Provisional support for TLS v1.2 client authentication: client side only.

Parse certificate request message and set digests appropriately.

Generate new TLS v1.2 format certificate verify message.

Keep handshake caches around for longer as they are needed for client auth.

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 5f418694bc8e5df2b7192d8fac9d19d835e0dbe6..c5ae9cf1d30519deee389aca4c45fcc28488a376 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.1  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
+     of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
+     until after the certificate request message is received.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
      extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
      format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 75f0a8e052027a240bad66ce3a45c5eed9fd9e54..e7dea7d72bd263a673dfb433abc53976757f1b30 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -904,9 +904,11 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                        }
                }
        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
-       if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+       /* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
+        * client authentication.
+        */
+       if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
                goto f_err;
-
        /* lets get the compression algorithm */
        /* COMPRESSION */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -1795,6 +1797,14 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
        if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
                {
                s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+               /* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
+                * as we wont be doing client auth.
+                */
+               if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+                       {
+                       if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                               goto err;
+                       }
                return(1);
                }
 
@@ -2836,12 +2846,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
        unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
        EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+       EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
        unsigned u=0;
-#endif
        unsigned long n;
        int j;
 
+       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
        if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
                {
                d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
@@ -2852,7 +2863,8 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
                if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
                        {
-                       s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+                       if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                               s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                                                NID_sha1,
                                                &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
                        }
@@ -2860,6 +2872,41 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                        {
                        ERR_clear_error();
                        }
+               /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
+                * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
+                */
+               if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                       {
+                       long hdatalen = 0;
+                       void *hdata;
+                       const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
+                       hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
+                                                               &hdata);
+                       if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+                                               ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                       p += 2;
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+                       fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
+                                                       EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+                       if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+                               || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+                               || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+                                               ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                       s2n(u,p);
+                       n = u + 4;
+                       if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                               goto err;
+                       }
+               else
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
                if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
                        {
@@ -2942,9 +2989,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                s->init_num=(int)n+4;
                s->init_off=0;
                }
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
        return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 err:
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
        return(-1);
        }