ash: do not use "safe applets" in non-standalone shell

diff --git a/shell/ash.c b/shell/ash.c
index 371b5d9c3a3975ae1f98a5da2eedd98eaee43e01..335dcbab1eea6287cc383574a908ad89908d2fc3 100644 (file)
--- a/shell/ash.c
+++ b/shell/ash.c
@@ -6455,7 +6455,9 @@ casematch(union node *pattern, char *val)
 
 /* ============ find_command */
 
-static int is_safe_applet(char *name)
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
+static int
+is_safe_applet(char *name)
 {
        /* It isn't a bug to have non-existent applet here... */
        /* ...just a waste of space... */
@@ -6488,6 +6490,7 @@ static int is_safe_applet(char *name)
 
        return 0;
 }
+#endif
 
 struct builtincmd {
        const char *name;
@@ -6551,27 +6554,26 @@ static void
 tryexec(char *cmd, char **argv, char **envp)
 {
        int repeated = 0;
-       struct BB_applet *a;
-       int argc = 0;
-       char **c;
 
-       if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL
-        && (a = find_applet_by_name(cmd)) != NULL
-        && is_safe_applet(cmd)
-       ) {
-               c = argv;
-               while (*c != NULL) {
-                       c++; argc++;
-               }
-               applet_name = cmd;
-               exit(a->main(argc, argv));
-       }
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
-       if (find_applet_by_name(cmd) != NULL) {
-               /* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */
-               execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);
-               /* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer
-                * executable, fall through */
+       if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL) {
+               struct BB_applet *a;
+               char **c;
+
+               a = find_applet_by_name(cmd);
+               if (a) {
+                       if (is_safe_applet(cmd)) {
+                               c = argv;
+                               while (*c)
+                                       c++;
+                               applet_name = cmd;
+                               exit(a->main(c - argv, argv));
+                       }
+                       /* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */
+                       execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);
+                       /* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer
+                        * executable, fall through */
+               }
        }
 #endif
 
@@ -6619,7 +6621,7 @@ shellexec(char **argv, const char *path, int idx)
 
        clearredir(1);
        envp = environment();
-       if (strchr(argv[0], '/') || is_safe_applet(argv[0])
+       if (strchr(argv[0], '/')
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
         || find_applet_by_name(argv[0])
 #endif
@@ -11141,13 +11143,13 @@ find_command(char *name, struct cmdentry *entry, int act, const char *path)
                entry->u.index = -1;
                return;
        }
-#endif
-
+       /* Already caught above
        if (is_safe_applet(name)) {
                entry->cmdtype = CMDNORMAL;
                entry->u.index = -1;
                return;
-       }
+       }*/
+#endif
 
        updatetbl = (path == pathval());
        if (!updatetbl) {