Avoid shadowing variables,

and re-enable seeding with more data than read from DEVRANDOM -- just
don't pretend it contains entropy.

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 5eef93d4bdbcfcd127a939523fa48417b79b4f58..dbed1dcde26c10f0c6275b08b64cafe774d4505c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
+static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, int add_entropy);
 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 
 RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
@@ -361,12 +361,12 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
                if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL)
                        {
                        unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
-                       int i;
+                       int n;
 
-                       i=fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,ENTROPY_NEEDED,fh);
+                       n=fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,ENTROPY_NEEDED,fh);
                        fclose(fh);
-                       RAND_seed(tmpbuf,i);
-                       memset(tmpbuf,0,i);
+                       RAND_add(tmpbuf,sizeof tmpbuf,n);
+                       memset(tmpbuf,0,n);
                        }
 #endif
 #ifdef PURIFY