * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
+     */
+
+    if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
+        if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
+
+    /*
+     * B size in section 5 step 1.S
+     * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
+     * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
+     */
+    Blen = p * 128 * r;
+    /*
+     * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
+     * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
+     */
+    if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
+     * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
+     */
+    i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
+    if (N + 2 > i / r) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+    /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
+    if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
+    if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
+        maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
+
+    if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
+    if (key == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
+    if (B == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
+    T = X + 32 * r;
+    V = T + 32 * r;
+    if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, sha256,
+                          (int)Blen, B) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
+        scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
+
+    if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, sha256,
+                          keylen, key) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    if (rv == 0)
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/providers/default/kdfs/sshkdf.c b/providers/default/kdfs/sshkdf.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..529a980
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_sshkdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_sshkdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_sshkdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_sshkdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params;
+
+static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                  const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                  const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
+                  const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
+                  char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
+
+typedef struct {
+    void *provctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    unsigned char *key; /* K */
+    size_t key_len;
+    unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
+    size_t xcghash_len;
+    char type; /* X */
+    unsigned char *session_id;
+    size_t session_id_len;
+} KDF_SSHKDF;
+
+static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
+{
+    KDF_SSHKDF *ctx;
+
+    if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ctx->provctx = provctx;
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static void kdf_sshkdf_free(void *vctx)
+{
+    KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+    kdf_sshkdf_reset(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+    KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+static int sshkdf_set_membuf(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
+                             const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
+    *dst = NULL;
+    return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)dst, 0, dst_len);
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
+                             size_t keylen)
+{
+    KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
+
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->key == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->xcghash == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->session_id == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->type == 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return SSHKDF(ctx->md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
+                  ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
+                  ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
+                  ctx->type, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    int t;
+    const char *properties = NULL;
+
+    /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        properties = p->data;
+    }
+    /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+                          properties);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+        ctx->md = md;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+        if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->key, &ctx->key_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH))
+        != NULL)
+        if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->xcghash, &ctx->xcghash_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID))
+        != NULL)
+        if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->session_id, &ctx->session_id_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
+            return 0;
+        t = *(unsigned char *)p->data;
+        if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_VALUE_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->type = (char)t;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                  const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                  const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
+                  const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
+                  char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
+    unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int dsize = 0;
+    size_t cursize = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (md == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
+        goto out;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
+        goto out;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
+        goto out;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
+        goto out;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
+        goto out;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
+        goto out;
+
+    if (okey_len < dsize) {
+        memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
+
+    for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
+
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
+            goto out;
+
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
+            goto out;
+
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
+            goto out;
+
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
+            goto out;
+
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
+            goto out;
+
+        if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
+            memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
+            ret = 1;
+            goto out;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+out:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    return ret;
+}
+
diff --git a/providers/default/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/default/kdfs/x942kdf.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..e8a5e4c
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <stdarg.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "internal/numbers.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
+# include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
+# include "internal/provider_algs.h"
+
+# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
+
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params;
+
+typedef struct {
+    void *provctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    unsigned char *secret;
+    size_t secret_len;
+    int cek_nid;
+    unsigned char *ukm;
+    size_t ukm_len;
+    size_t dkm_len;
+} KDF_X942;
+
+/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
+static const struct {
+    int nid;
+    size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
+} kek_algs[] = {
+    { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
+    { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
+    { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
+    { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
+    { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
+    { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
+    { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
+    { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
+};
+
+/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
+static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
+{
+    int i, tag, xclass;
+    long tmplen;
+    const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+
+    i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
+    if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
+        return 0;
+    if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+        q += tmplen;
+    *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
+    *plen -= q - *pp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode the other info structure.
+ *
+ *  RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
+ *
+ *  OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
+ *      partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ *      suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ *  }
+ *
+ *  KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ *      counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
+ *  }
+ *
+ * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
+ * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
+ * suppPubInfo (in bits).
+ * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
+ * can be NULL.
+ * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
+ * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
+ * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
+ * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
+ * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
+ * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
+ */
+static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
+                                 const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
+                                 unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
+                                 unsigned char **out_ctr)
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
+    int ret = 0, encoded_len;
+    long tlen;
+    /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
+    static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
+    X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
+
+    /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
+    ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
+    ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (ksi == NULL
+        || alg_oid == NULL
+        || ctr_oct == NULL
+        || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
+        || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
+        goto err;
+    /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
+    alg_oid = NULL;
+    ctr_oct = NULL;
+
+    /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
+    if (ukm != NULL) {
+        ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+        if (ukm_oct == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
+    }
+    /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
+    encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
+    if (encoded_len <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
+    p = encoded;
+    tlen = (long)encoded_len;
+    if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+        && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+        && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
+        *out_ctr = p;
+        *der = encoded;
+        *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+err:
+    if (ret != 1)
+        OPENSSL_free(encoded);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
+                            const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
+                            const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
+                            unsigned char *ctr,
+                            unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
+{
+    int ret = 0, hlen;
+    size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
+    unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char *out = derived_key;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
+
+    if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+            || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+            || derived_key_len == 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
+    if (hlen <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    out_len = (size_t)hlen;
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+    ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+    if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
+        goto end;
+
+    for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
+        /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
+        ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
+        ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
+        ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
+        ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
+
+        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
+            goto end;
+        if (len >= out_len) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
+                goto end;
+            out += out_len;
+            len -= out_len;
+            if (len == 0)
+                break;
+        } else {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
+                goto end;
+            memcpy(out, mac, len);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+end:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void *x942kdf_new(void *provctx)
+{
+    KDF_X942 *ctx;
+
+    if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ctx->provctx = provctx;
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_reset(void *vctx)
+{
+    KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx)
+{
+    KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+
+    x942kdf_reset(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
+                              const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+    if (p->data_size == 0 || p->data == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(*out);
+    *out = NULL;
+    return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
+}
+
+static size_t x942kdf_size(KDF_X942 *ctx)
+{
+    int len;
+
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    len = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
+    return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+    KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *ctr;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    size_t der_len = 0;
+
+    if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->ukm != NULL && ctx->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
+        /*
+         * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
+         * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
+         */
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (keylen != ctx->dkm_len) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* generate the otherinfo der */
+    if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->cek_nid, ctx->dkm_len,
+                               ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len,
+                               &der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(ctx->md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                           der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    const char *properties = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+
+    /* Grab search properties, this should be before the digest lookup */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES))
+        != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        properties = p->data;
+    }
+    /* Handle aliasing of digest parameter names */
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        md = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data,
+                          properties);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->md);
+        ctx->md = md;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
+        || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
+        if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM)) != NULL)
+        if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ukm, &ctx->ukm_len, p))
+            return 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p->data);
+        for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++)
+            if (kek_algs[i].nid == ctx->cek_nid)
+                goto cek_found;
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
+        return 0;
+cek_found:
+        ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+    OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_derive },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))x942kdf_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_get_ctx_params },
+    { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
index 000bf73672196cef70bbb7faa80a1731f216f321..59cd4080f4f32927767b0784b2d405740bf6c1af 100644 (file)
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <openssl/params.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
 
