OID NID.
[Steve Henson]
+ *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+ of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+ only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+ strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
[Steve Henson]
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:%s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error));
}
- else
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ /* Always print any error messages */
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return(0);
}
version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
}
+ else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ return -1;
+ }
else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
{
version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;
}
}
+ if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
}
/* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently
- * check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 and if
- * static DH client certificates can be used.
+ * check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if
+ * static DH client certificates can be used and optionally checks
+ * suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && !s->cert->key->digest)
return 0;
+ /* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it.
+ * This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
+ */
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
+ !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
+ return 0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
}
#endif
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || tls1_suiteb(s))
{
prio = srvr;
allow = clnt;
/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses
* an ephemeral EC key check it */
if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s);
+ ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
{
int ret=0;
const unsigned char *sig;
- size_t siglen;
+ size_t i, siglen;
int have_rsa_sign = 0, have_dsa_sign = 0, have_ecdsa_sign = 0;
int nostrict = 1;
unsigned long alg_k;
memcpy(p, s->cert->ctypes, s->cert->ctype_num);
return (int)s->cert->ctype_num;
}
- /* Else see if we have any signature algorithms configured */
- if (s->cert->client_sigalgs)
+ /* get configured sigalgs */
+ siglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sig);
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+ nostrict = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < siglen; i+=2, sig+=2)
{
- sig = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
- siglen = s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- {
- sig = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
- siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
- }
- /* If we have sigalgs work out if we can sign with RSA, DSA, ECDSA */
- if (sig)
- {
- size_t i;
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
- nostrict = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < siglen; i+=2, sig+=2)
+ switch(sig[1])
{
- switch(sig[1])
- {
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- have_rsa_sign = 1;
- break;
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ have_rsa_sign = 1;
+ break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
- have_dsa_sign = 1;
- break;
+ case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ have_dsa_sign = 1;
+ break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
- break;
- }
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
+ break;
}
}
- /* Otherwise allow anything */
- else
- {
- have_rsa_sign = 1;
- have_dsa_sign = 1;
- have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
- }
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
{
- /* Get NID of first shared curve */
- int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, 0);
+ /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+ int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
if (nid != NID_undef)
ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
}
/* Many implementations ignore some aspects of the TLS standards such as
* enforcing certifcate chain algorithms. When this is set we enforce them.
*/
-#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT 0x00000001L
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT 0x00000001L
+
+/* Suite B modes, takes same values as certificate verify flags */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY 0x10000
+/* Suite B 192 bit only mode */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS 0x20000
+/* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS 0x30000
+
+
/* Flags for building certificate chains */
/* Treat any existing certificates as untrusted CAs */
#define CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME 0x200
/* Cert type matches client types (always set for server cert) */
#define CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE 0x400
+/* Cert chain suitable to Suite B */
+#define CERT_PKEY_SUITEB 0x800
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
* they cannot be used to clear bits. */
#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
+#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST 380
#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
#define SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF 371
#define SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA 374
#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196
#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197
#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
+#define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE 379
#define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297
#define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG 327
#define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
#if 0
if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
if (i > 0)
return(retval);
}
+static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
+ const char **prule_str)
+ {
+ unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0;
+ if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128"))
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY"))
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+ else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192"))
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
+
+ if (suiteb_flags)
+ {
+ c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+ c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags;
+ }
+ else
+ suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+
+ if (!suiteb_flags)
+ return 1;
+ /* Check version */
+
+ switch(suiteb_flags)
+ {
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
- const char *rule_str)
+ const char *rule_str, CERT *c)
{
int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl;
if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
return NULL;
+ if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str))
+ return NULL;
+
+
/*
* To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
* in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST) ,"illegal Suite B digest"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF) ,"invalid audit proof"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA) ,"invalid authz data"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),"null ssl method passed"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),"old session cipher not returned"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),"old session compression algorithm not returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE),"only TLS 1.2 allowed in Suite B mode"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"only tls allowed in fips mode"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),"opaque PRF input too long"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"packet length too long"},
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
- meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+ meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
- &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+ &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str, ctx->cert);
/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
* was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
* (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
- &s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+ &s->cipher_list_by_id,str, s->cert);
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
- meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+ meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert);
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
|| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
{
*/
int valid_flags;
} CERT_PKEY;
+/* Retrieve Suite B flags */
+#define tls1_suiteb(s) (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
+/* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \
+ (SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
typedef struct cert_st
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted,
- const char *rule_str);
+ const char *rule_str, CERT *c);
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s,const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
int *curves, size_t ncurves);
int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
const char *str);
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s);
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
};
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
+ {
+ 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+ 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+ };
+
int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
{
/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
{
*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
*pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ return;
}
- else
+ /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+ switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+ *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+ *pcurveslen = 2;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+ *pcurveslen = 2;
+ break;
+ default:
*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
*pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
- /* If not set use default: for now static structure */
if (!*pcurves)
{
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
{
const unsigned char *curves;
size_t curveslen, i;
+ unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
return 0;
+ /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+ if (suiteb_flags)
+ {
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+ if (p[1])
+ return 0;
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+ {
+ if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+ {
+ if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else /* Should never happen */
+ return 0;
+ }
tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
{
}
/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
- * matches.
+ * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key.
*/
int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
+ if (nmatch == -2)
+ {
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
+ * already know these are acceptable due to previous
+ * checks.
+ */
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+ return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return NID_undef;
+ }
+ /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+ nmatch = 0;
+ }
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
&supp, &supplen);
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
if (i == plen)
return 0;
}
+ if (!curve_id)
+ return 1;
/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
{
}
if (i == plen)
return 0;
+ /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+ if (!s->server)
+ return 1;
}
return 1;
}
/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
* EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
*/
-static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
{
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (!rv)
return 0;
- return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
+ /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
+ * supported curves extension.
+ */
+ rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+ if (!rv)
+ return 0;
+ /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+ * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+ */
+ if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ int check_md;
+ size_t i;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ if (curve_id[0])
+ return 0;
+ /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+ if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+ else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+ else
+ return 0; /* Should never happen */
+ for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+ if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+ break;
+ if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+ return 0;
+ if (set_ee_md == 2)
+ {
+ if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
+ else
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
}
/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
{
unsigned char curve_id[2];
EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
+ * no other curves permitted.
+ */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+ curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+ else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+ curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ curve_id[0] = 0;
+ /* Check this curve is acceptable */
+ if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+ return 1;
+ /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
+ if (!ec)
+ return 0;
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
+ return 0;
+ if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ }
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
{
/* Need a shared curve */
#endif
};
+static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
+
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
{
+ /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+ * preferences.
+ */
+ switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+ return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+ return 2;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+ return 2;
+ }
+
/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+ /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+ return 0;
+ if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
+ return 0;
+ /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ if (curve_id[0])
+ return 0;
+ if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ {
+ if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ {
+ if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ return 0;
+
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
break;
}
/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
- if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
+ if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
size_t nmatch;
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
+ unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
- if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
+ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
}
- else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+ else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
}
else
- {
- conf = tls12_sigalgs;
- conflen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- conflen -= 2;
-#endif
- }
- if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+ if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
{
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
* use the certificate for signing.
*/
- if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
+ if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
{
/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
* not supported it stays as NULL.
int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
- /* idx != -1 means checking server chains */
+ unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+ /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
if (idx != -1)
{
- cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+ /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+ if (idx == -2)
+ {
+ cpk = c->key;
+ idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+ }
+ else
+ cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
x = cpk->x509;
pk = cpk->privatekey;
chain = cpk->chain;
- strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT;
+ strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
if (!x || !pk)
goto end;
if (idx == -1)
goto end;
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
- if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
+ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
else
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
strict_mode = 1;
}
+ if (suiteb_flags)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ if (check_flags)
+ check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+ ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+ if (ok != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ if (check_flags)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+ else
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
* signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
else if(check_flags)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
skip_sigs:
- /* Check cert parameters are consistent: server certs only */
- if (!s->server || tls1_check_cert_param(s, x))
+ /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+ if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
else if (!check_flags)
goto end;
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
- if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i)))
+ X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
{
if (check_flags)
{
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
cpk->valid_flags = rv;
else
- cpk->valid_flags = 0;
+ {
+ /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+ cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
return rv;
}
/* Flag set for unrecognised algorithms */
#define TLSEXT_nid_unknown 0x1000000
+/* ECC curves */
+
+#define TLSEXT_curve_P_256 23
+#define TLSEXT_curve_P_384 24
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
#define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff