(CVE-2019-1549)
[Matthias St. Pierre]
- *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt(). In situations
- where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure
- of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of
- messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption
- key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public
- RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not
- affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the
- CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info
- to decrypt.
- (CVE-2019-1563)
- [Bernd Edlinger]
-
*) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+ (CVE-2019-1563)
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1c and OpenSSL 1.1.1d [under development]
o Fixed a fork protection issue (CVE-2019-1549)
- o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt()
+ o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
(CVE-2019-1563)
o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
used even when parsing explicit parameters