Handle the hwcrhk private key with a bit more consistency. Also, for the

random numbers generator, always return status 1 since the entropy is
already presumably there...

diff --git a/crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c b/crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c
index b4d2502ce93f8eac0980b7a165e066adaf88647e..9021c2c45354ded125f71963b3a6439920156127 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
 
 /* RAND stuff */
 static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void);
 
 /* KM stuff */
 static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(const char *key_id,
@@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ static RAND_METHOD hwcrhk_rand =
        NULL,
        NULL,
        hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
-       NULL
+       hwcrhk_rand_status,
        };
 
 /* Our ENGINE structure. */
@@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(const char *key_id,
        RSA *rtmp = NULL;
        EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
        HWCryptoHook_MPI e, n;
-       HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle hptr;
+       HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
        HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
 
        if(!hwcrhk_context)
@@ -552,7 +553,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(const char *key_id,
                        ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
                goto err;
                }
-       if (p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey(hwcrhk_context, key_id, &hptr,
+       hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle));
+       if (p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey(hwcrhk_context, key_id, hptr,
                &rmsg, NULL))
                {
                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
@@ -560,7 +562,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(const char *key_id,
                ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
                goto err;
                }
-       if (!hptr)
+       if (!*hptr)
                {
                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
                        ENGINE_R_NO_KEY);
@@ -573,7 +575,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(const char *key_id,
        rtmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
        MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
        MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
-       if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)
+       if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)
                != HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE)
                {
                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,ENGINE_R_CHIL_ERROR);
@@ -586,7 +588,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(const char *key_id,
        MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
        MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
 
-       if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg))
+       if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg))
                {
                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
                        ENGINE_R_CHIL_ERROR);
@@ -865,6 +867,11 @@ static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
        return to_return;
        }
 
+static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void)
+       {
+       return 1;
+       }
+
 /* This cleans up an RSA KM key, called when ex_data is freed */
 
 static void hwcrhk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,