LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
- rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_rand.c
+ rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
+ */
+
+static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned char c;
+ unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) {
+ c = *p;
+ c++;
+ *p = c;
+ if (c != 0) {
+ /* If we didn't wrap around, we're done. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ size_t i, n;
+
+ if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we
+ * are XORing. So just process however much input we have.
+ */
+ n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen;
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ ctr->K[i] ^= in[i];
+ if (inlen <= ctr->keylen)
+ return;
+
+ n = inlen - ctr->keylen;
+ if (n > 16) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ n = 16;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
+ */
+static void ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ out[i] ^= in[i];
+ AES_encrypt(out, out, &ctr->df_ks);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X
+ */
+static void ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
+{
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in);
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in);
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16)
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions:
+ * see 10.3.1 stage 7.
+ */
+static void ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+{
+ memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
+ memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16);
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp);
+ ctr->bltmp[3] = 1;
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp);
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+ ctr->bltmp[3] = 2;
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial
+ */
+static void ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /* If we have partial block handle it first */
+ if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
+ size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos;
+
+ /* If we now have a complete block process it */
+ if (inlen >= left) {
+ memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left);
+ ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
+ ctr->bltmp_pos = 0;
+ inlen -= left;
+ in += left;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Process zero or more complete blocks */
+ for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) {
+ ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in);
+ }
+
+ /* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */
+ if (inlen > 0) {
+ memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
+ ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen;
+ }
+}
+
+static void ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+{
+ if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
+ memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos);
+ ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
+ const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
+ const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
+ const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
+{
+ static unsigned char c80 = 0x80;
+ size_t inlen;
+ unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp;
+
+ ctr_BCC_init(ctr);
+ if (in1 == NULL)
+ in1len = 0;
+ if (in2 == NULL)
+ in2len = 0;
+ if (in3 == NULL)
+ in3len = 0;
+ inlen = in1len + in2len + in3len;
+ /* Initialise L||N in temporary block */
+ *p++ = (inlen >> 24) & 0xff;
+ *p++ = (inlen >> 16) & 0xff;
+ *p++ = (inlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *p++ = inlen & 0xff;
+
+ /* NB keylen is at most 32 bytes */
+ *p++ = 0;
+ *p++ = 0;
+ *p++ = 0;
+ *p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
+ ctr->bltmp_pos = 8;
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len);
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len);
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len);
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1);
+ ctr_BCC_final(ctr);
+ /* Set up key K */
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->KX, ctr->keylen * 8, &ctr->df_kxks);
+ /* X follows key K */
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, ctr->KX, &ctr->df_kxks);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->KX, ctr->KX + 16, &ctr->df_kxks);
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16)
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + 16, ctr->KX + 32, &ctr->df_kxks);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length
+ * of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with
+ * zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together,
+ * so we handle both cases in this function instead.
+ */
+static void ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
+ const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
+ const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
+
+ /* ks is already setup for correct key */
+ inc_128(ctr);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
+
+ /* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+ inc_128(ctr);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K + 16, &ctr->ks);
+ }
+ inc_128(ctr);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->V, &ctr->ks);
+
+ /* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */
+ if (ctr->keylen == 24) {
+ memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8);
+ memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8);
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
+ /* If no input reuse existing derived value */
+ if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL)
+ ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len);
+ /* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */
+ if (in1len)
+ ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen);
+ } else {
+ ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len);
+ ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
+ }
+
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
+}
+
+int ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+ const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
+ const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
+
+ if (entropy == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
+ memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
+ ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+{
+ if (entropy == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
+
+ if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
+ ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ /* This means we reuse derived value */
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
+ adin = NULL;
+ adinlen = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ adinlen = 0;
+ }
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ inc_128(ctr);
+ if (outlen < 16) {
+ /* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
+ memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen);
+ break;
+ }
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, out, &ctr->ks);
+ out += 16;
+ outlen -= 16;
+ if (outlen == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
+ size_t keylen;
+
+ switch (drbg->nid) {
+ default:
+ /* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */
+ return 0;
+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+ keylen = 16;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+ keylen = 24;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ keylen = 32;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ctr->keylen = keylen;
+ drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
+ drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
+
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
+ /* df initialisation */
+ static unsigned char df_key[32] = {
+ 0x00,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07,
+ 0x08,0x09,0x0a,0x0b,0x0c,0x0d,0x0e,0x0f,
+ 0x10,0x11,0x12,0x13,0x14,0x15,0x16,0x17,
+ 0x18,0x19,0x1a,0x1b,0x1c,0x1d,0x1e,0x1f
+ };
+ /* Set key schedule for df_key */
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(df_key, drbg->strength, &ctr->df_ks);
+
+ drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
+ drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * drbg->min_entropylen;
+ drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
+ drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * drbg->min_noncelen;
+ drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+ drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
+ drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
+ /* Nonce not used */
+ drbg->min_noncelen = 0;
+ drbg->max_noncelen = 0;
+ drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen;
+ drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen;
+ }
+
+ drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
+ drbg->reseed_interval = MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+ return 1;
+}
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
-#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-
-/*
- * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
- */
-
-static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
-{
- int i;
- unsigned char c;
- unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15];
-
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) {
- c = *p;
- c++;
- *p = c;
- if (c != 0) {
- /* If we didn't wrap around, we're done. */
- break;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
-{
- size_t i, n;
-
- if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
- return;
-
- /*
- * Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we
- * are XORing. So just process however much input we have.
- */
- n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen;
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
- ctr->K[i] ^= in[i];
- if (inlen <= ctr->keylen)
- return;
-
- n = inlen - ctr->keylen;
- if (n > 16) {
- /* Should never happen */
- n = 16;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
- ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen];
-}
-
-/*
- * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
- */
-static void ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- out[i] ^= in[i];
- AES_encrypt(out, out, &ctr->df_ks);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X
- */
-static void ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
-{
- ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in);
- ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in);
- if (ctr->keylen != 16)
- ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions:
- * see 10.3.1 stage 7.
- */
-static void ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
-{
- memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
- memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16);
- ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp);
- ctr->bltmp[3] = 1;
- ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp);
- if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
- ctr->bltmp[3] = 2;
- ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial
- */
-static void ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
-{
- if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
- return;
-
- /* If we have partial block handle it first */
- if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
- size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos;
-
- /* If we now have a complete block process it */
- if (inlen >= left) {
- memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left);
- ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
- ctr->bltmp_pos = 0;
- inlen -= left;
- in += left;
- }
- }
-
- /* Process zero or more complete blocks */
- for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) {
- ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in);
- }
-
- /* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */
- if (inlen > 0) {
- memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
- ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen;
- }
-}
-
-static void ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
-{
- if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
- memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos);
- ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
- }
-}
-
-static void ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
- const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
- const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
- const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
-{
- static unsigned char c80 = 0x80;
- size_t inlen;
- unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp;
-
- ctr_BCC_init(ctr);
- if (in1 == NULL)
- in1len = 0;
- if (in2 == NULL)
- in2len = 0;
- if (in3 == NULL)
- in3len = 0;
- inlen = in1len + in2len + in3len;
- /* Initialise L||N in temporary block */
- *p++ = (inlen >> 24) & 0xff;
- *p++ = (inlen >> 16) & 0xff;
- *p++ = (inlen >> 8) & 0xff;
- *p++ = inlen & 0xff;
-
- /* NB keylen is at most 32 bytes */
- *p++ = 0;
- *p++ = 0;
- *p++ = 0;
- *p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
- ctr->bltmp_pos = 8;
- ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len);
- ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len);
- ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len);
- ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1);
- ctr_BCC_final(ctr);
- /* Set up key K */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->KX, ctr->keylen * 8, &ctr->df_kxks);
- /* X follows key K */
- AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, ctr->KX, &ctr->df_kxks);
- AES_encrypt(ctr->KX, ctr->KX + 16, &ctr->df_kxks);
- if (ctr->keylen != 16)
- AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + 16, ctr->KX + 32, &ctr->df_kxks);
-}
-
-/*
- * NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length
- * of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with
- * zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together,
- * so we handle both cases in this function instead.
- */
-static void ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
- const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
- const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen)
-{
- RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
-
- /* ks is already setup for correct key */
- inc_128(ctr);
- AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
-
- /* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */
- if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
- inc_128(ctr);
- AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K + 16, &ctr->ks);
- }
- inc_128(ctr);
- AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->V, &ctr->ks);
-
- /* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */
- if (ctr->keylen == 24) {
- memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8);
- memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8);
- }
-
- if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
- /* If no input reuse existing derived value */
- if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL)
- ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len);
- /* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */
- if (in1len)
- ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen);
- } else {
- ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len);
- ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
- }
-
- AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
-}
-
-int ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
- const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
- const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
-{
- RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
-
- if (entropy == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
- memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
- AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
- ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
- const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
-{
- if (entropy == NULL)
- return 0;
- ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
- const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
-{
- RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
-
- if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
- ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
- /* This means we reuse derived value */
- if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
- adin = NULL;
- adinlen = 1;
- }
- } else {
- adinlen = 0;
- }
-
- for ( ; ; ) {
- inc_128(ctr);
- if (outlen < 16) {
- /* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */
- AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
- memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen);
- break;
- }
- AES_encrypt(ctr->V, out, &ctr->ks);
- out += 16;
- outlen -= 16;
- if (outlen == 0)
- break;
- }
-
- ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
- RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
- size_t keylen;
-
- switch (drbg->nid) {
- default:
- /* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */
- return 0;
- case NID_aes_128_ctr:
- keylen = 16;
- break;
- case NID_aes_192_ctr:
- keylen = 24;
- break;
- case NID_aes_256_ctr:
- keylen = 32;
- break;
- }
-
- ctr->keylen = keylen;
- drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
- drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
-
- if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
- /* df initialisation */
- static unsigned char df_key[32] = {
- 0x00,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07,
- 0x08,0x09,0x0a,0x0b,0x0c,0x0d,0x0e,0x0f,
- 0x10,0x11,0x12,0x13,0x14,0x15,0x16,0x17,
- 0x18,0x19,0x1a,0x1b,0x1c,0x1d,0x1e,0x1f
- };
- /* Set key schedule for df_key */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(df_key, drbg->strength, &ctr->df_ks);
-
- drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
- drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * drbg->min_entropylen;
- drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
- drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * drbg->min_noncelen;
- drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
- drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
- } else {
- drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
- drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
- /* Nonce not used */
- drbg->min_noncelen = 0;
- drbg->max_noncelen = 0;
- drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen;
- drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen;
- }
-
- drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
- drbg->reseed_interval = MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL;
- return 1;
-}
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff