{
int i;
- OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ if (!ossl_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ return -1;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0, written);
return i;
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len, written);
+ if (!ossl_assert(SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) == 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr);
__owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr);
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size);
__owur int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size);
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
thisrr = &rr[j];
* contents of the padding bytes.
*/
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size);
+ if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
thisrr->length -= mac_size;
} else {
/*
if (sending) {
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
} else {
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
}
t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
+ return 0;
md_size = t;
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
*/
#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size)
{
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
size_t i, j;
size_t rotate_offset;
- OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
+ return 0;
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
}
#endif
+
+ return 1;
}
int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
unsigned char *mac;
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/*
* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* contents of the padding bytes.
*/
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
rr->length -= mac_size;
} else {
/*
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include <assert.h>
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
* many possible overflows later in this function.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
+ if (!ossl_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024))
+ return 0;
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
case NID_md5:
* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
* check that the hash function is supported.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ assert(0);
if (md_out_size)
*md_out_size = 0;
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES
+ && md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE
+ && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
+ return 0;
header_length = 13;
if (is_sslv3) {
*/
bits += 8 * md_block_size;
memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)))
+ return 0;
memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
/* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
- OPENSSL_assert(m);
+ if (!ossl_assert(m != NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
comp = NULL;
static uint32_t disabled_mkey_mask;
static uint32_t disabled_auth_mask;
-void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
+int ssl_load_ciphers(void)
{
size_t i;
const ssl_cipher_table *t;
disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask;
} else {
int tmpsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- OPENSSL_assert(tmpsize >= 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(tmpsize >= 0))
+ return 0;
ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = tmpsize;
}
}
/* Make sure we can access MD5 and SHA1 */
- OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL);
- OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL);
+ if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL))
+ return 0;
+ if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL))
+ return 0;
disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
disabled_auth_mask = 0;
if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) ==
(SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12))
disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST;
+
+ return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
#endif
/* initialize cipher/digest methods table */
- ssl_load_ciphers();
+ if (!ssl_load_ciphers())
+ return 0;
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: "
s->record_padding_arg = ctx->record_padding_arg;
s->block_padding = ctx->block_padding;
s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx))
+ goto err;
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
* Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
* so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+ if (!ossl_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)))
+ return NULL;
/*
* If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void);
-void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
+int ssl_load_ciphers(void);
__owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field,
size_t len, DOWNGRADE dgrd);
__owur int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen,
#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
long ii; \
- OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
is_complete = 1; \
if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
/* should have something reasonable now */
return -1;
- if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
- s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->init_num ==
+ s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ return -1;
+ }
if (s->write_hash) {
if (s->enc_write_ctx
} else
return -1;
} else {
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
} else {
* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
* got sent. but why would this happen?
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(len == written);
+ if (!ossl_assert(len == written))
+ return -1;
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
/*
RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
(long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
+ if (!ossl_assert(msg_hdr->msg_len > 0))
+ goto err;
RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
is_complete);
* would have returned it and control would never have reached this
* branch.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ if (!ossl_assert(item != NULL))
+ goto err;
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
* have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or
* the record will have been discarded.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ if (!ossl_assert(item != NULL))
+ goto err;
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
* this function is called immediately after a message has been
* serialized
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->init_off == 0))
+ return 0;
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
if (frag == NULL)
if (is_ccs) {
/* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- ((s->version ==
- DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
- == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ ((s->version ==
+ DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ == (unsigned int)s->init_num))
+ return 0;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num))
+ return 0;
}
frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
- /*-
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
- */
-
/* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8);
*/
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length))
- return 0;
+ s->session->master_key_length)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
+ if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
finish_md_len);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
finish_md_len);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
+ if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff