*) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent
Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
- [Ulf Moeller]
+ [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
*) Update Rijndael code to version 3.0 and change EVP AES ciphers to
handle the new API. Currently only ECB, CBC modes supported. Add new
void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
-int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *max);
+int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *range);
int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG);
BIGNUM *BN_new(void);
#define BN_F_BN_MPI2BN 112
#define BN_F_BN_NEW 113
#define BN_F_BN_RAND 114
+#define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122
#define BN_F_BN_USUB 115
/* Reason codes. */
#define BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA 105
#define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110
#define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106
+#define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115
#define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111
#define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107
#define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_MPI2BN,0), "BN_mpi2bn"},
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_NEW,0), "BN_new"},
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_RAND,0), "BN_rand"},
+{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE,0), "BN_rand_range"},
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_USUB,0), "BN_usub"},
{0,NULL}
};
{BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA ,"expand on static bignum data"},
{BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED ,"input not reduced"},
{BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH ,"invalid length"},
+{BN_R_INVALID_RANGE ,"invalid range"},
{BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE ,"not a square"},
{BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED ,"not initialized"},
{BN_R_NO_INVERSE ,"no inverse"},
}
#endif
-/* random number r: min <= r < max */
-int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *max)
+/* random number r: min <= r < min+range */
+int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *range)
{
- int n = BN_num_bits(max);
- do
+ int n;
+
+ if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range))
+ {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ n = BN_num_bits(range); /* n > 0 */
+
+ if (n == 1)
+ {
+ if (!BN_zero(r)) return 0;
+ }
+ else if (BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2))
+ {
+ do
+ {
+ /* range = 11..._2, so each iteration succeeds with probability > .5 */
+ if (!BN_rand(r, n, 0, 0)) return 0;
+ fprintf(stderr, "?");
+ }
+ while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "! (11...)\n");
+ }
+ else
{
- if (!BN_rand(r, n, 0, 0)) return 0;
- } while ((min && BN_cmp(r, min) < 0) || BN_cmp(r, max) >= 0);
+ /* range = 10..._2,
+ * so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer than range */
+ do
+ {
+ if (!BN_rand(r, n + 1, 0, 0)) return 0;
+ /* If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range
+ * (which is either r, r - range, or r - 2*range).
+ * Otherwise, iterate once more.
+ * Since 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with
+ * probability > .5. */
+ if (BN_cmp(r ,range) >= 0)
+ {
+ if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0;
+ if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0)
+ if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "?");
+ }
+ while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "! (10...)\n");
+ }
+
+ if (min != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!BN_add(r, r, min)) return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
kinv=NULL;
/* Get random k */
- if (!BN_rand_range(&k, BN_value_one(), dsa->q)) goto err;
+ do
+ if (!BN_rand_range(&k, NULL, dsa->q)) goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(&k));
if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P))
{
int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
- int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *max);
+ int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *range);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
-number B<rnd> in the range B<min> E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<max>. B<min>
-may be NULL, in that case 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<max>.
+number B<rnd> in the range B<min> E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<min> + B<range>.
+B<min> may be NULL, in that case 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_rand() or BN_rand_range().