We should check the eight bytes starting at p[-9] for rollback attack

detection, or the probability for an erroneous RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK
will be larger than necessary.

PR: 1695

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index ea72629494cffd952d15eff4098b3f554c9ff723..cfeff15bc9c125c30e418a2e5351f019eba40236 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
                return(-1);
                }
-       for (k= -8; k<0; k++)
+       for (k = -9; k<-1; k++)
                {
                if (p[k] !=  0x03) break;
                }