functions are now EVP_MAC functions, usually with ctx in their names.
Before 3.0 is released, the names are mutable and this prevents more
inconsistencies being introduced.
There are no functional or code changes.
Just the renaming and a little reformatting.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11997)
and HMAC_CTX_get_md.
Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
- time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_MAC_CTX_new(3)>,
- L<EVP_MAC_CTX_free(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_update(3)>
+ time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_MAC_new_ctx(3)>,
+ L<EVP_MAC_free_ctx(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_update(3)>
and L<EVP_MAC_final(3)>.
*Paul Dale*
CMAC_CTX_copy, CMAC_Init, CMAC_Update, CMAC_Final and CMAC_resume.
Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
- time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_MAC_CTX_new(3)>,
- L<EVP_MAC_CTX_free(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_update(3)>
+ time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_MAC_new_ctx(3)>,
+ L<EVP_MAC_free_ctx(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_update(3)>
and L<EVP_MAC_final(3)>.
*Paul Dale*
goto end;
}
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac);
if (ctx == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to create MAC CTX for module check\n");
goto end;
if (params == NULL)
goto end;
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC parameter error\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
ok = 0;
goto end;
}
- ctx2 = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
+ ctx2 = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx);
if (ctx2 == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to create MAC CTX for install indicator\n");
goto end;
BIO_free(module_bio);
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(opts);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx2);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx2);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(read_buffer);
free_config_and_unload(conf);
return ret;
BIO_printf(bio_err, "HMAC not found\n");
goto end;
}
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(hmac);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(hmac);
if (ctx == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "HMAC context allocation failed\n");
goto end;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, cookie_secret,
COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "HMAC context parameter setting failed\n");
goto end;
}
goto opthelp;
}
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (params == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC parameter error\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
ok = 0;
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(opts);
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free(out);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
return ret;
}
static void cmac_key_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MAC_CTX *cmctx = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
- EVP_MAC *mac = cmctx == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(cmctx);
+ EVP_MAC *mac = cmctx == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(cmctx);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(cmctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(cmctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
}
macparams[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
basekey, bklen);
if ((mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL)) == NULL
- || (mctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL
- || !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(mctx, macparams)
+ || (mctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac)) == NULL
+ || !EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(mctx, macparams)
|| !EVP_MAC_init(mctx)
|| !EVP_MAC_update(mctx, msg, msglen)
|| !EVP_MAC_final(mctx, mac_res, outlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
err:
/* cleanup */
OPENSSL_cleanse(basekey, bklen);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(mctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_F_EVP_KEYEXCH_FROM_DISPATCH:244:evp_keyexch_from_dispatch
EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTRL:209:EVP_MAC_ctrl
EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTRL_STR:210:EVP_MAC_ctrl_str
-EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_DUP:211:EVP_MAC_CTX_dup
-EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_NEW:213:EVP_MAC_CTX_new
EVP_F_EVP_MAC_INIT:212:EVP_MAC_init
EVP_F_EVP_MD_BLOCK_SIZE:232:EVP_MD_block_size
EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX:110:EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
#include "internal/provider.h"
#include "evp_local.h"
-EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_new(EVP_MAC *mac)
+EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_new_ctx(EVP_MAC *mac)
{
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MAC_CTX));
if (ctx == NULL
|| (ctx->data = mac->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(mac->prov))) == NULL
|| !EVP_MAC_up_ref(mac)) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (ctx != NULL)
mac->freectx(ctx->data);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
return ctx;
}
-void EVP_MAC_CTX_free(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
+void EVP_MAC_free_ctx(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL) {
ctx->meth->freectx(ctx->data);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
-EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src)
+EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src)
{
EVP_MAC_CTX *dst;
dst = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dst));
if (dst == NULL) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
*dst = *src;
if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(dst->meth)) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_free(dst);
return NULL;
}
dst->data = src->meth->dupctx(src->data);
if (dst->data == NULL) {
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(dst);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(dst);
return NULL;
}
return dst;
}
-EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
+EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->meth;
}
return 1;
}
-int EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
if (ctx->meth->get_ctx_params != NULL)
return ctx->meth->get_ctx_params(ctx->data, params);
return 1;
}
-int EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
if (ctx->meth->set_ctx_params != NULL)
return ctx->meth->set_ctx_params(ctx->data, params);
prov == NULL ? NULL : ossl_provider_library_context(prov);
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
EVP_MAC *cmac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC, NULL);
- EVP_MAC_CTX *cmctx = cmac != NULL ? EVP_MAC_CTX_new(cmac) : NULL;
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *cmctx = cmac != NULL ? EVP_MAC_new_ctx(cmac) : NULL;
OSSL_PARAM params[4];
size_t paramsn = 0;
(char *)priv, len);
params[paramsn] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(cmctx, params)) {
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(cmctx, params)) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
goto err;
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(cmctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(cmctx);
EVP_MAC_free(cmac);
return NULL;
# else
}
if (mac != NULL) {
- hctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
+ hctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac);
if (hctx->ctx == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(hctx);
return 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(dst, dctx);
dst->keygen_info_count = 0;
- dctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(sctx->ctx);
+ dctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(sctx->ctx);
if (dctx->ctx == NULL)
goto err;
* fetches the MAC method anew in this case. Therefore, its reference
* count must be adjusted here.
