Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [XX xxx XXXX]
+ *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
+ RSA encryption was accidentily removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
+ when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client
+ hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against
+ SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking
+ means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is
+ around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98
+ paper.)
+
+ Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a
+ random 'decryption result') did not work properly because
+ ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would
+ detect the supposedly ignored error.
+
+ Both problems are now fixed.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096
+ (previously it was 1024).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings
+ unless some valid trust or reject settings are present.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing
+ parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the
+ DSA routines if parameters are absent.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd"
+ in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set.
+ RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has
+ caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME.
+ Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a
+ DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set.
+ For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require
+ environment variables.
+
*) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by
CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids
having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently.
copied!)
[Bodo Moeller]
- *) Bugfix: SSL_set_mode ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_mode
+ *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options
worked.
*) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
# error message.
"solaris-x86-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -m486 -Wall -DL_ENDIAN -DNO_INLINE_ASM::-D_REENTRANT:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_sol_asm}:dlfcn:gnu-shared:-fPIC:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+#### Solaris x86 with Sun C setups
+"solaris-x86-cc","cc:-fast -O -Xa::-D_REENTRANT:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::::::::dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
#### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups
"solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::::::::dlfcn:gnu-shared:-fPIC:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mv8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:asm/sparcv8.o:::::::::dlfcn:gnu-shared:-fPIC:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
[USER] Questions on using the OpenSSL applications
* Why do I get a "PRNG not seeded" error message?
+* Why do I get an "unable to write 'random state'" error message?
* How do I create certificates or certificate requests?
* Why can't I create certificate requests?
* Why does <SSL program> fail with a certificate verify error?
device" that serves this purpose. On other systems, applications have
to call the RAND_add() or RAND_seed() function with appropriate data
before generating keys or performing public key encryption.
+(These functions initialize the pseudo-random number generator, PRNG.)
Some broken applications do not do this. As of version 0.9.5, the
OpenSSL functions that need randomness report an error if the random
correctly. OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later make the error visible by refusing
to perform potentially insecure encryption.
-On systems without /dev/urandom, it is a good idea to use the Entropy
-Gathering Demon; see the RAND_egd() manpage for details.
-
-Most components of the openssl command line tool try to use the
-file $HOME/.rnd (or $RANDFILE, if this environment variable is set)
-for seeding the PRNG. If this file does not exist or is too short,
-the "PRNG not seeded" error message may occur.
-
-[Note to OpenSSL 0.9.5 users: The command "openssl rsa" in version
-0.9.5 does not do this and will fail on systems without /dev/urandom
-when trying to password-encrypt an RSA key! This is a bug in the
-library; try a later version instead.]
+On systems without /dev/urandom and /dev/random, it is a good idea to
+use the Entropy Gathering Demon (EGD); see the RAND_egd() manpage for
+details. Starting with version 0.9.7, OpenSSL will automatically look
+for an EGD socket at /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool and
+/etc/entropy.
+
+Most components of the openssl command line utility automatically try
+to seed the random number generator from a file. The name of the
+default seeding file is determined as follows: If environment variable
+RANDFILE is set, then it names the seeding file. Otherwise if
+environment variable HOME is set, then the seeding file is $HOME/.rnd.
+If neither RANDFILE nor HOME is set, versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6 will
+use file .rnd in the current directory while OpenSSL 0.9.6a uses no
+default seeding file at all. OpenSSL 0.9.6b and later will behave
+similarly to 0.9.6a, but will use a default of "C:" for HOME on
+Windows systems if the environment variable has not been set.
+
+If the default seeding file does not exist or is too short, the "PRNG
+not seeded" error message may occur.
+
+The openssl command line utility will write back a new state to the
+default seeding file (and create this file if necessary) unless
+there was no sufficient seeding.
+
+Pointing $RANDFILE to an Entropy Gathering Daemon socket does not work.
+Use the "-rand" option of the OpenSSL command line tools instead.
+The $RANDFILE environment variable and $HOME/.rnd are only used by the
+OpenSSL command line tools. Applications using the OpenSSL library
+provide their own configuration options to specify the entropy source,
+please check out the documentation coming the with application.
For Solaris 2.6, Tim Nibbe <tnibbe@sprint.net> and others have suggested
installing the SUNski package from Sun patch 105710-01 (Sparc) which
device, which may have some effects on OpenSSL.
+* Why do I get an "unable to write 'random state'" error message?
+
+
+Sometimes the openssl command line utility does not abort with
+a "PRNG not seeded" error message, but complains that it is
+"unable to write 'random state'". This message refers to the
+default seeding file (see previous answer). A possible reason
+is that no default filename is known because neither RANDFILE
+nor HOME is set. (Versions up to 0.9.6 used file ".rnd" in the
+current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
+
+
* How do I create certificates or certificate requests?
Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
To install OpenSSL, you will need:
+ * make
* Perl 5
* an ANSI C compiler
+ * a development environment in form of development libraries and C
+ header files
* a supported Unix operating system
Quick Start
--openssldir=DIR Directory for OpenSSL files. If no prefix is specified,
the library files and binaries are also installed there.
- rsaref Build with RSADSI's RSAREF toolkit (this assumes that
- librsaref.a is in the library search path).
-
no-threads Don't try to build with support for multi-threaded
applications.
directory, and the binary will be in the "apps" directory.
If "make" fails, look at the output. There may be reasons for
- the failure that isn't a problem in OpenSSL itself (like missing
+ the failure that aren't problems in OpenSSL itself (like missing
standard headers). If it is a problem with OpenSSL itself, please
report the problem to <openssl-bugs@openssl.org> (note that your
message will be forwarded to a public mailing list). Include the
This file is divided in the following parts:
+ Requirements - Mandatory reading.
Checking the distribution - Mandatory reading.
Compilation - Mandatory reading.
Logical names - Mandatory reading.
TODO - Things that are to come.
+Requirements:
+=============
+
+To build and install OpenSSL, you will need:
+
+ * DEC C or some other ANSI C compiler. VAX C is *not* supported.
+ [Note: OpenSSL has only been tested with DEC C. Compiling with
+ a different ANSI C compiler may require some work]
+
Checking the distribution:
==========================
X509_free(revcert);
strncpy(buf[0],dbfile,BSIZE-4);
+#ifndef VMS
strcat(buf[0],".new");
+#else
+ strcat(buf[0],"-new");
+#endif
if (BIO_write_filename(out,buf[0]) <= 0)
{
perror(dbfile);
j=TXT_DB_write(out,db);
if (j <= 0) goto err;
strncpy(buf[1],dbfile,BSIZE-4);
+#ifndef VMS
strcat(buf[1],".old");
+#else
+ strcat(buf[1],"-old");
+#endif
if (rename(dbfile,buf[1]) < 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"unable to rename %s to %s\n", dbfile, buf[1]);
a=key->algor;
if (ret->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
- if (a->parameter->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ if (a->parameter && (a->parameter->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
{
ret->pkey.dsa->write_params=0;
p=a->parameter->value.sequence->data;
static int buffer_new(BIO *h);
static int buffer_free(BIO *data);
static long buffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp);
-#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 1024
+#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 4096
static BIO_METHOD methods_buffer=
{
/* Reason codes. */
#define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 100
+#define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 101
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[]=
{
{DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE ,"data too large for key size"},
+{DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS ,"missing parameters"},
{0,NULL}
};
int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;
+ if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
+ {
+ reason=DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
+ goto err;
+ }
BN_init(&m);
BN_init(&xr);
s=BN_new();
BIGNUM k,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
int ret=0;
+ if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
+ {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (ctx_in == NULL)
{
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(bf, bf_ks, BF, bf_ks, NID_bf, 8, 16, 8,
- 0, bf_init_key, NULL,
+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, bf_init_key, NULL,
EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL)
static int bf_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
local($addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_;
$ret="";
- $addr =~ s/(^|[+ \t])([A-Za-z_]+)($|[+ \t])/$1$under$2$3/;
+ $addr =~ s/(^|[+ \t])([A-Za-z_]+[A-Za-z0-9_]+)($|[+ \t])/$1$under$2$3/;
$reg1="$regs{$reg1}" if defined($regs{$reg1});
$reg2="$regs{$reg2}" if defined($regs{$reg2});
$ret.=$addr if ($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0);
{
if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
s=getenv("HOME");
+#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
+ if (s == NULL)
+ {
+ s = DEFAULT_HOME;
+ }
+#endif
if (s != NULL && (strlen(s)+strlen(RFILE)+2 < size))
{
strcpy(buf,s);
strcat(buf,RFILE);
ret=buf;
}
- else
+ else
buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
}
return(ret);
static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
- if(x->aux) return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
+ if(x->aux && (x->aux->trust || x->aux->reject))
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
/* we don't have any trust settings: for compatibility
* we return trusted if it is self signed
*/
B<ctx>.
A detailed description for the B<*_get_ex_new_index()> functionality
-can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod(3)>.
+can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>.
The B<*_get_ex_data()> and B<*_set_ex_data()> functionality is described in
L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>.
L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>,
-L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>
=cut
B<session>.
A detailed description for the B<*_get_ex_new_index()> functionality
-can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod(3)>.
+can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>.
The B<*_get_ex_data()> and B<*_set_ex_data()> functionality is described in
L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>.
time during the protocol (initiated by either the client or the server);
SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), and SSL_write() will handle any pending handshakes.
+=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT
+
+The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be
+called again later. The underlying BIO was not connected yet to the peer
+and the call would block in connect(). The SSL function should be
+called again when the connection is established. This messages can only
+appear with a BIO_s_connect() BIO.
+In order to find out, when the connection has been successfully established,
+on many platforms select() or poll() for writing on the socket file descriptor
+can be used.
+
=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP
The operation did not complete because an application callback set by
B<ssl>.
A detailed description for the B<*_get_ex_new_index()> functionality
-can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod(3)>.
+can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>.
The B<*_get_ex_data()> and B<*_set_ex_data()> functionality is described in
L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>.
method is being used (see L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, so that
L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)> or SSL_set_accept_state()
must be used before the first call to an SSL_read() or
-L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)> function.
+L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)> function).
+
+SSL_read() works based on the SSL/TLS records. The data are received in
+records (with a maximum record size of 16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1). Only when a
+record has been completely received, it can be processed (decryption and
+check of integrity). Therefore data that was not retrieved at the last
+call of SSL_read() can still be buffered inside the SSL layer and will be
+retrieved on the next call to SSL_read(). If B<num> is higher than the
+number of bytes buffered, SSL_read() will return with the bytes buffered.
+If no more bytes are in the buffer, SSL_read() will trigger the processing
+of the next record. Only when the record has been received and processed
+completely, SSL_read() will return reporting success. At most the contents
+of the record will be returned. As the size of an SSL/TLS record may exceed
+the maximum packet size of the underlying transport (e.g. TCP), it may
+be necessary to read several packets from the transport layer before the
+record is complete and SSL_read() can succeed.
If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_read() will only return, once the
read operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a
for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data
must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
+SSL_write() will only return with success, when the complete contents
+of B<buf> of length B<num> has been written. This default behaviour
+can be changed with the SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE option of
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>. When this flag is set,
+SSL_write() will also return with success, when a partial write has been
+successfully completed. In this case the SSL_write() operation is considered
+completed. The bytes are sent and a new SSL_write() operation with a new
+buffer (with the already sent bytes removed) must be started.
+A partial write is performed with the size of a message block, which is
+16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1.
+
=head1 WARNING
When an SSL_write() operation has to be repeated because of
# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
# define NUL_DEV "nul"
# define RFILE ".rnd"
+# define DEFAULT_HOME "C:"
#else /* The non-microsoft world world */
/* bad decrypt */
#if 1
/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
- * dud master secret */
+ * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
if ((i < 0) ||
((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
|| (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i !=
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
{
+ ERR_clear_error();
if (is_export)
i=ek;
else
i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ al = -1;
+
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
}
- if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+ if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
{
/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
}
}
+ if (al != -1)
+ {
+#if 0
+ goto f_err;
+#else
+ /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+ * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+ * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
+ * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
+ * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+ * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+#endif
+ }
+
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
@./$(BNTEST) >tmp.bntest
@echo quit >>tmp.bntest
@echo "running bc"
- @<tmp.bntest sh -c "`sh ./bctest; true`" | $(PERL) -e '$$i=0; while (<STDIN>) {if (/^test (.*)/) {print STDERR "\nverify $$1";} elsif (!/^0$$/) {die "\nFailed! bc: $$_";} else {print STDERR "."; $$i++;}} print STDERR "\n$$i tests passed\n"'
+ @<tmp.bntest sh -c "`sh ./bctest ignore`" | $(PERL) -e '$$i=0; while (<STDIN>) {if (/^test (.*)/) {print STDERR "\nverify $$1";} elsif (!/^0$$/) {die "\nFailed! bc: $$_";} else {print STDERR "."; $$i++;}} print STDERR "\n$$i tests passed\n"'
@echo 'test a^b%c implementations'
./$(EXPTEST)
done
echo "No working bc found. Consider installing GNU bc." >&2
-echo "cat >/dev/null"
+if [ "$1" = ignore ]; then
+ echo "cat >/dev/null"
+ exit 0
+fi
exit 1
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff