(CVE-2008-5077).
Submitted by: Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team
Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values
+ (CVE-2008-5077).
+ [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team]
+
*) Enable TLS extensions by default.
[Ben Laurie]
{
ret=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, buf,36, buf2,
rsa_num, rsa_key[j]);
- if (ret == 0)
+ if (ret <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"RSA verify failure\n");
pkey = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki);
if(verify) {
i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey);
- if(i) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n");
+ if (i > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n");
else {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature Failure\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
ret=0;
end:
- if (i)
+ if (i > 0)
{
fprintf(stdout,"OK\n");
ret=1;
ERR_clear_error();
return(ok);
}
-
/* NOTE: this certificate can/should be self signed, unless it was
* a certificate request in which case it is not. */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(&xsc,x);
- if (!reqfile && !X509_verify_cert(&xsc))
+ if (!reqfile && X509_verify_cert(&xsc) <= 0)
goto end;
if (!X509_check_private_key(xca,pkey))
cms_fixup_mctx(&mctx, si->pkey);
r = EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx,
si->signature->data, si->signature->length, si->pkey);
- if (!r)
+ if (r <= 0)
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i))
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if (i) /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
+ if (i > 0) /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- if (i)
+ if (i > 0)
{
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
!= (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
- if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
- if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
else
{
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if (!i)
+ if (i <= 0)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
{
- if (ok)
+ if (ok > 0)
{
const char *cond_end = NULL;