*Steve Henson*
- *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
- results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
- with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
- way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
- Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
- fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
- Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
- the OpenSSL core team.
- [CVE-2014-3570][]
+ * Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ [CVE-2014-3570][]
*Andy Polyakov*
- *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
- version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
- version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
- sanity and breaks all known clients.
+ * Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+ version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+ version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+ sanity and breaks all known clients.
*David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper*
- *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
- early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
- renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+ * Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+ early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+ renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
*Emilia Käsper*
- *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
- ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
- the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
- announced in the initial ServerHello.
+ * Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+ ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+ the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+ announced in the initial ServerHello.
- Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
- was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+ Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+ was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
*Emilia Käsper*
*Steve Henson*
- *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
- results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
- with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
- way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
- Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
- fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
- Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
- the OpenSSL core team.
- [CVE-2014-3570][]
+ * Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ [CVE-2014-3570][]
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+ * Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.