Limit the number of AES-GCM keys allowed in TLS. A new error is raised if this
authorPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Tue, 11 Sep 2018 23:25:20 +0000 (09:25 +1000)
committerPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Tue, 11 Sep 2018 23:25:20 +0000 (09:25 +1000)
limit is ever reached.

This is a FIPS 140-2 requirement from IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
Requirements from SP 800-38D".

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7129)

crypto/err/openssl.txt
crypto/evp/e_aes.c
crypto/evp/evp_err.c
include/openssl/evperr.h

index 2c8572ba64ad4b0f6542ded632ab3df0694f6039..84e639305b9baf7c30a60afe44b5dba6ba6b548e 100644 (file)
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT:187:int_engine_module_init
 ENGINE_F_OSSL_HMAC_INIT:200:ossl_hmac_init
 EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY:165:aesni_init_key
 EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL:196:aes_gcm_ctrl
+EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER:207:aes_gcm_tls_cipher
 EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY:133:aes_init_key
 EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER:169:aes_ocb_cipher
 EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY:178:aes_t4_init_key
@@ -805,6 +806,7 @@ EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE:158:pkey_set_type
 EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH:109:rc2_magic_to_meth
 EVP_F_RC5_CTRL:125:rc5_ctrl
 EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL:201:s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl
+EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER:208:s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher
 EVP_F_UPDATE:173:update
 KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR:103:pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str
 KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE:102:pkey_hkdf_derive
@@ -2265,6 +2267,7 @@ EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED:179:\
 EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:145:private key decode error
 EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR:146:private key encode error
 EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA:106:public key not rsa
+EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS:183:too many records
 EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER:160:unknown cipher
 EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST:161:unknown digest
 EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION:169:unknown option
index 61d37a899f67202c2e8a43ea1f9f33ba466b9650..f81ad66029be47ef9d44c8f16c658d5cd31fb1d2 100644 (file)
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ typedef struct {
     int taglen;
     int iv_gen;                 /* It is OK to generate IVs */
     int tls_aad_len;            /* TLS AAD length */
+    uint64_t tls_enc_records;   /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
     ctr128_f ctr;
 } EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
 
@@ -1069,6 +1070,7 @@ typedef struct {
     int kreslen;
 
     int tls_aad_len;
+    uint64_t tls_enc_records;   /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
 } S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -1692,6 +1694,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
         buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
         memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
         gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+        gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
 
         len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
         /* Correct length for explicit iv. */
@@ -1791,6 +1794,17 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
     if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
         return -1;
 
+    /*
+     * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+     * Requirements from SP 800-38D".  The requirements is for one party to the
+     * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys.  We do this on the encrypting
+     * side only.
+     */
+    if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
                                      : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
                             EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
@@ -2901,6 +2915,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
             return 0;
         memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
         gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+        gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
         {
             unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
             /* Correct length for explicit IV */
@@ -3035,6 +3050,18 @@ static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
     if (out != in
         || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
         return -1;
+    
+    /*
+     * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+     * Requirements from SP 800-38D".  The requirements is for one party to the
+     * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys.  We do this on the encrypting
+     * side only.
+     */
+    if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
      * buffer.
index 3e14a7b509496a2ab9651f81a3c9a645731087a3..ec6efb6e978ae722dc208fdc3dd25d3d900c4929 100644 (file)
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, 0), "aesni_init_key"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, 0), "aes_gcm_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, 0), "aes_gcm_tls_cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_init_key"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER, 0), "aes_ocb_cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_t4_init_key"},
@@ -148,6 +149,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH, 0), "rc2_magic_to_meth"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_RC5_CTRL, 0), "rc5_ctrl"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, 0), "s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, 0),
+     "s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_UPDATE, 0), "update"},
     {0, NULL}
 };
@@ -239,6 +242,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),
     "private key encode error"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA), "public key not rsa"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS), "too many records"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER), "unknown cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION), "unknown option"},
index 3484fa841d15a9b8a5c0b224328b8f7878f5fa79..d2d44c24345147c40ef80f73c3d697f841779959 100644 (file)
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
  */
 # define EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY                             165
 # define EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL                               196
+# define EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER                         207
 # define EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY                               133
 # define EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER                             169
 # define EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY                            178
@@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH                          109
 # define EVP_F_RC5_CTRL                                   125
 # define EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL                         201
+# define EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER                   208
 # define EVP_F_UPDATE                                     173
 
 /*
@@ -174,6 +176,7 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR                   145
 # define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR                   146
 # define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA                         106
+# define EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS                           183
 # define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER                             160
 # define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST                             161
 # define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION                             169