Address a timing side channel whereby it is possible to determine some

information about the length of the scalar used in ECDSA operations
from a large number (2^32) of signatures.

This doesn't rate as a CVE because:

* For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
  more information.

* For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
  to leak a small amount of information.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4576)

(cherry picked from commit 4a089bbdf11f9e231cc68f42bba934c954d81a49)

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
index d67c48524a78dbf570ed4c5b0e3c29ef28b14237..72e2f0f28bc2d3aea3be3c6805895fb48fcc699e 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
     EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
     const EC_GROUP *group;
     int ret = 0;
+    int order_bits;
 
     if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
         ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@@ -77,6 +78,13 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
         goto err;
     }
 
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
+        goto err;
+
     do {
         /* get random k */
         do
@@ -100,13 +108,19 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
         /*
          * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
          * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the code
+         * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
          */
-
-        if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
+        if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
+            || !BN_add(X, r, order)
+            || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
             goto err;
-        if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
-            if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
-                goto err;
 
         /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
         if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {