{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST), "o2i_SCT_LIST"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE), "o2i_SCT_signature"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW), "SCT_CTX_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY), "SCT_CTX_verify"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_NEW), "SCT_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64), "SCT_new_from_base64"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID), "SCT_set0_log_id"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE), "SCT_set_log_entry_type"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID), "SCT_set_signature_nid"},
{ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION), "SCT_set_version"},
- {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY), "SCT_CTX_verify"},
{0, NULL}
};
"log conf missing description"},
{ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY), "log conf missing key"},
{ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID), "log key invalid"},
+ {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP), "sct future timestamp"},
{ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_INVALID), "sct invalid"},
{ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE), "sct invalid signature"},
{ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID), "sct list invalid"},
/* pre-certificate encoding */
unsigned char *preder;
size_t prederlen;
+ /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that the SCT isn't from the future) */
+ uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
};
/* Context when evaluating whether a Certificate Transparency policy is met */
X509 *cert;
X509 *issuer;
CTLOG_STORE *log_store;
+ /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that SCTs aren't from the future) */
+ uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
};
/*
*/
__owur int SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey);
+/*
+ * Sets the current time, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch.
+ * The timestamp of the SCT will be compared to this, to check that it was not
+ * issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs whose
+ * timestamp is in the future", so SCT verification will fail in this case.
+ */
+void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms);
+
/*
* Verifies an SCT with the given context.
* Returns 1 if the SCT verifies successfully; any other value indicates
ctx->log_store = log_store;
}
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms)
+{
+ ctx->epoch_time_in_ms = time_in_ms;
+}
+
X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->cert;
return ctx->log_store;
}
+uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->epoch_time_in_ms;
+}
goto err;
}
+ SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms);
+
/*
* XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy
* lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
sctx->pkey = pkey;
return 1;
}
+
+void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms)
+{
+ sctx->epoch_time_in_ms = time_in_ms;
+}
CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_LOG_ID_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
+ if (sct->timestamp > sctx->epoch_time_in_ms) {
+ CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP);
+ return 0;
+ }
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx,
CTLOG_STORE *log_store);
+/*
+ * Gets the time, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch, that will be used as the
+ * current time when checking whether an SCT was issued in the future.
+ * Such SCTs will fail validation, as required by RFC6962.
+ */
+uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the current time, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch.
+ * The timestamps of the SCTs will be compared to this, to check that they were
+ * not issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs
+ * whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate in this case.
+ */
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms);
+
/*****************
* SCT functions *
*****************/
# define CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST 111
# define CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE 112
# define CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW 126
+# define CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY 128
# define CT_F_SCT_NEW 100
# define CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64 127
# define CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID 101
# define CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE 102
# define CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID 103
# define CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION 104
-# define CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY 128
/* Reason codes. */
# define CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR 108
# define CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_DESCRIPTION 111
# define CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY 112
# define CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID 113
+# define CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP 116
# define CT_R_SCT_INVALID 104
# define CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE 107
# define CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID 105
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert);
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer);
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store);
+ CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(ctx, SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_get0_session(s)));
scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s);
typedef struct ct_test_fixture {
const char *test_case_name;
+ /* The current time in milliseconds */
+ uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
/* The CT log store to use during tests */
CTLOG_STORE* ctlog_store;
/* Set the following to test handling of SCTs in X509 certificates */
const char *certs_dir;
char *certificate_file;
char *issuer_file;
+ /* Expected number of SCTs */
int expected_sct_count;
+ /* Expected number of valid SCTS */
+ int expected_valid_sct_count;
/* Set the following to test handling of SCTs in TLS format */
const unsigned char *tls_sct_list;
size_t tls_sct_list_len;
const char *sct_text_file;
/* Whether to test the validity of the SCT(s) */
int test_validity;
-
} CT_TEST_FIXTURE;
static CT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
}
fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+ fixture.epoch_time_in_ms = 1473269626000; /* Sep 7 17:33:46 2016 GMT */
fixture.ctlog_store = ctlog_store;
end:
}
}
- if (valid_sct_count != fixture.expected_sct_count) {
+ if (valid_sct_count != fixture.expected_valid_sct_count) {
int unverified_sct_count = sk_SCT_num(scts) -
invalid_sct_count - valid_sct_count;
"%d SCTs were unverified\n",
invalid_sct_count,
valid_sct_count,
- fixture.expected_sct_count,
+ fixture.expected_valid_sct_count,
unverified_sct_count);
return 0;
}
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(
ct_policy_ctx, fixture.ctlog_store);
+ CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(ct_policy_ctx, fixture.epoch_time_in_ms);
+
if (fixture.certificate_file != NULL) {
int sct_extension_index;
X509_EXTENSION *sct_extension = NULL;
fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem";
fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem";
- fixture.expected_sct_count = 1;
+ fixture.expected_sct_count = fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 1;
fixture.test_validity = 1;
EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
}
fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs3.pem";
fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem";
- fixture.expected_sct_count = 3;
+ fixture.expected_sct_count = fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 3;
+ fixture.test_validity = 1;
+ EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_verify_fails_for_future_sct()
+{
+ SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+ fixture.epoch_time_in_ms = 1365094800000; /* Apr 4 17:00:00 2013 GMT */
+ fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
+ fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem";
+ fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem";
+ fixture.expected_sct_count = 1;
+ fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 0;
fixture.test_validity = 1;
EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
}
ADD_TEST(test_multiple_scts_in_certificate);
ADD_TEST(test_verify_one_sct);
ADD_TEST(test_verify_multiple_scts);
+ ADD_TEST(test_verify_fails_for_future_sct);
ADD_TEST(test_decode_tls_sct);
ADD_TEST(test_encode_tls_sct);
OCSP_RESPID_match 4159 1_1_0a EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
DSO_pathbyaddr 4170 1_1_0c EXIST::FUNCTION:
DSO_dsobyaddr 4171 1_1_0c EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time 4172 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time 4173 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:CT