# primarily because vendor assembler can't assemble our modules
# with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even
# available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel
- # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays
+ # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by today's
# standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged
# option, which we can firmly point at...
#
HASHBANGPERL
The command string for the Perl executable to insert in the
- #! line of perl scripts that will be publically installed.
+ #! line of perl scripts that will be publicly installed.
Default: /usr/bin/env perl
Note: the value of this variable is added to the same scripts
on all platforms, but it's only relevant on Unix-like platforms.
(*salt_p)[i] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[i] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
(*salt_p)[i] = 0;
# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- /* The password encryption funtion will convert back to ASCII */
+ /* The password encryption function will convert back to ASCII */
ascii2ebcdic(*salt_p, *salt_p, saltlen);
# endif
}
# nothing one can do and the result appears optimal. CCM result is
# identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without
# saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly
-# interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
+# interleaved with CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
# "straightforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
# disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical
# limit.
! technique.
!
! The macro also loads address sbox 1 to 5 to global 1 to 5, address
-! sbox 6 to local6, and addres sbox 8 to out3.
+! sbox 6 to local6, and address sbox 8 to out3.
!
-! Rotates the halfs 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions.
+! Rotates the halves 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions.
!
! Loads key first round from address in parameter 5 to out0, out1.
!
! After the original LibDES initial permutation, the resulting left
! is in the variable initially used for right and vice versa. The macro
-! implements the possibility to keep the halfs in the original registers.
+! implements the possibility to keep the halves in the original registers.
!
! parameter 1 left
! parameter 2 right
add %o7,global1,global1
sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
- ! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halfs 3 left
+ ! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halves 3 left
! Errors caught by destest? Yes. Still? *NO*
!sethi %hi(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! address sbox 1
} icv;
unsigned char k[32];
} kmac_param;
- /* KMAC-AES paramater block - end */
+ /* KMAC-AES parameter block - end */
union {
unsigned long long g[2];
/*
* Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp
* (where available, which is OpenVMS v8.4 and up) to ensure that
- * the nonce is unique whith high probability for different process
+ * the nonce is unique with high probability for different process
* instances.
*/
data.pid = getpid();
/*
* Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
- * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for
+ * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
* different process instances.
*/
data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-RAND_set_rand_method() returns 1 on success and 0 on failue.
+RAND_set_rand_method() returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
RAND_get_rand_method() and RAND_OpenSSL() return pointers to the respective
methods.
* SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
* internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
} else if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
- /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+ /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
* internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
size_t hashlen;
/*
- * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
+ * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't
* affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
* point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
*/
} else {
# It's a bit counter-intuitive spot to make next connection to
# the s_server. Rationale is that established connection works
- # as syncronization point, in sense that this way we know that
+ # as synchronization point, in sense that this way we know that
# s_server is actually done with current session...
$self->connect_to_server();
}
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff