# RC4_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h
# Following are set automatically by this script
#
-# MD5_ASM use some extra md5 assember,
-# SHA1_ASM use some extra sha1 assember, must define L_ENDIAN for x86
-# RMD160_ASM use some extra ripemd160 assember,
+# MD5_ASM use some extra md5 assembler,
+# SHA1_ASM use some extra sha1 assembler, must define L_ENDIAN for x86
+# RMD160_ASM use some extra ripemd160 assembler,
# SHA256_ASM sha256_block is implemented in assembler
# SHA512_ASM sha512_block is implemented in assembler
# AES_ASM ASE_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler
# resolve_config(target)
#
-# Resolves all the late evalutations, inheritances and so on for the
+# Resolves all the late evaluations, inheritances and so on for the
# chosen target and any target it inherits from.
sub resolve_config;
my @tls = qw(ssl3 tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2);
my @dtls = qw(dtls1 dtls1_2);
-# Explicitelly known options that are possible to disable. They can
+# Explicitly known options that are possible to disable. They can
# be regexps, and will be used like this: /^no-${option}$/
# For developers: keep it sorted alphabetically
unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/)
{
# "no-..." follows later after implied disactivations
- # have been derived. (Don't take this too seroiusly,
+ # have been derived. (Don't take this too seriously,
# we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of
# nostalgia.)
$disabled{threads} = "unavailable";
}
} else {
- # The user chose to enable threads explicitely, let's see
+ # The user chose to enable threads explicitly, let's see
# if there's a chance that's possible
if ($target{thread_scheme} eq "(unknown)") {
# If the user asked for "threads" and we don't have internal
}
-# configuration resolver. Will only resolve all the lazy evalutation
-# codeblocks for the chozen target and all those it inherits from,
+# configuration resolver. Will only resolve all the lazy evaluation
+# codeblocks for the chosen target and all those it inherits from,
# recursively
sub resolve_config {
my $target = shift;
# - If a value is a coderef, it will be executed with the list of
# inherited values as arguments.
# - If the corresponding key doesn't have a value at all or is the
- # emoty string, the inherited value list will be run through the
+ # empty string, the inherited value list will be run through the
# default combiner (below), and the result becomes this target's
# value.
# - Otherwise, this target's value is assumed to be a string that
* in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
* outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
* err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO.
- * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi"
+ * in: a NUL terminated string like "abc,def,ghi"
*
- * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure.
+ * returns: a malloc'd buffer or NULL on failure.
*/
unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen, const char *in)
{
BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free);
/*
- * Now let callback prepend any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure
+ * Now let callback prepends any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure
* needs.
*/
* family, such as AF_UNIX
*
* the return value is 1 on success, or 0 on failure, which
- * only happens if a memory allocation error occured.
+ * only happens if a memory allocation error occurred.
*/
static int addrinfo_wrap(int family, int socktype,
const void *where, size_t wherelen,
#endif
struct servent *se;
- /* Apprently, on WIN64, s_proto and s_port have traded places... */
+ /* Apparently, on WIN64, s_proto and s_port have traded places... */
#ifdef _WIN64
struct servent se_fallback = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
#else
int struct_ref;
/*
* reference count on usability of the engine type. NB: This controls the
- * loading and initialisation of any functionlity required by this
+ * loading and initialisation of any functionality required by this
* engine, whereas the previous count is simply to cope with
* (de)allocation of this structure. Hence, running_ref <= struct_ref at
* all times.
int ossl_init_thread_start(uint64_t opts);
/*
* OPENSSL_INIT flags. The primary list of these is in crypto.h. Flags below
- * are those ommitted from crypto.h because they are "reserverd for internal
+ * are those ommitted from crypto.h because they are "reserved for internal
* use".
*/
# define OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB 0x00010000L
# if defined(__alpha) || defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__mips)
# define MD32_REG_T long
/*
- * This comment was originaly written for MD5, which is why it
+ * This comment was originally written for MD5, which is why it
* discusses A-D. But it basically applies to all 32-bit digests,
* which is why it was moved to common header file.
*
struct X509_crl_info_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version: defaults to v1(0) so may be NULL */
- X509_ALGOR sig_alg; /* signagture algorithm */
+ X509_ALGOR sig_alg; /* signature algorithm */
X509_NAME *issuer; /* CRL issuer name */
ASN1_TIME *lastUpdate; /* lastUpdate field */
ASN1_TIME *nextUpdate; /* nextUpdate field: optional */
* POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE and |padbit| to 0. In all other cases |padbit|
* should be set to 1 to perform implicit padding with 128th bit.
* poly1305_blocks does not actually check for this constraint though,
- * it's caller(*)'s resposibility to comply.
+ * it's caller(*)'s responsibility to comply.
*
* (*) In the context "caller" is not application code, but higher
* level Poly1305_* from this very module, so that quirks are
if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
goto err;
- user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
+ user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */
}
}
}
* required.
*/
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *extra_data;
- /* This is the authority constained policy set */
+ /* This is the authority constrained policy set */
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_policies;
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *user_policies;
unsigned int flags;
=item EVP_aes_128_ocb(void), EVP_aes_192_ocb(void), EVP_aes_256_ocb(void)
-Offest Codebook Mode (OCB) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively.
+Offset Codebook Mode (OCB) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively.
These ciphers require additional control operations to function correctly: see
the L</GCM and OCB modes> section below for details.
* for data that caller is responsible for freeing (only if function returns
* successfully).
* If "pp" is NULL and "*pp" is not NULL, caller is responsible for ensuring
- * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serializied data.
+ * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serialized data.
* Returns < 0 on error, >= 0 indicating bytes written (or would have been)
* on success.
*/
* for data that caller is responsible for freeing (only if function returns
* successfully).
* If "pp" is NULL and "*pp" is not NULL, caller is responsible for ensuring
- * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serializied data.
+ * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serialized data.
* Returns < 0 on error, >= 0 indicating bytes written (or would have been)
* on success.
*/
* Parses an SCT in TLS format and returns it.
* If |psct| is not null, it will end up pointing to the parsed SCT. If it
* already points to a non-null pointer, the pointer will be free'd.
- * |in| should be a pointer to a string contianing the TLS-format SCT.
+ * |in| should be a pointer to a string containing the TLS-format SCT.
* |in| will be advanced to the end of the SCT if parsing succeeds.
* |len| should be the length of the SCT in |in|.
* Returns NULL if an error occurs.
/*
* Parses an SCT signature in TLS format and populates the |sct| with it.
-* |in| should be a pointer to a string contianing the TLS-format signature.
+* |in| should be a pointer to a string containing the TLS-format signature.
* |in| will be advanced to the end of the signature if parsing succeeds.
* |len| should be the length of the signature in |in|.
* Returns the number of bytes parsed, or a negative integer if an error occurs.
/*
* If this flag is set the DH method is FIPS compliant and can be used in
* FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application
- * sets this flag in its own methods it is its reposibility to ensure the
+ * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the
* result is compliant.
*/
/*
* If this flag is set the DSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used in
* FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application
- * sets this flag in its own methods it is its reposibility to ensure the
+ * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the
* result is compliant.
*/
const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group);
-/** Gets the number of bits of ther order of an EC_GROUP
+/** Gets the number of bits of the order of an EC_GROUP
* \param group EC_GROUP object
* \return number of bits of group order.
*/
/*
* EC_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t size) returns number of all
- * available curves or zero if a error occurred. In case r ist not zero
+ * available curves or zero if a error occurred. In case r is not zero,
* nitems EC_builtin_curve structures are filled with the data of the first
* nitems internal groups
*/
* \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
* \param r EC_POINT object for the result
* \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
- * \param num number futher summands
+ * \param num number further summands
* \param p array of size num of EC_POINT objects
* \param m array of size num of BIGNUM objects
* \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
*/
int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey);
-/** Sets a public key from affine coordindates performing
+/** Sets a public key from affine coordinates performing
* necessary NIST PKV tests.
* \param key the EC_KEY object
* \param x public key x coordinate
* \param dgst pointer to the hash value to sign
* \param dgstlen length of the hash value
* \param kinv BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional)
- * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optioanl),
+ * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional),
* see ECDSA_sign_setup
* \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key
* \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred
* \param sig buffer to hold the DER encoded signature
* \param siglen pointer to the length of the returned signature
* \param kinv BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional)
- * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optioanl),
+ * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional),
* see ECDSA_sign_setup
* \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key
* \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise
} SRP_VBASE;
/*
- * Structure interne pour retenir les couples N et g
+ * Internal structure storing N and g pair
*/
typedef struct SRP_gN_st {
char *id;
extern "C" {
#endif
-/* Default security level if not overriden at config time */
+/* Default security level if not overridden at config time */
# ifndef OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL
# define OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL 1
# endif
display a dialog box after it has been built.
a reader This function is called to read a given prompt,
maybe from the tty, maybe from a field in a
- window. Note that it's called wth all string
+ window. Note that it's called with all string
structures, not only the prompt ones, so it must
check such things itself.
a closer This function closes the session, maybe by closing
/* Return the actual string to output (the prompt, info or error) */
const char *UI_get0_output_string(UI_STRING *uis);
/*
- * Return the optional action string to output (the boolean promtp
+ * Return the optional action string to output (the boolean prompt
* instruction)
*/
const char *UI_get0_action_string(UI_STRING *uis);
# define X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT 0x1000
/* Delta CRL support */
# define X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS 0x2000
-/* Check selfsigned CA signature */
+/* Check self-signed CA signature */
# define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000
/* Use trusted store first */
# define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST 0x8000
}
/*
- * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
+ * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
* maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
* support this.
*/
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
/*
- * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
+ * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be
* fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
/*
* Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
* better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
- * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
+ * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
* compromise is considered worthy.
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
/*
* If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
- * 1 pipeline. Similaraly if the cipher does not support pipelined
+ * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
* processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
* explicit IVs
*/
/*
* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
* multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
- * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
+ * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
*/
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
*(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
/*
- * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
+ * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
* and record version number > TLS 1.0
*/
if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
/*
* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
- * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
+ * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
* the peer refused it where we carry on.
goto err;
else
/*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
goto err;
else
/*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (ret == -1) {
/*
* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must
- * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation,
+ * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invocation,
* return WANT_WRITE
*/
return (ret);
return 1;
}
-/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH), "renegotiation mismatch"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING), "required cipher missing"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),
- "required compresssion algorithm missing"},
+ "required compression algorithm missing"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),
"scsv received when renegotiating"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED), "sct verification failed"},
/*
* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
- * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
+ * variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
* allocated ctx;
*/
/*
* the RSA prefix is required by the format's definition although there's
- * nothing RSA-specifc in the output, therefore, we don't have to check if
+ * nothing RSA-specific in the output, therefore, we don't have to check if
* the cipher suite is based on RSA
*/
if (BIO_puts(bp, "RSA ") <= 0)
/*****************************************************************************
* *
- * These emums should be considered PRIVATE to the state machine. No *
+ * These enums should be considered PRIVATE to the state machine. No *
* non-state machine code should need to use these *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
- * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
* @s: SSL connection
* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
*
/*-
* check for enough space.
- * 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ * 4 for the servername type and extension length
* 2 for servernamelist length
* 1 for the hostname type
* 2 for hostname length
/*-
* check for enough space.
- * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
+ * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
* 1 for the srp user identity
* + srp user identity length
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
/*
- * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
+ * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
*/
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
- * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
+ * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
+ * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
{
int al;
size_t i;
- /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
+
+ /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
OPENSSL_free(Z2);
- fprintf(stderr, "Initalisation error RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Initialisation error RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return 0;
err:
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff