PROP_R_STRING_TOO_LONG:109:string too long
PROP_R_TRAILING_CHARACTERS:110:trailing characters
PROV_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED:101:aes key setup failed
+PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH:173:algorithm mismatch
PROV_R_BAD_DECRYPT:100:bad decrypt
PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING:141:bad encoding
PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH:142:bad length
PROV_R_BN_ERROR:160:bn error
PROV_R_BOTH_MODE_AND_MODE_INT:127:both mode and mode int
PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED:102:cipher operation failed
+PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED:174:digest not allowed
PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION:164:failed during derivation
PROV_R_FAILED_TO_DECRYPT:162:failed to decrypt
PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GENERATE_KEY:121:failed to generate key
PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER:103:failed to get parameter
PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER:104:failed to set parameter
+PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE:165:\
+ illegal or unsupported padding mode
PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH:146:inavlid ukm length
PROV_R_INVALID_AAD:108:invalid aad
PROV_R_INVALID_CONSTANT_LENGTH:157:invalid constant length
PROV_R_INVALID_CUSTOM_LENGTH:111:invalid custom length
PROV_R_INVALID_DATA:115:invalid data
PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST:122:invalid digest
+PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH:166:invalid digest length
PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT:123:invalid iteration count
PROV_R_INVALID_IVLEN:116:invalid ivlen
PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH:109:invalid iv length
PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN:124:invalid key len
PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH:105:invalid key length
PROV_R_INVALID_MAC:151:invalid mac
+PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD:167:invalid mgf1 md
PROV_R_INVALID_MODE:125:invalid mode
PROV_R_INVALID_MODE_INT:126:invalid mode int
+PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE:168:invalid padding mode
+PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN:169:invalid pss saltlen
PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH:112:invalid salt length
PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH:154:invalid seed length
PROV_R_INVALID_TAG:110:invalid tag
PROV_R_INVALID_TAGLEN:118:invalid taglen
+PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST:170:invalid x931 digest
+PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL:171:key size too small
PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG:144:missing cek alg
PROV_R_MISSING_CIPHER:155:missing cipher
PROV_R_MISSING_CONSTANT:156:missing constant
PROV_R_NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH:113:not xof or invalid length
PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET:114:no key set
PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:106:output buffer too small
+PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL:172:pss saltlen too small
PROV_R_READ_KEY:159:read key
PROV_R_TAG_NOTSET:119:tag notset
PROV_R_TAG_NOT_NEEDED:120:tag not needed
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (keytype == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR:
- if (p1 == -2) {
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx);
- } else if (p1 < -1 || p1 > 1) {
- /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
- return -2;
- } else {
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, p1);
- }
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE:
- if (p1 == -2) {
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx);
- } else {
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx, p1);
- }
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, p1);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p2, p1);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR:
+ if (p1 == -2) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx);
+ } else if (p1 < -1 || p1 > 1) {
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ } else {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, p1);
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE:
+ if (p1 == -2) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx);
+ } else {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx, p1);
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, p1);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p2, p1);
}
}
# endif
if (keytype == -1) {
switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, p1);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, p2, p1);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, (unsigned char **)p2);
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, p1);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, p2, p1);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, (unsigned char **)p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, p1);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, p2);
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
# endif
- if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP,
- EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return -2;
+ if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return 1;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
}
}
return 0;
name = OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST;
else if (strcmp(name, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0)
name = OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL;
+ else if (strcmp(name, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0)
+ name = OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (strcmp(name, "dh_pad") == 0)
name = OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_PAD;
LIBS=../../libcrypto
-$COMMON=rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_pk1.c \
+$COMMON=rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_aid.c rsa_pk1.c \
rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_crpt.c \
rsa_x931g.c rsa_sp800_56b_gen.c rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+
+#define ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x30
+#define ASN1_OID 0x06
+
+/*
+ * -- RFC 2313
+ * pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1
+ * }
+ */
+
+/*
+ * -- RFC 3279
+ * md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
+ * md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
+ * sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
+ */
+#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(name, n) \
+ static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0b, \
+ ASN1_OID, 0x09, 1 * 40 + 2, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, n \
+}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(md2, 2);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(md5, 4);
+#endif
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(sha1, 5);
+
+/*
+ * -- RFC 4055
+ * sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 14 }
+ * sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
+ * sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
+ * sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
+ */
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(sha224, 14);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(sha256, 11);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(sha384, 12);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_PKCS1(sha512, 13);
+
+/*
+ * -- https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/computer-security-objects-register/algorithm-registration
+ *
+ * sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 }
+ *
+ * id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-224 ::= { sigAlgs 13 }
+ * id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-256 ::= { sigAlgs 14 }
+ * id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-384 ::= { sigAlgs 15 }
+ * id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-512 ::= { sigAlgs 16 }
+ */
+#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SIGALGS(name, n) \
+ static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0c, \
+ ASN1_OID, 0x0a, 1 * 40 + 2, 16, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, n \
+}
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SIGALGS(sha3_224, 13);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SIGALGS(sha3_256, 14);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SIGALGS(sha3_384, 15);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SIGALGS(sha3_512, 16);
+
+#define MD_CASE(name) \
+ case NID_##name: \
+ *len = sizeof(algorithmidentifier_##name##_der); \
+ return algorithmidentifier_##name##_der
+
+const unsigned char *rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (md_nid) {
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ MD_CASE(md2);
+ MD_CASE(md5);
+#endif
+ MD_CASE(sha1);
+ MD_CASE(sha224);
+ MD_CASE(sha256);
+ MD_CASE(sha384);
+ MD_CASE(sha512);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_224);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_256);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_384);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_512);
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
return -1;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
- if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
- || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ if ((!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL))
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
pad_mode, NULL);
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, &pad_mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE, &pad_mode);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params);
return -1;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
- if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
- || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ if ((!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL))
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0,
pad_mode);
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params))
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
return -1;
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST,
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST,
/*
- * Cast away the const. This is read
- * only so should be safe
+ * Cast away the const. This is
+ * read only so should be safe
*/
(char *)mdname, 0);
if (mdprops != NULL) {
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(
- OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST_PROPS,
- /*
- * Cast away the const. This is read
- * only so should be safe
- */
- (char *)mdprops, 0);
+ *p++ =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES,
+ /*
+ * Cast away the const. This is
+ * read only so should be safe
+ */
+ (char *)mdprops, 0);
}
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
return -1;
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST,
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST,
name, namelen);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
(void *)label);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
- /*
- * Cast away the const. This is read
- * only so should be safe
- */
- (void *)label,
- (size_t)llen);
+ /*
+ * Cast away the const. This is
+ * read only so should be safe
+ */
+ (void *)label,
+ (size_t)llen);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params))
return (int)labellen;
}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN,
+ saltlen, NULL);
+
+ *p++ =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, &saltlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || saltlen == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN,
+ 0, saltlen);
+
+ *p++ =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
#endif
BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
};
-extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm,
- size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
- size_t siglen, RSA *rsa);
/* Macros to test if a pkey or ctx is for a PSS key */
#define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
#define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
/* RSA pkey context structure */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
# include <openssl/md2.h> /* uses MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+# include <openssl/md4.h> /* uses MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
# include <openssl/md5.h> /* uses MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
# include <openssl/mdc2.h> /* uses MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+# include <openssl/ripemd.h> /* uses RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+#endif
#include <openssl/sha.h> /* uses SHA???_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
/*
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, sz \
};
-/* MD2 and MD5 OIDs are of the form: (1 2 840 113549 2 |n|) */
+/* MD2, MD4 and MD5 OIDs are of the form: (1 2 840 113549 2 |n|) */
#define ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(name, n, sz) \
static const unsigned char digestinfo_##name##_der[] = { \
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x10 + sz, \
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(md2, 0x02, MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(md4, 0x03, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(md5, 0x05, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
};
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+/* RIPEMD160 (1 3 36 3 3 1 2) */
+static const unsigned char digestinfo_ripemd160_der[] = {
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0c + RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x08,
+ ASN1_OID, 0x04, 1 * 40 + 3, 36, 3, 3, 1, 2,
+ ASN1_NULL, 0x00,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH
+};
+# endif
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
/* SHA-1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) */
static const unsigned char digestinfo_sha1_der[] = {
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0d + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
};
-#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
-
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha256, 0x01, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha384, 0x02, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha512, 0x03, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
*len = sizeof(digestinfo_##name##_der); \
return digestinfo_##name##_der;
-static const unsigned char *digestinfo_encoding(int nid, size_t *len)
+const unsigned char *rsa_digestinfo_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len)
{
- switch (nid) {
+ switch (md_nid) {
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
MD_CASE(mdc2)
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
MD_CASE(md2)
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+ MD_CASE(md4)
+# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
MD_CASE(md5)
# endif
- MD_CASE(sha1)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+ MD_CASE(ripemd160)
+# endif
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+ MD_CASE(sha1)
MD_CASE(sha224)
MD_CASE(sha256)
MD_CASE(sha384)
RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- di_prefix = digestinfo_encoding(type, &di_prefix_len);
+ di_prefix = rsa_digestinfo_encoding(type, &di_prefix_len);
if (di_prefix == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1,
RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad);
- int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len);
- int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *len);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int mbits);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes);
The control command is indicated in B<cmd> and any additional arguments in
B<p1> and B<p2>.
-For
B<cmd> = B<EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY>, B<p1> is the length of the MAC key,
-and B<p2> is MAC key. This is used by Poly1305, SipHash, HMAC and CMAC.
+For
I<cmd> = B<EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY>, I<p1> is the length of the MAC key,
+and I<p2> is the MAC key. This is used by Poly1305, SipHash, HMAC and CMAC.
Applications will not normally call EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() directly but will
instead call one of the algorithm specific macros below.
The EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding() function gets the RSA padding mode for B<ctx>.
-The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() macro sets the RSA PSS salt length to
-B<len>. As its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. Three special
-values are supported: B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST> sets the salt length to the
-digest length, B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX> sets the salt length to the maximum
-permissible value. When verifying B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO> causes the salt length
-to be automatically determined based on the B<PSS> block structure. If this
-macro is not called maximum salt length is used when signing and auto detection
-when verifying is used by default.
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() function sets the RSA PSS salt
+length to I<saltlen>. As its name implies it is only supported for PSS
+padding. If this function is not called then the maximum salt length
+is used when signing and auto detection when verifying. Three special
+values are supported:
-The EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen() macro gets the RSA PSS salt length
-for B<ctx>. The padding mode must have been set to B<RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING>.
+=over 4
+
+=item B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST>
+
+sets the salt length to the digest length.
+
+=item B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX>
+
+sets the salt length to the maximum permissible value.
+
+=item B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO>
+
+causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the
+B<PSS> block structure when verifying. When signing, it has the same
+meaning as B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX>.
+
+=back
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen() function gets the RSA PSS salt length
+for B<ctx>. The padding mode must already have been set to
+B<RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING>.
The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits() macro sets the RSA key length for
-RSA key generation to B<bits>. If not specified 1024 bits is used.
+RSA key generation to I<bits>. If not specified 2048 bits is used.
The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp() macro sets the public exponent value
for RSA key generation to B<pubexp>. Currently it should be an odd integer. The
=head2 DSA parameters
The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() macro sets the number of bits used
-for DSA parameter generation to B<nbits>. If not specified, 1024 is used.
+for DSA parameter generation to I<nbits>. If not specified, 2048 is used.
The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_q_bits() macro sets the number of bits in the
-subprime parameter B<q> for DSA parameter generation to B<qbits>. If not
-specified, 160 is used. If a digest function is specified below, this parameter
-is ignored and instead, the number of bits in B<q> matches the size of the
+subprime parameter I<q> for DSA parameter generation to I<qbits>. If not
+specified, 224 is used. If a digest function is specified below, this parameter
+is ignored and instead, the number of bits in I<q> matches the size of the
digest.
The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_md() macro sets the digest function used for
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(),
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(),
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(),
-EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label() were macros in OpenSSL 1.1.1 and below. From
-OpenSSL 3.0 they are functions.
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(),
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(), were macros in OpenSSL 1.1.1 and below.
+From OpenSSL 3.0 they are functions.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(),
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name() and EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name() were
int rsa_validate_private(const RSA *key);
int rsa_validate_pairwise(const RSA *key);
+int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm,
+ size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+ size_t siglen, RSA *rsa);
+
+const unsigned char *rsa_digestinfo_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len);
+const unsigned char *rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len);
+
#endif
/* Known DIGEST names (not a complete list) */
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 "MD5"
+#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 "MD5-SHA1"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 "SHA1"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 "SHA2-224"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 "SHA2-256"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 "SHA2-384"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 "SHA2-512"
+#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 "MD2"
+#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 "MD4"
+#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 "MDC2"
+#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 "RIPEMD160"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 "SHA3-224"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 "SHA3-256"
#define OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 "SHA3-384"
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DEFAULT_DIGEST "default-digest" /* utf8 string */
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MANDATORY_DIGEST "mandatory-digest" /* utf8 string */
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE "pad-mode"
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE "digest-size"
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST "mgf1-digest"
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES "mgf1-properties"
+
+/* Diffie-Hellman/DSA public/private key */
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY "pub"
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY "priv"
/* Signature parameters */
#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID "algorithm-id"
+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE
#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST
#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES
+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN "pss-saltlen"
+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST
+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES \
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES
/* Asym cipher parameters */
-#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE "pad-mode"
+#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE
+#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST \
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST
+#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST_PROPS \
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS "digest-props"
-#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST "mgf1-digest"
-#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST_PROPS "mgf1-digest-props"
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL "oaep-label"
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL_LEN "oaep-label-len"
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION "tls-client-version"
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode);
-# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, len) \
- RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, len, NULL)
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen);
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen);
+
/* Salt length matches digest */
# define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST -1
/* Verify only: auto detect salt length */
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, len, NULL)
-# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, plen) \
- RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, plen)
-
# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) \
RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL)
* PROV reason codes.
*/
# define PROV_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED 101
+# define PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 173
# define PROV_R_BAD_DECRYPT 100
# define PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING 141
# define PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH 142
# define PROV_R_BN_ERROR 160
# define PROV_R_BOTH_MODE_AND_MODE_INT 127
# define PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED 102
+# define PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED 174
# define PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION 164
# define PROV_R_FAILED_TO_DECRYPT 162
# define PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GENERATE_KEY 121
# define PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER 103
# define PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER 104
+# define PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE 165
# define PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH 146
# define PROV_R_INVALID_AAD 108
# define PROV_R_INVALID_CONSTANT_LENGTH 157
# define PROV_R_INVALID_CUSTOM_LENGTH 111
# define PROV_R_INVALID_DATA 115
# define PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST 122
+# define PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH 166
# define PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT 123
# define PROV_R_INVALID_IVLEN 116
# define PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH 109
# define PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN 124
# define PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH 105
# define PROV_R_INVALID_MAC 151
+# define PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD 167
# define PROV_R_INVALID_MODE 125
# define PROV_R_INVALID_MODE_INT 126
+# define PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE 168
+# define PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN 169
# define PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH 112
# define PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH 154
# define PROV_R_INVALID_TAG 110
# define PROV_R_INVALID_TAGLEN 118
+# define PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST 170
+# define PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 171
# define PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG 144
# define PROV_R_MISSING_CIPHER 155
# define PROV_R_MISSING_CONSTANT 156
# define PROV_R_NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH 113
# define PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET 114
# define PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 106
+# define PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL 172
# define PROV_R_READ_KEY 159
# define PROV_R_TAG_NOTSET 119
# define PROV_R_TAG_NOT_NEEDED 120
static const ERR_STRING_DATA PROV_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED),
"aes key setup failed"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH),
+ "algorithm mismatch"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_BAD_DECRYPT), "bad decrypt"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING), "bad encoding"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"},
"both mode and mode int"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED),
"cipher operation failed"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED),
+ "digest not allowed"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION),
"failed during derivation"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_DECRYPT), "failed to decrypt"},
"failed to get parameter"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER),
"failed to set parameter"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),
+ "illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH),
"inavlid ukm length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_AAD), "invalid aad"},
"invalid custom length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_DATA), "invalid data"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH),
+ "invalid digest length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT),
"invalid iteration count"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_IVLEN), "invalid ivlen"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH),
"invalid key length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_MAC), "invalid mac"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE), "invalid mode"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE_INT), "invalid mode int"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE),
+ "invalid padding mode"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN),
+ "invalid pss saltlen"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH),
"invalid salt length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH),
"invalid seed length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG), "invalid tag"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_TAGLEN), "invalid taglen"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST),
+ "invalid x931 digest"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL),
+ "key size too small"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG), "missing cek alg"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_MISSING_CIPHER), "missing cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_MISSING_CONSTANT), "missing constant"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET), "no key set"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL),
"output buffer too small"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL),
+ "pss saltlen too small"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_READ_KEY), "read key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_TAG_NOTSET), "tag notset"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_TAG_NOT_NEEDED), "tag not needed"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
{ "DSA:dsaEncryption", "provider=default", dsa_signature_functions },
#endif
+ { "RSA:rsaEncryption", "default=yes", rsa_signature_functions },
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
/* Signature */
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH dsa_signature_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[];
/* Asym Cipher */
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_asym_cipher_functions[];
# switch each to the Legacy provider when needed.
$DSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$RSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
IF[{- !$disabled{dsa} -}]
SOURCE[$DSA_GOAL]=dsa.c
ENDIF
+SOURCE[$RSA_GOAL]=rsa.c
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "internal/sizes.h"
+#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
+
+static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
+ { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
+ { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
+ { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
+ { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
+ * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
+ * we use that here too.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
+ * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
+ * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
+ * by their Final function.
+ */
+ unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
+
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
+ unsigned char aid[128];
+ size_t aid_len;
+
+ /* main digest */
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+ int mdnid;
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
+
+ /* RSA padding mode */
+ int pad_mode;
+ /* message digest for MGF1 */
+ EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
+ char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
+ /* PSS salt length */
+ int saltlen;
+ /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
+ int min_saltlen;
+
+ /* Temp buffer */
+ unsigned char *tbuf;
+
+} PROV_RSA_CTX;
+
+static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
+{
+ if (prsactx->md != NULL)
+ return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ /*
+ * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
+ * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
+ * map.
+ */
+ static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
+ { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
+ { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
+ { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
+ { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
+ { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
+ { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
+ { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
+ { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
+ { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
+ { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
+ { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
+ { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
+ { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
+ { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
+ { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
+ };
+ size_t i;
+ int mdnid = NID_undef;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
+ if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
+ mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+
+ end:
+ return mdnid;
+}
+
+static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
+{
+ if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ return prsactx;
+}
+
+/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
+
+static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
+ return 0;
+
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+ prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
+ if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+ else
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+ prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *mdprops)
+{
+ if (mdname != NULL) {
+ EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+ int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
+ size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
+ const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier = NULL;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = NULL;
+ ctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ ctx->mdname[0] = '\0';
+ ctx->aid[0] = '\0';
+ ctx->aid_len = 0;
+
+ algorithmidentifier =
+ rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(md_nid, &algorithmidentifier_len);
+
+ ctx->md = md;
+ ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
+ if (algorithmidentifier != NULL) {
+ memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
+ ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *props)
+{
+ if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
+
+ if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
+}
+
+static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
+ ctx->tbuf = NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ int ret;
+ size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
+
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+ *siglen = rsasize;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (mdsize != 0) {
+ if (tbslen != mdsize) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
+ prsactx->rsa);
+
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = sltmp;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
+ prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
+ sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ clean_tbuf(prsactx);
+ break;
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+
+ ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
+ prsactx->rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = sltmp;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ /* Check PSS restrictions */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHRU */
+ default:
+ if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
+ && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
+ prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
+ prsactx->saltlen)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
+ sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ clean_tbuf(prsactx);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->pad_mode);
+ }
+
+#ifdef LEGACY_MODE
+ end:
+#endif
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
+ unsigned char *rout,
+ size_t *routlen,
+ size_t routsize,
+ const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t siglen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (rout == NULL) {
+ *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
+ switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
+ RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ if (ret < 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret--;
+ if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ "Should be %d, but got %d",
+ EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *routlen = ret;
+ if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
+ break;
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ {
+ size_t sltmp;
+
+ ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+ sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = sltmp;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->pad_mode);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ *routlen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ size_t rslen;
+
+ if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
+ switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
+ prsactx->rsa)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ {
+ int ret;
+ size_t mdsize;
+
+ /* Check PSS restrictions */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return 0;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHRU */
+ default:
+ if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
+ && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
+ * call
+ */
+ mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
+ if (tbslen != mdsize) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ "Should be %d, but got %d",
+ mdsize, tbslen);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
+ prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
+ prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
+ prsactx->tbuf,
+ prsactx->saltlen);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->pad_mode);
+ if (rslen == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *props, void *vrsa)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
+ if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
+ || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
+ return 0;
+
+ prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
+ goto error;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ error:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
+ prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
+ prsactx->md = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ size_t sigsize)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dlen = 0;
+
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
+ * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
+ */
+ if (sig != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
+ * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
+ * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+}
+
+
+int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t siglen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dlen = 0;
+
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
+ * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
+ * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+}
+
+static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
+ EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
+ free_tbuf(prsactx);
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
+}
+
+static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
+
+ dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
+ if (dstctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *dstctx = *srcctx;
+ dstctx->rsa = NULL;
+ dstctx->md = NULL;
+ dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
+
+ if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
+
+ if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
+
+ if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
+
+ if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
+ dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
+ || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return dstctx;
+ err:
+ rsa_freectx(dstctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ switch (p->data_type) {
+ case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
+ {
+ int i;
+ const char *word = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
+ word = padding_item[i].ptr;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (word != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
+ <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
+ /* Not allowed during certain operations */
+ if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
+ return 0;
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
+ char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
+ return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
+ return 1;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* non-PSS code follows */
+ if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int pad_mode = 0;
+
+ switch (p->data_type) {
+ case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (p->data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
+ pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ /*
+ * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
+ * with signature use.
+ */
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
+ return 0;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
+ rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
+ goto cont;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cont:
+ if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int saltlen;
+
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+ "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
+ "PSS padding has been specified first");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (p->data_type) {
+ case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
+ if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ else
+ saltlen = atoi(p->data);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
+ * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
+ * lowest saltlen number possible.
+ */
+ if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
+ char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
+ return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
+ if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
+ || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
+ return 1;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* non-PSS code follows */
+ if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
+ * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
+ * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
+ * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
+ */
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
+}
+
+static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff