return NULL;
}
-int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
+ * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
+ * Here we avoid compounding the problem.
+ */
+static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int length, tmplen;
unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
+ * not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
+ * both just in case.
+ */
length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
- if (length < 0 || a == NULL)
+ if (length <= 0 || a == NULL)
return length;
tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
return length;
}
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL.
+ *
+ * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
+ * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
+ * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
+ * allocated buffer.
+ */
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ int length;
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+
+ /* Buffer provided by caller */
+ if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
+ return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
+
+ /* Obtain the combined length */
+ if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
+ return length;
+
+ /* Allocate requisite combined storage */
+ *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return -1; /* Push error onto error stack? */
+
+ /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
+ length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
+ if (length <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(*pp);
+ *pp = NULL;
+ }
+ return length;
+}
+
int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp)
{
x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
#include <openssl/x509.h>
- X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **px, const unsigned char **in, int len);
+ X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **px, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **px, const unsigned char **in, long len);
int i2d_X509(X509 *x, unsigned char **out);
+ int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *x, unsigned char **out);
X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x);
X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x);
If the call is successful B<*in> is incremented to the byte following the
parsed data.
+d2i_X509_AUX() is similar to d2i_X509() but the input is expected to consist of
+an X509 certificate followed by auxiliary trust information.
+This is used by the PEM routines to read "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" objects.
+This function should not be called on untrusted input.
+
i2d_X509() encodes the structure pointed to by B<x> into DER format.
If B<out> is not B<NULL> is writes the DER encoded data to the buffer
at B<*out>, and increments it to point after the data just written.
case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
data just written.
+i2d_X509_AUX() is similar to i2d_X509(), but the encoded output contains both
+the certificate and any auxiliary trust information.
+This is used by the PEM routines to write "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" objects.
+Note, this is a non-standard OpenSSL-specific data format.
+
d2i_X509_bio() is similar to d2i_X509() except it attempts
to parse data from BIO B<bp>.