Changes between 1.1.0f and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Add multi-prime RSA (RFC 8017) support.
+ [Paul Yang]
+
*) Add SM3 implemented according to GB/T 32905-2016
[ Jack Lloyd <jack.lloyd@ribose.com>,
Ronald Tse <ronald.tse@ribose.com>,
# include <openssl/rand.h>
# define DEFBITS 2048
+# define DEFPRIMES 2
static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb);
typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
OPT_3, OPT_F4, OPT_ENGINE,
- OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_CIPHER,
+ OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_PRIMES,
OPT_R_ENUM
} OPTION_CHOICE;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
{"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
# endif
+ {"primes", OPT_PRIMES, 'p', "Specify number of primes"},
{NULL}
};
const BIGNUM *e;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- int ret = 1, num = DEFBITS, private = 0;
+ int ret = 1, num = DEFBITS, private = 0, primes = DEFPRIMES;
unsigned long f4 = RSA_F4;
char *outfile = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passout = NULL;
char *prog, *hexe, *dece;
if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc))
goto end;
break;
+ case OPT_PRIMES:
+ if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &primes))
+ goto end;
+ break;
}
}
argc = opt_num_rest();
if (out == NULL)
goto end;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating RSA private key, %d bit long modulus\n",
- num);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating RSA private key, %d bit long modulus (%d primes)\n",
+ num, primes);
rsa = eng ? RSA_new_method(eng) : RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL)
goto end;
- if (!BN_set_word(bn, f4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, num, bn, cb))
+ if (!BN_set_word(bn, f4)
+ || !RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, num, primes, bn, cb))
goto end;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, &e, NULL);
typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
OPT_ELAPSED, OPT_EVP, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_MULTI,
- OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS, OPT_R_ENUM
+ OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS, OPT_R_ENUM,
+ OPT_PRIMES
} OPTION_CHOICE;
const OPTIONS speed_options[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
{"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
#endif
+ {"primes", OPT_PRIMES, 'p', "Specify number of primes (for RSA only)"},
{NULL},
};
sizeof(test15360)
};
int rsa_doit[RSA_NUM] = { 0 };
+ int primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
static const unsigned int dsa_bits[DSA_NUM] = { 512, 1024, 2048 };
if (!opt_rand(o))
goto end;
break;
+ case OPT_PRIMES:
+ if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &primes))
+ goto end;
+ break;
}
}
argc = opt_num_rest();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+ if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
+ /* for multi-prime RSA, skip this */
+ break;
+ }
for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) {
const unsigned char *p;
if (!rsa_doit[testnum])
continue;
for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+ if (primes > 2) {
+ /* we haven't set keys yet, generate multi-prime RSA keys */
+ BIGNUM *bn = BN_new();
+
+ if (bn == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if (!BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4)) {
+ BN_free(bn);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generate multi-prime RSA key for %s\n",
+ rsa_choices[testnum].name);
+
+ loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum] = RSA_new();
+ if (loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum] == NULL) {
+ BN_free(bn);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum],
+ rsa_bits[testnum],
+ primes, bn, NULL)) {
+ BN_free(bn);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BN_free(bn);
+ }
st = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2,
&loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]);
if (st == 0)
RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL:160:invalid label
RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH:131:invalid message length
RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD:156:invalid mgf1 md
+RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY:167:invalid multi prime key
RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS:161:invalid oaep parameters
RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING:138:invalid padding
RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE:141:invalid padding mode
RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER:139:invalid trailer
RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST:142:invalid x931 digest
RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q:126:iqmp not inverse of q
+RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID:165:key prime num invalid
RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL:120:key size too small
RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID:134:last octet invalid
RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED:152:mgf1 digest not allowed
RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE:105:modulus too large
+RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R:168:mp coefficient not inverse of r
+RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D:169:mp exponent not congruent to d
+RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME:170:mp r not prime
RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:140:no public exponent
RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING:113:null before block missing
+RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES:172:n does not equal product of primes
RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q:127:n does not equal p q
RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR:121:oaep decoding error
RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:148:\
rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \
rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c \
rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
- rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c
+ rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c
const RSA *x = pkey->pkey.rsa;
char *str;
const char *s;
- int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
+ int ret = 0, mod_len = 0, ex_primes;
if (x->n != NULL)
mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
+ ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos);
if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
goto err;
goto err;
if (priv && x->d) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit, %d primes)\n",
+ mod_len, ex_primes <= 0 ? 2 : ex_primes + 2) <= 0)
goto err;
str = "modulus:";
s = "publicExponent:";
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off))
goto err;
if (priv) {
+ int i;
+
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off))
goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos); i++) {
+ /* print multi-prime info */
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+ int j;
+
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(x->prime_infos, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+ goto err;
+ switch (j) {
+ case 0:
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "prime%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ bn = pinfo->r;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "exponent%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ bn = pinfo->d;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "coefficient%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ bn = pinfo->t;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "", bn, NULL, off))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
}
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey) && !rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 1, x->pss, off))
goto err;
/*
- * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include "rsa_locl.h"
-/* Override the default free and new methods */
+/*
+ * Override the default free and new methods,
+ * and calculate helper products for multi-prime
+ * RSA keys.
+ */
static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *exarg)
{
RSA_free((RSA *)*pval);
*pval = NULL;
return 2;
+ } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
+ if (((RSA *)*pval)->version != RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
+ /* not a multi-prime key, skip */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return (rsa_multip_calc_product((RSA *)*pval) == 1) ? 2 : 0;
}
return 1;
}
+/* Based on definitions in RFC 8017 appendix A.1.2 */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PRIME_INFO) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, r, CBIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, d, CBIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, t, CBIGNUM),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
+
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = {
ASN1_EMBED(RSA, version, INT32),
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, CBIGNUM),
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, CBIGNUM),
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, CBIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM)
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(RSA, prime_infos, RSA_PRIME_INFO)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
/*
- * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
{
BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
BN_CTX *ctx;
- int ret = 1;
+ int ret = 1, ex_primes = 0, idx;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
if (key->p == NULL || key->q == NULL || key->n == NULL
|| key->e == NULL || key->d == NULL) {
return 0;
}
+ /* multi-prime? */
+ if (key->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI
+ && (ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(key->prime_infos)) <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
i = BN_new();
j = BN_new();
k = BN_new();
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
}
- /* n = p*q? */
+ /* r_i prime? */
+ for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+ if (BN_is_prime_ex(pinfo->r, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* n = p*q * r_3...r_i? */
if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
+ for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+ if (!BN_mul(i, i, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) {
ret = 0;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+ if (ex_primes)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX,
+ RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES);
+ else
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
}
- /* d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
+ /* d*e = 1 mod \lambda(n)? */
if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
goto err;
}
- /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
+ /* now compute k = \lambda(n) = LCM(i, j, r_3 - 1...) */
if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
+ for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+ if (!BN_sub(k, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mul(l, l, k, ctx)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_gcd(m, m, k, ctx)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
}
+ for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+ /* d_i = d mod (r_i - 1)? */
+ if (!BN_sub(i, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(j, pinfo->d) != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+ }
+ /* t_i = R_i ^ -1 mod r_i ? */
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, pinfo->pp, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(i, pinfo->t) != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R);
+ }
+ }
+
err:
BN_free(i);
BN_free(j);
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH),
"invalid message length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY),
+ "invalid multi prime key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS),
"invalid oaep parameters"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"},
"invalid x931 digest"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q),
"iqmp not inverse of q"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID),
+ "key prime num invalid"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED),
"mgf1 digest not allowed"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R),
+ "mp coefficient not inverse of r"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),
+ "mp exponent not congruent to d"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME), "mp r not prime"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),
"null before block missing"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES),
+ "n does not equal product of primes"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q),
"n does not equal p q"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR),
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "rsa_locl.h"
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
BN_GENCB *cb);
/*
*/
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
- if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL)
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
- return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+
+ return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM,
+ e_value, cb);
}
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes,
+ e_value, cb);
+ return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
- BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
- int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
+ BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime;
+ int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
+ int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BN_ULONG bitst = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * From Github pull request #4241:
+ *
+ * We are in disagreement on how to handle security trade-off, in other
+ * words:
+ *
+ * mechanical-check-for-maximum-of-16-prime-factors vs.
+ * limiting-number-depending-on-length-less-factors-for-shorter-keys.
+ */
/*
* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
goto err;
}
+ if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM
+ || primes > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM || bits <= primes) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (r3 == NULL)
+ if (r2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */
+ quo = bits / primes;
+ rmd = bits % primes;
+
+ if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM && quo < RSA_MIN_PRIME_SIZE) {
+ /*
+ * this means primes are too many for the key bits.
+ *
+ * This only affects multi-prime keys. For normal RSA,
+ * it's limited above (bits >= 16, hence each prime >= 8).
+ *
+ * This is done in this way because the original normal
+ * RSA's behavior should not alter at least in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+ */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
goto err;
+ }
- bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
- bitsq = bits - bitsp;
+ for (i = 0; i < primes; i++)
+ bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo;
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
+ /* initialize multi-prime components */
+ if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
+ rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
+ prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2);
+ if (prime_infos == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) {
+ /* could this happen? */
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+ }
+ rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos;
+
+ /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */
+ for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+ if (pinfo == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
+ }
+ }
+
if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
goto err;
- /* generate p and q */
- for (;;) {
- if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
- break;
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+ /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */
+ for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) {
+ adj = 0;
+ retries = 0;
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ prime = rsa->p;
+ } else if (i == 1) {
+ prime = rsa->q;
+ } else {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+ prime = pinfo->r;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ redo:
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3...
+ * (those primes prior to this one)
+ */
+ {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ BIGNUM *prev_prime;
+
+ if (j == 0)
+ prev_prime = rsa->p;
+ else if (j == 1)
+ prev_prime = rsa->q;
+ else
+ prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos,
+ j - 2)->r;
+
+ if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) {
+ goto redo;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ bitse += bitsr[i];
+
+ /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */
+ if (i == 1) {
+ /* we get at least 2 primes */
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (i != 0) {
+ /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* i == 0, do nothing */
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
+ goto err;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected
+ * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than
+ * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime.
+ *
+ * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of
+ * the way factors are generated.
+ *
+ * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the
+ * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at
+ * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private
+ * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered
+ * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9.
+ */
+ if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4))
goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
- goto err;
- for (;;) {
- do {
- if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+ bitst = BN_get_word(r2);
+
+ if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) {
+ /*
+ * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to
+ * meet length requirement.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length.
+ *
+ * This strategy has the following goals:
+ *
+ * 1. 1024-bit factors are effcient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
+ * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key
+ */
+ bitse -= bitsr[i];
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
- } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
- if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+ if (primes > 4) {
+ if (bitst < 0x9)
+ adj++;
+ else
+ adj--;
+ } else if (retries == 4) {
+ /*
+ * re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used
+ * in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times
+ * is set to 4.
+ */
+ i = -1;
+ bitse = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ retries++;
+ goto redo;
+ }
+ /* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */
+ if (i > 1 && BN_copy(pinfo->pp, rsa->n) == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
+ if (BN_copy(rsa->n, r1) == NULL)
goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
- break;
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
goto err;
}
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
- goto err;
+
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
tmp = rsa->p;
rsa->p = rsa->q;
rsa->q = tmp;
}
- /* calculate n */
- if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
- goto err;
-
/* calculate d */
+
+ /* p - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
- goto err; /* p-1 */
+ goto err;
+ /* q - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
- goto err; /* q-1 */
+ goto err;
+ /* (p - 1)(q - 1) */
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
- goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+ goto err;
+ /* multi-prime */
+ for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+ /* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */
+ if (!BN_sub(pinfo->d, pinfo->r, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, pinfo->d, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
{
BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
if (pr0 == NULL)
goto err;
+
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
BN_free(pr0);
if (d == NULL)
goto err;
+
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if ( /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
- !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
- /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+ /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
BN_free(d);
goto err;
}
+
+ /* calculate CRT exponents */
+ for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+ /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */
+ if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
BN_free(d);
}
BN_free(p);
goto err;
}
+
+ /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */
+ for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+ BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(p);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
BN_free(p);
}
if (ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
return ok;
}
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
+ * and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
+ */
+int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
+ BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
+{
+ STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+ int i;
+
+ if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
+ if (prime_infos == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
+ old = r->prime_infos;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+ pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+ if (pinfo == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
+ BN_free(pinfo->r);
+ BN_free(pinfo->d);
+ BN_free(pinfo->t);
+ pinfo->r = primes[i];
+ pinfo->d = exps[i];
+ pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
+ } else {
+ rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
+ }
+
+ r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
+
+ if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+ r->prime_infos = old;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (old != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
+ * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
+ * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
+ * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
+ */
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
+ }
+
+ r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ /* r, d, t should not be freed */
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
{
*q = r->q;
}
+int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
+{
+ int pnum;
+
+ pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
+ if (pnum <= 0)
+ pnum = 0;
+ return pnum;
+}
+
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
+{
+ int pnum, i;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+ if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * return other primes
+ * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
+ primes[i] = pinfo->r;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
const BIGNUM **iqmp)
*iqmp = r->iqmp;
}
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
+ const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
+{
+ int pnum;
+
+ if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* return other primes */
+ if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+ int i;
+
+ /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
+ for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
+ if (exps != NULL)
+ exps[i] = pinfo->d;
+ if (coeffs != NULL)
+ coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
{
r->flags &= ~flags;
r->flags |= flags;
}
+int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
+{
+ /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
+ return r->version;
+}
+
ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
{
return r->engine;
/*
- * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#define RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM 16
+#define RSA_MIN_PRIME_SIZE 64
+
+typedef struct rsa_prime_info_st {
+ BIGNUM *r;
+ BIGNUM *d;
+ BIGNUM *t;
+ /* save product of primes prior to this one */
+ BIGNUM *pp;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m;
+} RSA_PRIME_INFO;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
+
struct rsa_st {
/*
* The first parameter is used to pickup errors where this is passed
BIGNUM *dmp1;
BIGNUM *dmq1;
BIGNUM *iqmp;
+ /* for multi-prime RSA, defined in RFC 8017 */
+ STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos;
/* If a PSS only key this contains the parameter restrictions */
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
/* be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared */
* things as "builtin software" implementations.
*/
int (*rsa_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+ int (*rsa_multi_prime_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
};
extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen);
+/* internal function to clear and free multi-prime parameters */
+void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void);
+int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa);
return 1;
}
+int (*RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+ (RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ return meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+ int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits,
+ int primes, BIGNUM *e,
+ BN_GENCB *cb))
+{
+ meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen = keygen;
+ return 1;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017 BaishanCloud. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
+{
+ /* free pp and pinfo only */
+ BN_clear_free(pinfo->pp);
+ OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
+}
+
+void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
+{
+ /* free a RSA_PRIME_INFO structure */
+ BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
+ BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
+ BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
+ rsa_multip_info_free_ex(pinfo);
+}
+
+RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void)
+{
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+ /* create a RSA_PRIME_INFO structure */
+ pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(RSA_PRIME_INFO));
+ if (pinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((pinfo->r = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((pinfo->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((pinfo->t = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((pinfo->pp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ return pinfo;
+
+ err:
+ BN_free(pinfo->r);
+ BN_free(pinfo->d);
+ BN_free(pinfo->t);
+ BN_free(pinfo->pp);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Refill products of primes */
+int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+ BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int i, rv = 0, ex_primes;
+
+ if ((ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) <= 0) {
+ /* invalid */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* calculate pinfo->pp = p * q for first 'extra' prime */
+ p1 = rsa->p;
+ p2 = rsa->q;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+ if (pinfo->pp == NULL) {
+ pinfo->pp = BN_secure_new();
+ if (pinfo->pp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mul(pinfo->pp, p1, p2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* save previous one */
+ p1 = pinfo->pp;
+ p2 = pinfo->r;
+ }
+
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return rv;
+}
NULL,
0, /* rsa_sign */
0, /* rsa_verify */
- NULL /* rsa_keygen */
+ NULL, /* rsa_keygen */
+ NULL /* rsa_multi_prime_keygen */
};
static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
}
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
/* do the decrypt */
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
- int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy, *r2, *m[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM];
+ int ret = 0, i, ex_primes = 0;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (vrfy == NULL)
goto err;
+ if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI
+ && (ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
{
BIGNUM *p = BN_new(), *q = BN_new();
BN_free(q);
goto err;
}
+ if (ex_primes > 0) {
+ /* cache BN_MONT_CTX for other primes */
+ BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
+
+ if (r == NULL) {
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+ BN_with_flags(r, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&pinfo->m, rsa->lock, r, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(r);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(r);
+ }
}
/*
* We MUST free p and q before any further use of rsa->p and rsa->q
BN_free(dmp1);
}
+ /*
+ * calculate m_i in multi-prime case
+ *
+ * TODO:
+ * 1. squash the following two loops and calculate |m_i| there.
+ * 2. remove cc and reuse |c|.
+ * 3. remove |dmq1| and |dmp1| in previous block and use |di|.
+ *
+ * If these things are done, the code will be more readable.
+ */
+ if (ex_primes > 0) {
+ BIGNUM *di = BN_new(), *cc = BN_new();
+
+ if (cc == NULL || di == NULL) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+ /* prepare m_i */
+ if ((m[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+
+ /* prepare c and d_i */
+ BN_with_flags(cc, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(di, pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, cc, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* compute r1 ^ d_i mod r_i */
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m[i], r1, di, pinfo->r, ctx, pinfo->m)) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ }
+
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
goto err;
/*
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
goto err;
+ /* add m_i to m in multi-prime case */
+ if (ex_primes > 0) {
+ BIGNUM *pr2 = BN_new();
+
+ if (pr2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+ if (!BN_sub(r1, m[i], r0)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mul(r2, r1, pinfo->t, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_with_flags(pr2, r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, pr2, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_negative(r1))
+ if (!BN_add(r1, r1, pinfo->r)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r1, pinfo->pp, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, r1)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ }
+
if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa)
{
+ int i;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(pinfo->m);
+ }
return 1;
}
/* Key gen parameters */
int nbits;
BIGNUM *pub_exp;
+ int primes;
/* Keygen callback info */
int gentmp[2];
/* RSA padding mode */
if (rctx == NULL)
return 0;
rctx->nbits = 1024;
+ rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
else
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
return 1;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
+ if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ rctx->primes = p1;
+ return 1;
+
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
int pm;
+
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) {
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
int saltlen;
+
if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
- int nbits;
- nbits = atoi(value);
+ int nbits = atoi(value);
+
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
int ret;
+
BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
return 0;
return ret;
}
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
+ int nprimes = atoi(value);
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
+ }
+
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
unsigned char *lab;
long lablen;
int ret;
+
lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
if (!lab)
return 0;
} else {
pcb = NULL;
}
- ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
+ ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
+ rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
RSA_free(rsa);
The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 1024 is used.
+=item B<rsa_keygen_primes:numprimes>
+
+The number of primes in the generated key. If not specified 2 is used.
+
+=item B<rsa_keygen_pubexp:value>
+
+The RSA public exponent value. This can be a large decimal or
+hexadecimal value if preceded by B<0x>. Default value is 65537.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RSA-PSS KEY GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+Note: by default an B<RSA-PSS> key has no parameter restrictions.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<rsa_keygen_bits:numbits>, B<rsa_keygen_pubexp:value>
+
+These options have the same meaning as the B<RSA> algorithm.
+
+=item B<rsa_pss_keygen_md:digest>
+
=item B<rsa_keygen_pubexp:value>
The RSA public exponent value. This can be a large decimal or
[B<-rand file...>]
[B<-writerand file>]
[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-primes num>]
[B<numbits>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
+=item B<-primes num>
+
+Specify the number of primes to use while generating the RSA key. The B<num>
+parameter must be a positive integer that is greater than 1 and less than 16.
+If B<num> is greater than 2, then the generated key is called a 'multi-prime'
+RSA key, which is defined in RFC 8017.
+
=item B<numbits>
The size of the private key to generate in bits. This must be the last option
=head1 NOTES
-RSA private key generation essentially involves the generation of two prime
-numbers. When generating a private key various symbols will be output to
+RSA private key generation essentially involves the generation of two or more
+prime numbers. When generating a private key various symbols will be output to
indicate the progress of the generation. A B<.> represents each number which
has passed an initial sieve test, B<+> means a number has passed a single
-round of the Miller-Rabin primality test. A newline means that the number has
-passed all the prime tests (the actual number depends on the key size).
+round of the Miller-Rabin primality test, B<*> means the current prime starts
+a regenerating progress due to some failed tests. A newline means that the number
+has passed all the prime tests (the actual number depends on the key size).
Because key generation is a random process the time taken to generate a key
-may vary somewhat.
+may vary somewhat. But in general, more primes lead to less generation time
+of a key.
=head1 BUGS
[B<-decrypt>]
[B<-rand file...>]
[B<-writerand file>]
+[B<-primes num>]
[B<algorithm...>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
Writes random data to the specified I<file> upon exit.
This can be used with a subsequent B<-rand> flag.
+=item B<-primes num>
+
+Generate a B<num>-prime RSA key and use it to run the benchmarks. This option
+is only effective if RSA algorithm is specified to test.
+
=item B<[zero or more test algorithms]>
If any options are given, B<speed> tests those algorithms, otherwise all of
=head1 NAME
-RSA_generate_key_ex, RSA_generate_key - generate RSA key pair
+RSA_generate_key_ex, RSA_generate_key,
+RSA_generate_multi_prime_key - generate RSA key pair
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+ int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
Deprecated:
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-RSA_generate_key_ex() generates a key pair and stores it in the B<RSA>
-structure provided in B<rsa>. The pseudo-random number generator must
+RSA_generate_key_ex() generates a 2-prime RSA key pair and stores it in the
+B<RSA> structure provided in B<rsa>. The pseudo-random number generator must
be seeded prior to calling RSA_generate_key_ex().
-The modulus size will be of length B<bits>, and the public exponent will be
-B<e>. Key sizes with B<num> E<lt> 1024 should be considered insecure.
-The exponent is an odd number, typically 3, 17 or 65537.
+RSA_generate_multi_prime_key() generates a multi-prime RSA key pair and stores
+it in the B<RSA> structure provided in B<rsa>. The number of primes is given by
+the B<primes> parameter. The pseudo-random number generator must be seeded prior
+to calling RSA_generate_multi_prime_key().
+
+The modulus size will be of length B<bits>, the number of primes to form the
+modulus will be B<primes>, and the public exponent will be B<e>. Key sizes
+with B<num> E<lt> 1024 should be considered insecure. The exponent is an odd
+number, typically 3, 17 or 65537.
A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the
progress of the key generation. If B<cb> is not B<NULL>, it
=back
-The process is then repeated for prime q with B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)>.
+The process is then repeated for prime q and other primes (if any)
+with B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)> where B<i> indicates the i-th prime.
=head1 RETURN VALUE
+RSA_generate_multi_prime_key() returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
RSA_generate_key_ex() returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
RSA_set0_key, RSA_set0_factors, RSA_set0_crt_params, RSA_get0_key,
RSA_get0_factors, RSA_get0_crt_params, RSA_clear_flags,
-RSA_test_flags, RSA_set_flags, RSA_get0_engine - Routines for getting
-and setting data in an RSA object
+RSA_test_flags, RSA_set_flags, RSA_get0_engine, RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count,
+RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors, RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params,
+RSA_set0_multi_prime_params, RSA_get_version
+- Routines for getting and setting data in an RSA object
=head1 SYNOPSIS
int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags);
void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags);
ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(RSA *r);
+ int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r);
+ int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]);
+ int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
+ const BIGNUM *coeffs[]);
+ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
+ BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum);
+ int RSA_get_version(RSA *r);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
the first and second factor of B<n> and B<dmp1>, B<dmq1> and B<iqmp>
are the exponents and coefficient for CRT calculations.
+For multi-prime RSA (defined in RFC 8017), there are also one or more
+'triplet' in an RSA object. A triplet contains three members, B<r>, B<d>
+and B<t>. B<r> is the additional prime besides B<p> and B<q>. B<d> and
+B<t> are the exponent and coefficient for CRT calculations.
+
The B<n>, B<e> and B<d> parameters can be obtained by calling
RSA_get0_key(). If they have not been set yet, then B<*n>, B<*e> and
B<*d> will be set to NULL. Otherwise, they are set to pointers to
RSA_get0_crt_params() and RSA_set0_crt_params().
For RSA_get0_key(), RSA_get0_factors(), and RSA_get0_crt_params(),
-NULL value BIGNUM ** output parameters are permitted. The functions
+NULL value BIGNUM ** output parameters are permitted. The functions
ignore NULL parameters but return values for other, non-NULL, parameters.
+For multi-prime RSA, RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors() and RSA_get0_multi_prime_params()
+can be used to obtain other primes and related CRT parameters. The
+return values are stored in an array of B<BIGNUM *>. RSA_set0_multi_prime_params()
+sets a collect of multi-prime 'triplet' members (prime, exponent and coefficient)
+into an RSA object.
+
RSA_set_flags() sets the flags in the B<flags> parameter on the RSA
object. Multiple flags can be passed in one go (bitwise ORed together).
Any flags that are already set are left set. RSA_test_flags() tests to
RSA_get0_engine() returns a handle to the ENGINE that has been set for
this RSA object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set.
+RSA_get_version() returns the version of an RSA object B<r>.
+
=head1 NOTES
Values retrieved with RSA_get0_key() are owned by the RSA object used
duplicate. The same applies to RSA_get0_factors() and RSA_set0_factors()
as well as RSA_get0_crt_params() and RSA_set0_crt_params().
+The caller should obtain the size by calling RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count()
+in advance and allocate sufficient buffer to store the return values before
+calling RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors() and RSA_get0_multi_prime_params().
+
+RSA_set0_multi_prime_params() always clears the original multi-prime
+triplets in RSA object B<r> and assign the new set of triplets into it.
+
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-RSA_set0_key(), RSA_set0_factors and RSA_set0_crt_params() return 1 on
-success or 0 on failure.
+RSA_set0_key(), RSA_set0_factors(), RSA_set0_crt_params() and
+RSA_set0_multi_prime_params() return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors() and RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params() return
+1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count() returns two less than the number of primes
+in use, which is 0 for traditional RSA and the number of extra primes for
+multi-prime RSA.
+
+RSA_get_version() returns B<RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI> for multi-prime RSA and
+B<RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT> for normal two-prime RSA, as defined in RFC 8017.
RSA_test_flags() returns the current state of the flags in the RSA object.
=head1 HISTORY
-The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(), RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(),
+RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(), RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(),
+and RSA_get_version() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+
+Other functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_get_init,
RSA_meth_set_init, RSA_meth_get_finish, RSA_meth_set_finish,
RSA_meth_get_sign, RSA_meth_set_sign, RSA_meth_get_verify,
-RSA_meth_set_verify, RSA_meth_get_keygen, RSA_meth_set_keygen
+RSA_meth_set_verify, RSA_meth_get_keygen, RSA_meth_set_keygen,
+RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen, RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen
- Routines to build up RSA methods
=head1 SYNOPSIS
int (*keygen)(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
BN_GENCB *cb));
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa, int bits,
+ int primes, BIGNUM *e,
+ BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ int RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+ int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits,
+ int primes, BIGNUM *e,
+ BN_GENCB *cb));
+
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The B<RSA_METHOD> type is a structure used for the provision of custom
RSA_meth_get_keygen() and RSA_meth_set_keygen() get and set the
function used for generating a new RSA key pair respectively. This
function will be called in response to the application calling
-RSA_generate_key(). The parameter for the function has the same
-meaning as for RSA_generate_key().
+RSA_generate_key_ex(). The parameter for the function has the same
+meaning as for RSA_generate_key_ex().
+
+RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen() and RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen() get
+and set the function used for generating a new multi-prime RSA key pair
+respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling
+RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(). The parameter for the function has the same
+meaning as for RSA_generate_multi_prime_key().
RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(), RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(),
RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(), RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(),
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<RSA_new(3)>, L<RSA_generate_key(3)>, L<RSA_sign(3)>,
-L<RSA_set_method(3)>, L<RSA_size(3)>, L<RSA_get0_key(3)>
+L<RSA_new(3)>, L<RSA_generate_key_ex(3)>, L<RSA_sign(3)>,
+L<RSA_set_method(3)>, L<RSA_size(3)>, L<RSA_get0_key(3)>,
+L<RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen() and RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen() were
+added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+
+Other functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
# define RSA_3 0x3L
# define RSA_F4 0x10001L
+/* based on RFC 8017 appendix A.1.2 */
+# define RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT 0
+# define RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI 1
+
+# define RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM 2
+
# define RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK 0x0001/* don't check pub/private
* match */
RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, primes) \
+ RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES, primes, NULL)
+
# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md) \
RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md))
# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 11)
# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 12)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
+
# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
# define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
# define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r,BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
+ BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum);
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r);
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]);
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
+ const BIGNUM *coeffs[]);
void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags);
int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags);
void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags);
+int RSA_get_version(RSA *r);
ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r);
/* Deprecated version */
/* New version */
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+/* Multi-prime version */
+int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1,
BIGNUM *q2, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2,
int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
BN_GENCB *cb));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+ (RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+int RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+ int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits,
+ int primes, BIGNUM *e,
+ BN_GENCB *cb));
int ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
# ifdef __cplusplus
# define RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL 160
# define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131
# define RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD 156
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY 167
# define RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS 161
# define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING 138
# define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE 141
# define RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER 139
# define RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST 142
# define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q 126
+# define RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID 165
# define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 120
# define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID 134
# define RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED 152
# define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 105
+# define RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R 168
+# define RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 169
+# define RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME 170
# define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 140
# define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING 113
+# define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES 172
# define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
# define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
# define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 148
x509_time_test x509_dup_cert_test x509_check_cert_pkey_test \
recordlentest drbgtest sslbuffertest \
time_offset_test pemtest ssl_cert_table_internal_test ciphername_test \
- servername_test ocspapitest
+ servername_test ocspapitest rsa_mp_test
SOURCE[aborttest]=aborttest.c
INCLUDE[aborttest]=../include
INCLUDE[rsa_test]=.. ../include
DEPEND[rsa_test]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
+ SOURCE[rsa_mp_test]=rsa_mp_test.c
+ INCLUDE[rsa_mp_test]=.. ../include
+ DEPEND[rsa_mp_test]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
+
SOURCE[evp_test]=evp_test.c
INCLUDE[evp_test]=../include
DEPEND[evp_test]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
--- /dev/null
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2017 BaishanCloud. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_mp_rsa");
+
+plan tests => 61;
+
+ok(run(test(["rsa_mp_test"])), "running rsa multi prime test");
+
+my $cleartext = data_file("plain_text");
+
+my @test_param = (
+ # 3 primes, 2048-bit
+ {
+ primes => '3',
+ bits => '2048',
+ },
+ # 4 primes, 2048-bit
+ {
+ primes => '4',
+ bits => '2048',
+ },
+ # 8 primes, 2048-bit
+ {
+ primes => '8',
+ bits => '2048',
+ },
+ # 15 primes, 2048-bit
+ {
+ primes => '15',
+ bits => '2048',
+ },
+ # 8 primes, 15360-bit (3 & 4 primes for 15360 bit is too long to gen a key)
+ {
+ primes => '8',
+ bits => '15360',
+ },
+ # 15 primes, 15360-bit
+ {
+ primes => '15',
+ bits => '15360',
+ },
+);
+
+# genrsa
+run_mp_tests(0);
+# evp
+run_mp_tests(1);
+
+sub run_mp_tests {
+ my $evp = shift;
+
+ foreach my $param (@test_param) {
+ my $primes = $param->{primes};
+ my $bits = $param->{bits};
+ my $name = ($evp ? "evp" : "") . "${bits}p${primes}";
+
+ if ($evp) {
+ ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', '-out', 'rsamptest.pem',
+ '-algorithm', 'RSA', '-pkeyopt', "rsa_keygen_primes:$primes",
+ '-pkeyopt', "rsa_keygen_bits:$bits"])), "genrsa $name");
+ } else {
+ ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genrsa', '-out', 'rsamptest.pem',
+ '-primes', $primes, $bits])), "genrsa $name");
+ }
+
+ ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-in', 'rsamptest.pem',
+ '-noout'])), "rsa -check $name");
+ if ($evp) {
+ ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-inkey', 'rsamptest.pem',
+ '-encrypt', '-in', $cleartext,
+ '-out', 'rsamptest.enc' ])), "rsa $name encrypt");
+ ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-inkey', 'rsamptest.pem',
+ '-decrypt', '-in', 'rsamptest.enc',
+ '-out', 'rsamptest.dec' ])), "rsa $name decrypt");
+ } else {
+ ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsautl', '-inkey', 'rsamptest.pem',
+ '-encrypt', '-in', $cleartext,
+ '-out', 'rsamptest.enc' ])), "rsa $name encrypt");
+ ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsautl', '-inkey', 'rsamptest.pem',
+ '-decrypt', '-in', 'rsamptest.enc',
+ '-out', 'rsamptest.dec' ])), "rsa $name decrypt");
+ }
+
+ ok(check_msg(), "rsa $name check result");
+
+ # clean up temp files
+ unlink 'rsamptest.pem';
+ unlink 'rsamptest.enc';
+ unlink 'rsamptest.dec';
+ }
+}
+
+sub check_msg {
+ my $msg;
+ my $dec;
+
+ open(my $fh, "<", $cleartext) or return 0;
+ binmode $fh;
+ read($fh, $msg, 10240);
+ close $fh;
+ open($fh, "<", "rsamptest.dec") or return 0;
+ binmode $fh;
+ read($fh, $dec, 10240);
+ close $fh;
+
+ if ($msg ne $dec) {
+ print STDERR "cleartext and decrypted are not the same";
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
--- /dev/null
+It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,
+it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness,
+it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity,
+it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness.
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017 BaishanCloud. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* This aims to test the setting functions */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#define NUM_EXTRA_PRIMES 5
+
+static int key4096p7(RSA *key)
+{
+ /* C90 requires string should <= 509 bytes */
+ static unsigned char n1[] =
+ "\x00\xeb\xa2\x2b\x74\x76\x32\x33\xbf\xb9\x9a\xe4\xb0\x84\xac"
+ "\x9a\x20\x1b\xe6\x1a\x22\x3f\xcd\x13\xe1\x42\xee\xd8\x1a\x6e"
+ "\xe3\xd5\x91\x1e\xee\x32\x5c\x78\x76\x8b\x5d\x82\x6f\xd0\xaf"
+ "\xa3\x56\xd6\x15\x5f\x64\xb3\x5a\xcf\xc8\x7d\xa3\xb1\x3d\x10"
+ "\xbf\x47\x00\xa9\xc9\x96\x9d\xfd\x7c\x82\x4f\xb5\x70\x39\xd4"
+ "\xd9\x0f\xd7\xd9\x86\xd4\xd4\x35\x06\x35\x07\xa3\x1b\x8c\xf4"
+ "\x35\xb8\xb2\xd4\xa3\xbe\x6c\x64\x7d\x74\x17\x88\x36\x07\x32"
+ "\x6f\x84\x48\xd4\xb8\x4a\x12\xba\xe8\x40\x5b\xc6\xa5\xa4\x11"
+ "\x0d\x8a\xa6\x60\x3d\x98\x8b\xf8\x11\x8f\x43\xab\x2f\x95\x0f"
+ "\x3b\x20\x3f\x48\x88\xaa\x3d\x20\xa6\xaf\x6a\xdf\xc0\x95\x38"
+ "\xff\x47\x7c\x8a\x8b\xec\x76\x45\x43\xd0\x06\x7c\x71\x76\x5f"
+ "\x0d\x11\x58\x0a\xa9\x0e\x7e\x07\xe9\x89\xc1\x9e\x56\x6d\x08"
+ "\xe4\xe3\x16\xb4\xa0\x03\x7a\x49\x96\xa8\x88\xcf\x89\xe3\xdb"
+ "\x47\x0c\xd2\x1b\x6f\x67\x4d\xc8\xee\x53\xe9\x0b\x3d\xe5\x11"
+ "\x9d\x85\x75\xfe\x26\x4a\x99\x58\x79\x28\x91\x03\x8b\xe4\xbf"
+ "\x49\xd3\xfa\x8e\x25\xe3\xb1\xb2\xc2\x33\xd9\x8b\xe0\x9d\x1b"
+ "\xa4\xa0\xcf\x05\x5f\xb9\x19\x65\x74\x24\xae\x2e\x33\xc8\xd9";
+
+ static unsigned char n2[] =
+ "\x55\xae\xcb\x37\xa1\x3b\x95\xf7\x5f\xff\x1f\x06\x4a\xab\x85"
+ "\x94\x37\x15\x6f\xf2\xc8\x9b\x73\xb9\x1d\x8e\x30\x63\x5a\xa1"
+ "\x84\x31\xa8\xbe\x7e\x4f\xeb\xa0\xe6\x73\xc7\xbe\xd4\x5e\xe7"
+ "\x5e\xae\x5d\xfd\xf7\xf5\xa4\xb6\xb8\x3c\x15\xac\x1b\xcd\x3a"
+ "\xb6\xbd\xa9\x11\xd0\x44\xa5\x08\x7e\x60\x1d\x1d\x4d\xa6\xd7"
+ "\x06\xe5\x4f\x37\x0d\x5c\xbd\xad\x8d\x40\x18\xbd\xc7\x58\x20"
+ "\xed\xa8\x4d\xd8\x29\xdc\x42\x4f\x50\xa6\x03\xf0\xa5\xa2\x18"
+ "\x2b\xdd\x1c\x0e\x89\x3f\xbc\x5d\x35\xac\xa8\x55\x6d\x17\x28"
+ "\xae\xee\x78\xeb\x6d\x7a\x21\xd6\x6c\xdd\x21\x1d\xcc\xe5\xb0"
+ "\xf2\xef\x7f\x1d\x8a\xb7\x95\xaf\x40\xb5\x5c\x8b\x0d\x59\x45"
+ "\x21\x86\x34\x6d\x13\xd7\x14\xa5\x0e\xca\x88\x32\x57\xfe\x2d"
+ "\xd1\xcb\xad\x14\xbe\x30\xb1\x69\x9b\x72\x82\xad\x47\xb5\x45"
+ "\xc8\x65\x83\xce\x07\x21\x15\x6b\x65\x9d\xf3\x4d\x92\x19\xbe"
+ "\x67\x73\xd0\x60\x9f\xc7\xef\xee\xfa\xb0\xd3\xa4\x95\x81\xb0"
+ "\xbd\x4b\xd5\xf8\xbd\xbd\x9f\x41\x41\xc0\xfd\xe9\x17\xe3\x16"
+ "\xd3\xdc\xc8\xe2\xa5\xca\xff\xea\x91\xf4\x33\xc0\xfb\xdc\x02"
+ "\x62\x0a\x4e\x26\x92\xb5\x13\xec\x43\xd2\x25\x19\xe2\x6d\xef"
+ "\xea\x38\x75";
+
+ static unsigned char e[] = "\x01\x00\x01";
+
+ static unsigned char d1[] =
+ "\x60\x43\x92\x69\x33\xd8\x72\x97\xc3\x25\xea\x83\xca\xd0\x10"
+ "\xef\x49\x36\x8a\x3a\xaf\xc2\x02\x7b\x26\xb3\x19\x0a\x43\x7f"
+ "\x44\xc2\xd2\xd6\x11\x31\x01\xed\xbc\x25\xe9\xa1\xf0\xa9\xb0"
+ "\x9b\x4b\x3e\xd4\x07\xf9\xd6\x01\xc9\x30\xba\xed\x2f\xbb\x65"
+ "\xc9\x86\x15\xd7\x4b\x77\x24\x15\xf7\xce\xc4\x9b\x21\x62\x4d"
+ "\xde\x77\xf0\x1e\x62\x49\x54\xda\xda\xcd\xdd\x0f\x53\xe2\xd2"
+ "\x39\x4f\x60\x8e\xec\xe3\x49\x1b\xe7\x9a\x3e\x17\x8e\x5a\x77"
+ "\x4a\x15\xf6\x57\xc5\xfe\x2b\xa5\x94\x04\x94\x9c\xe7\xa8\xcc"
+ "\x07\x4b\xd8\xb8\x55\xaa\xdf\x33\xca\x2c\x8c\xee\x61\x1a\x89"
+ "\x0d\x3b\xcd\x16\x28\xb5\x50\x62\x2f\xb1\x9e\x61\x27\xd7\xf1"
+ "\xe1\x22\x58\x84\xcd\x18\xc3\xbf\xde\x52\x25\xdd\xc1\xcd\x2a"
+ "\x20\x78\x5e\xde\x65\x6a\x25\x12\x2d\x78\x28\xdb\x2c\x6f\x1b"
+ "\x65\x71\x1b\x2e\x1c\x18\x62\xf6\x71\x82\xdc\xa8\x80\x0e\xb5"
+ "\x8b\x09\x97\xc3\x81\xe1\x23\x2e\x40\x75\xbf\xd3\x78\xdc\xd5"
+ "\xc3\xe6\x75\x8b\xb0\x48\x7a\x78\x7d\xfe\xcc\x4c\xa1\x40\x11"
+ "\x20\xbe\x2a\xc1\xaf\x18\x53\x45\x6a\xb4\x2a\x0a\xc9\x01\x36"
+ "\x60\xf1\x61\x97\x73\xde\xac\x3e\x24\xff\x5b\x25\xdb\x93\x97";
+
+ static unsigned char d2[] =
+ "\x03\xf4\xef\x4a\x73\x47\xa8\x31\xd1\x63\x5b\xba\xa6\xe2\x7a"
+ "\xd8\xef\xea\x2f\x04\x76\x3c\x7a\x8d\x4e\xc1\x81\xc5\x39\x4f"
+ "\x09\xc4\xb1\xfb\x75\xd0\xae\x32\x2e\x44\xa3\xb6\xdc\x60\xc6"
+ "\x60\x1e\x40\x6f\x04\xc2\x7a\xd3\x0f\x8a\xa4\x23\x8f\x0e\x2e"
+ "\x2a\xcd\x65\x2a\x6e\x97\xa8\xe5\x01\x96\xd1\x41\x27\xa5\x16"
+ "\x2f\xb0\x15\x0a\x33\x06\x72\x40\xa5\xe4\x74\xbe\x4a\x87\x28"
+ "\x8a\x68\xea\x39\x42\x08\x47\xff\x9d\x9e\x06\x03\xfa\x4a\x6a"
+ "\xbb\xe5\x6f\x97\x05\x5f\xae\x47\xe6\xc4\xe0\x48\x62\x65\x9b"
+ "\x91\x50\xda\x84\xcf\xa3\xb2\x9d\x51\x84\x02\x4b\xe6\x12\xa2"
+ "\x87\x6e\x1f\x43\x2f\x90\x36\xb1\x15\xc6\xf6\xe0\xde\x52\x39"
+ "\x8e\x22\x39\x8c\x4f\x1c\x08\xac\x55\x5c\xa9\x69\x4e\x77\x8d"
+ "\x74\x6e\x0b\x06\xda\x61\xcd\xe2\xc8\xc6\x02\x54\x70\x05\xc1"
+ "\x50\x6d\x5e\x3e\x66\x7d\x41\x3c\x57\x68\x8a\x16\xb9\xd8\x29"
+ "\xfb\xeb\x05\x57\x87\xdc\x88\xc6\x91\x67\x3c\xcc\x19\x28\xa1"
+ "\x23\x54\xc3\x88\xc4\x28\x63\xca\xf7\xb2\xea\x34\xa1\x9e\xc1"
+ "\xca\x9b\x96\xe7\x4d\x82\x22\xf9\xcb\xc3\x2a\x3f\x19\xe3\x7c"
+ "\xce\x8c\x66\x45\xfe\xe6\x31\x31\x66\xd4\x1a\xb5\x47\x98\xea"
+ "\x80\x01";
+
+ static unsigned char p[] =
+ "\x03\xf5\x90\x21\xf3\xa6\x13\xdd\x33\x2a\x4c\x1f\x53\xd6\x9e"
+ "\x64\x1d\xfc\xed\xfb\xa1\xe6\xd0\x80\xd1\x6a\xcd\x20\x68\xea"
+ "\x75\x72\x59\x24\x8b\x1b\x28\x37\xbd\x8f\xc4\xc9\xb6\xda\xef"
+ "\x55\xb9\x0e\x26\x93\x8a\x8a\xec\x2f\x47\xe6\x4e\xa9\x42\xfb"
+ "\x02\x28\x5e\x37\xb7\x5a\x61\xfa\x39\xab\x63\x61\x1b\xbb";
+
+ static unsigned char q[] =
+ "\x01\xea\x64\x6e\x7d\xaa\xd7\x6a\xfa\x0c\x52\xfa\x2b\x00\x51"
+ "\x7d\x4d\xc3\x9f\x1d\x21\xb2\x62\x11\xd4\x7d\x0e\xc2\xe7\xdf"
+ "\xd0\x04\xd6\x30\x02\x54\xb2\xa5\xb7\x85\xd5\x96\xc7\x24\x83"
+ "\x8e\x3d\x60\xc3\x42\xa5\xa3\x76\xdd\x6e\x60\xa0\xbf\x85\x05"
+ "\xb6\x52\x32\xeb\x41\x6f\x08\xc8\x56\x43\xd8\x80\x06\xf7";
+
+ static unsigned char dmp1[] =
+ "\x03\xcc\x5c\xe7\x45\x91\x49\xb3\x47\x77\xc7\xa9\xb2\x4b\xce"
+ "\x8e\xab\xfa\x4f\xf1\xbd\x63\xeb\x19\xfa\x4e\x64\xd6\x37\xf0"
+ "\xde\x95\xc2\x11\x7d\xe6\xa2\xd1\xbe\xe9\x23\x58\x85\x35\x4a"
+ "\xb0\xc9\xa5\x5a\xba\xe7\x09\xda\x06\x8e\x0a\xd3\xe2\x2c\x61"
+ "\x14\xb3\xd7\x97\xca\x2e\x4a\x9a\xbd\x22\xc0\x67\x94\x2b";
+
+ static unsigned char dmq1[] =
+ "\x01\x66\x28\x8d\xce\x38\x8d\x76\xb3\x43\x77\x03\x01\x8f\x0c"
+ "\xf5\x40\x6b\x84\x75\x69\x5b\xf8\x66\x5f\x54\x2b\x08\xcd\x03"
+ "\x58\xd1\x7f\x81\xb6\xe2\x17\x4c\x13\x3a\xab\x21\xa1\x36\x98"
+ "\xe2\xb5\x0f\x4b\xed\x0c\x3e\xd4\x1c\xab\x75\xe5\x51\x9b\x9c"
+ "\xed\x69\x21\x89\x52\xd3\xfe\x8d\x1a\xfc\x18\x4e\x81\x47";
+
+ static unsigned char iqmp[] =
+ "\x02\x31\xad\xe8\xa5\xa9\x5d\x52\x70\x68\xc1\x6e\x6b\x4e\xb5"
+ "\x0b\xc2\xd9\x89\xe5\xbc\x46\xca\xac\xac\x04\xe2\x39\x7f\xc4"
+ "\xa0\xe4\x9e\x8a\xb8\x1e\x67\x66\x85\xb8\x3e\x42\x7c\xc7\x2c"
+ "\x02\x64\x7c\xd3\x40\xda\x5d\x9f\x38\xa7\x7c\x30\xcd\x6b\x7d"
+ "\x4d\xd0\x77\x2d\x9b\xd1\xc3\x55\x03\x69\x3d\xda\x48\xe2";
+
+ static char *primes[] = {
+ "\x01\xb2\xe2\xf7\x3b\x29\xdc\x90\xf9\xc4\x5a\x75\x09\x00\xbe"
+ "\xec\xa6\x97\xbc\x47\x89\x24\x71\x48\xa7\xc9\xc8\xed\x9c\x88"
+ "\xb9\x9f\xcd\x79\xc9\x2d\xb1\x78\xf7\x54\x2c\x28\x01\x37\x01"
+ "\xa0\xff\xf2\x69\x52\x93\xf0\x16\x08\xaa\x2f\xff\x35\x14\x2d"
+ "\x65\x8d\x21\x05\x30\x84\x9b\xcb\x58\x42\xc6\x9b\xa7\xb5",
+
+ "\x01\xb7\x66\xfe\xb5\x94\xf8\x46\xcb\x06\x2a\x7a\xd4\x35\xe4"
+ "\x68\x6d\xcf\x58\x0b\xb3\x12\xe6\x7b\x66\xee\x36\xf5\x1f\x79"
+ "\x8f\x82\x1e\xd9\x97\x33\x45\x37\xa3\x84\x54\xab\x4b\x12\x96"
+ "\x76\x9f\xf9\x98\x02\xf1\x5e\xcb\x97\xe8\x13\xde\x91\x0b\xd5"
+ "\xec\x7f\x2b\x27\x55\xc1\x69\x58\xad\x8b\xaa\xce\x68\xc5",
+
+ "\x01\xbe\xdf\xa5\x33\xfb\xa1\xfa\xf6\xd2\x43\xcd\x76\x3e\x23"
+ "\xa2\xf7\x29\xeb\x65\xe5\xae\xe8\xfc\xfd\xca\x55\x16\x01\x57"
+ "\xcd\xca\x9e\x83\xf9\x61\x6a\x17\xac\x61\xec\x04\x32\x9f\x69"
+ "\xb8\x6d\x66\x33\x9b\xef\xf4\x91\xf1\x99\x02\xc2\xea\x58\x6e"
+ "\xad\x3d\x0e\xa9\x87\x17\x7c\x9b\x72\xcc\xab\x1c\x93\x2b",
+
+ "\x03\x2f\x4a\x9c\x49\x66\x9d\xbc\xae\xec\x54\x7d\xe6\x07\x52"
+ "\xc2\x9a\x09\xf5\xa7\x56\xa6\x68\x45\x38\x75\x7d\xb0\x0e\xee"
+ "\xf3\x23\xec\x74\x1e\x3b\xc0\x58\x1d\x43\xd9\x35\x15\x7e\x2f"
+ "\x28\xff\x08\x7a\x79\x44\xfc\x24\x06\xc5\x3f\xaa\xe0\xfa\xb2"
+ "\x1f\xd9\x4e\xd8\xc8\xda\xed\x1f\xaa\x77\x64\xae\xb3\xe3",
+
+ "\x01\xea\xaa\x9d\x90\x67\x3b\x2f\x9a\xe3\x7b\x56\x5c\x35\x9f"
+ "\x65\x0b\x0c\x3b\xa6\x60\x5f\x98\x36\x2c\xb6\xaa\xdb\xb2\x86"
+ "\x8b\x20\xba\xa4\x85\x7b\xa8\x80\x41\xee\x22\x1c\x7a\x92\xf5"
+ "\x39\x4e\x4a\x0b\x29\x0b\xe7\xdd\x3c\xb6\x51\xec\xc3\x26\xbc"
+ "\x33\x11\xbc\x29\x7a\x10\x68\x32\x55\xb4\x15\xd9\x8e\xc1"
+ };
+
+ static int primes_len[] = { 74, 74, 74, 74, 74 };
+
+ static char *exponents[] = {
+ "\x01\xa4\x49\xb7\x57\xc5\x50\x36\x08\x3c\xdc\x93\x29\x1d\x40"
+ "\x67\x63\x65\x57\x7f\xe7\x29\x82\x16\x0e\x9a\x74\x06\x37\x76"
+ "\xe7\xb6\x6a\x15\x5d\xf9\x3c\x00\x45\x3f\x62\xe1\x52\xb3\x3f"
+ "\x6e\xc2\x8d\x1b\x7e\xc4\x1c\x8e\x9e\xd7\x23\x45\xc8\x9d\x74"
+ "\x76\x25\x5b\x99\x31\x57\xa7\x5d\x71\x32\x2f\xd1\x74\xd5",
+
+ "\x01\x3a\xa4\x6d\x05\xf7\xeb\xa5\x3d\xe2\x67\x6e\xd7\x20\xd4"
+ "\x33\x17\x56\xdf\x34\x59\x81\xd2\x3b\x51\x64\x89\x44\x13\xca"
+ "\xc7\x41\xa4\xf7\xa8\xf6\xd4\xbc\xd7\xc1\x7d\xa3\xbf\x39\x4b"
+ "\x37\x1c\xac\xec\xf6\x46\x82\xdc\x05\x25\xf1\x7c\x71\x9e\xe9"
+ "\x0b\xd5\xb0\x40\x15\x7f\x4f\x01\x6a\x1c\x56\x2e\x42\x05",
+
+ "\x00\x9b\xd7\x14\x9e\xcf\x47\x4a\xe5\x1e\xa8\xc4\x93\x52\xd2"
+ "\x4c\xb7\xd3\x67\xa3\x4e\x79\x34\x09\x5e\x5c\x5c\x55\xe3\x3c"
+ "\x02\xa9\x81\xa4\x56\xa8\xb1\x3d\xf6\x40\xe3\xf5\x06\xce\x6f"
+ "\x29\x01\x05\xde\x43\xa8\x67\xeb\x29\x8d\x09\xd8\x7d\xaf\x3f"
+ "\x51\xac\xf4\x5b\x0c\xa0\x95\x35\x04\xd0\xf9\x6f\x6a\xa7",
+
+ "\x02\xfd\x38\x42\x48\x82\x90\x3a\xb0\xd4\x10\xd9\xba\x35\xd5"
+ "\x6f\xe1\xb4\xc7\x65\x30\xe7\x2f\xa7\x08\xbe\xfe\x21\x69\x62"
+ "\xcd\xc3\x42\x04\x1a\xfc\x6a\x24\x4a\x13\x8c\xa3\x4e\x71\x09"
+ "\x42\xa9\x5d\x03\xd7\x1e\xf0\xa9\xbf\xd1\x13\x59\x07\xa1\x45"
+ "\xde\xae\xd0\x5a\x98\xeb\x22\xf5\x3d\xc2\xa2\x35\x77\x91",
+
+ "\x13\x1d\x2c\x60\x28\xb5\x54\x88\x6b\x1e\x2d\xe2\x0f\xb0\xb2"
+ "\xe5\xf8\x47\x06\x97\x30\x82\x24\x72\x1f\x77\x8e\x71\x68\xee"
+ "\x58\x8b\x0c\xc7\xaa\x66\x89\x00\x88\x7f\x49\xae\xb8\xb4\xd6"
+ "\xd3\xa6\xec\xc2\x5f\x95\x5b\xb7\xf6\xbe\x40\x43\xe5\xe9\x64"
+ "\xef\xe6\xed\x92\xb4\xba\xea\x63\x0e\x4d\xdf\x98\xc1"
+ };
+
+ static int exps_len[] = { 74, 74, 74, 74, 73 };
+
+ static char *coefficients[] = {
+ "\x18\x19\x50\xc2\x69\x6a\x63\x66\x40\x6a\x43\xa6\x7d\x0d\x12"
+ "\x0f\x04\x3a\xe7\xb2\x1c\xe3\xfc\x6f\xa7\x8b\x5e\x99\xe3\x43"
+ "\x97\x68\x10\xee\x68\x73\x01\xc6\xaf\x5e\x26\xaf\xcc\x1f\x39"
+ "\x9c\x8d\xa9\x06\x80\x21\x7a\xaa\x29\x8a\x4b\x71\x03\xb0\x9a"
+ "\x2f\xd6\x6b\xb0\x0b\x93\xc9\x4d\x0b\x9d\x3f\xe6\x21",
+
+ "\x00\xa4\x80\x6e\xef\x34\xba\x3f\xe7\x96\xec\x25\x16\x25\xe9"
+ "\x77\x5f\x61\xb1\x48\xdb\x03\xfa\x80\xf3\xbd\x20\xd1\x60\x9a"
+ "\x10\x9d\xf0\x1b\xff\xb8\x50\x14\x54\x75\x53\x2b\x89\x9f\x39"
+ "\x96\x63\x05\x89\xfb\xfb\x7f\x59\x93\xdc\x61\xe2\x8c\xfc\x5a"
+ "\x6f\x2c\x6a\xcf\xd4\xac\xa5\x81\xf2\xdd\x68\x75\xd4\x48",
+
+ "\x00\xf6\xec\xd6\x98\x10\x42\x38\x94\x30\x2c\xd4\xe7\xb1\x5f"
+ "\xa2\xfd\xc9\xc4\x92\x78\xf6\x31\x34\xb7\x26\xa1\x7f\x0b\xa3"
+ "\xc3\xf6\x4f\xd0\x05\x4e\x98\x1b\xa5\x98\xde\x26\xb8\xc2\x14"
+ "\x12\xa4\xae\x2f\xd8\x48\x39\x1b\x33\x1d\x0f\x72\xaf\xd3\x8d"
+ "\xd8\xb0\x9f\x52\x42\x5d\xae\xf6\x3c\xe1\xd2\x09\xd8\x53",
+
+ "\x00\xb3\xce\x4b\x87\x41\x21\x34\x7b\xe3\x64\x74\xef\x9f\x71"
+ "\xcc\x01\x19\x50\x69\xbb\x5f\x69\xc8\xbc\x62\x8b\x4d\xa9\x73"
+ "\x23\x7f\xc6\xce\xfa\xe7\x96\xa7\x22\x44\x33\x32\x47\x60\x23"
+ "\xb4\xd2\x5e\xa4\xa1\xbd\x31\x1f\x04\x1a\xdf\xdb\x05\xe9\x4c"
+ "\x44\xfb\x9b\x73\xfe\x25\x3d\x7a\x61\xc2\x22\x9a\xd6\x18",
+
+ "\x01\x8d\x43\x63\x89\x6d\x97\xf3\x4a\x3e\x10\xa0\x94\x46\x1a"
+ "\x1c\x34\x22\xb3\xe3\x21\xff\xad\xf2\x1b\x56\x74\x32\xdc\xd2"
+ "\x0e\xd7\x3a\x9c\xe9\x87\xcc\xf1\x9c\x56\xfe\xff\x2f\x3d\xec"
+ "\x70\xba\xfb\x5d\x37\xa8\x57\xd1\xc4\xa9\x1b\xc9\xdc\x76\x68"
+ "\xca\x7d\x39\x59\x97\x2d\x07\x03\x52\xf6\x8d\xb6\x0e\x24"
+ };
+
+ static int coeffs_len[] = { 73, 74, 74, 74, 74 };
+
+ BIGNUM **pris = NULL, **exps = NULL, **coeffs = NULL;
+ int i, rv = 512;
+ unsigned char *n, *d;
+ size_t len_n, len_d;
+
+ len_n = sizeof(n1) + sizeof(n2) - 2;
+ n = OPENSSL_zalloc(len_n);
+ if (n == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(n, n1, sizeof(n1) - 1);
+ memcpy(n + sizeof(n1) - 1, n2, sizeof(n2) - 1);
+
+ len_d = sizeof(d1) + sizeof(d2) - 2;
+ d = OPENSSL_zalloc(len_d);
+ if (d == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memcpy(d, d1, sizeof(d1) - 1);
+ memcpy(d + sizeof(d1) - 1, d2, sizeof(d2) - 1);
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RSA_set0_key(key,
+ BN_bin2bn(n, len_n, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e) - 1, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(d, len_d, NULL)), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RSA_set0_factors(key,
+ BN_bin2bn(p, sizeof(p) - 1, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(q, sizeof(q) - 1, NULL)), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RSA_set0_crt_params(key,
+ BN_bin2bn(dmp1, sizeof(dmp1) - 1, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(dmq1, sizeof(dmq1) - 1, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(iqmp, sizeof(iqmp) - 1,
+ NULL)), 1))
+ return 0;
+
+ pris = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIGNUM *) * NUM_EXTRA_PRIMES);
+ exps = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIGNUM *) * NUM_EXTRA_PRIMES);
+ coeffs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIGNUM *) * NUM_EXTRA_PRIMES);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(pris) || !TEST_ptr(exps) || !TEST_ptr(coeffs))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXTRA_PRIMES; i++) {
+ pris[i] = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *)primes[i], primes_len[i], NULL);
+ exps[i] = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *)exponents[i], exps_len[i], NULL);
+ coeffs[i] = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *)coefficients[i],
+ coeffs_len[i], NULL);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(pris[i]) || !TEST_ptr(exps[i]) || !TEST_ptr(coeffs[i]))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!TEST_true(RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(key, pris, exps,
+ coeffs, NUM_EXTRA_PRIMES)))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret:
+ OPENSSL_free(pris);
+ OPENSSL_free(exps);
+ OPENSSL_free(coeffs);
+ OPENSSL_free(n);
+ OPENSSL_free(d);
+ return rv;
+ err:
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+ if (pris != NULL)
+ BN_free(pris[i]);
+ if (exps != NULL)
+ BN_free(exps[i]);
+ if (coeffs != NULL)
+ BN_free(coeffs[i]);
+ }
+ rv = 0;
+ goto ret;
+}
+
+static int test_rsa_mp(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ RSA *key;
+ unsigned char ptext[512];
+ unsigned char ctext[512];
+ static unsigned char ptext_ex[] = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a";
+ int plen;
+ int clen = 0;
+ int num;
+
+ plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1;
+ key = RSA_new();
+ if (!TEST_ptr(key))
+ goto err;
+ clen = key4096p7(key);
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(clen, 512))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(RSA_check_key_ex(key, NULL)))
+ goto err;
+
+ num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(num, clen))
+ goto err;
+
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(ptext, num, ptext_ex, plen))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ RSA_free(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int setup_tests(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ ADD_TEST(test_rsa_mp);
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
DH_check_ex 4383 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
DH_check_pub_key_ex 4384 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
DH_check_params_ex 4385 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+RSA_generate_multi_prime_key 4386 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count 4387 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors 4388 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params 4389 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_set0_multi_prime_params 4390 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get_version 4391 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen 4392 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen 4393 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff