#include "ssl_locl.h"
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+ {
+ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ if (((size_t)&ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx&(sizeof(ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx)-1))
+ ==0) /* check alignment, practically always true */
{
- static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
+ int ret;
+ if ((ret=ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((ret=ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ ret=ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+ else /* commonly eliminated */
+ {
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
+ }
void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
{
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+static void tlsa_free(void *parent,void *ptr,CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,int idx,long argl,void *argp)
+ {
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex = ptr;
+
+ if (ex!=NULL)
+ {
+ if (ex->tlsa_record!=NULL && ex->tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
+ OPENSSL_free(ex->tlsa_record);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ex);
+ }
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx(void)
+ {
+ static volatile int ssl_tlsa_idx= -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ if (((size_t)&ssl_tlsa_idx&(sizeof(ssl_tlsa_idx)-1))
+ ==0) /* check alignment, practically always true */
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret=ssl_tlsa_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((ret=ssl_tlsa_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ ret=ssl_tlsa_idx=SSL_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"per-SSL TLSA",NULL,NULL,tlsa_free);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+ else /* commonly eliminated */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ssl_tlsa_idx < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (ssl_tlsa_idx < 0)
+ {
+ ssl_tlsa_idx=SSL_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"pre-SSL TLSA",NULL,NULL,tlsa_free);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ return ssl_tlsa_idx;
+ }
+ }
+
+TLSA_EX_DATA *SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+ int idx = SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx();
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
+
+ if ((ex=SSL_get_ex_data(ssl,idx)) == NULL)
+ {
+ ex = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLSA_EX_DATA));
+ ex->tlsa_record = NULL;
+ ex->tlsa_witness = -1;
+ SSL_set_ex_data(ssl,idx,ex);
+ }
+
+ return ex;
+ }
+
/*
* return value:
* -1: format or digest error
* 0: match
* 1: no match
*/
-int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen)
-{
+static int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen)
+ {
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int len, selector, matching_type;
int ret;
- if (reclen<3) return -1;
+ if (reclen<3 || tlsa_record[0]>3) return -1;
selector = tlsa_record[1];
matching_type = tlsa_record[2];
default:
return -1;
}
-}
+ }
-int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
+static int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth);
- unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage, witness_usage=0x100;
- const unsigned char *tlsa_record = s->tlsa_record;
- int tlsa_ret = -1;
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
+ const unsigned char *tlsa_record;
+ int tlsa_ret=-1, mask=1;
+
+
+ if ((ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx())) == NULL ||
+ (tlsa_record=ex->tlsa_record) == NULL ||
+ (tlsa_record==(void *)-1 && (ok=0,ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA)) || /* temporary code? */
+ /*
+ * X509_verify_cert initially starts throwing ok=0 upon
+ * failure to build certificate chain. As all certificate
+ * usages except for 3 require verifiable chain, ok=0 at
+ * non-zero depth is fatal. More specifically ok=0 at zero
+ * depth is allowed only for usage 3. Special note about
+ * usage 2. The chain is supposed to be filled by
+ * dane_get_issuer, or once again we should tolerate ok=0
+ * only in usage 3 case.
+ */
+ (!ok && depth!=0)) {
+ if (s->verify_callback) return s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
+ else return ok;
+ }
- if (s->verify_callback) ok = s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
+ while (1) {
+ unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage;
- if (tlsa_record == NULL) return ok;
+ memcpy(&reclen,tlsa_record,sizeof(reclen));
- if (tlsa_record == (void*)-1) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; /* temporary code? */
- return 0;
- }
+ if (reclen==0) break;
- while ((reclen = *(unsigned int *)tlsa_record)) {
- tlsa_record += sizeof(unsigned int);
+ tlsa_record += sizeof(reclen);
+ if (!(ex->tlsa_mask&mask)) { /* not matched yet */
/*
* tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field
* tlsa_record[1] Selector field
if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) {
tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen);
if (tlsa_ret==0) {
- s->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage;
+ ex->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage;
+ ex->tlsa_mask |= mask;
break;
}
- else if (tlsa_ret==-1)
- s->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */
+ else if (tlsa_ret==-1) {
+ ex->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */
+ ex->tlsa_mask |= mask;
+ }
}
- tlsa_record += reclen;
+ }
+ tlsa_record += reclen;
+ mask <<= 1;
}
if (depth==0) {
- switch (s->tlsa_witness&0xff) { /* witnessed usage */
- case 0: /* CA constraint */
- if (s->tlsa_witness<0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
- return 0;
- case 1: /* service certificate constraint */
- if (tlsa_ret!=0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- return 0;
- case 2: /* trust anchor assertion */
- if ((s->tlsa_witness>>8)>0 && ctx->error==X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY)
- ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
- break;
- case 3: /* domain-issued certificate */
- if (tlsa_ret==0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* override all errors? */
- break;
- default:/* there were TLSA records, but something phishy happened */
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- return ok;
- }
+ if (ex->tlsa_witness==-1) /* no match */
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, ok=0;
+ else
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK, ok=1;
}
- /*
- * returning 1 makes verify procedure traverse the whole chain,
- * not actually approve it...
- */
- return 1;
-}
+ if (s->verify_callback) return s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
+ else return ok;
+ }
+
+static int dane_get_issuer(X509 **issuer,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
+ {
+ SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx());
+
+ /* XXX TODO */
+
+ return ex->get_issuer(issuer,ctx,x);
+ }
#endif
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
int i;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
+#endif
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback);
- s->tlsa_witness = -1;
-#else
+ if (!s->server &&
+ (ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx()))!=NULL)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *tlsa_record = ex->tlsa_record;
+
+ /*
+ * See if there are usable certificates we can add
+ * to chain.
+ */
+ while (tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
+ {
+ unsigned int reclen;
+
+ memcpy (&reclen,tlsa_record,sizeof(reclen));
+
+ if (reclen==0) break;
+
+ tlsa_record += sizeof(reclen);
+
+ if (tlsa_record[0]==2 &&
+ tlsa_record[1]==0 && /* full certificate */
+ tlsa_record[2]==0) /* itself */
+ {
+ ex->get_issuer = ctx.get_issuer;
+ ctx.get_issuer = dane_get_issuer;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ tlsa_record += reclen;
+ }
+
+ ex->tlsa_mask = 0;
+ ex->tlsa_witness = -1;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
-#endif
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff