always reject numbers >= n.
[Bodo Moeller]
+ *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2
+ to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on
+ systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long'
+ variable) is not atomic.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
*) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID
*before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had
a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID.
"ssl_sess_cert",
"ssl",
"rand",
+ "rand2",
"debug_malloc",
"BIO",
"gethostbyname",
"debug_malloc2",
"dso",
"dynlock",
-#if CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS != 28
+#if CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS != 29
# error "Inconsistency between crypto.h and cryptlib.c"
#endif
};
#define CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT 15
#define CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL 16
#define CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND 17
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC 18
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO 19
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME 20
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_GETSERVBYNAME 21
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR 22
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING 23
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_DH 24
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC2 25
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_DSO 26
-#define CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK 27
-#define CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS 28
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 18
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC 19
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO 20
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME 21
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_GETSERVBYNAME 22
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR 23
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING 24
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_DH 25
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC2 26
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_DSO 27
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK 28
+#define CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS 29
#define CRYPTO_LOCK 1
#define CRYPTO_UNLOCK 2
static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
* holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
* (to prevent double locking) */
+/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
*/
/* check if we already have the lock */
- do_not_lock = crypto_lock_rand && (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx=state_index;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
if (!initialized)
/* check if we already have the lock
* (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
- do_not_lock = crypto_lock_rand && (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
}