#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <internal/dane.h>
#include <internal/x509_int.h>
#include "x509_lcl.h"
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
ctx->tree = NULL;
ctx->parent = NULL;
+ ctx->dane = NULL;
/* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
ctx->param = param;
}
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct dane_st *dane)
+{
+ ctx->dane = dane;
+}
+
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb;
return param->peername;
}
+/*
+ * Move peername from one param structure to another, freeing any name present
+ * at the target. If the source is a NULL parameter structure, free and zero
+ * the target peername.
+ */
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from)
+{
+ char *peername = (from != NULL) ? from->peername : NULL;
+
+ if (to->peername != peername) {
+ OPENSSL_free(to->peername);
+ to->peername = peername;
+ }
+ if (from)
+ from->peername = NULL;
+}
+
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *email, size_t emaillen)
{
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- goto err;
+ goto end;
}
/*
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- goto err;
+ goto end;
}
/*
#define CERT_FILE "server.pem"
-BIO *in = NULL;
+static int done = 0;
-void close_up()
+void interrupt()
{
- BIO_free(in);
+ done = 1;
+}
+
+void sigsetup(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa;
+
+ /*
+ * Catch at most once, and don't restart the accept system call.
+ */
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
+ sa.sa_handler = interrupt;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char *port = NULL;
+ BIO *in = NULL;
BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp;
SSL_CTX *ctx;
char buf[512];
else
port = argv[1];
- signal(SIGINT, close_up);
-
SSL_load_error_strings();
/* Add ciphers and message digests */
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, CERT_FILE, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, CERT_FILE))
goto err;
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, CERT_FILE, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
goto err;
*/
BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio);
+ /* Arrange to leave server loop on interrupt */
+ sigsetup();
+
again:
/*
* The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a
if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0)
goto err;
- for (;;) {
+ while (!done) {
i = BIO_read(in, buf, 512);
if (i == 0) {
/*
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#define HOSTPORT "localhost:4433"
+#define CAFILE "root.pem"
+
extern int errno;
int main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
- char *host;
- BIO *out;
+ const char *hostport = HOSTPORT;
+ const char *CAfile = CAFILE;
+ char *hostname;
+ char *cp;
+ BIO *out = NULL;
char buf[1024 * 10], *p;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
SSL *ssl;
BIO *ssl_bio;
int i, len, off, ret = 1;
- if (argc <= 1)
- host = "localhost:4433";
- else
- host = argv[1];
+ if (argc > 1)
+ hostport = argv[1];
+ if (argc > 2)
+ CAfile = argv[2];
+
+ hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(hostport);
+ if ((cp = strchr(hostname, ':')) != NULL)
+ *cp = 0;
#ifdef WATT32
dbug_init();
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+ /* Enable trust chain verification */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ssl_ctx, CAfile, NULL);
+
/* Lets make a SSL structure */
ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ /* Enable peername verification */
+ if (SSL_set1_host(ssl, hostname) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
/* Use it inside an SSL BIO */
ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, ssl, BIO_CLOSE);
/* Lets use a connect BIO under the SSL BIO */
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect());
- BIO_set_conn_hostname(out, host);
+ BIO_set_conn_hostname(out, hostport);
BIO_set_nbio(out, 1);
out = BIO_push(ssl_bio, out);
subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert
issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIDpTCCAo2gAwIBAgIJAK8ArbvjIOQlMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMHAxCzAJBgNV
+MIIDyTCCArGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBwMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzEW
+MBQGA1UECgwNT3BlblNTTCBHcm91cDEiMCAGA1UECwwZRk9SIFRFU1RJTkcgUFVS
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+IFBVUlBPU0VTIE9OTFkxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFRlc3QgU2VydmVyIENlcnQwggEiMA0G
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+Jdvzqqlgv02qedGrkki6GY4S7GjZxrrf7Foc2EP+51LJzwLQx3/JfrCU41NEWAsu
+/Sl0tQabXESN+zJ1pDqoZ3uHMgpQjeGiE0olr+YcsSW/tJmiU9OiAr8RAgMBAAGj
+eDB2MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSCvM8AABPR9zklmifnr9LvIBturDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ2
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+sAr4uvkYOu/pSwQ3MYOFqZ0BnPuP0/AZW2zF7TLNy8g36GyH9rKxz2ffQEHRmPQN
+Z11Ohg3z03jw/sVzkgt2U5Ipv923sSeCZcu0nuNex3v9/x72ldYikZNhQOsw+2kr
+hx3OvE9R7xl9eyjz7BknsbY7PC3kiUY8SDdc5Fr/XMkHm3ge65oWYOHBjC5tAr5K
+FGCEjM3syxS+Li5X6yfDGiVSjOU4gJuZDCYbl7cEQexU2deds8EmpJJrrI7s4JcQ
+rraHI8+Hu8X9VLpZE1jl/fKJw3D0i53PoN2WhukIOg1Zv+ajMKQ4ubVfISH2ebox
++ybAZO8hxL6/I08/GQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
+issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Root CA
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDvjCCAqagAwIBAgIJAPzCy4CUW9/qMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMGgxCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT
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-A1UEBhMCVUsxFjAUBgNVBAoMDU9wZW5TU0wgR3JvdXAxIjAgBgNVBAsMGUZPUiBU
-RVNUSU5HIFBVUlBPU0VTIE9OTFkxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFRlc3QgU2VydmVyIENlcnQw
-ggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDzhPOSNtyyRspmeuUpxfNJ
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-vPQGuI+OEAcnleVCy9HVEIySrO4P3CNIicnGkwwiAud05yUAq/gPXBC1hTtmlPD7
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-+EIBDQQfFh1PcGVuU1NMIEdlbmVyYXRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZTANBgkqhkiG9w0B
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-dLPqZEpj0kXT8gTYEROX7tq9gYwpe6FVKw==
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+GNXND2ip0TcyTSPLROXOyQakcVfIGJmdSa1wHKi+c2gMA4emADudZUOYLrg80gr2
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+CXEiQhtWHpPrFEfrExeVy2kjJNRctEfq3OTd1bjgX64zvTU7eR+MHFYKPoyMqwIR
+gjoVKinvovEwWoZe5kfMQwJNA3IgoJexX9BXbS8efAYF/ku3tS0laoZS/q6V/o5I
+RvG0OqnNgxhul+96PE5ujSaprsyvBswIUKt+e/BCxGaS6f2AJ8RmtoPOSfT4b9qN
+thI=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA84TzkjbcskbKZnrlKcXzSSgi07n+4N7kOM7uIhzpkTuU0HIv
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(),
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(),
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() and
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for
failure.
--- /dev/null
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_dane_enable, SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set, SSL_dane_enable,
+SSL_dane_tlsa_add, SSL_get0_dane_authority, SSL_get0_dane_tlsa -
+enable DANE TLS authentication of the remote TLS server in the local
+TLS client
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+ uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord);
+ int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain);
+ int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
+ uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen);
+ int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki);
+ int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
+ uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data,
+ size_t *dlen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions implement support for DANE TLSA (RFC6698 and RFC7671)
+peer authentication.
+
+SSL_CTX_dane_enable() must be called first to initialize the
+shared state required for DANE support. Individual connections
+associated with the context can then enable per-connection DANE
+support as appropriate. DANE authentication is implemented in the
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)> function, and applications that override
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)> via L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>
+are responsible to authenticate the peer chain in whatever manner
+they see fit.
+
+SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set() may then be called zero or more times to
+to adjust the supported digest algorithms. This must be done before
+any SSL handles are created for the context.
+
+The B<mtype> argument specifies a DANE TLSA matching type and the
+the B<md> argument specifies the associated digest algorithm handle.
+The B<ord> argument specifies a strength ordinal. Algorithms with
+a larger strength ordinal are considered more secure. Strength
+ordinals are used to implement RFC7671 digest algorithm agility.
+Specifying a B<NULL> digest algorithm for a matching type disables
+support for that matching type. Matching type Full(0) cannot be
+modified or disabled.
+
+By default, matching type C<SHA2-256(1)> (see RFC7218 for definitions
+of the DANE TLSA parameter acronyms) is mapped to C<EVP_sha256()>
+with a strength ordinal of C<1> and matching type C<SHA2-512(2)>
+is mapped to C<EVP_sha512()> with a strength ordinal of C<2>.
+
+SSL_dane_enable() may be called before the SSL handshake is
+initiated with L<SSL_connect(3)> to enable DANE for that connection.
+(The connection must be associated with a DANE-enabled SSL context).
+The B<basedomain> argument specifies the RFC7671 TLSA base domain,
+which will be the primary peer reference identifier for certificate
+name checks. Additional server names can be specified via
+L<SSL_add1_host(3)>. The B<basedomain> is used as the default SNI
+hint if none has yet been specified via L<SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(3)>.
+
+SSL_dane_tlsa_add() may then be called one or more times, to
+load each of the TLSA records that apply to the remote TLS peer.
+(This too must be done prior to the beginning of the SSL handshake).
+The arguments specify the fields of the TLSA record. The B<data>
+field is provided in binary (wire RDATA) form, not the hexadecimal ASCII
+presentation form, with an explicit length passed via B<dlen>.
+A return value of 0 indicates that "unusable" TLSA records
+(with invalid or unsupported parameters) were provided, a negative
+return value indicates an internal error in processing the records.
+If DANE authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records are added
+successfully, authentication will fail, and the handshake may not
+complete, depending on the B<mode> argument of L<SSL_set_verify(3)>
+and any verification callback.
+
+SSL_get0_dane_authority() can be used to get more detailed information
+about the matched DANE trust-anchor after successful connection
+completion. The return value is negative if DANE verification
+failed (or was not enabled), 0 if an EE TLSA record directly matched
+the leaf certificate, or a positive number indicating the depth at
+which a TA record matched an issuer certificate.
+
+If the B<mcert> argument is not B<NULL> and a TLSA record matched
+a chain certificate, a pointer to the matching certificate is
+returned via B<mcert>. The returned address is a short-term internal
+reference to the certificate and must not be freed by the application.
+Applications that want to retain access to the certificate can call
+L<X509_up_ref(3)> to obtain a long-term reference which must then
+be freed via L<X509_free(3)> once no longer needed.
+
+If no TLSA records directly matched any elements of the certificate
+chain, but a DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) record provided the public
+key that signed an element of the chain, then that key is returned
+via B<mspki> argument (if not NULL). In this case the return value
+is the depth of the top-most element of the validated certificate
+chain. As with B<mcert> this is a short-term internal reference,
+and L<EVP_PKEY_up_ref(3)> and L<EVP_PKEY_free(3)> can be used to
+acquire and release long-term references respectively.
+
+SSL_get0_dane_tlsa() can be used to retrieve the fields of the
+TLSA record that matched the peer certificate chain. The return
+value indicates the match depth or failure to match just as with
+SSL_get0_dane_authority(). When the return value is non-negative,
+the storage pointed to by the B<usage>, B<selector>, B<mtype> and
+B<data> parameters is updated to the corresponding TLSA record
+fields. The B<data> field is in binary wire form, and is therefore
+not NUL-terminated, its length is returned via the B<dlen> parameter.
+If any of these parameters is NULL, the corresponding field
+is not returned. The B<data> parameter is set to a short-term
+internal-copy of the associated data field and must not be freed
+by the application. Applications that need long-term access to
+this field need to copy the content.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The functions SSL_CTX_dane_enable(), SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(),
+SSL_dane_enable() and SSL_dane_tlsa_add() return a positive value
+on success. Negative return values indicate resource problems (out
+of memory, etc.) in the SSL library, while a return value of B<0>
+indicates incorrect usage or invalid input, such as an unsupported
+TLSA record certificate usage, selector or matching type. Invalid
+input also includes malformed data, either a digest length that
+does not match the digest algorithm, or a C<Full(0)> (binary ASN.1
+DER form) certificate or a public key that fails to parse.
+
+The functions SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
+return a negative value when DANE authentication failed or was not
+enabled, a non-negative value indicates the chain depth at which
+the TLSA record matched a chain certificate, or the depth of the
+top-most certificate, when the TLSA record is a full public key
+that is its signer.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Suppose "smtp.example.com" is the MX host of the domain "example.com",
+and has DNSSEC-validated TLSA records. The calls below will perform
+DANE authentication and arrange to match either the MX hostname or
+the destination domain name in the SMTP server certificate. Wildcards
+are supported, but must match the entire label. The actual name
+matched in the certificate (which might be a wildcard) is retrieved,
+and must be copied by the application if it is to be retained beyond
+the lifetime of the SSL connection.
+
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ int num_usable = 0;
+ const char *nexthop_domain = "example.com";
+ const char *dane_tlsa_domain = "smtp.example.com";
+ uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
+
+ if ((ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method())) == NULL)
+ /* handle error */
+ if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0)
+ /* handle error */
+
+ if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
+ /* handle error */
+
+ if (SSL_dane_enable(ssl, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0)
+ /* handle error */
+ if (!SSL_add1_host(ssl, nexthop_domain))
+ /* handle error */
+ SSL_set_hostflags(ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
+
+ for (... each TLSA record ...) {
+ unsigned char *data;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* set usage, selector, mtype, data, len */
+
+ /* Opportunistic DANE TLS clients treat usages 0, 1 as unusable. */
+ switch (usage) {
+ case 0: /* PKIX-TA(0) */
+ case 1: /* PKIX-EE(1) */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, usage, selector, mtype, data, len);
+ /* free data as approriate */
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ /* handle SSL library internal error */
+ else if (ret == 0)
+ /* handle unusable TLSA record */
+ else
+ ++num_usable;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Opportunistic DANE clients use unauthenticated TLS when all TLSA records
+ * are unusable, so continue the handshake even if authentication fails.
+ */
+ if (num_usable == 0) {
+ int (*cb)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *sctx) = NULL;
+
+ /* Log all records unusable? */
+ /* Set cb to a non-NULL callback of your choice? */
+
+ SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, cb);
+ }
+
+ /* Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */
+
+ if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
+ const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl);
+ EVP_PKEY *mspki = NULL;
+
+ int depth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki);
+ if (depth >= 0) {
+ (void) SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, NULL, NULL);
+ printf("DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s at depth %d\n", usage, selector, mtype,
+ (mspki != NULL) ? "TA public key verified certificate" :
+ depth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate",
+ depth);
+ }
+ if (peername != NULL) {
+ /* Name checks were in scope and matched the peername */
+ printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Not authenticated, presumably all TLSA rrs unusable, but possibly a
+ * callback suppressed connection termination despite presence of TLSA
+ * usable RRs none of which matched. Do whatever is appropriate for
+ * unauthenticated connections.
+ */
+ }
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+It is expected that the majority of clients employing DANE TLS will
+be doing "opportunistic DANE TLS" in the sense of RFC7672 and
+RFC7435. That is, they will use DANE authentication when
+DNSSEC-validated TLSA records are published for a given peer, and
+otherwise will use unauthenticated TLS or even cleartext.
+
+Such applications should generally treat any TLSA records published
+by the peer with usages PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1) as "unusable",
+and should not include them among the TLSA records used to authenticate
+peer connections. In addition, some TLSA records with supported
+usages may be "unusable" as a result of invalid or unsupported
+parameters.
+
+When a peer has TLSA records, but none are "usable", an opportunistic
+application must avoid cleartext, but cannot authenticate the peer,
+and so should generally proceed with an unauthenticated connection.
+Opportunistic applications need to note the return value of each
+call to SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and if all return 0 (due to invalid
+or unsupported parameters) disable peer authentication by calling
+L<SSL_set_verify(3)> with B<mode> equal to B<SSL_VERIFY_NONE>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_add1_host(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_hostflags(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_verify(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<SSL_connect(3)>,
+L<SSL_get0_peername(3)>,
+L<EVP_get_digestbyname(3)>,
+L<X509_up_ref(3)>,
+L<X509_free(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_up_ref(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_free(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=cut
--- /dev/null
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ SSL_set1_host, SSL_add1_host, SSL_set_hostflags, SSL_get0_peername -
+ SSL server verification parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+ int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+ void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags);
+ const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions configure server hostname checks in the SSL client.
+
+SSL_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to B<name> clearing
+any previously specified host name or names. If B<name> is NULL,
+or the empty string the list of hostnames is cleared, and name
+checks are not performed on the peer certificate. When a non-empty
+B<name> is specified, certificate verification automatically checks
+the peer hostname via L<X509_check_host(3)> with B<flags> as specified
+via SSL_set_hostflags(). Clients that enable DANE TLSA authentication
+via L<SSL_dane_enable(3)> should leave it to that function to set
+the primary reference identifier of the peer, and should not call
+SSL_set1_host().
+
+SSL_add1_host() adds B<name> as an additional reference identifier
+that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names set via
+SSL_set1_host() or SSL_add1_host() are retained, no change is made
+if B<name> is NULL or empty. When multiple names are configured,
+the peer is considered verified when any name matches. This function
+is required for DANE TLA in the presence of service name indirection
+via CNAME, MX or SRV records as specified in RFC7671, RFC7672 or
+RFC7673.
+
+SSL_set_hostflags() sets the B<flags> that will be passed to
+L<X509_check_host(3)> when name checks are applicable, by default
+the B<flags> value is 0. See L<X509_check_host(3)> for the list
+of available flags and their meaning.
+
+SSL_get0_peername() returns the DNS hostname or subject CommonName
+from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference
+identifiers. When wildcard matching is not disabled, the name
+matched in the peer certificate may be a wildcard name. When one
+of the reference identifiers configured via SSL_set1_host() or
+SSL_add1_host() starts with ".", which indicates a parent domain prefix
+rather than a fixed name, the matched peer name may be a sub-domain
+of the reference identifier. The returned string is allocated by
+the library and is no longer valid once the associated B<ssl> handle
+is cleared or freed, or a renegotiation takes place. Applications
+must not free the return value.
+
+SSL clients are advised to use these functions in preference to
+explicitly calling L<X509_check_host(3)>. Hostname checks are out
+of scope with the RFC7671 DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the
+internal check will be suppressed as appropriate when DANE is
+enabled.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set1_host() and SSL_add1_host() return 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+
+SSL_get0_peername() returns NULL if peername verification is not
+applicable (as with RFC7671 DANE-EE(3)), or no trusted peername was
+matched. Otherwise, it returns the matched peername. To determine
+whether verification succeeded call L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Suppose "smtp.example.com" is the MX host of the domain "example.com".
+The calls below will arrange to match either the MX hostname or the
+destination domain name in the SMTP server certificate. Wildcards
+are supported, but must match the entire label. The actual name
+matched in the certificate (which might be a wildcard) is retrieved,
+and must be copied by the application if it is to be retained beyond
+the lifetime of the SSL connection.
+
+ SSL_set_hostflags(ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
+ if (!SSL_set1_host(ssl, "smtp.example.com")) {
+ /* handle error */
+ }
+ if (!SSL_add1_host(ssl, "example.com")) {
+ /* handle error */
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */
+
+ if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
+ const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl);
+
+ if (peername != NULL) {
+ /* Name checks were in scope and matched the peername */
+ }
+ }
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_check_host(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>.
+L<SSL_dane_enable(3)>.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=cut
=item SSL *B<SSL_dup>(SSL *ssl);
+SSL_dup() allows applications to configure an SSL handle for use
+in multiple SSL connections, and then duplicate it prior to initiating
+each connection with the duplicated handle.
+Use of SSL_dup() avoids the need to repeat the configuration of the
+handles for each connection.
+This is used internally by L<BIO_s_accept(3)> to construct
+per-connection SSL handles after L<accept(2)>.
+
+For SSL_dup() to work, the connection MUST be in its initial state
+and MUST NOT have not yet have started the SSL handshake.
+For connections that are not in their initial state SSL_dup() just
+increments an internal reference count and returns the I<same>
+handle.
+It may be possible to use L<SSL_clear(3)> to recycle an SSL handle
+that is not in its initial state for re-use, but this is best
+avoided.
+Instead, save and restore the session, if desired, and construct a
+fresh handle for each connection.
+
=item STACK *B<SSL_dup_CA_list>(STACK *sk);
=item void B<SSL_free>(SSL *ssl);
--- /dev/null
+/* dane.h */
+/*
+ * Written by Viktor Dukhovni (viktor@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2015.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H
+#define HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H
+
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+/*-
+ * Certificate usages:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.1
+ */
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_TA 0
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_EE 1
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA 2
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE 3
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_LAST DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE
+
+/*-
+ * Selectors:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.2
+ */
+#define DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT 0
+#define DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI 1
+#define DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
+
+/*-
+ * Matching types:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.3
+ */
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL 0
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_2256 1
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_2512 2
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST DANETLS_MATCHING_2512
+
+typedef struct danetls_record_st {
+ uint8_t usage;
+ uint8_t selector;
+ uint8_t mtype;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ size_t dlen;
+ EVP_PKEY *spki;
+} danetls_record;
+
+/*
+ * Shared DANE context
+ */
+struct dane_ctx_st {
+ const EVP_MD **mdevp; /* mtype -> digest */
+ uint8_t *mdord; /* mtype -> preference */
+ uint8_t mdmax; /* highest supported mtype */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Per connection DANE state
+ */
+struct dane_st {
+ struct dane_ctx_st *dctx;
+ STACK_OF(danetls_record) *trecs;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs; /* DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0) certs */
+ danetls_record *mtlsa; /* Matching TLSA record */
+ X509 *mcert; /* DANE matched cert */
+ uint32_t umask; /* Usages present */
+ int mdpth; /* Depth of matched cert */
+ int pdpth; /* Depth of PKIX trust */
+};
+
+#define DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->trecs != NULL))
+
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(u) (((uint32_t)1) << u)
+
+#define DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_TA))
+#define DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_EE))
+#define DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA))
+#define DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE))
+
+#define DANETLS_PKIX_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK | DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK)
+#define DANETLS_DANE_MASK (DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK)
+#define DANETLS_TA_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK)
+#define DANETLS_EE_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK)
+
+#define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_TA_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_EE(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_EE_MASK))
+
+#define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX_TA(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX_EE(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_DANE_EE(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK))
+
+#endif /* HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H */
# define sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, (st))
# define sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, (st))
+# define sk_danetls_record_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(danetls_record, (cmp))
+# define sk_danetls_record_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(danetls_record)
+# define sk_danetls_record_free(st) SKM_sk_free(danetls_record, (st))
+# define sk_danetls_record_num(st) SKM_sk_num(danetls_record, (st))
+# define sk_danetls_record_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(danetls_record, (st), (i))
+# define sk_danetls_record_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(danetls_record, (st), (i), (val))
+# define sk_danetls_record_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(danetls_record, (st))
+# define sk_danetls_record_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(danetls_record, (st), (val))
+# define sk_danetls_record_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(danetls_record, (st), (val))
+# define sk_danetls_record_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(danetls_record, (st), (val))
+# define sk_danetls_record_find_ex(st, val) SKM_sk_find_ex(danetls_record, (st), (val))
+# define sk_danetls_record_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(danetls_record, (st), (i))
+# define sk_danetls_record_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(danetls_record, (st), (ptr))
+# define sk_danetls_record_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(danetls_record, (st), (val), (i))
+# define sk_danetls_record_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(danetls_record, (st), (cmp))
+# define sk_danetls_record_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(danetls_record, st)
+# define sk_danetls_record_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(danetls_record, (st), (free_func))
+# define sk_danetls_record_deep_copy(st, copy_func, free_func) SKM_sk_deep_copy(danetls_record, (st), (copy_func), (free_func))
+# define sk_danetls_record_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(danetls_record, (st))
+# define sk_danetls_record_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(danetls_record, (st))
+# define sk_danetls_record_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(danetls_record, (st))
+# define sk_danetls_record_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(danetls_record, (st))
+
# define sk_nid_triple_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(nid_triple, (cmp))
# define sk_nid_triple_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(nid_triple)
# define sk_nid_triple_free(st) SKM_sk_free(nid_triple, (st))
DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(danetls_record)
+
/* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/
typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st {
const char *name;
__owur int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust);
__owur int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust);
+__owur int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+__owur int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+__owur const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s);
+void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+ uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord);
+__owur int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain);
+__owur int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
+ uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen);
+__owur int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki);
+__owur int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
+ uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data,
+ size_t *dlen);
+/*
+ * Bridge opacity barrier between libcrypt and libssl, also needed to support
+ * offline testing in test/danetest.c
+ */
+struct dane_st *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *ssl);
+
__owur int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
__owur int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
/* Function codes. */
# define SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST 331
# define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103
+# define SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE 347
+# define SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET 393
+# define SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD 394
# define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245
# define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104
# define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246
# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179
# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO 336
# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE 337
+# define SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE 395
# define SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG 391
# define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180
# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181
# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307
# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142
# define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144
+# define SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED 167
# define SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE 400
# define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308
+# define SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED 172
+# define SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL 173
+# define SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED 175
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE 180
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE 184
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH 189
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 192
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE 200
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY 201
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR 202
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA 203
# define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145
# define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146
# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147
# define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 354
# define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150
# define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151
+# define SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN 204
# define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
# define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
# define SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC 405
/* For CRL path validation: parent context */
X509_STORE_CTX *parent;
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+ struct dane_st *dane;
} /* X509_STORE_CTX */ ;
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
+/*
+ * Bridge opacity barrier between libcrypt and libssl, also needed to support
+ * offline testing in test/danetest.c
+ */
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct dane_st *dane);
+
/* X509_VERIFY_PARAM functions */
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void);
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
unsigned int flags);
char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *email, size_t emaillen);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
return 1;
}
-void RECORD_LAYER_dup(RECORD_LAYER *dst, RECORD_LAYER *src)
-{
- /*
- * Currently only called from SSL_dup...which only seems to expect the
- * rstate to be duplicated and nothing else from the RECORD_LAYER???
- */
- dst->rstate = src->rstate;
-}
-
void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
-void RECORD_LAYER_dup(RECORD_LAYER *dst, RECORD_LAYER *src);
void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int RECORD_LAYER_setup_comp_buffer(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int i;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return (0);
}
+ param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx);
+
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+ /* Verify via DANE if enabled */
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(&ctx, &s->dane);
+
/*
* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
* the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
/*
- * Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+ * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
*/
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param);
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
}
s->verify_result = ctx.error;
+
+ /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
+
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (i);
static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST), "check_suiteb_cipher_list"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION), "d2i_SSL_SESSION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE), "dane_ctx_enable"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET), "dane_mtype_set"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD), "dane_tlsa_add"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE), "do_dtls1_write"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE), "DO_SSL3_WRITE"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT), "dtls1_accept"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO), "SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE),
"SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE), "SSL_dane_enable"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG), "ssl_do_config"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE), "SSL_do_handshake"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "ssl_get_new_session"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),
"compression library error"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET), "connection type not set"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED), "context not dane enabled"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE),
"cookie gen callback failure"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH), "cookie mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED), "dane already enabled"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL),
+ "dane cannot override mtype full"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED), "dane not enabled"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE), "dane tlsa bad certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE),
+ "dane tlsa bad certificate usage"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH), "dane tlsa bad data length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH),
+ "dane tlsa bad digest length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE),
+ "dane tlsa bad matching type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY), "dane tlsa bad public key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR), "dane tlsa bad selector"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA), "dane tlsa null data"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),
"data between ccs and finished"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "data length too long"},
"encrypted length too long"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),
"error in received cipher list"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN),
+ "error setting tlsa base domain"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE), "excessive message size"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE), "extra data in message"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC), "failed to init async"},
} f;
};
+static const struct {
+ uint8_t mtype;
+ uint8_t ord;
+ int nid;
+} dane_mds[] = {
+ { DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef },
+ { DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 },
+ { DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 },
+};
+
+static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
+{
+ const EVP_MD **mdevp;
+ uint8_t *mdord;
+ uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST;
+ int n = ((int) mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */
+ size_t i;
+
+ mdevp = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdevp));
+ mdord = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdord));
+
+ if (mdord == NULL || mdevp == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(mdevp);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Install default entries */
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(dane_mds); ++i) {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ if (dane_mds[i].nid == NID_undef ||
+ (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dane_mds[i].nid)) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ mdevp[dane_mds[i].mtype] = md;
+ mdord[dane_mds[i].mtype] = dane_mds[i].ord;
+ }
+
+ dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
+ dctx->mdord = mdord;
+ dctx->mdmax = mdmax;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void dane_ctx_final(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdevp);
+ dctx->mdevp = NULL;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdord);
+ dctx->mdord = NULL;
+ dctx->mdmax = 0;
+}
+
+static void tlsa_free(danetls_record *t)
+{
+ if (t == NULL)
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(t->data);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(t->spki);
+ OPENSSL_free(t);
+}
+
+static void dane_final(struct dane_st *dane)
+{
+ sk_danetls_record_pop_free(dane->trecs, tlsa_free);
+ dane->trecs = NULL;
+
+ sk_X509_pop_free(dane->certs, X509_free);
+ dane->certs = NULL;
+
+ X509_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = NULL;
+ dane->mtlsa = NULL;
+ dane->mdpth = -1;
+ dane->pdpth = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dane_copy - Copy dane configuration, sans verification state.
+ */
+static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from)
+{
+ int num;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(&from->dane))
+ return 1;
+
+ dane_final(&to->dane);
+
+ num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i);
+ if (SSL_dane_tlsa_add(to, t->usage, t->selector, t->mtype,
+ t->data, t->dlen) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dane_mtype_set(
+ struct dane_ctx_st *dctx,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ uint8_t mtype,
+ uint8_t ord)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET,
+ SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) {
+ const EVP_MD **mdevp;
+ uint8_t *mdord;
+ int n = ((int) mtype) + 1;
+
+ mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp));
+ if (mdevp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
+
+ mdord = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdord, n * sizeof(*mdord));
+ if (mdord == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dctx->mdord = mdord;
+
+ /* Zero-fill any gaps */
+ for (i = dctx->mdmax+1; i < mtype; ++i) {
+ mdevp[i] = NULL;
+ mdord[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ dctx->mdmax = mtype;
+ }
+
+ dctx->mdevp[mtype] = md;
+ /* Coerce ordinal of disabled matching types to 0 */
+ dctx->mdord[mtype] = (md == NULL) ? 0 : ord;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(struct dane_st *dane, uint8_t mtype)
+{
+ if (mtype > dane->dctx->mdmax)
+ return NULL;
+ return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype];
+}
+
+static int dane_tlsa_add(
+ struct dane_st *dane,
+ uint8_t usage,
+ uint8_t selector,
+ uint8_t mtype,
+ unsigned char *data,
+ size_t dlen)
+{
+ danetls_record *t;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ int ilen = (int)dlen;
+ int i;
+
+ if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ilen < 0 || dlen != (size_t)ilen) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (usage > DANETLS_USAGE_LAST) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (selector > DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+ md = tlsa_md_get(dane, mtype);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (md != NULL && dlen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!data) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((t = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*t))) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ t->usage = usage;
+ t->selector = selector;
+ t->mtype = mtype;
+ t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(ilen);
+ if (t->data == NULL) {
+ tlsa_free(t);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(t->data, data, ilen);
+ t->dlen = ilen;
+
+ /* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */
+ if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+ const unsigned char *p = data;
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ switch (selector) {
+ case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
+ if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, dlen) || p < data ||
+ dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
+ tlsa_free(t);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (X509_get0_pubkey(cert) == NULL) {
+ tlsa_free(t);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_TA_MASK) == 0) {
+ X509_free(cert);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 0 0" TLSA
+ * records that contain full certificates of trust-anchors that are
+ * not present in the wire chain. For usage PKIX-TA(0), we augment
+ * the chain with untrusted Full(0) certificates from DNS, in case
+ * they are missing from the chain.
+ */
+ if ((dane->certs == NULL &&
+ (dane->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ !sk_X509_push(dane->certs, cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509_free(cert);
+ tlsa_free(t);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+ if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, dlen) || p < data ||
+ dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
+ tlsa_free(t);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 1 0" TLSA
+ * records that contain full bare keys of trust-anchors that are
+ * not present in the wire chain.
+ */
+ if (usage == DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA)
+ t->spki = pkey;
+ else
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * Find the right insertion point for the new record.
+ *
+ * See crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. We sort DANE-EE(3) records first, so that
+ * they can be processed first, as they require no chain building, and no
+ * expiration or hostname checks. Because DANE-EE(3) is numerically
+ * largest, this is accomplished via descending sort by "usage".
+ *
+ * We also sort in descending order by matching ordinal to simplify
+ * the implementation of digest agility in the verification code.
+ *
+ * The choice of order for the selector is not significant, so we
+ * use the same descending order for consistency.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); ++i) {
+ danetls_record *rec = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+ if (rec->usage > usage)
+ continue;
+ if (rec->usage < usage)
+ break;
+ if (rec->selector > selector)
+ continue;
+ if (rec->selector < selector)
+ break;
+ if (dane->dctx->mdord[rec->mtype] > dane->dctx->mdord[mtype])
+ continue;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_danetls_record_insert(dane->trecs, t, i)) {
+ tlsa_free(t);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dane->umask |= DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static void clear_ciphers(SSL *s)
{
/* clear the current cipher */
clear_ciphers(s);
s->first_packet = 0;
+ /* Reset DANE verification result state */
+ s->dane.mdpth = -1;
+ s->dane.pdpth = -1;
+ X509_free(s->dane.mcert);
+ s->dane.mcert = NULL;
+ s->dane.mtlsa = NULL;
+
+ /* Clear the verification result peername */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, NULL);
+
/*
* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
* back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
+int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(s->param, flags);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(s->param);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane);
+}
+
+int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = &s->dane;
+
+ if (s->ctx->dane.mdmax == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (dane->trecs != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Primary RFC6125 reference identifier */
+ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, basedomain, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Default SNI name */
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain))
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ dane->mdpth = -1;
+ dane->pdpth = -1;
+ dane->dctx = &s->ctx->dane;
+ dane->trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null();
+
+ if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = &s->dane;
+
+ if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ return -1;
+ if (dane->mtlsa) {
+ if (mcert)
+ *mcert = dane->mcert;
+ if (mspki)
+ *mspki = (dane->mcert == NULL) ? dane->mtlsa->spki : NULL;
+ }
+ return dane->mdpth;
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
+ uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = &s->dane;
+
+ if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ return -1;
+ if (dane->mtlsa) {
+ if (usage)
+ *usage = dane->mtlsa->usage;
+ if (selector)
+ *selector = dane->mtlsa->selector;
+ if (mtype)
+ *mtype = dane->mtlsa->mtype;
+ if (data)
+ *data = dane->mtlsa->data;
+ if (dlen)
+ *dlen = dane->mtlsa->dlen;
+ }
+ return dane->mdpth;
+}
+
+struct dane_st *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s)
+{
+ return &s->dane;
+}
+
+int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
+ uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen)
+{
+ return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord)
+{
+ return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord);
+}
+
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
#endif
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+ dane_final(&s->dane);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
if (s->bbio != NULL) {
* what if we are setup for one protocol version but want to talk another
*/
if (t->method != f->method) {
- t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
- t->method = f->method; /* change method */
- t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
+ t->method->ssl_free(t);
+ t->method = f->method;
+ if (t->method->ssl_new(t) == 0)
+ return 0;
}
CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
#endif
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+ dane_ctx_final(&a->dane);
/*
* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
- int conn = -1;
int ret = 1;
if (s->method != meth) {
- if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
- conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+ const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method;
+ int (*hf)(SSL *) = s->handshake_func;
- if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+ if (sm->version == meth->version)
s->method = meth;
else {
- s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ sm->ssl_free(s);
s->method = meth;
ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
}
- if (conn == 1)
+ if (hf == sm->ssl_connect)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
- else if (conn == 0)
+ else if (hf == sm->ssl_accept)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
}
return (ret);
SSL *ret;
int i;
+ /* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ return s;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set.
+ */
if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
return (NULL);
- ret->version = s->version;
- ret->method = s->method;
-
if (s->session != NULL) {
- /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+ /*
+ * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref. This "copies"
+ * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert'
+ */
if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s))
goto err;
} else {
* point to the same object, and thus we can't use
* SSL_copy_session_id.
*/
-
- ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
- ret->method = s->method;
- ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ret, s->method))
+ goto err;
if (s->cert != NULL) {
ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
goto err;
}
+ ssl_dane_dup(ret, s);
+ ret->version = s->version;
ret->options = s->options;
ret->mode = s->mode;
SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
} else
ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
}
- ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
- ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+
ret->server = s->server;
- ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
- ret->new_session = s->new_session;
- ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+ if (s->handshake_func) {
+ if (s->server)
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ret);
+ else
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ret);
+ }
ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
- ret->statem = s->statem; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
- * though */
- RECORD_LAYER_dup(&ret->rlayer, &s->rlayer);
- ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
- * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
- * ret->init_off */
ret->hit = s->hit;
ret->default_passwd_callback = s->default_passwd_callback;
#include "record/record.h"
#include "statem/statem.h"
#include "packet_locl.h"
+#include "internal/dane.h"
# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
# undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list;
unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ /* Shared DANE context */
+ struct dane_ctx_st dane;
+
/* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
/*
void *msg_callback_arg;
int hit; /* reusing a previous session */
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+ /* Per connection DANE state */
+ struct dane_st dane;
+
/* crypto */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff