Reported by: Solar Designer of Openwall

Make sure tkeylen is initialised properly when encrypting CMS messages.

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 943502ec0b928c5dc15b809f6934e818b5aaf661..1e2f31277fa53e7a954d117f27f82a908023ab80 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
      approved.
      [Steve Henson]

diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
index 580083b45f870aebd3e21680cfe70d6d15260dfd..f873ce3794452a1ba64cbae3f98b68c09076f256 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -139,10 +139,10 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
                                CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
                goto err;
                }
+       tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
        /* Generate random session key */
        if (!enc || !ec->key)
                {
-               tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
                tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
                if (!tkey)
                        {
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
                        /* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
                         * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
                         */
-                       if (ec->debug)
+                       if (enc || ec->debug)
                                {
                                CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
                                                CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);

diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index becbab91c219617452c9bacda251dadaf93331ee..a8b75d7c968e99df4bc6e7a57a616d7916d68d24 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -208,6 +208,12 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                                rec->input[k]=j;
                        l+=i;
                        rec->length+=i;
+if (rec->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+       {
+       memset(rec->input, 63, 64);
+       rec->length = 64;
+       l = 64;
+       }
                        }
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@@ -260,7 +266,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                                }
                        /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
                         * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-                       if (i > (int)rec->length)
+                       if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
                                {
                                /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
                                 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is

diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 201ca9ad6de20299a52870bf85257357fb1ae43b..3f13934acbaafba26ebf656ce6a2d665eb423bd2 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -793,6 +793,12 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                                rec->input[k]=j;
                        l+=i;
                        rec->length+=i;
+if (rec->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+       {
+       memset(rec->input, 63, 64);
+       rec->length = 64;
+       l = 64;
+       }
                        }
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@@ -889,6 +895,8 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                        if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
                                && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
                                {
+                               if (bs > (int)rec->length)
+                                       return -1;
                                rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */
                                rec->input += bs;
                                rec->length -= bs;