Code was added in commit
62f488d that overwrite the last ex_data valye
using CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() causing a memory leak and potentially
confusing the ex_data dup() callback.
In ssl_session_dup(), new-up the ex_data before calling
CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(); all the other structures that dup ex_data have
the destination ex_data new'd before the dup.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3568)
if (j < mx)
mx = j;
if (mx > 0) {
- if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, NULL))
+ /*
+ * Make sure the ex_data stack is at least |mx| elements long to avoid
+ * issues in the for loop that follows; so go get the |mx|'th element
+ * (if it does not exist CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns NULL), and assign
+ * to itself. This is normally a no-op; but ensures the stack is the
+ * proper size
+ */
+ if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, mx - 1)))
goto skip;
storage = OPENSSL_malloc(mx * sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *));
if (!storage)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
dest->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
- memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
/* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
dest->prev = NULL;
if (src->peer != NULL)
CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data))
+ goto err;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
}
# endif
- if (ticket != 0) {
+ if (ticket != 0 && src->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
goto err;