Prepare OpenSSL 0.9.8g: cherry pick

  http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=16674
Avoid shadow and signed/unsigned warnings.

Submitted by: steve

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 22bd28a4bb0bc246245ec417734042b4cabd168c..ca61c188531f65576dba2de181fce53f47479144 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -297,9 +297,9 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
                                {
                                /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
                                 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
-                               unsigned char *p = &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+                               unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
                                const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-                               int len;
+                               int xlen;
 
                                if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                                        {
@@ -311,15 +311,15 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
                                        l2n3(0,p);
                                        l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
                                        p  -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-                                       len = ret;
+                                       xlen = ret;
                                        }
                                else
                                        {
                                        p  += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-                                       len = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                                       xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
                                        }
 
-                               ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, len);
+                               ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
                                }
 
                        if (ret == s->init_num)
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
                 * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
                if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
                        {
-                       unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data;
+                       unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
                        unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
 
                        /* reconstruct message header as if it was
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 
                if (al==0) /* no alert */
                        {
-                       unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                       unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
                        memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
                                frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
                        }
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 
        if ( frag_len > 0)
                {
-               unsigned char *p=s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+               unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
                i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
                        &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);