Final part of flushing out SSLEay API's.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
*) All instances of the string "ssleay" in the public API were replaced
with OpenSSL (case-matching; e.g., OPENSSL_VERSION for #define's)
+ Some error codes related to internal RSA_eay API's were renamed.
[Rich Salz]
*) The demo files in crypto/threads were moved to demo/threads.
GENERAL=Makefile
LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
-LIBSRC= rsa_eay.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \
+LIBSRC= rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \
rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c rsa_null.c \
rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c
-LIBOBJ= rsa_eay.o rsa_gen.o rsa_lib.o rsa_sign.o rsa_saos.o rsa_err.o \
+LIBOBJ= rsa_ossl.o rsa_gen.o rsa_lib.o rsa_sign.o rsa_saos.o rsa_err.o \
rsa_pk1.o rsa_ssl.o rsa_none.o rsa_oaep.o rsa_chk.o rsa_null.o \
rsa_pss.o rsa_x931.o rsa_asn1.o rsa_depr.o rsa_ameth.o rsa_prn.o \
rsa_pmeth.o rsa_crpt.o rsa_x931g.o
rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
rsa_depr.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_depr.c
-rsa_eay.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/internal/bn_int.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c
rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
rsa_oaep.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_oaep.c
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/internal/bn_int.h
+rsa_ossl.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_ossl.c
rsa_pk1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/internal/constant_time_locl.h
rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+++ /dev/null
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/bn_int.h"
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#ifndef RSA_NULL
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = {
- "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
- RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
- RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
- * if e == 3 */
- RSA_eay_init,
- RSA_eay_finish,
- RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
- NULL,
- 0, /* rsa_sign */
- 0, /* rsa_verify */
- NULL /* rsa_keygen */
-};
-
-const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
-{
- return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret;
- int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding) {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n))
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
- * modulus
- */
- j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
- i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
- for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
- to[k] = 0;
-
- r = num;
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
-}
-
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_BLINDING *ret;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
-
- ret = rsa->blinding;
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) {
- /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-
- *local = 1;
- } else {
- /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-
- /*
- * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
- * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
- * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
- */
- *local = 0;
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
- if (!got_write_lock) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
- }
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
- ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
- }
-
- err:
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (unblind == NULL)
- /*
- * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
- */
- return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else {
- /*
- * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
- */
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- /*
- * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
- * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
- * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
- * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
- * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
- * to access the blinding without a lock.
- */
- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
-}
-
-/* signing */
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
- int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- /*
- * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
- * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
- * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
- */
- BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding) {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL) {
- if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else {
- BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_d = d = BN_new();
- if (d == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_free(local_d);
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
- if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
- res = f;
- else
- res = ret;
- } else
- res = ret;
-
- /*
- * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
- * modulus
- */
- j = BN_num_bytes(res);
- i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
- for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
- to[k] = 0;
-
- r = num;
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret;
- int j, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- /*
- * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
- * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
- * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
- */
- BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
- * top '0' bytes
- */
- if (flen > num) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
- RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL) {
- if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else {
- BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_d = d = BN_new();
- if (d == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_free(local_d);
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- p = buf;
- j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding) {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
- break;
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
-}
-
-/* signature verification */
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret;
- int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
- * top '0' bytes
- */
- if (flen > num) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n))
- goto err;
-
- if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
- if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
- goto err;
-
- p = buf;
- i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
-
- switch (padding) {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
- BIGNUM *local_dmp1, *local_dmq1, *local_c, *local_r1;
- BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
- int ret = 0;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- local_dmp1 = BN_new();
- local_dmq1 = BN_new();
- local_c = BN_new();
- local_r1 = BN_new();
- if (local_dmp1 == NULL
- || local_dmq1 == NULL || local_c == NULL || local_r1 == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- {
- BIGNUM *local_p = NULL, *local_q = NULL;
- BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
- * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
- */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_p = p = BN_new();
- if (p == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- local_q = q = BN_new();
- if (q == NULL) {
- BN_free(local_p);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- p = rsa->p;
- q = rsa->q;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)
- || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_p);
- BN_free(local_q);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- BN_free(local_p);
- BN_free(local_q);
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* compute I mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- c = local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- dmq1 = local_dmq1;
- BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q))
- goto err;
-
- /* compute I mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- c = local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- dmp1 = local_dmp1;
- BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
- goto err;
- /*
- * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
- * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
- */
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- pr1 = local_r1;
- BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- pr1 = r1;
- if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
- * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
- * break the private key operations: the following second correction
- * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
- * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
- */
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
- goto err;
-
- if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n))
- goto err;
- /*
- * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
- * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
- * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
- * absolute equality, just congruency.
- */
- if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
- if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
- /*
- * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
- * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
- * return that instead.
- */
-
- BIGNUM *local_d = NULL;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_d = d = BN_new();
- if (d == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- d = rsa->d;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_free(local_d);
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(local_dmp1);
- BN_free(local_dmq1);
- BN_free(local_c);
- BN_free(local_r1);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
-{
- rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
-{
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
- return (1);
-}
-
-#endif
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX), "RSA_check_key_ex"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT), "rsa_cms_decrypt"},
- {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_eay_private_decrypt"},
- {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_eay_private_encrypt"},
- {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_eay_public_decrypt"},
- {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_eay_public_encrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_decrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_encrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_decrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_encrypt"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY), "RSA_generate_key"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "rsa_item_verify"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK), "RSA_memory_lock"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_public_encrypt"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OAEP_TO_CTX), "RSA_OAEP_TO_CTX"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
- {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP),
- "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1),
"RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "rsa_pub_decode"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"},
- {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
- "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
"RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01), "block type is not 01"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02), "block type is not 02"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN),
- "data greater than mod len"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN), "data greater than mod len"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
"data too large for key size"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),
- "null before block missing"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING), "null before block missing"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q), "n does not equal p q"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR), "oaep decoding error"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#ifndef RSA_NULL
+
+static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = {
+ "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA (from Eric Young)",
+ rsa_ossl_public_encrypt,
+ rsa_ossl_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ rsa_ossl_private_encrypt, /* signing */
+ rsa_ossl_private_decrypt,
+ rsa_ossl_mod_exp,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
+ * if e == 3 */
+ rsa_ossl_init,
+ rsa_ossl_finish,
+ RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
+ NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0, /* rsa_verify */
+ NULL /* rsa_keygen */
+};
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+ return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+ * modulus
+ */
+ j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
+ for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+ to[k] = 0;
+
+ r = num;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+ return (r);
+}
+
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_BLINDING *ret;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+
+ ret = rsa->blinding;
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) {
+ /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
+
+ *local = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
+
+ /*
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
+ * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
+ * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
+ */
+ *local = 0;
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
+ if (!got_write_lock) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+ ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (unblind == NULL)
+ /*
+ * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+ else {
+ /*
+ * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
+ */
+ int ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ return ret;
+ }
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+ * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
+ * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+ * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
+ * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
+ * to access the blinding without a lock.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+}
+
+/* signing */
+static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
+ int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ /*
+ * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+ */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL) {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ local_d = d = BN_new();
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
+ if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
+ res = f;
+ else
+ res = ret;
+ } else
+ res = ret;
+
+ /*
+ * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+ * modulus
+ */
+ j = BN_num_bytes(res);
+ i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
+ for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+ to[k] = 0;
+
+ r = num;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+ return (r);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ /*
+ * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+ */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+ * top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* make data into a big number */
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL) {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* do the decrypt */
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ local_d = d = BN_new();
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = buf;
+ j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+ return (r);
+}
+
+/* signature verification */
+static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+ * top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
+ if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = buf;
+ i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+ return (r);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
+ BIGNUM *local_dmp1, *local_dmq1, *local_c, *local_r1;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ local_dmp1 = BN_new();
+ local_dmq1 = BN_new();
+ local_c = BN_new();
+ local_r1 = BN_new();
+ if (local_dmp1 == NULL
+ || local_dmq1 == NULL || local_c == NULL || local_r1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ {
+ BIGNUM *local_p = NULL, *local_q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
+ */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ local_p = p = BN_new();
+ if (p == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ local_q = q = BN_new();
+ if (q == NULL) {
+ BN_free(local_p);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else {
+ p = rsa->p;
+ q = rsa->q;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)
+ || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(local_p);
+ BN_free(local_q);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(local_p);
+ BN_free(local_q);
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute I mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ c = local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ dmq1 = local_dmq1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute I mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ c = local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ dmp1 = local_dmp1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
+ * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
+ */
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ pr1 = local_r1;
+ BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ pr1 = r1;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
+ * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
+ * break the private key operations: the following second correction
+ * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
+ * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
+ * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
+ * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
+ * absolute equality, just congruency.
+ */
+ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+ /*
+ * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
+ * return that instead.
+ */
+
+ BIGNUM *local_d = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ local_d = d = BN_new();
+ if (d == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_free(local_d);
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(local_dmp1);
+ BN_free(local_dmq1);
+ BN_free(local_c);
+ BN_free(local_r1);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#endif
# define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY 123
# define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX 160
# define RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT 159
-# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 101
-# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 102
-# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103
-# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 101
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 102
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104
# define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY 105
# define RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY 148
# define RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK 130
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff