Fix kerberos ciphersuite bugs introduced with PR:1336.

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 278be82294cde73236c1d9c8c4262a2b2088e4d5..d98c7f998f1459a16b19dbcdcf720803d1e17a5d 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -821,7 +821,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 
        if (!ok) return((int)n);
 
-       if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+       if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+               ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5) && 
+               (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
                {
                s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
                return(1);
@@ -2292,18 +2294,18 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
 
        sc=s->session->sess_cert;
 
-       if (sc == NULL)
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-               goto err;
-               }
-
        algs=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
 
        /* we don't have a certificate */
        if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5))
                return(1);
 
+       if (sc == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+               goto err;
+               }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 #endif

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 9414cf09fb6405d52ccba280b2116716e31c28dc..39668f499ad6d0988d0eaa94a9395f34c0f46c73 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1997,7 +1997,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                        goto err;
                        }
-               if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+               if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
                    {
                    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
                     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
@@ -2007,8 +2007,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
                     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
                     */
-                   if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
-                          (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+                   if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                               SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);