+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
-# define _GNU_SOURCE
-#endif
-#include "e_os.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/dso.h"
-
-#ifdef __linux
-# include <sys/syscall.h>
-# ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
-# include <sys/shm.h>
-# include <sys/utsname.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/sysctl.h>
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
- || defined(__DJGPP__)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
-
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
-
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-# define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
-
-/*
- * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard
- * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
- * are available.
- *
- * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
- * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc
- * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
- * so this needs to be checked for.
- *
- * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
- * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means
- * an extra check is needed.
- *
- * The final condition is:
- * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
- *
- * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
- * macro that might be undefined.
- */
-# undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
-# if defined(__GLIBC__)
-# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
-# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-# endif
-# else
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
- || defined(__DJGPP__) */
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-/* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-# error "UEFI only supports seeding NONE"
-#endif
-
-#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \
- || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
- || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-# error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time."
-# endif
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-# error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32"
-# endif
-
-/*
- * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
- * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the
- * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
- * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
- * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
- * it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
- * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
- * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
- * would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy
- * platforms.
- *
- * As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte.
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- short int code;
- int i, k;
- size_t bytes_needed;
- struct timespec ts;
- unsigned char v;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
- long duration;
- extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
-# else
- long long duration;
- extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
-# endif
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/);
-
- for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
- /*
- * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
- * interference, etc.
- */
- for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
- ts.tv_nsec = random();
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
- /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */
- duration = 1;
- s$sleep(&duration, &code);
-# else
- /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */
- duration = 1;
- s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
-# endif
-
- /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
- v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
- rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
- }
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-# else
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \
- (defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
-# error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given"
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-# error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured"
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
-# if !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-# error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured"
-# endif
-# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
-# error "librandom not (yet) supported"
-# endif
-
-# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
-/*
- * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
- * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
- int mib[2];
- size_t done = 0;
- size_t len;
-
- /*
- * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
- * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
- */
-
- /*
- * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
- * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
- * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
- * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
- */
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
- if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
- errno = EINVAL;
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
- * filled in an int, leaving the rest uninitialized. Since NetBSD 4.0
- * it returns a variable number of bytes with the current version supporting
- * up to 256 bytes.
- * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
- */
-#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
- errno = ENOSYS;
- return -1;
-#endif
-
- mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
- mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
-
- do {
- len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
- if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
- return done > 0 ? done : -1;
- done += len;
- buf += len;
- buflen -= len;
- } while (buflen > 0);
-
- return done;
-}
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-
-# if defined(__linux) && !defined(__NR_getrandom)
-# if defined(__arm__)
-# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384)
-# elif defined(__i386__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 355
-# elif defined(__x86_64__)
-# if defined(__ILP32__)
-# define __NR_getrandom (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 318)
-# else
-# define __NR_getrandom 318
-# endif
-# elif defined(__xtensa__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 338
-# elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 349
-# elif defined(__bfin__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 389
-# elif defined(__powerpc__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 359
-# elif defined(__mips__) || defined(__mips64)
-# if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32
-# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 353)
-# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
-# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 313)
-# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
-# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 317)
-# endif
-# elif defined(__hppa__)
-# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 339)
-# elif defined(__sparc__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 347
-# elif defined(__ia64__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 1339
-# elif defined(__alpha__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 511
-# elif defined(__sh__)
-# if defined(__SH5__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 373
-# else
-# define __NR_getrandom 384
-# endif
-# elif defined(__avr32__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 317
-# elif defined(__microblaze__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 385
-# elif defined(__m68k__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 352
-# elif defined(__cris__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 356
-# elif defined(__aarch64__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 278
-# else /* generic */
-# define __NR_getrandom 278
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/*
- * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
- * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
- */
-static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
- /*
- * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
- * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
- *
- * 2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14
- *
- * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
- * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
- */
-
- /*
- * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
- *
- * Known OSs that should support this:
- * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
- * - Solaris since 11.3
- * - OpenBSD since 5.6
- * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
- * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
- */
-# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
- extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
-
- if (getentropy != NULL)
- return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-# elif !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
- union {
- void *p;
- int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
- } p_getentropy;
-
- /*
- * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
- * call this function often.
- */
- ERR_set_mark();
- p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
- return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-# endif
-
- /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
-# if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
- return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
-# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
- return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
-# else
- errno = ENOSYS;
- return -1;
-# endif
-}
-# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
-static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM };
-static struct random_device {
- int fd;
- dev_t dev;
- ino_t ino;
- mode_t mode;
- dev_t rdev;
-} random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)];
-static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
-
-# if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \
- && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-static void *shm_addr;
-
-# if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-static void cleanup_shm(void)
-{
- shmdt(shm_addr);
-}
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Ensure that the system randomness source has been adequately seeded.
- * This is done by having the first start of libcrypto, wait until the device
- * /dev/random becomes able to supply a byte of entropy. Subsequent starts
- * of the library and later reseedings do not need to do this.
- */
-static int wait_random_seeded(void)
-{
- static int seeded = OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID < 0;
- static const int kernel_version[] = { DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL };
- int kernel[2];
- int shm_id, fd, r;
- char c, *p;
- struct utsname un;
- fd_set fds;
-
- if (!seeded) {
- /* See if anything has created the global seeded indication */
- if ((shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, 0)) == -1) {
- /*
- * Check the kernel's version and fail if it is too recent.
- *
- * Linux kernels from 4.8 onwards do not guarantee that
- * /dev/urandom is properly seeded when /dev/random becomes
- * readable. However, such kernels support the getentropy(2)
- * system call and this should always succeed which renders
- * this alternative but essentially identical source moot.
- */
- if (uname(&un) == 0) {
- kernel[0] = atoi(un.release);
- p = strchr(un.release, '.');
- kernel[1] = p == NULL ? 0 : atoi(p + 1);
- if (kernel[0] > kernel_version[0]
- || (kernel[0] == kernel_version[0]
- && kernel[1] >= kernel_version[1])) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Open /dev/random and wait for it to be readable */
- if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
- if (DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT && fd < FD_SETSIZE) {
- FD_ZERO(&fds);
- FD_SET(fd, &fds);
- while ((r = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL)) < 0
- && errno == EINTR);
- } else {
- while ((r = read(fd, &c, 1)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
- }
- close(fd);
- if (r == 1) {
- seeded = 1;
- /* Create the shared memory indicator */
- shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1,
- IPC_CREAT | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
- }
- }
- }
- if (shm_id != -1) {
- seeded = 1;
- /*
- * Map the shared memory to prevent its premature destruction.
- * If this call fails, it isn't a big problem.
- */
- shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
-# ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- /* TODO 3.0: The FIPS provider doesn't have OPENSSL_atexit */
- if (shm_addr != (void *)-1)
- OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm);
-# endif
- }
- }
- return seeded;
-}
-# else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */
-static int wait_random_seeded(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is
- * still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not
- * uncommon for daemons to close all open file handles when daemonizing.
- * So the handle might have been closed or even reused for opening
- * another file.
- */
-static int check_random_device(struct random_device * rd)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- return rd->fd != -1
- && fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1
- && rd->dev == st.st_dev
- && rd->ino == st.st_ino
- && ((rd->mode ^ st.st_mode) & ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) == 0
- && rd->rdev == st.st_rdev;
-}
-
-/*
- * Open a random device if required and return its file descriptor or -1 on error
- */
-static int get_random_device(size_t n)
-{
- struct stat st;
- struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
- /* reuse existing file descriptor if it is (still) valid */
- if (check_random_device(rd))
- return rd->fd;
-
- /* open the random device ... */
- if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- return rd->fd;
-
- /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */
- if (fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1) {
- rd->dev = st.st_dev;
- rd->ino = st.st_ino;
- rd->mode = st.st_mode;
- rd->rdev = st.st_rdev;
- } else {
- close(rd->fd);
- rd->fd = -1;
- }
-
- return rd->fd;
-}
-
-/*
- * Close a random device making sure it is a random device
- */
-static void close_random_device(size_t n)
-{
- struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
- if (check_random_device(rd))
- close(rd->fd);
- rd->fd = -1;
-}
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
- size_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
- random_devices[i].fd = -1;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
- size_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
- close_random_device(i);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
- if (!keep)
- rand_pool_cleanup();
-
- keep_random_devices_open = keep;
-}
-
-# else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-/*
- * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful.
- *
- * TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it
- * preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected
- * (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add
- * more entropy than requested and/or from different sources?
- *
- * Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the
- * configure step, yet in practice only the first available source
- * will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but
- * currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without
- * overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which
- * could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount
- * of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality,
- * possibility of blocking).
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-# else
- size_t entropy_available;
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
- {
- size_t bytes_needed;
- unsigned char *buffer;
- ssize_t bytes;
- /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
- int attempts = 3;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
- if (bytes > 0) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- bytes_needed -= bytes;
- attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
- } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
- {
- /* Not yet implemented. */
- }
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
- if (wait_random_seeded()) {
- size_t bytes_needed;
- unsigned char *buffer;
- size_t i;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths);
- i++) {
- ssize_t bytes = 0;
- /* Maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
- int attempts = 3;
- const int fd = get_random_device(i);
-
- if (fd == -1)
- continue;
-
- while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
-
- if (bytes > 0) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- bytes_needed -= bytes;
- attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */
- } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
- break;
- }
- }
- if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
- close_random_device(i);
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
- }
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
- }
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC)
- entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU)
- entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD)
- {
- static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
- size_t bytes_needed;
- unsigned char *buffer;
- int i;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
- int num;
-
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i],
- buffer, (int)bytes_needed);
- if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
-
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
- }
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
- }
-# endif
-
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-# endif
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
- || defined(__DJGPP__)
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- pid_t pid;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
- * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
- * different process instances.
- */
- data.pid = getpid();
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- data.time = get_time_stamp();
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- int fork_id;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
- * The fork_id adds some extra fork-safety.
- * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
- * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
- */
- data.fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- data.time = get_timer_bits();
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating.
- * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock
- * is synchronized.
- */
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
-{
-# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
- {
- struct timespec ts;
-
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
- || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
- {
- struct timeval tv;
-
- if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
- }
-# endif
- return time(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data,
- * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result
- * is acceptable.
- */
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
-{
- uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-
- if (res != 0)
- return res;
-
-# if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
- return gethrtime();
-# elif defined(_AIX)
- {
- timebasestruct_t t;
-
- read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
- return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
- }
-# elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
- {
- struct timespec ts;
-
-# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-# elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
-# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC
-# else
-# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME
-# endif
-
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
- || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
- {
- struct timeval tv;
-
- if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
- }
-# endif
- return time(NULL);
-}
-#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
- || defined(__DJGPP__) */
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#define __NEW_STARLET 1 /* New starlet definitions since VMS 7.0 */
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include <descrip.h>
-#include <dvidef.h>
-#include <jpidef.h>
-#include <rmidef.h>
-#include <syidef.h>
-#include <ssdef.h>
-#include <starlet.h>
-#include <efndef.h>
-#include <gen64def.h>
-#include <iosbdef.h>
-#include <iledef.h>
-#include <lib$routines.h>
-#ifdef __DECC
-# pragma message disable DOLLARID
-#endif
-
-#include <dlfcn.h> /* SYS$GET_ENTROPY presence */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * DATA COLLECTION METHOD
- * ======================
- *
- * This is a method to get low quality entropy.
- * It works by collecting all kinds of statistical data that
- * VMS offers and using them as random seed.
- */
-
-/* We need to make sure we have the right size pointer in some cases */
-#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
-# pragma pointer_size save
-# pragma pointer_size 32
-#endif
-typedef uint32_t *uint32_t__ptr32;
-#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
-# pragma pointer_size restore
-#endif
-
-struct item_st {
- short length, code; /* length is number of bytes */
-};
-
-static const struct item_st DVI_item_data[] = {
- {4, DVI$_ERRCNT},
- {4, DVI$_REFCNT},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st JPI_item_data[] = {
- {4, JPI$_BUFIO},
- {4, JPI$_CPUTIM},
- {4, JPI$_DIRIO},
- {4, JPI$_IMAGECOUNT},
- {4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS},
- {4, JPI$_PID},
- {4, JPI$_PPGCNT},
- {4, JPI$_WSPEAK},
- /*
- * Note: the direct result is just a 32-bit address. However, it points
- * to a list of 4 32-bit words, so we make extra space for them so we can
- * do in-place replacement of values
- */
- {16, JPI$_FINALEXC},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st JPI_item_data_64bit[] = {
- {8, JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I},
- {8, JPI$_LOGINTIM},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st RMI_item_data[] = {
- {4, RMI$_COLPG},
- {4, RMI$_MWAIT},
- {4, RMI$_CEF},
- {4, RMI$_PFW},
- {4, RMI$_LEF},
- {4, RMI$_LEFO},
- {4, RMI$_HIB},
- {4, RMI$_HIBO},