 /* TODO(3.0): Needed for dummy_evp_call(). To be removed */
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ static int dummy_evp_call(void *provctx)
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
     EVP_MD *sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA256", NULL);
+    EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "pbkdf2", NULL);
     char msg[] = "Hello World!";
     const unsigned char exptd[] = {
         0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
@@ -138,7 +140,7 @@ static int dummy_evp_call(void *provctx)
     EC_KEY *key = NULL;
 #endif
 
-    if (ctx == NULL || sha256 == NULL || drbg == NULL)
+    if (ctx == NULL || sha256 == NULL || drbg == NULL || kdf == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, sha256, NULL))
@@ -185,6 +187,7 @@ static int dummy_evp_call(void *provctx)
     BN_CTX_end(bnctx);
     BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
 
+    EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
     EVP_MD_free(sha256);
 
@@ -342,6 +345,14 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_macs[] = {
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
+static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_kdfs[] = {
+    { "HKDF", "fips=yes", kdf_hkdf_functions },
+    { "SSKDF", "fips=yes", kdf_sskdf_functions },
+    { "PBKDF2", "fips=yes", kdf_pbkdf2_functions },
+    { "TLS1-PRF", "fips=yes", kdf_tls1_prf_functions },
+   { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM *fips_query(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
                                          int operation_id,
                                          int *no_cache)
@@ -354,6 +365,8 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM *fips_query(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
         return fips_ciphers;
     case OSSL_OP_MAC:
         return fips_macs;
+    case OSSL_OP_KDF:
+        return fips_kdfs;
     }
     return NULL;
 }