width=s+1;
for (;;)
{
- FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+ int read_from_terminal;
+ int read_from_sslcon;
+
+ read_from_terminal = 0;
+ read_from_sslcon = SSL_pending(con);
+
+ if (!read_from_sslcon)
+ {
+ FD_ZERO(&readfds);
#ifndef WINDOWS
- FD_SET(fileno(stdin),&readfds);
+ FD_SET(fileno(stdin),&readfds);
#endif
- FD_SET(s,&readfds);
- /* Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
- * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems
- * it is (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke
- * the compiler: if you do have a cast then you can either
- * go for (int *) or (void *).
- */
+ FD_SET(s,&readfds);
+ /* Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
+ * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems
+ * it is (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke
+ * the compiler: if you do have a cast then you can either
+ * go for (int *) or (void *).
+ */
#ifdef WINDOWS
- /* Under Windows we can't select on stdin: only
- * on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every
- * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows
- * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient.
- */
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,NULL,NULL,&tv);
- if((i < 0) || (!i && !_kbhit() ) )continue;
- if(_kbhit())
+ /* Under Windows we can't select on stdin: only
+ * on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every
+ * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows
+ * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient.
+ */
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,NULL,NULL,&tv);
+ if((i < 0) || (!i && !_kbhit() ) )continue;
+ if(_kbhit())
+ read_from_terminal = 1;
#else
- i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,NULL,NULL,NULL);
- if (i <= 0) continue;
- if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin),&readfds))
+ i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ if (i <= 0) continue;
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin),&readfds))
+ read_from_terminal = 1;
#endif
+ if (FD_ISSET(s,&readfds))
+ read_from_sslcon = 1;
+ }
+ if (read_from_terminal)
{
if (s_crlf)
{
if (i <= 0) break;
}
}
- if (FD_ISSET(s,&readfds))
+ if (read_from_sslcon)
{
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(con))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
- if((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
(st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
(stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
{
/* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
* hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
* start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
- */
+ * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
+ * we have not completed the handshake. */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
}
Free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
s->s3->rrec.comp=NULL;
}
+#ifndef NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+#endif
rp=s->s3->rbuf.buf;
wp=s->s3->wbuf.buf;
int al,i,j,n,ret;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb)()=NULL;
- BIO *bio;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
{
+#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
+ * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
+ * protocol violations): */
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#else
+ s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#endif
s->new_session=1;
}
n=s->handshake_func(s);
return(-1);
}
+#if 1 /* probably nonsense (does not work with readahead),
+ * but keep it for now anyway ... s_server relies on this */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
/* In the case where we try to read application data
* the first time, but we trigger an SSL handshake, we
* return -1 with the retry option set. I do this
* otherwise renegotiation can cause nasty problems
- * in the non-blocking world */
+ * in the non-blocking world */ /* That's "non-non-blocking",
+ * I guess? When receiving a
+ * Hello Request, we have the
+ * same problem (e.g. in s_client),
+ * but it's really an application bug.
+ */
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
+#else
+ goto start;
+#endif
+ }
switch (rr->type)
{
* but have application data. If the library was
* running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
* is set) and it makes sense to read application data
- * at this point (session renegotation not yet started),
+ * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
* we will indulge it.
*/
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
abort();
- /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- if(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) return 2;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
+ {
+ /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
+ * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
+ * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
+ * when a handshake is not completed ... */
+#ifndef NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 2;
+ }
return 1;
}
i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-#if 0
- /* If a bad decrypt, use a random master key */
- if ((i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) ||
- ((p[0] != (s->client_version>>8)) ||
- (p[1] != (s->client_version & 0xff))))
- {
- int bad=1;
-
- if ((i == SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) &&
- (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) &&
- (p[1] == 0))
- {
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
- bad=0;
- }
- if (bad)
- {
- p[0]=(s->version>>8);
- p[1]=(s->version & 0xff);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(&(p[2]),SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH-2);
- i=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- }
- /* else, an SSLeay bug, ssl only server, tls client */
- }
-#else
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
memset(p,0,i);
}
else
-#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
s->hit=0;
s->shutdown=0;
-#if 0
+#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+ * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
if (s->new_session) return(1);
+#else
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
#endif
state=s->state; /* Keep to check if we throw away the session-id */
{
/* Current active set */
CERT_PKEY *key; /* ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array
- * Probably it would make more sense to store
- * an index, not a pointer. */
+ * Probably it would make more sense to store
+ * an index, not a pointer. */
/* The following masks are for the key and auth
* algorithms that are supported by the certs below */
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff