PR: 2628

Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve

Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS
fragments.

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 68172a9dda0b2e7d114422f836f7e12b428e3ea4..9f898d69978d38f7d59667f57bd2e46012917300 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -793,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
                *ok = 0;
                return i;
                }
-       OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+       /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+       if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+               {
+               al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
 
        /* parse the message fragment header */
        dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@@ -865,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 
        /* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
         * handshake to fail */
-       OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+       if (i != (int)frag_len)
+               {
+               al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
 
        *ok = 1;