Add additional DigestInfo checks.

Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.

Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 845b6be5601726de8a3dbb2465941aaa85a0f44f..19c9f9c519597b3f75cb45d960e23c6ef310d090 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -627,6 +627,16 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
 
+  *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+ 
+     Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
+     will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.
+
+     Note: this is a precautionary measure OpenSSL and no attacks
+     are currently known.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
      handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
      SSL/TLS clients and servers.

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index fa3239ab30a80d0c5d4614688e5d6d34385e553e..748292550d83a8caed062578d6234b6c26399d23 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -143,6 +143,25 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
        return(ret);
        }
 
+/*
+ * Check DigestInfo structure does not contain extraneous data by reencoding
+ * using DER and checking encoding against original. 
+ */
+static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo, int dinfolen)
+       {
+       unsigned char *der = NULL;
+       int derlen;
+       int ret = 0;
+       derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der);
+       if (derlen <= 0)
+               return 0;
+       if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen))
+               ret = 1;
+       OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+       OPENSSL_free(der);
+       return ret;
+       }
+
 int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
                          unsigned int m_len,
                          unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
@@ -211,7 +230,7 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
                if (sig == NULL) goto err;
 
                /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
-               if(p != s+i)
+               if(p != s+i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i))
                        {
                        RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
                        goto err;