{
md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
+ if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+ entropy += add;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
#ifndef THREADS
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
#endif
- if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
- entropy += add;
}
static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- /* Use a random entropy pool device. Linux and FreeBSD have
- * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random will block
+ /* Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD
+ * have this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block
* if it runs out of random entries. */
if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL)
ssleay_rand_initialize();
ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+ if (!ok)
+ {
+ /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing
+ * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new
+ * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate.
+ * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to
+ * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious
+ * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness.
+ */
+ entropy -= num;
+ if (entropy < 0)
+ entropy = 0;
+ }
st_idx=state_index;
st_num=state_num;