*/
- if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(dctx->ctx)))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(dctx->ctx)))
goto err;
dctx->type = sctx->type;
MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx == NULL ? NULL : EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
if (hctx != NULL) {
- EVP_MAC *mac = hctx->ctx != NULL ? EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx) : NULL;
+ EVP_MAC *mac = hctx->ctx != NULL ? EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(hctx->ctx)
+ : NULL;
switch (hctx->type) {
case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
hctx->raw_data.ktmp.length);
break;
}
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(hctx->ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
OPENSSL_free(hctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL);
return 0;
}
- cmkey = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(hctx->ctx);
+ cmkey = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(hctx->ctx);
if (cmkey == NULL)
return 0;
- if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx)))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(hctx->ctx)))
return 0;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, nid, cmkey);
}
}
if (set_key) {
- if (!EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx),
+ if (!EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(hctx->ctx),
OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx)))))
return 0;
key = EVP_PKEY_get0(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx));
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
key->data, key->length);
params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- rv = EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
+ rv = EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx->ctx, params);
}
return rv;
}
return 0;
}
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params)
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx->ctx, params)
|| !EVP_MAC_init(hctx->ctx))
return 0;
}
if (ctx->pkey == NULL)
return 0;
- new_mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr);
+ new_mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr);
if (new_mac_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(hctx->ctx);
hctx->ctx = new_mac_ctx;
}
break;
return 0;
}
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx->ctx, params))
return 0;
params[0] =
OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, &verify);
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(hctx->ctx, params))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(hctx->ctx, params))
return 0;
/*
return 0;
}
- return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
+ return EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx->ctx, params);
}
break;
default:
key->data, key->length);
params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
+ return EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx->ctx, params);
}
break;
case MAC_TYPE_MAC:
EVPerr(0, EVP_R_FETCH_FAILED);
return 0;
}
- mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx);
+ mac = EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(hctx->ctx);
/*
* Translation of some control names that are equivalent to a single
return 0;
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- ok = EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
+ ok = EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx->ctx, params);
OPENSSL_free(params[0].data);
return ok;
}
EVP_MAC_CTX *mac_ctx;
int ret = 0;
- mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx->mac_ctx_init);
+ mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx->mac_ctx_init);
if (mac_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
ret = 1;
err:
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(mac_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* TODO(3.0) library context */
|| (ctx->mac =
EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC, NULL)) == NULL
- || (ctx->mac_ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(ctx->mac)) == NULL
- || !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->mac_ctx_init, params)
+ || (ctx->mac_ctx_init = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(ctx->mac)) == NULL
+ || !EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx->mac_ctx_init, params)
|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, NULL, key + klen, NULL)
- || (mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx->mac_ctx_init)) == NULL
+ || (mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx->mac_ctx_init)) == NULL
|| !EVP_MAC_update(mac_ctx, zero, sizeof(zero))
|| !EVP_MAC_final(mac_ctx, ctx->d.byte, &out_len,
sizeof(ctx->d.byte))) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->cipher_ctx);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->mac_ctx_init);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->mac_ctx_init);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(mac_ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
return 0;
}
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(mac_ctx);
ctx->final_ret = -1;
ctx->crypto_ok = 1;
memcpy(&dest->d, &src->d, sizeof(src->d));
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(dest->cipher_ctx, src->cipher_ctx))
return 0;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(dest->mac_ctx_init);
- dest->mac_ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(src->mac_ctx_init);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(dest->mac_ctx_init);
+ dest->mac_ctx_init = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(src->mac_ctx_init);
if (dest->mac_ctx_init == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
siv128_dbl(&ctx->d);
- if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx->mac_ctx_init)) == NULL
+ if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx->mac_ctx_init)) == NULL
|| !EVP_MAC_update(mac_ctx, aad, len)
|| !EVP_MAC_final(mac_ctx, mac_out.byte, &out_len,
sizeof(mac_out.byte))
|| out_len != SIV_LEN) {
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(mac_ctx);
return 0;
}
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(mac_ctx);
siv128_xorblock(&ctx->d, &mac_out);
if (ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->cipher_ctx);
ctx->cipher_ctx = NULL;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->mac_ctx_init);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->mac_ctx_init);
ctx->mac_ctx_init = NULL;
EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
ctx->mac = NULL;
Passes options to the MAC algorithm.
A comprehensive list of controls can be found in the EVP_MAC implementation
documentation.
-Common parameter names used by EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params() are:
+Common parameter names used by EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params() are:
=over 4
EVP_MAC, EVP_MAC_fetch, EVP_MAC_up_ref, EVP_MAC_free,
EVP_MAC_is_a, EVP_MAC_number, EVP_MAC_names_do_all,
EVP_MAC_provider, EVP_MAC_get_params, EVP_MAC_gettable_params,
-EVP_MAC_CTX, EVP_MAC_CTX_new, EVP_MAC_CTX_free, EVP_MAC_CTX_dup,
-EVP_MAC_CTX_mac, EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params, EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params,
+EVP_MAC_CTX, EVP_MAC_new_ctx, EVP_MAC_free_ctx, EVP_MAC_dup_ctx,
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac, EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params, EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params,
EVP_MAC_size, EVP_MAC_init, EVP_MAC_update, EVP_MAC_final,
EVP_MAC_gettable_ctx_params, EVP_MAC_settable_ctx_params,
EVP_MAC_do_all_provided - EVP MAC routines
const OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_MAC_provider(const EVP_MAC *mac);
int EVP_MAC_get_params(EVP_MAC *mac, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
- EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_new(EVP_MAC *mac);
- void EVP_MAC_CTX_free(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
- EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src);
- EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
- int EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
- int EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_new_ctx(EVP_MAC *mac);
+ void EVP_MAC_free_ctx(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src);
+ EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+ int EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
size_t EVP_MAC_size(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_MAC_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
=head2 Context manipulation functions
-EVP_MAC_CTX_new() creates a new context for the MAC type I<mac>.
+EVP_MAC_new_ctx() creates a new context for the MAC type I<mac>.
The created context can then be used with most other functions
described here.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_free() frees the contents of the context, including an
+EVP_MAC_free_ctx() frees the contents of the context, including an
underlying context if there is one, as well as the context itself.
NULL is a valid parameter, for which this function is a no-op.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_dup() duplicates the I<src> context and returns a newly allocated
+EVP_MAC_dup_ctx() duplicates the I<src> context and returns a newly allocated
context.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_mac() returns the B<EVP_MAC> associated with the context
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac() returns the B<EVP_MAC> associated with the context
I<ctx>.
=head2 Computing functions
Note that a parameter that is unknown in the underlying context is
simply ignored.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params() retrieves chosen parameters, given the
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params() retrieves chosen parameters, given the
context I<ctx> and its underlying context.
The set of parameters given with I<params> determine exactly what
parameters should be retrieved.
Note that a parameter that is unknown in the underlying context is
simply ignored.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() passes chosen parameters to the underlying
+EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params() passes chosen parameters to the underlying
context, given a context I<ctx>.
The set of parameters given with I<params> determine exactly what
parameters are passed down.
EVP_MAC_gettable_params(), EVP_MAC_gettable_ctx_params() and
EVP_MAC_settable_ctx_params() get a constant B<OSSL_PARAM> array that
describes the retrievable and settable parameters, i.e. parameters that
-can be used with EVP_MAC_get_params(), EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params()
-and EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(), respectively.
+can be used with EVP_MAC_get_params(), EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params()
+and EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(), respectively.
See L<OSSL_PARAM(3)> for the use of B<OSSL_PARAM> as parameter descriptor.
=head2 Information functions
EVP_MAC_provider() returns a pointer to the provider for the MAC, or
NULL on error.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_new() and EVP_MAC_CTX_dup() return a pointer to a newly
+EVP_MAC_new_ctx() and EVP_MAC_dup_ctx() return a pointer to a newly
created EVP_MAC_CTX, or NULL if allocation failed.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_free() returns nothing at all.
+EVP_MAC_free_ctx() returns nothing at all.
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params() and EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() return 1 on
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params() and EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params() return 1 on
success, 0 on error.
EVP_MAC_init(), EVP_MAC_update(), and EVP_MAC_final() return 1 on success, 0
if (mac == NULL
|| key == NULL
- || (ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL
- || EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) <= 0)
+ || (ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac)) == NULL
+ || EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx))
printf("%02X", buf[i]);
printf("\n");
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
exit(0);
err:
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
fprintf(stderr, "Something went wrong\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
All of the functions described on this page are deprecated. Applications should
-instead use L<EVP_MAC_CTX_new(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_free(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>,
+instead use L<EVP_MAC_new_ctx(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_free_ctx(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC_update(3)> and L<EVP_MAC_final(3)>.
HMAC is a MAC (message authentication code), i.e. a keyed hash
goto err;
}
params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
goto err;
while (params_n-- > 0)
OPENSSL_free(params[params_n].data);
ticket.
Before the callback function is started I<ctx> and I<hctx> have been
-initialised with L<EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(3)> and L<EVP_MAC_CTX_new(3)>
+initialised with L<EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(3)> and L<EVP_MAC_new_ctx(3)>
respectively.
For new sessions tickets, when the client doesn't present a session ticket, or
The initialization vector I<iv> should be a random value. The cipher context
I<ctx> should use the initialisation vector I<iv>. The cipher context can be
set using L<EVP_EncryptInit_ex(3)>. The hmac context and digest can be set using
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)> with the B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY> and
+L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)> with the B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY> and
B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST> parameters respectively.
When the client presents a session ticket, the callback function with be called
to retrieve a cryptographic parameters and that the cryptographic context
I<ctx> will be set with the retrieved parameters and the initialization vector
I<iv>. using a function like L<EVP_DecryptInit_ex(3)>. The key material and
-digest for I<hctx> need to be set using L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)> with the
+digest for I<hctx> need to be set using L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)> with the
B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY> and B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST> parameters respectively.
If the I<name> is still valid but a renewal of the ticket is required the
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_evp_cb() except that it takes a deprecated
HMAC_CTX pointer instead of an EVP_MAC_CTX one.
Before this callback function is started I<hctx> will have been
-initialised with L<EVP_MAC_CTX_new(3)> and the digest set with
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>.
+initialised with L<EVP_MAC_new_ctx(3)> and the digest set with
+L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>.
The I<hctx> key material can be set using L<HMAC_Init_ex(3)>.
=head1 NOTES
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
"sha256", 0);
params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx, params);
+ EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx, params);
return 1;
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
"sha256", 0);
params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx, params);
+ EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx, params);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv);
The general description of these parameters can be found in
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>.
-All these parameters can be set with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params().
+All these parameters can be set with EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params().
Furthermore, the "size" parameter can be retrieved with
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(), or with EVP_MAC_size().
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(), or with EVP_MAC_size().
The length of the "size" parameter should not exceed that of a B<size_t>.
=over 4
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>,
+L<EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>, L<OSSL_PARAM(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The general description of these parameters can be found in
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>.
-The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params():
+The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params():
=over 4
=back
The following parameters can be retrieved with
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params():
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params():
=over 4
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>,
+L<EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>, L<OSSL_PARAM(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
The general description of these parameters can be found in
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>.
-The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params():
+The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params():
=over 4
=back
The following parameters can be retrieved with
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params():
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params():
=over 4
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>,
+L<EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>, L<OSSL_PARAM(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
The general description of these parameters can be found in
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>.
-The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params():
+The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params():
=over 4
The "flags" parameter is passed directly to HMAC_CTX_set_flags().
The following parameter can be retrieved with
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params():
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params():
=over 4
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>,
+L<EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>, L<OSSL_PARAM(3)>, L<HMAC(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
The general description of these parameters can be found in
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>.
-All these parameters can be set with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params().
+All these parameters can be set with EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params().
Furthermore, the "size" parameter can be retrieved with
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(), or with EVP_MAC_size().
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(), or with EVP_MAC_size().
The length of the "size" parameter should not exceed that of a B<size_t>.
=over 4
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>,
+L<EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>, L<OSSL_PARAM(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
The general description of these parameters can be found in
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>.
-The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params():
+The following parameter can be set with EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params():
=over 4
=back
The following parameters can be retrieved with
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params():
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params():
=over 4
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>,
+L<EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>, L<OSSL_PARAM(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
The general description of these parameters can be found in
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>.
-All these parameters can be set with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params().
+All these parameters can be set with EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params().
Furthermore, the "size" parameter can be retrieved with
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(), or with EVP_MAC_size().
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(), or with EVP_MAC_size().
The length of the "size" parameter should not exceed that of a B<size_t>.
=over 4
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(3)>,
+L<EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(3)>,
L<EVP_MAC(3)/PARAMETERS>, L<OSSL_PARAM(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
# include <openssl/evperr.h>
# include <openssl/params.h>
+# include <openssl/mac.h>
+
# define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 64/* longest known is SHA512 */
# define EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64
# define EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16
void (*fn)(EVP_MD *md, void *arg),
void *arg);
-/* MAC stuff */
-
-EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
- const char *properties);
-int EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC *mac);
-void EVP_MAC_free(EVP_MAC *mac);
-int EVP_MAC_number(const EVP_MAC *mac);
-int EVP_MAC_is_a(const EVP_MAC *mac, const char *name);
-const OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_MAC_provider(const EVP_MAC *mac);
-int EVP_MAC_get_params(EVP_MAC *mac, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
-
-EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_new(EVP_MAC *mac);
-void EVP_MAC_CTX_free(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
-EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src);
-EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
-int EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
-
-size_t EVP_MAC_size(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_MAC_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_MAC_update(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen);
-int EVP_MAC_final(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize);
-const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_MAC_gettable_params(const EVP_MAC *mac);
-const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_MAC_gettable_ctx_params(const EVP_MAC *mac);
-const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_MAC_settable_ctx_params(const EVP_MAC *mac);
-
-void EVP_MAC_do_all_provided(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
- void (*fn)(EVP_MAC *mac, void *arg),
- void *arg);
-void EVP_MAC_names_do_all(const EVP_MAC *mac,
- void (*fn)(const char *name, void *data),
- void *data);
-
/* PKEY stuff */
DEPRECATEDIN_3_0(int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(unsigned char *dec_key,
const unsigned char *enc_key,
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019=-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* MAC stuff */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_EVP_MAC_H
+# define OPENSSL_EVP_MAC_H
+# pragma once
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/types.h>
+# include <openssl/core.h>
+
+EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
+ const char *properties);
+int EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC *mac);
+void EVP_MAC_free(EVP_MAC *mac);
+int EVP_MAC_number(const EVP_MAC *mac);
+int EVP_MAC_is_a(const EVP_MAC *mac, const char *name);
+const OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_MAC_provider(const EVP_MAC *mac);
+int EVP_MAC_get_params(EVP_MAC *mac, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+
+EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_new_ctx(EVP_MAC *mac);
+void EVP_MAC_free_ctx(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src);
+EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+int EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+
+size_t EVP_MAC_size(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_MAC_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_MAC_update(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen);
+int EVP_MAC_final(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize);
+const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_MAC_gettable_params(const EVP_MAC *mac);
+const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_MAC_gettable_ctx_params(const EVP_MAC *mac);
+const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_MAC_settable_ctx_params(const EVP_MAC *mac);
+
+void EVP_MAC_do_all_provided(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
+ void (*fn)(EVP_MAC *mac, void *arg),
+ void *arg);
+void EVP_MAC_names_do_all(const EVP_MAC *mac,
+ void (*fn)(const char *name, void *data),
+ void *data);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_EVP_MAC_H */
if (macname != NULL) {
EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, macname, properties);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(*macctx);
- *macctx = mac == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(*macctx);
+ *macctx = mac == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac);
/* The context holds on to the MAC */
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
if (*macctx == NULL)
#endif
*mp = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(*macctx, mac_params))
+ if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(*macctx, mac_params))
return 1;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(*macctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(*macctx);
*macctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac);
if (mac == NULL || ctx == NULL)
goto err;
sizeof(fixed_key));
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) <= 0
+ if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params) <= 0
|| !EVP_MAC_init(ctx))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
return ret;
}
{
KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->ctx_init);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
for (counter = 1; written < ko_len; counter++) {
i = be32(counter);
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto done;
written += h;
k_i_len = h;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
done:
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
NULL, NULL, libctx))
return 0;
else if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL
- && !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->ctx_init),
+ && !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(ctx->ctx_init),
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)
- && !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->ctx_init),
+ && !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(ctx->ctx_init),
OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MAC);
return 0;
ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
mparams[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx_init, mparams)
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx->ctx_init, mparams)
|| !EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx_init))
return 0;
}
(void *)custom, custom_len);
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
/* By default only do one iteration if kmac_out_len is not specified */
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE,
&kmac_out_len);
- if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params) <= 0)
return 0;
/*
(void *)salt, salt_len);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx_init, params))
goto end;
if (!kmac_init(ctx_init, kmac_custom, kmac_custom_len, kmac_out_len,
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
if (!(ctx != NULL
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, z, z_len)
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
else
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_buf, sizeof(mac_buf));
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->macctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->macctx);
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
size_t custom_len = 0;
int default_salt_len;
- EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->macctx);
+ EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(ctx->macctx);
/*
* TODO(3.0) investigate the necessity to have all these controls.
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_hash);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_hash);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_sha1);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
NULL, SN_sha1, libctx))
return 0;
} else {
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_sha1);
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
NULL, NULL, libctx))
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
(void *)sec, sec_len);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx_init, params))
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
goto err;
if (chunk == 0)
goto err;
/* A(0) = seed */
- ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
+ ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len))
/* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len, sizeof(Ai)))
goto err;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx_Ai);
ctx_Ai = NULL;
/* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len))
goto err;
/* save state for calculating next A(i) value */
if (olen > chunk) {
- ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
+ ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
}
}
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, olen))
goto err;
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
out += chunk;
olen -= chunk;
}
ret = 1;
err:
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx_Ai);
OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai));
return ret;
}
}
#endif
mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
- if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
+ if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac)) == NULL)
goto err;
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
return ret;
err:
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ret->ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
#endif
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
+ if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
}
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(hmac);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(hmac);
if (ctx == NULL
- || !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
+ || !EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)
|| !EVP_MAC_init(ctx)
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hash, hashlen)
/* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
ret = hashlen;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(hmac);
return ret;
}
/* Append HMAC to data */
hmac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL);
- ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(hmac);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(hmac);
EVP_MAC_free(hmac);
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
"SHA1", 0);
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
mac_key, 20);
params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params);
+ EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
EVP_MAC_init(ctx);
EVP_MAC_update(ctx, epoch, 2);
EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seq, 6);
EVP_MAC_update(ctx, lenbytes, 2); /* Length */
EVP_MAC_update(ctx, enc, len); /* Finally the data itself */
EVP_MAC_final(ctx, enc + len, NULL, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
/* Append padding bytes */
len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if ((ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(expected->mac)) == NULL) {
+ if ((ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(expected->mac)) == NULL) {
t->err = "MAC_CREATE_ERROR";
goto err;
}
- if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {
+ if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) {
t->err = "MAC_BAD_PARAMS";
goto err;
}
while (params_n-- > params_n_allocstart) {
OPENSSL_free(params[params_n].data);
}
- EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(got);
return 1;
}
params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (aes128cbc == NULL
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, aes128cbc, NULL, tick_aes_key, iv, enc)
- || !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx, params)
+ || !EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(hctx, params)
|| !EVP_MAC_init(hctx))
ret = -1;
else
EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx 4531 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_set_digest_custom 4532 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_get_digest_custom 4533 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_MAC_CTX_new ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_MAC_CTX_free ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_MAC_CTX_dup ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_MAC_CTX_mac ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MAC_new_ctx ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MAC_free_ctx ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MAC_dup_ctx ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_size ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_init ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_update ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MD_get_params ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_fetch ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_settable_ctx_params ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_gettable_ctx_params ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_free ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MAC_up_ref ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff