CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
err:
+ /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
return valid;
}
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
- char *sub, *iss;
+ int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
+ char *str;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
int time_cmp;
- ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " considering %s %s with..", desc1, desc2);
- if ((sub = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
- ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", sub);
- if ((iss = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
- ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", iss);
- OPENSSL_free(iss);
- OPENSSL_free(sub);
+ ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
+ self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
+ if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
+ ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
+ if (!self_issued) {
+ str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
+ if (str != NULL)
+ ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
+ }
if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
|| already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
return 0;
/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
- ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert is acceptable");
+ ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
return 1;
}
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
return 0;
}
- if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt)) {
- ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert path validation failed");
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
+ if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
+ return 1;
+
+ ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
+ "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
- * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP and if the ctx
- * option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates from extraCerts as
- * trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
+ * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
+ * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
+ * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
*/
static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
int valid = 0;
- X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
+ X509_STORE *store;
+
+ if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
+ || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
+ 1 /* self-issued only */))
+ goto err;
- if (store != NULL /* store does not include CRLs */
- && ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
- 1 /* self-issued only */))
- valid = check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, store, scrt, msg);
- if (valid) {
+ /* store does not include CRLs */
+ valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
+ if (!valid) {
+ ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
+ "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
+ } else {
/*
- * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which is assumed to have
- * rid == 0) can also be validated with the same trusted store
+ * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
+ * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
*/
EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
- ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip, 0);
+ ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
+ OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID);
X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey, crep);
/*
* maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
X509_free(newcrt);
}
+
+ err:
X509_STORE_free(store);
return valid;
}
{
int ret = 0;
+ if (mode_3gpp
+ && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
+ || ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
+ return 0;
+
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
- mode_3gpp ? "failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
+ mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
: "trying first normal mode using trust store");
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
return ret;
}
+static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
+ OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
/* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
return 0;
}
+ /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
+
/*
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
*/
- (void)ERR_set_mark();
- if (scrt != NULL
- && cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
- NULL, NULL, msg)
- && (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
+ if (scrt != NULL) {
+ (void)ERR_set_mark();
+ ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
+ "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
+ if (cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
+ NULL, NULL, msg)
+ && (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, scrt, msg))) {
+ (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ return 1;
+ }
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
- return 1;
+ /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
+ (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
}
- (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
-
- /* release any cached sender cert that proved no more successfully usable */
- (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
- ctx->log_cb = NULL; /* temporarily disable logging diagnostic info */
-
- if (check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
- || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */)) {
- /* discard any diagnostic info on trying to use certs */
- ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; /* restore any logging */
+ ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
+ res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
+ || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
+ ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
+ if (res) {
+ /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
- res = 1;
goto end;
}
/* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
- ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; /* restore any logging */
(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
: OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
- ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "verifying msg signature with valid cert that..");
+ ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
if (sname != NULL)
- ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender name = %s", sname);
+ ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
if (skid_str != NULL)
- ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
+ ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
else
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff