refactor correct_password.c to avoid one if

Signed-off-by: walter harms <wharms@bfs.de>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>

diff --git a/libbb/correct_password.c b/libbb/correct_password.c
index 6301589e6ae2ba227d138fb3fff27ea025c5c5b9..7cabd33d075ade13e38e9fe8d17eb94a9d1c943a 100644 (file)
--- a/libbb/correct_password.c
+++ b/libbb/correct_password.c
@@ -41,12 +41,6 @@ int FAST_FUNC correct_password(const struct passwd *pw)
        char *unencrypted, *encrypted;
        const char *correct;
        int r;
-#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
-       /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
-       struct spwd spw;
-       char buffer[256];
-#endif
-
        /* fake salt. crypt() can choke otherwise. */
        correct = "aa";
        if (!pw) {
@@ -55,7 +49,10 @@ int FAST_FUNC correct_password(const struct passwd *pw)
        }
        correct = pw->pw_passwd;
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+       /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
        if ((correct[0] == 'x' || correct[0] == '*') && !correct[1]) {
+               struct spwd spw;
+               char buffer[256];
                /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
                 * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
                struct spwd *result = NULL;