- {4, RMI$_SUSP},
- {4, RMI$_SUSPO},
- {4, RMI$_FPG},
- {4, RMI$_COM},
- {4, RMI$_COMO},
- {4, RMI$_CUR},
-#if defined __alpha
- {4, RMI$_FRLIST},
- {4, RMI$_MODLIST},
-#endif
- {4, RMI$_FAULTS},
- {4, RMI$_PREADS},
- {4, RMI$_PWRITES},
- {4, RMI$_PWRITIO},
- {4, RMI$_PREADIO},
- {4, RMI$_GVALFLTS},
- {4, RMI$_WRTINPROG},
- {4, RMI$_FREFLTS},
- {4, RMI$_DZROFLTS},
- {4, RMI$_SYSFAULTS},
- {4, RMI$_ISWPCNT},
- {4, RMI$_DIRIO},
- {4, RMI$_BUFIO},
- {4, RMI$_MBREADS},
- {4, RMI$_MBWRITES},
- {4, RMI$_LOGNAM},
- {4, RMI$_FCPCALLS},
- {4, RMI$_FCPREAD},
- {4, RMI$_FCPWRITE},
- {4, RMI$_FCPCACHE},
- {4, RMI$_FCPCPU},
- {4, RMI$_FCPHIT},
- {4, RMI$_FCPSPLIT},
- {4, RMI$_FCPFAULT},
- {4, RMI$_ENQNEW},
- {4, RMI$_ENQCVT},
- {4, RMI$_DEQ},
- {4, RMI$_BLKAST},
- {4, RMI$_ENQWAIT},
- {4, RMI$_ENQNOTQD},
- {4, RMI$_DLCKSRCH},
- {4, RMI$_DLCKFND},
- {4, RMI$_NUMLOCKS},
- {4, RMI$_NUMRES},
- {4, RMI$_ARRLOCPK},
- {4, RMI$_DEPLOCPK},
- {4, RMI$_ARRTRAPK},
- {4, RMI$_TRCNGLOS},
- {4, RMI$_RCVBUFFL},
- {4, RMI$_ENQNEWLOC},
- {4, RMI$_ENQNEWIN},
- {4, RMI$_ENQNEWOUT},
- {4, RMI$_ENQCVTLOC},
- {4, RMI$_ENQCVTIN},
- {4, RMI$_ENQCVTOUT},
- {4, RMI$_DEQLOC},
- {4, RMI$_DEQIN},
- {4, RMI$_DEQOUT},
- {4, RMI$_BLKLOC},
- {4, RMI$_BLKIN},
- {4, RMI$_BLKOUT},
- {4, RMI$_DIRIN},
- {4, RMI$_DIROUT},
- /* We currently get a fault when trying these. TODO: To be figured out. */
-#if 0
- {140, RMI$_MSCP_EVERYTHING}, /* 35 32-bit words */
- {152, RMI$_DDTM_ALL}, /* 38 32-bit words */
- {80, RMI$_TMSCP_EVERYTHING} /* 20 32-bit words */
-#endif
- {4, RMI$_LPZ_PAGCNT},
- {4, RMI$_LPZ_HITS},
- {4, RMI$_LPZ_MISSES},
- {4, RMI$_LPZ_EXPCNT},
- {4, RMI$_LPZ_ALLOCF},
- {4, RMI$_LPZ_ALLOC2},
- {4, RMI$_ACCESS},
- {4, RMI$_ALLOC},
- {4, RMI$_FCPCREATE},
- {4, RMI$_VOLWAIT},
- {4, RMI$_FCPTURN},
- {4, RMI$_FCPERASE},
- {4, RMI$_OPENS},
- {4, RMI$_FIDHIT},
- {4, RMI$_FIDMISS},
- {4, RMI$_FILHDR_HIT},
- {4, RMI$_DIRFCB_HIT},
- {4, RMI$_DIRFCB_MISS},
- {4, RMI$_DIRDATA_HIT},
- {4, RMI$_EXTHIT},
- {4, RMI$_EXTMISS},
- {4, RMI$_QUOHIT},
- {4, RMI$_QUOMISS},
- {4, RMI$_STORAGMAP_HIT},
- {4, RMI$_VOLLCK},
- {4, RMI$_SYNCHLCK},
- {4, RMI$_SYNCHWAIT},
- {4, RMI$_ACCLCK},
- {4, RMI$_XQPCACHEWAIT},
- {4, RMI$_DIRDATA_MISS},
- {4, RMI$_FILHDR_MISS},
- {4, RMI$_STORAGMAP_MISS},
- {4, RMI$_PROCCNTMAX},
- {4, RMI$_PROCBATCNT},
- {4, RMI$_PROCINTCNT},
- {4, RMI$_PROCNETCNT},
- {4, RMI$_PROCSWITCHCNT},
- {4, RMI$_PROCBALSETCNT},
- {4, RMI$_PROCLOADCNT},
- {4, RMI$_BADFLTS},
- {4, RMI$_EXEFAULTS},
- {4, RMI$_HDRINSWAPS},
- {4, RMI$_HDROUTSWAPS},
- {4, RMI$_IOPAGCNT},
- {4, RMI$_ISWPCNTPG},
- {4, RMI$_OSWPCNT},
- {4, RMI$_OSWPCNTPG},
- {4, RMI$_RDFAULTS},
- {4, RMI$_TRANSFLTS},
- {4, RMI$_WRTFAULTS},
-#if defined __alpha
- {4, RMI$_USERPAGES},
-#endif
- {4, RMI$_VMSPAGES},
- {4, RMI$_TTWRITES},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAG},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAK},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS01},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS2},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS01},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS2},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS01},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS2},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS01},
- {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS2},
- {4, RMI$_DLCK_INCMPLT},
- {4, RMI$_DLCKMSGS_IN},
- {4, RMI$_DLCKMSGS_OUT},
- {4, RMI$_MCHKERRS},
- {4, RMI$_MEMERRS},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st RMI_item_data_64bit[] = {
-#if defined __ia64
- {8, RMI$_FRLIST},
- {8, RMI$_MODLIST},
-#endif
- {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_REQCNT},
- {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_REQTIME},
- {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINCNT},
- {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINTIME},
- {8, RMI$_CPUINTSTK},
- {8, RMI$_CPUMPSYNCH},
- {8, RMI$_CPUKERNEL},
- {8, RMI$_CPUEXEC},
- {8, RMI$_CPUSUPER},
- {8, RMI$_CPUUSER},
-#if defined __ia64
- {8, RMI$_USERPAGES},
-#endif
- {8, RMI$_TQETOTAL},
- {8, RMI$_TQESYSUB},
- {8, RMI$_TQEUSRTIMR},
- {8, RMI$_TQEUSRWAKE},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st SYI_item_data[] = {
- {4, SYI$_PAGEFILE_FREE},
-};
-
-/*
- * Input:
- * items_data - an array of lengths and codes
- * items_data_num - number of elements in that array
- *
- * Output:
- * items - pre-allocated ILE3 array to be filled.
- * It's assumed to have items_data_num elements plus
- * one extra for the terminating NULL element
- * databuffer - pre-allocated 32-bit word array.
- *
- * Returns the number of elements used in databuffer
- */
-static size_t prepare_item_list(const struct item_st *items_input,
- size_t items_input_num,
- ILE3 *items,
- uint32_t__ptr32 databuffer)
-{
- size_t data_sz = 0;
-
- for (; items_input_num-- > 0; items_input++, items++) {
-
- items->ile3$w_code = items_input->code;
- /* Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC */
- if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC)
- items->ile3$w_length = 4;
- else
- items->ile3$w_length = items_input->length;
-
- items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = databuffer;
- items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = 0;
-
- databuffer += items_input->length / sizeof(databuffer[0]);
- data_sz += items_input->length;
- }
- /* Terminating NULL entry */
- items->ile3$w_length = items->ile3$w_code = 0;
- items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = NULL;
-
- return data_sz / sizeof(databuffer[0]);
-}
-
-static void massage_JPI(ILE3 *items)
-{
- /*
- * Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC
- * The result of that item's data buffer is a 32-bit address to a list of
- * 4 32-bit words.
- */
- for (; items->ile3$w_length != 0; items++) {
- if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC) {
- uint32_t *data = items->ile3$ps_bufaddr;
- uint32_t *ptr = (uint32_t *)*data;
- size_t j;
-
- /*
- * We know we made space for 4 32-bit words, so we can do in-place
- * replacement.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
- data[j] = ptr[j];
-
- break;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * This number expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy.
- *
- * For the moment, we assume about 0.05 entropy bits per data bit, or 1
- * bit of entropy per 20 data bits.
- */
-#define ENTROPY_FACTOR 20
-
-size_t data_collect_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- ILE3 JPI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) + 1];
- ILE3 RMI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) + 1];
- ILE3 DVI_items[OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data) + 1];
- ILE3 JPI_items[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data) + 1];
- ILE3 RMI_items[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data) + 1];
- ILE3 SYI_items[OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data) + 1];
- union {
- /* This ensures buffer starts at 64 bit boundary */
- uint64_t dummy;
- uint32_t buffer[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) * 2
- + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) * 2
- + OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data)
- + OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data)
- + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data)
- + OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data)
- + 4 /* For JPI$_FINALEXC */];
- } data;
- size_t total_elems = 0;
- size_t total_length = 0;
- size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, ENTROPY_FACTOR);
- size_t bytes_remaining = rand_pool_bytes_remaining(pool);
-
- /* Take all the 64-bit items first, to ensure proper alignment of data */
- total_elems +=
- prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit),
- JPI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
- total_elems +=
- prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit),
- RMI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
- /* Now the 32-bit items */
- total_elems += prepare_item_list(DVI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data),
- DVI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
- total_elems += prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data),
- JPI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
- total_elems += prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data),
- RMI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
- total_elems += prepare_item_list(SYI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data),
- SYI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
- total_length = total_elems * sizeof(data.buffer[0]);
-
- /* Fill data.buffer with various info bits from this process */
- {
- uint32_t status;
- uint32_t efn;
- IOSB iosb;
- $DESCRIPTOR(SYSDEVICE,"SYS$SYSDEVICE:");
-
- if ((status = sys$getdviw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, &SYSDEVICE, DVI_items,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items_64bit, 0, 0, 0))
- != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items, 0, 0, 0))
- != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = sys$getsyiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, SYI_items, 0, 0, 0))
- != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * The RMI service is a bit special, as there is no synchronous
- * variant, so we MUST create an event flag to synchronise on.
- */
- if ((status = lib$get_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items_64bit, &iosb, 0, 0))
- != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items, &iosb, 0, 0))
- != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((status = lib$free_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- massage_JPI(JPI_items);
-
- /*
- * If we can't feed the requirements from the caller, we're in deep trouble.
- */
- if (!ossl_assert(total_length >= bytes_needed)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_UNDERFLOW,
- "Needed: %zu, Available: %zu",
- bytes_needed, total_length);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Try not to overfeed the pool
- */
- if (total_length > bytes_remaining)
- total_length = bytes_remaining;
-
- /* We give the pessimistic value for the amount of entropy */
- rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)data.buffer, total_length,
- 8 * total_length / ENTROPY_FACTOR);
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- pid_t pid;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp
- * (where available, which is OpenVMS v8.4 and up) to ensure that
- * the nonce is unique with high probability for different process
- * instances.
- */
- data.pid = getpid();
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000
- sys$gettim_prec(&data.time);
-#else
- sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
-#endif
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-/*
- * SYS$GET_ENTROPY METHOD
- * ======================
- *
- * This is a high entropy method based on a new system service that is
- * based on getentropy() from FreeBSD 12. It's only used if available,
- * and its availability is detected at run-time.
- *
- * We assume that this function provides full entropy random output.
- */
-#define PUBLIC_VECTORS "SYS$LIBRARY:SYS$PUBLIC_VECTORS.EXE"
-#define GET_ENTROPY "SYS$GET_ENTROPY"
-
-static int get_entropy_address_flag = 0;
-static int (*get_entropy_address)(void *buffer, size_t buffer_size) = NULL;
-static int init_get_entropy_address(void)
-{
- if (get_entropy_address_flag == 0)
- get_entropy_address = dlsym(dlopen(PUBLIC_VECTORS, 0), GET_ENTROPY);
- get_entropy_address_flag = 1;
- return get_entropy_address != NULL;
-}
-
-size_t get_entropy_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- /*
- * The documentation says that SYS$GET_ENTROPY will give a maximum of
- * 256 bytes of data.
- */
- unsigned char buffer[256];
- size_t bytes_needed;
- size_t bytes_to_get = 0;
- uint32_t status;
-
- for (bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
- bytes_needed > 0;
- bytes_needed -= bytes_to_get) {
- bytes_to_get =
- bytes_needed > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : bytes_needed;
-
- status = get_entropy_address(buffer, bytes_to_get);
- if (status == SS$_RETRY) {
- /* Set to zero so the loop doesn't diminish |bytes_needed| */
- bytes_to_get = 0;
- /* Should sleep some amount of time */
- continue;
- }
-
- if (status != SS$_NORMAL) {
- lib$signal(status);
- return 0;
- }
-
- rand_pool_add(pool, buffer, bytes_to_get, 8 * bytes_to_get);
- }
-
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-/*
- * MAIN ENTROPY ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS
- * ==================================
- *
- * These functions are called by the RAND / DRBG functions
- */
-
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (init_get_entropy_address())
- return get_entropy_method(pool);
- return data_collect_method(pool);
-}
-
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
- * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
- * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
- */
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000
- sys$gettim_prec(&data.time);
-#else
- sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
-#endif
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <version.h>
-#include <taskLib.h>
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-/* none means none */
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
-# if _WRS_VXWORKS_MAJOR >= 7
-# define RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB
-# else
-# error "VxWorks <7 only support RAND_SEED_NONE"
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB)
-# include <randomNumGen.h>
-#endif
-
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-#define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
-
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
-{
- struct timespec ts;
-
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- return time(NULL);
-}
-
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
-{
- uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
- struct timespec ts;
-
- if (res != 0)
- return res;
-
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- return time(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * empty implementation
- * vxworks does not need to init/cleanup or keep open the random lib
- */
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
- * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
- * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
- */
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- data.time = get_timer_bits();
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- pid_t pid;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
- * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
- * different process instances.
- */
- data.pid = getpid();
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- data.time = get_time_stamp();
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB)
- /* vxRandLib based entropy method */
- size_t bytes_needed;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- if (bytes_needed > 0)
- {
- int retryCount = 0;
- STATUS result = ERROR;
- unsigned char *buffer;
-
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- while ((result != OK) && (retryCount < 10)) {
- RANDOM_NUM_GEN_STATUS status = randStatus();
-
- if ((status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_ENOUGH_ENTROPY)
- || (status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_MAX_ENTROPY) ) {
- result = randBytes(buffer, bytes_needed);
- if (result == OK)
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
- /*
- * no else here: randStatus said ok, if randBytes failed
- * it will result in another loop or no entropy
- */
- } else {
- /*
- * give a minimum delay here to allow OS to collect more
- * entropy. taskDelay duration will depend on the system tick,
- * this is by design as the sw-random lib uses interrupts
- * which will at least happen during ticks
- */
- taskDelay(5);
- }
- retryCount++;
- }
- }
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#else
- /*
- * SEED_NONE means none, without randlib we dont have entropy and
- * rely on it being added externally
- */
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#endif /* defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB) */
-}
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-# endif
-
-# include <windows.h>
-/* On Windows Vista or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */
-# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER > 1500 /* 1500 = Visual Studio 2008 */ \
- && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600
-# define USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
-# endif
-
-# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
-# include <bcrypt.h>
-# pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")
-# ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS
-# define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
-# endif
-# else
-# include <wincrypt.h>
-/*
- * Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from
- * http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm
- */
-# define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22
-# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
-# endif
-
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
- HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
-# endif
- unsigned char *buffer;
- size_t bytes_needed;
- size_t entropy_available = 0;
-
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
- entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
- entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
- if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buffer, bytes_needed,
- BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
-
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- }
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# else
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
- /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
- if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
- CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
- if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
-
- CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
- }
-
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- }
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
- /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
- if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL,
- INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC,
- CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
- if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
-
- CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
- }
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- }
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- DWORD pid;
- DWORD tid;
- FILETIME time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
- * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
- * different process instances.
- */
- data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
- data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
- GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&data.time);
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- DWORD tid;
- LARGE_INTEGER time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
- * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
- * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
- */
- data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
- QueryPerformanceCounter(&data.time);
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
-{
- RAND_poll();
- return RAND_status();
-}
-
-void RAND_screen(void)
-{
- RAND_poll();
-}
-# endif
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+# define _GNU_SOURCE
+#endif
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "rand_local.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/dso.h"
+
+#ifdef __linux
+# include <sys/syscall.h>
+# ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
+# include <sys/shm.h>
+# include <sys/utsname.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/sysctl.h>
+# include <sys/param.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
+# include <sys/param.h>
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
+ || defined(__DJGPP__)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <sys/time.h>
+
+static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
+static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
+
+/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
+# define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
+
+/*
+ * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard
+ * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
+ * are available.
+ *
+ * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
+ * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc
+ * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
+ * so this needs to be checked for.
+ *
+ * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
+ * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means
+ * an extra check is needed.
+ *
+ * The final condition is:
+ * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
+ *
+ * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
+ * macro that might be undefined.
+ */
+# undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
+# if defined(__GLIBC__)
+# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
+# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# endif
+# endif
+# else
+# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
+ || defined(__DJGPP__) */
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
+/* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
+# error "UEFI only supports seeding NONE"
+#endif
+
+#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \
+ || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
+ || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
+# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
+# error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time."
+# endif
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
+# error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32"
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
+ * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the
+ * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
+ * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
+ * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
+ * it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
+ * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
+ * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
+ * would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy
+ * platforms.
+ *
+ * As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte.
+ */
+size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ short int code;
+ int i, k;
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ struct timespec ts;
+ unsigned char v;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+ long duration;
+ extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
+# else
+ long long duration;
+ extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
+# endif
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
+ /*
+ * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
+ * interference, etc.
+ */
+ for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
+ ts.tv_nsec = random();
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+ /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */
+ duration = 1;
+ s$sleep(&duration, &code);
+# else
+ /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */
+ duration = 1;
+ s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
+# endif
+
+ /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+ v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
+ rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
+ }
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+}
+
+void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+}
+
+# else
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \
+ (defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
+# error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given"
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM)
+# error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured"
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
+# if !defined(DEVRANDOM)
+# error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured"
+# endif
+# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
+# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
+# error "librandom not (yet) supported"
+# endif
+
+# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
+/*
+ * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
+ * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ int mib[2];
+ size_t done = 0;
+ size_t len;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
+ * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
+ * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
+ * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
+ * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
+ */
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
+ if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
+ * filled in an int, leaving the rest uninitialized. Since NetBSD 4.0
+ * it returns a variable number of bytes with the current version supporting
+ * up to 256 bytes.
+ * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
+ */
+#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+
+ mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
+ mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
+
+ do {
+ len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
+ if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
+ return done > 0 ? done : -1;
+ done += len;
+ buf += len;
+ buflen -= len;
+ } while (buflen > 0);
+
+ return done;
+}
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
+
+# if defined(__linux) && !defined(__NR_getrandom)
+# if defined(__arm__)
+# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384)
+# elif defined(__i386__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 355
+# elif defined(__x86_64__)
+# if defined(__ILP32__)
+# define __NR_getrandom (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 318)
+# else
+# define __NR_getrandom 318
+# endif
+# elif defined(__xtensa__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 338
+# elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 349
+# elif defined(__bfin__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 389
+# elif defined(__powerpc__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 359
+# elif defined(__mips__) || defined(__mips64)
+# if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32
+# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 353)
+# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
+# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 313)
+# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
+# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 317)
+# endif
+# elif defined(__hppa__)
+# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 339)
+# elif defined(__sparc__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 347
+# elif defined(__ia64__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 1339
+# elif defined(__alpha__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 511
+# elif defined(__sh__)
+# if defined(__SH5__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 373
+# else
+# define __NR_getrandom 384
+# endif
+# elif defined(__avr32__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 317
+# elif defined(__microblaze__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 385
+# elif defined(__m68k__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 352
+# elif defined(__cris__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 356
+# elif defined(__aarch64__)
+# define __NR_getrandom 278
+# else /* generic */
+# define __NR_getrandom 278
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
+ * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
+ */
+static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
+ * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
+ *
+ * 2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14
+ *
+ * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
+ * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
+ *
+ * Known OSs that should support this:
+ * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
+ * - Solaris since 11.3
+ * - OpenBSD since 5.6
+ * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
+ * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
+ */
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
+ extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
+
+ if (getentropy != NULL)
+ return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
+# elif !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+ union {
+ void *p;
+ int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
+ } p_getentropy;
+
+ /*
+ * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
+ * call this function often.
+ */
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
+ return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
+# endif
+
+ /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
+# if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+ return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
+# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
+ return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
+# else
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+# endif
+}
+# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
+static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM };
+static struct random_device {
+ int fd;
+ dev_t dev;
+ ino_t ino;
+ mode_t mode;
+ dev_t rdev;
+} random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)];
+static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
+
+# if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \
+ && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
+static void *shm_addr;
+
+# if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+static void cleanup_shm(void)
+{
+ shmdt(shm_addr);
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the system randomness source has been adequately seeded.
+ * This is done by having the first start of libcrypto, wait until the device
+ * /dev/random becomes able to supply a byte of entropy. Subsequent starts
+ * of the library and later reseedings do not need to do this.
+ */
+static int wait_random_seeded(void)
+{
+ static int seeded = OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID < 0;
+ static const int kernel_version[] = { DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL };
+ int kernel[2];
+ int shm_id, fd, r;
+ char c, *p;
+ struct utsname un;
+ fd_set fds;
+
+ if (!seeded) {
+ /* See if anything has created the global seeded indication */
+ if ((shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, 0)) == -1) {
+ /*
+ * Check the kernel's version and fail if it is too recent.
+ *
+ * Linux kernels from 4.8 onwards do not guarantee that
+ * /dev/urandom is properly seeded when /dev/random becomes
+ * readable. However, such kernels support the getentropy(2)
+ * system call and this should always succeed which renders
+ * this alternative but essentially identical source moot.
+ */
+ if (uname(&un) == 0) {
+ kernel[0] = atoi(un.release);
+ p = strchr(un.release, '.');
+ kernel[1] = p == NULL ? 0 : atoi(p + 1);
+ if (kernel[0] > kernel_version[0]
+ || (kernel[0] == kernel_version[0]
+ && kernel[1] >= kernel_version[1])) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Open /dev/random and wait for it to be readable */
+ if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+ if (DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT && fd < FD_SETSIZE) {
+ FD_ZERO(&fds);
+ FD_SET(fd, &fds);
+ while ((r = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL)) < 0
+ && errno == EINTR);
+ } else {
+ while ((r = read(fd, &c, 1)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ if (r == 1) {
+ seeded = 1;
+ /* Create the shared memory indicator */
+ shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1,
+ IPC_CREAT | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (shm_id != -1) {
+ seeded = 1;
+ /*
+ * Map the shared memory to prevent its premature destruction.
+ * If this call fails, it isn't a big problem.
+ */
+ shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
+# ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ /* TODO 3.0: The FIPS provider doesn't have OPENSSL_atexit */
+ if (shm_addr != (void *)-1)
+ OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm);
+# endif
+ }
+ }
+ return seeded;
+}
+# else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */
+static int wait_random_seeded(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is
+ * still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not
+ * uncommon for daemons to close all open file handles when daemonizing.
+ * So the handle might have been closed or even reused for opening
+ * another file.
+ */
+static int check_random_device(struct random_device * rd)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ return rd->fd != -1
+ && fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1
+ && rd->dev == st.st_dev
+ && rd->ino == st.st_ino
+ && ((rd->mode ^ st.st_mode) & ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) == 0
+ && rd->rdev == st.st_rdev;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open a random device if required and return its file descriptor or -1 on error
+ */
+static int get_random_device(size_t n)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
+
+ /* reuse existing file descriptor if it is (still) valid */
+ if (check_random_device(rd))
+ return rd->fd;
+
+ /* open the random device ... */
+ if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ return rd->fd;
+
+ /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */
+ if (fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1) {
+ rd->dev = st.st_dev;
+ rd->ino = st.st_ino;
+ rd->mode = st.st_mode;
+ rd->rdev = st.st_rdev;
+ } else {
+ close(rd->fd);
+ rd->fd = -1;
+ }
+
+ return rd->fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Close a random device making sure it is a random device
+ */
+static void close_random_device(size_t n)
+{
+ struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
+
+ if (check_random_device(rd))
+ close(rd->fd);
+ rd->fd = -1;
+}
+
+int rand_pool_init(void)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
+ random_devices[i].fd = -1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
+ close_random_device(i);
+}
+
+void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+ if (!keep)
+ rand_pool_cleanup();
+
+ keep_random_devices_open = keep;
+}
+
+# else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
+
+int rand_pool_init(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+}
+
+# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
+
+/*
+ * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful.
+ *
+ * TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it
+ * preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected
+ * (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add
+ * more entropy than requested and/or from different sources?
+ *
+ * Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the
+ * configure step, yet in practice only the first available source
+ * will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but
+ * currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without
+ * overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which
+ * could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount
+ * of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality,
+ * possibility of blocking).
+ */
+size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+# else
+ size_t entropy_available;
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
+ {
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
+ int attempts = 3;
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ bytes_needed -= bytes;
+ attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
+ } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
+ {
+ /* Not yet implemented. */
+ }
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
+ if (wait_random_seeded()) {
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+ size_t i;
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths);
+ i++) {
+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ /* Maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
+ int attempts = 3;
+ const int fd = get_random_device(i);
+
+ if (fd == -1)
+ continue;
+
+ while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
+
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ bytes_needed -= bytes;
+ attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */
+ } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
+ close_random_device(i);
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
+ }
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+ }
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC)
+ entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU)
+ entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD)
+ {
+ static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+ int i;
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ size_t bytes = 0;
+ int num;
+
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i],
+ buffer, (int)bytes_needed);
+ if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
+ bytes = bytes_needed;
+
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
+ }
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+# endif
+}
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
+ || defined(__DJGPP__)
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ pid_t pid;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data;
+
+ /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
+ * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
+ * different process instances.
+ */
+ data.pid = getpid();
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ data.time = get_time_stamp();
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ int fork_id;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data;
+
+ /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
+ * The fork_id adds some extra fork-safety.
+ * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
+ * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
+ */
+ data.fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ data.time = get_timer_bits();
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution
+ *
+ * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating.
+ * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock
+ * is synchronized.
+ */
+static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
+{
+# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
+ {
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
+ }
+# endif
+# if defined(__unix__) \
+ || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
+ {
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
+ }
+# endif
+ return time(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution
+ *
+ * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data,
+ * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result
+ * is acceptable.
+ */
+static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
+{
+ uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+
+ if (res != 0)
+ return res;
+
+# if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
+ return gethrtime();
+# elif defined(_AIX)
+ {
+ timebasestruct_t t;
+
+ read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
+ return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
+ }
+# elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
+ {
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
+# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME
+# elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
+# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+# else
+# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME
+# endif
+
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
+ }
+# endif
+# if defined(__unix__) \
+ || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
+ {
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
+ }
+# endif
+ return time(NULL);
+}
+#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
+ || defined(__DJGPP__) */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#define __NEW_STARLET 1 /* New starlet definitions since VMS 7.0 */
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "rand_local.h"
+#include <descrip.h>
+#include <dvidef.h>
+#include <jpidef.h>
+#include <rmidef.h>
+#include <syidef.h>
+#include <ssdef.h>
+#include <starlet.h>
+#include <efndef.h>
+#include <gen64def.h>
+#include <iosbdef.h>
+#include <iledef.h>
+#include <lib$routines.h>
+#ifdef __DECC
+# pragma message disable DOLLARID
+#endif
+
+#include <dlfcn.h> /* SYS$GET_ENTROPY presence */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
+# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * DATA COLLECTION METHOD
+ * ======================
+ *
+ * This is a method to get low quality entropy.
+ * It works by collecting all kinds of statistical data that
+ * VMS offers and using them as random seed.
+ */
+
+/* We need to make sure we have the right size pointer in some cases */
+#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+# pragma pointer_size save
+# pragma pointer_size 32
+#endif
+typedef uint32_t *uint32_t__ptr32;
+#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+# pragma pointer_size restore
+#endif
+
+struct item_st {
+ short length, code; /* length is number of bytes */
+};
+
+static const struct item_st DVI_item_data[] = {
+ {4, DVI$_ERRCNT},
+ {4, DVI$_REFCNT},
+};
+
+static const struct item_st JPI_item_data[] = {
+ {4, JPI$_BUFIO},
+ {4, JPI$_CPUTIM},
+ {4, JPI$_DIRIO},
+ {4, JPI$_IMAGECOUNT},
+ {4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS},
+ {4, JPI$_PID},
+ {4, JPI$_PPGCNT},
+ {4, JPI$_WSPEAK},
+ /*
+ * Note: the direct result is just a 32-bit address. However, it points
+ * to a list of 4 32-bit words, so we make extra space for them so we can
+ * do in-place replacement of values
+ */
+ {16, JPI$_FINALEXC},
+};
+
+static const struct item_st JPI_item_data_64bit[] = {
+ {8, JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I},
+ {8, JPI$_LOGINTIM},
+};
+
+static const struct item_st RMI_item_data[] = {
+ {4, RMI$_COLPG},
+ {4, RMI$_MWAIT},
+ {4, RMI$_CEF},
+ {4, RMI$_PFW},
+ {4, RMI$_LEF},
+ {4, RMI$_LEFO},
+ {4, RMI$_HIB},
+ {4, RMI$_HIBO},
+ {4, RMI$_SUSP},
+ {4, RMI$_SUSPO},
+ {4, RMI$_FPG},
+ {4, RMI$_COM},
+ {4, RMI$_COMO},
+ {4, RMI$_CUR},
+#if defined __alpha
+ {4, RMI$_FRLIST},
+ {4, RMI$_MODLIST},
+#endif
+ {4, RMI$_FAULTS},
+ {4, RMI$_PREADS},
+ {4, RMI$_PWRITES},
+ {4, RMI$_PWRITIO},
+ {4, RMI$_PREADIO},
+ {4, RMI$_GVALFLTS},
+ {4, RMI$_WRTINPROG},
+ {4, RMI$_FREFLTS},
+ {4, RMI$_DZROFLTS},
+ {4, RMI$_SYSFAULTS},
+ {4, RMI$_ISWPCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_DIRIO},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFIO},
+ {4, RMI$_MBREADS},
+ {4, RMI$_MBWRITES},
+ {4, RMI$_LOGNAM},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPCALLS},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPREAD},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPWRITE},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPCACHE},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPCPU},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPHIT},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPSPLIT},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPFAULT},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQNEW},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQCVT},
+ {4, RMI$_DEQ},
+ {4, RMI$_BLKAST},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQWAIT},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQNOTQD},
+ {4, RMI$_DLCKSRCH},
+ {4, RMI$_DLCKFND},
+ {4, RMI$_NUMLOCKS},
+ {4, RMI$_NUMRES},
+ {4, RMI$_ARRLOCPK},
+ {4, RMI$_DEPLOCPK},
+ {4, RMI$_ARRTRAPK},
+ {4, RMI$_TRCNGLOS},
+ {4, RMI$_RCVBUFFL},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQNEWLOC},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQNEWIN},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQNEWOUT},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQCVTLOC},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQCVTIN},
+ {4, RMI$_ENQCVTOUT},
+ {4, RMI$_DEQLOC},
+ {4, RMI$_DEQIN},
+ {4, RMI$_DEQOUT},
+ {4, RMI$_BLKLOC},
+ {4, RMI$_BLKIN},
+ {4, RMI$_BLKOUT},
+ {4, RMI$_DIRIN},
+ {4, RMI$_DIROUT},
+ /* We currently get a fault when trying these. TODO: To be figured out. */
+#if 0
+ {140, RMI$_MSCP_EVERYTHING}, /* 35 32-bit words */
+ {152, RMI$_DDTM_ALL}, /* 38 32-bit words */
+ {80, RMI$_TMSCP_EVERYTHING} /* 20 32-bit words */
+#endif
+ {4, RMI$_LPZ_PAGCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_LPZ_HITS},
+ {4, RMI$_LPZ_MISSES},
+ {4, RMI$_LPZ_EXPCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_LPZ_ALLOCF},
+ {4, RMI$_LPZ_ALLOC2},
+ {4, RMI$_ACCESS},
+ {4, RMI$_ALLOC},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPCREATE},
+ {4, RMI$_VOLWAIT},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPTURN},
+ {4, RMI$_FCPERASE},
+ {4, RMI$_OPENS},
+ {4, RMI$_FIDHIT},
+ {4, RMI$_FIDMISS},
+ {4, RMI$_FILHDR_HIT},
+ {4, RMI$_DIRFCB_HIT},
+ {4, RMI$_DIRFCB_MISS},
+ {4, RMI$_DIRDATA_HIT},
+ {4, RMI$_EXTHIT},
+ {4, RMI$_EXTMISS},
+ {4, RMI$_QUOHIT},
+ {4, RMI$_QUOMISS},
+ {4, RMI$_STORAGMAP_HIT},
+ {4, RMI$_VOLLCK},
+ {4, RMI$_SYNCHLCK},
+ {4, RMI$_SYNCHWAIT},
+ {4, RMI$_ACCLCK},
+ {4, RMI$_XQPCACHEWAIT},
+ {4, RMI$_DIRDATA_MISS},
+ {4, RMI$_FILHDR_MISS},
+ {4, RMI$_STORAGMAP_MISS},
+ {4, RMI$_PROCCNTMAX},
+ {4, RMI$_PROCBATCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_PROCINTCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_PROCNETCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_PROCSWITCHCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_PROCBALSETCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_PROCLOADCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_BADFLTS},
+ {4, RMI$_EXEFAULTS},
+ {4, RMI$_HDRINSWAPS},
+ {4, RMI$_HDROUTSWAPS},
+ {4, RMI$_IOPAGCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_ISWPCNTPG},
+ {4, RMI$_OSWPCNT},
+ {4, RMI$_OSWPCNTPG},
+ {4, RMI$_RDFAULTS},
+ {4, RMI$_TRANSFLTS},
+ {4, RMI$_WRTFAULTS},
+#if defined __alpha
+ {4, RMI$_USERPAGES},
+#endif
+ {4, RMI$_VMSPAGES},
+ {4, RMI$_TTWRITES},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAG},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAK},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS01},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS2},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS01},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS2},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS01},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS2},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS01},
+ {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS2},
+ {4, RMI$_DLCK_INCMPLT},
+ {4, RMI$_DLCKMSGS_IN},
+ {4, RMI$_DLCKMSGS_OUT},
+ {4, RMI$_MCHKERRS},
+ {4, RMI$_MEMERRS},
+};
+
+static const struct item_st RMI_item_data_64bit[] = {
+#if defined __ia64
+ {8, RMI$_FRLIST},
+ {8, RMI$_MODLIST},
+#endif
+ {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_REQCNT},
+ {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_REQTIME},
+ {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINCNT},
+ {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINTIME},
+ {8, RMI$_CPUINTSTK},
+ {8, RMI$_CPUMPSYNCH},
+ {8, RMI$_CPUKERNEL},
+ {8, RMI$_CPUEXEC},
+ {8, RMI$_CPUSUPER},
+ {8, RMI$_CPUUSER},
+#if defined __ia64
+ {8, RMI$_USERPAGES},
+#endif
+ {8, RMI$_TQETOTAL},
+ {8, RMI$_TQESYSUB},
+ {8, RMI$_TQEUSRTIMR},
+ {8, RMI$_TQEUSRWAKE},
+};
+
+static const struct item_st SYI_item_data[] = {
+ {4, SYI$_PAGEFILE_FREE},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Input:
+ * items_data - an array of lengths and codes
+ * items_data_num - number of elements in that array
+ *
+ * Output:
+ * items - pre-allocated ILE3 array to be filled.
+ * It's assumed to have items_data_num elements plus
+ * one extra for the terminating NULL element
+ * databuffer - pre-allocated 32-bit word array.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of elements used in databuffer
+ */
+static size_t prepare_item_list(const struct item_st *items_input,
+ size_t items_input_num,
+ ILE3 *items,
+ uint32_t__ptr32 databuffer)
+{
+ size_t data_sz = 0;
+
+ for (; items_input_num-- > 0; items_input++, items++) {
+
+ items->ile3$w_code = items_input->code;
+ /* Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC */
+ if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC)
+ items->ile3$w_length = 4;
+ else
+ items->ile3$w_length = items_input->length;
+
+ items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = databuffer;
+ items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = 0;
+
+ databuffer += items_input->length / sizeof(databuffer[0]);
+ data_sz += items_input->length;
+ }
+ /* Terminating NULL entry */
+ items->ile3$w_length = items->ile3$w_code = 0;
+ items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = NULL;
+
+ return data_sz / sizeof(databuffer[0]);
+}
+
+static void massage_JPI(ILE3 *items)
+{
+ /*
+ * Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC
+ * The result of that item's data buffer is a 32-bit address to a list of
+ * 4 32-bit words.
+ */
+ for (; items->ile3$w_length != 0; items++) {
+ if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC) {
+ uint32_t *data = items->ile3$ps_bufaddr;
+ uint32_t *ptr = (uint32_t *)*data;
+ size_t j;
+
+ /*
+ * We know we made space for 4 32-bit words, so we can do in-place
+ * replacement.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+ data[j] = ptr[j];
+
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This number expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy.
+ *
+ * For the moment, we assume about 0.05 entropy bits per data bit, or 1
+ * bit of entropy per 20 data bits.
+ */
+#define ENTROPY_FACTOR 20
+
+size_t data_collect_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ ILE3 JPI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) + 1];
+ ILE3 RMI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) + 1];
+ ILE3 DVI_items[OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data) + 1];
+ ILE3 JPI_items[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data) + 1];
+ ILE3 RMI_items[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data) + 1];
+ ILE3 SYI_items[OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data) + 1];
+ union {
+ /* This ensures buffer starts at 64 bit boundary */
+ uint64_t dummy;
+ uint32_t buffer[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) * 2
+ + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) * 2
+ + OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data)
+ + OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data)
+ + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data)
+ + OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data)
+ + 4 /* For JPI$_FINALEXC */];
+ } data;
+ size_t total_elems = 0;
+ size_t total_length = 0;
+ size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, ENTROPY_FACTOR);
+ size_t bytes_remaining = rand_pool_bytes_remaining(pool);
+
+ /* Take all the 64-bit items first, to ensure proper alignment of data */
+ total_elems +=
+ prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit),
+ JPI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
+ total_elems +=
+ prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit),
+ RMI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
+ /* Now the 32-bit items */
+ total_elems += prepare_item_list(DVI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data),
+ DVI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
+ total_elems += prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data),
+ JPI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
+ total_elems += prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data),
+ RMI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
+ total_elems += prepare_item_list(SYI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data),
+ SYI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
+ total_length = total_elems * sizeof(data.buffer[0]);
+
+ /* Fill data.buffer with various info bits from this process */
+ {
+ uint32_t status;
+ uint32_t efn;
+ IOSB iosb;
+ $DESCRIPTOR(SYSDEVICE,"SYS$SYSDEVICE:");
+
+ if ((status = sys$getdviw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, &SYSDEVICE, DVI_items,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items_64bit, 0, 0, 0))
+ != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items, 0, 0, 0))
+ != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = sys$getsyiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, SYI_items, 0, 0, 0))
+ != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The RMI service is a bit special, as there is no synchronous
+ * variant, so we MUST create an event flag to synchronise on.
+ */
+ if ((status = lib$get_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items_64bit, &iosb, 0, 0))
+ != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items, &iosb, 0, 0))
+ != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((status = lib$free_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ massage_JPI(JPI_items);
+
+ /*
+ * If we can't feed the requirements from the caller, we're in deep trouble.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(total_length >= bytes_needed)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_UNDERFLOW,
+ "Needed: %zu, Available: %zu",
+ bytes_needed, total_length);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try not to overfeed the pool
+ */
+ if (total_length > bytes_remaining)
+ total_length = bytes_remaining;
+
+ /* We give the pessimistic value for the amount of entropy */
+ rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)data.buffer, total_length,
+ 8 * total_length / ENTROPY_FACTOR);
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ pid_t pid;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data;
+
+ /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp
+ * (where available, which is OpenVMS v8.4 and up) to ensure that
+ * the nonce is unique with high probability for different process
+ * instances.
+ */
+ data.pid = getpid();
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000
+ sys$gettim_prec(&data.time);
+#else
+ sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
+#endif
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SYS$GET_ENTROPY METHOD
+ * ======================
+ *
+ * This is a high entropy method based on a new system service that is
+ * based on getentropy() from FreeBSD 12. It's only used if available,
+ * and its availability is detected at run-time.
+ *
+ * We assume that this function provides full entropy random output.
+ */
+#define PUBLIC_VECTORS "SYS$LIBRARY:SYS$PUBLIC_VECTORS.EXE"
+#define GET_ENTROPY "SYS$GET_ENTROPY"
+
+static int get_entropy_address_flag = 0;
+static int (*get_entropy_address)(void *buffer, size_t buffer_size) = NULL;
+static int init_get_entropy_address(void)
+{
+ if (get_entropy_address_flag == 0)
+ get_entropy_address = dlsym(dlopen(PUBLIC_VECTORS, 0), GET_ENTROPY);
+ get_entropy_address_flag = 1;
+ return get_entropy_address != NULL;
+}
+
+size_t get_entropy_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ /*
+ * The documentation says that SYS$GET_ENTROPY will give a maximum of
+ * 256 bytes of data.
+ */
+ unsigned char buffer[256];
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ size_t bytes_to_get = 0;
+ uint32_t status;
+
+ for (bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
+ bytes_needed > 0;
+ bytes_needed -= bytes_to_get) {
+ bytes_to_get =
+ bytes_needed > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : bytes_needed;
+
+ status = get_entropy_address(buffer, bytes_to_get);
+ if (status == SS$_RETRY) {
+ /* Set to zero so the loop doesn't diminish |bytes_needed| */
+ bytes_to_get = 0;
+ /* Should sleep some amount of time */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (status != SS$_NORMAL) {
+ lib$signal(status);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rand_pool_add(pool, buffer, bytes_to_get, 8 * bytes_to_get);
+ }
+
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+}
+
+/*
+ * MAIN ENTROPY ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS
+ * ==================================
+ *
+ * These functions are called by the RAND / DRBG functions
+ */
+
+size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ if (init_get_entropy_address())
+ return get_entropy_method(pool);
+ return data_collect_method(pool);
+}
+
+
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data;
+
+ /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
+ * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
+ * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
+ */
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000
+ sys$gettim_prec(&data.time);
+#else
+ sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
+#endif
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_init(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_local.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <version.h>
+#include <taskLib.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
+/* none means none */
+# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
+# if _WRS_VXWORKS_MAJOR >= 7
+# define RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB
+# else
+# error "VxWorks <7 only support RAND_SEED_NONE"
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB)
+# include <randomNumGen.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
+#define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
+
+static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
+{
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
+ return time(NULL);
+}
+
+static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
+{
+ uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+ if (res != 0)
+ return res;
+
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
+ return time(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * empty implementation
+ * vxworks does not need to init/cleanup or keep open the random lib
+ */
+int rand_pool_init(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data;
+
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
+ * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
+ * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
+ */
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ data.time = get_timer_bits();
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ pid_t pid;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data;
+
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
+ * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
+ * different process instances.
+ */
+ data.pid = getpid();
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ data.time = get_time_stamp();
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB)
+ /* vxRandLib based entropy method */
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ if (bytes_needed > 0)
+ {
+ int retryCount = 0;
+ STATUS result = ERROR;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ while ((result != OK) && (retryCount < 10)) {
+ RANDOM_NUM_GEN_STATUS status = randStatus();
+
+ if ((status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_ENOUGH_ENTROPY)
+ || (status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_MAX_ENTROPY) ) {
+ result = randBytes(buffer, bytes_needed);
+ if (result == OK)
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
+ /*
+ * no else here: randStatus said ok, if randBytes failed
+ * it will result in another loop or no entropy
+ */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * give a minimum delay here to allow OS to collect more
+ * entropy. taskDelay duration will depend on the system tick,
+ * this is by design as the sw-random lib uses interrupts
+ * which will at least happen during ticks
+ */
+ taskDelay(5);
+ }
+ retryCount++;
+ }
+ }
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+#else
+ /*
+ * SEED_NONE means none, without randlib we dont have entropy and
+ * rely on it being added externally
+ */
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+#endif /* defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB) */
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_local.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
+# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
+# endif
+
+# include <windows.h>
+/* On Windows Vista or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER > 1500 /* 1500 = Visual Studio 2008 */ \
+ && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600
+# define USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
+# endif
+
+# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
+# include <bcrypt.h>
+# pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")
+# ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS
+# define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
+# endif
+# else
+# include <wincrypt.h>
+/*
+ * Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from
+ * http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm
+ */
+# define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22
+# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
+# endif
+
+size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
+ HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
+# endif
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ size_t entropy_available = 0;
+
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
+ entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
+ entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ if (buffer != NULL) {
+ size_t bytes = 0;
+ if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buffer, bytes_needed,
+ BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
+ bytes = bytes_needed;
+
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ }
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+# else
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ if (buffer != NULL) {
+ size_t bytes = 0;
+ /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
+ if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
+ CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
+ if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
+ bytes = bytes_needed;
+
+ CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
+ }
+
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ }
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ if (buffer != NULL) {
+ size_t bytes = 0;
+ /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
+ if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL,
+ INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC,
+ CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
+ if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
+ bytes = bytes_needed;
+
+ CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
+ }
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ }
+ if (entropy_available > 0)
+ return entropy_available;
+# endif
+
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+}
+
+
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ DWORD pid;
+ DWORD tid;
+ FILETIME time;
+ } data;
+
+ /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
+ * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
+ * different process instances.
+ */
+ data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
+ data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&data.time);
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ DWORD tid;
+ LARGE_INTEGER time;
+ } data;
+
+ /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+ /*
+ * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
+ * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
+ * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
+ */
+ data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
+ QueryPerformanceCounter(&data.time);
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
+{
+ RAND_poll();
+ return RAND_status();
+}
+
+void RAND_screen(void)
+{
+ RAND_poll();
+}
+# endif
+
+int rand_pool_init(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+}
+
+#endif
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff