LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
LIBSRC= cms_lib.c cms_asn1.c cms_att.c cms_io.c cms_smime.c cms_err.c \
cms_sd.c cms_dd.c cms_cd.c cms_env.c cms_enc.c cms_ess.c \
- cms_pwri.c
+ cms_pwri.c cms_kari.c
LIBOBJ= cms_lib.o cms_asn1.o cms_att.o cms_io.o cms_smime.o cms_err.o \
cms_sd.o cms_dd.o cms_cd.o cms_env.o cms_enc.o cms_ess.o \
- cms_pwri.o
+ cms_pwri.o cms_kari.o
SRC= $(LIBSRC)
typedef struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st CMS_RecipientInfo;
typedef struct CMS_ReceiptRequest_st CMS_ReceiptRequest;
typedef struct CMS_Receipt_st CMS_Receipt;
+typedef struct CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_st CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey;
+typedef struct CMS_OtherKeyAttribute_st CMS_OtherKeyAttribute;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo)
DECLARE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES)
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ContentInfo)
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentInfo)
#define CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL 0
#define CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER 1
+#define CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE -1
#define CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS 0
#define CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE 1
#define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK 2
int *pallorfirst,
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist,
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto);
-
#endif
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ X509_ALGOR **palg,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm);
+STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert);
+
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
+ CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
+ X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+ X509 *cert);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek);
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY 160
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT 134
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT 169
+#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT 178
+#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG 175
+#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID 173
+#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS 172
+#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP 174
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT 135
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT 136
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID 137
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD 168
#define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY 145
#define CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL 170
+#define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS 176
+#define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID 177
#define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER 146
#define CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED 147
#define CMS_F_CMS_SIGN 148
#define CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT 165
#define CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA 122
#define CMS_R_NOT_KEK 123
+#define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT 181
#define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT 124
#define CMS_R_NOT_PWRI 177
#define CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE 125
ASN1_IMP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, d.rKeyId, CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, 0)
} ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier)
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) = {
+static int cms_rek_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+ {
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *)*pval;
+ if(operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST)
+ {
+ if (rek->pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(rek->pkey);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, cms_rek_cb) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, rid, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, algorithm, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_IMP(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.originatorKey, CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, 1)
} ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey)
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo) = {
+static int cms_kari_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+ {
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = (CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *)*pval;
+ if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&kari->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(&kari->ctx,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW);
+ kari->pctx = NULL;
+ }
+ else if(operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST)
+ {
+ if (kari->pctx)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, cms_kari_cb) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, version, LONG),
ASN1_EXP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, originator, CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, 0),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 1),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, recipientEncryptedKeys, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KEKIdentifier) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKIdentifier, keyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
return cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
}
-static int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd)
+int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd)
{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = ri->d.ktri->pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int i;
+ if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
+ pkey = ri->d.ktri->pkey;
+ else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ri->d.kari->pctx;
+ if (!pctx)
+ return 0;
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl)
return 1;
i = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE, cmd, ri);
{
if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
return ri->d.ktri->pctx;
+ else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ return ri->d.kari->pctx;
return NULL;
}
/* Key Transport Recipient Info (KTRI) routines */
-/* Add a recipient certificate. For now only handle key transport.
- * If we ever handle key agreement will need updating.
- */
+/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
-CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- X509 *recip, unsigned int flags)
+static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+ EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
{
- CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
- CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
- EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
- int type;
- env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
- if (!env)
- goto err;
-
- /* Initialize recipient info */
- ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
- if (!ri)
- goto merr;
-
- /* Initialize and add key transport recipient info */
+ int idtype;
ri->d.ktri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo);
if (!ri->d.ktri)
- goto merr;
+ return 0;
ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
ktri = ri->d.ktri;
- X509_check_purpose(recip, -1, -1);
- pk = X509_get_pubkey(recip);
- if (!pk)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT,
- CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&recip->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- ktri->pkey = pk;
- ktri->recip = recip;
-
if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID)
{
ktri->version = 2;
- type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+ idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER;
}
else
{
ktri->version = 0;
- type = CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+ idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL;
}
/* Not a typo: RecipientIdentifier and SignerIdentifier are the
* same structure.
*/
- if (!cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(ktri->rid, recip, type))
- goto err;
+ if (!cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(ktri->rid, recip, idtype))
+ return 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&recip->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ CRYPTO_add(&pk->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ ktri->pkey = pk;
+ ktri->recip = recip;
if (flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM)
{
if (!ktri->pctx)
return 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
+ return 0;
}
else if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Add a recipient certificate using appropriate type of RecipientInfo
+ */
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ X509 *recip, unsigned int flags)
+ {
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
+ CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+ if (!env)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Initialize recipient info */
+ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri)
+ goto merr;
+
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(recip);
+ if (!pk)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT,
+ CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY);
goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk))
+ {
+
+ case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
+ if (!cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(ri, recip, pk, flags))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+
+ case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE:
+ if (!cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(ri, recip, pk, flags))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT,
+ CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+
+ }
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
goto merr;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+
return ri;
merr:
err:
if (ri)
M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (pk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
return NULL;
}
case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt(cms, ri);
+ case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE:
+ return cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(cms, ri);
+
case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK:
return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(cms, ri);
break;
return NULL;
}
+/* Get RecipientInfo type (if any) supported by a key (public or private).
+ * To retain compatibility with previous behaviour if the ctrl value isn't
+ * supported we assume key transport.
+ */
+int cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk)
+ {
+ if (pk->ameth && pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl)
+ {
+ int i, r;
+ i = pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pk, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE, 0, &r);
+ if (i > 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+ }
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE), "CMS_EnvelopedData_create"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO), "cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT), "CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL), "CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL), "cms_env_asn1_ctrl"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL), "CMS_final"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES), "CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CONTENT), "CMS_get0_content"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY), "cms_Receipt_verify"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT), "CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT), "CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT), "cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT), "CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT), "CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD), "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY), "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL), "CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS), "cms_set1_ias"},
+{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID), "cms_set1_keyid"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER), "cms_set1_SignerIdentifier"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED), "CMS_set_detached"},
{ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN), "CMS_sign"},
{ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT) ,"not a signed receipt"},
{ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA) ,"not encrypted data"},
{ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEK) ,"not kek"},
+{ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT) ,"not key agreement"},
{ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT) ,"not key transport"},
{ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_PWRI) ,"not pwri"},
{ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE),"not supported for this key type"},
--- /dev/null
+/* crypto/cms/cms_kari.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
+
+/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ X509_ALGOR **palg,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
+ {
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (palg)
+ *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+ if (pukm)
+ *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
+
+STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+ {
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
+ }
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+ {
+ CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = NULL;
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = NULL;
+ if (pubalg)
+ *pubalg = NULL;
+ if (pubkey)
+ *pubkey = NULL;
+ if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+ {
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
+ }
+ else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+ {
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
+ }
+ else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY)
+ {
+ if (pubalg)
+ *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
+ if (pubkey)
+ *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
+ {
+ CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
+ if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+ return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
+ else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+ return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
+ CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
+ X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+ {
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
+ if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+ {
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = NULL;
+ if (tm)
+ *tm = NULL;
+ if (other)
+ *other = NULL;
+ }
+ else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+ {
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
+ if (tm)
+ *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
+ if (other)
+ *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+ X509 *cert)
+ {
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
+ if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+ return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
+ else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+ return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
+ if (kari->pctx)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+ kari->pctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (!pk)
+ return 1;
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
+ goto err;
+ kari->pctx = pctx;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (pctx)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+ {
+ if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ return &ri->d.kari->ctx;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+/* Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the
+ * original CEK or the encrypted CEK.
+ */
+
+static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
+ {
+ /* Key encryption key */
+ unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t keklen;
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *out = NULL;
+ int outlen;
+ keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&kari->ctx);
+ if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ /* Derive KEK */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Set KEK in context */
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
+ goto err;
+ /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
+ goto err;
+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+ if (!out)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
+ goto err;
+ *pout = out;
+ *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
+ rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
+ if (!rv && out)
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+ kari->pctx = NULL;
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
+ {
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
+ size_t enckeylen;
+ size_t ceklen;
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
+ enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
+ /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
+ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
+ goto err;
+ /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
+ if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
+ goto err;
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+ if (ec->key)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+ }
+ ec->key = cek;
+ ec->keylen = ceklen;
+ cek = NULL;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (cek)
+ OPENSSL_free(cek);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
+static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
+ EVP_PKEY *pk)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
+ int rv = 0;
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ if (!pctx)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
+ if (!pctx)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ kari->pctx = pctx;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!rv && pctx)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (ekey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+ EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
+ {
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
+
+ ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri->d.kari)
+ return 0;
+ ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
+
+ kari = ri->d.kari;
+ kari->version = 3;
+
+ rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
+ if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek))
+ {
+ M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID)
+ {
+ rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+ if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+ if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Create ephemeral key */
+ if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
+ return 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&pk->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ rek->pkey = pk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &kari->ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+ int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+ /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
+ kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
+
+ if (kekcipher)
+ {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is
+ * DES3 use DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key
+ * size.
+ */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
+ kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
+ else if (keylen <= 16)
+ kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
+ else if (keylen <= 24)
+ kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
+ else
+ kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
+ return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+ {
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
+ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kari = ri->d.kari;
+ reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+ /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
+ if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
+ return 0;
+ /* If no orignator key set up initialise for ephemeral key
+ * the public key ASN1 structure will set the actual public
+ * key value.
+ */
+ if (kari->originator->type == -1)
+ {
+ CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
+ oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
+ oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
+ if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
+ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+ return 0;
+ /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++)
+ {
+ unsigned char *enckey;
+ size_t enckeylen;
+ rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
+ kari, 1))
+ return 0;
+ ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+ }
typedef struct CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_st CMS_OriginatorPublicKey;
typedef struct CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey_st CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey;
typedef struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_st CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo;
-typedef struct CMS_OtherKeyAttribute_st CMS_OtherKeyAttribute;
typedef struct CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_st CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier;
typedef struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier_st CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier;
-typedef struct CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_st CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey;
typedef struct CMS_KEKIdentifier_st CMS_KEKIdentifier;
typedef struct CMS_KEKRecipientInfo_st CMS_KEKRecipientInfo;
typedef struct CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo_st CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *recipientEncryptedKeys;
+ /* Public key context associated with current operation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+ /* Cipher context for CEK wrapping */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
};
struct CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey_st
{
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey;
+ /* Public key associated with this recipient */
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
};
struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier_st
#define CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL 0
#define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER 1
+#define CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL 0
+#define CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER 1
+
+#define CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL 0
+#define CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER 1
+#define CMS_OIK_PUBKEY 2
+
BIO *cms_content_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
CMS_ContentInfo *cms_Data_create(void);
int cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, BIO *chain,
X509_ALGOR *mdalg);
+int cms_ias_cert_cmp(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias, X509 *cert);
+int cms_keyid_cert_cmp(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid, X509 *cert);
+int cms_set1_ias(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber **pias, X509 *cert);
+int cms_set1_keyid(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pkeyid, X509 *cert);
+
BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec);
BIO *cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
int cms_EncryptedContent_init(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec,
BIO *cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_get0_enveloped(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd);
+int cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk);
+/* KARI routines */
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+ EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags);
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
/* PWRI routines */
int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
*/
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
}
return crls;
}
+
+int cms_ias_cert_cmp(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias, X509 *cert)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ias->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ias->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
+ }
+
+int cms_keyid_cert_cmp(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid, X509 *cert)
+ {
+ X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, -1);
+ if (!cert->skid)
+ return -1;
+ return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keyid, cert->skid);
+ }
+
+int cms_set1_ias(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber **pias, X509 *cert)
+ {
+ CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias;
+ ias = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber);
+ if (!ias)
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_NAME_set(&ias->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(ias->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
+ goto err;
+ if (*pias)
+ M_ASN1_free_of(*pias, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber);
+ *pias = ias;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (ias)
+ M_ASN1_free_of(ias, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber);
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int cms_set1_keyid(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pkeyid, X509 *cert)
+ {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
+ X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, -1);
+ if (!cert->skid)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID, CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ keyid = ASN1_STRING_dup(cert->skid);
+ if (!keyid)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (*pkeyid)
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*pkeyid);
+ *pkeyid = keyid;
+ return 1;
+ }
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
switch(type)
{
case CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL:
- sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber =
- M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber);
- if (!sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber)
- goto merr;
- if (!X509_NAME_set(&sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer,
- X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
- goto merr;
- if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(
- sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber,
- X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
- goto merr;
+ if (!cms_set1_ias(&sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert))
+ return 0;
break;
case CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER:
- if (!cert->skid)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER,
- CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID);
+ if (!cms_set1_keyid(&sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert))
return 0;
- }
- sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier = ASN1_STRING_dup(cert->skid);
- if (!sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier)
- goto merr;
break;
default:
sid->type = type;
return 1;
-
- merr:
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
-
}
int cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid,
int cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert)
{
- int ret;
if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL)
- {
- ret = X509_NAME_cmp(sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer,
- X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber,
- X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
- }
+ return cms_ias_cert_cmp(sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
else if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER)
- {
- X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, -1);
- if (!cert->skid)
- return -1;
- return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier,
- cert->skid);
- }
+ return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
else
return -1;
}
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
{
return NULL;
}
+static int cms_kari_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
+ {
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
+ reks = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(ri);
+ if (!cert)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++)
+ {
+ int rv;
+ rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
+ if (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(rek, cert))
+ continue;
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
+ rv = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(cms, ri, rek);
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
+ if (rv > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
{
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
- int i, r;
+ int i, r, ri_type;
int debug = 0;
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
if (ris)
debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
+ ri_type = cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk);
+ if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
+ CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
{
ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
- if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
+ if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != ri_type)
continue;
+ if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ {
+ r = cms_kari_set1_pkey(cms, ri, pk, cert);
+ if (r > 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
/* If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo
* otherwise try them all.
*/
- if (!cert || (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert) == 0))
+ else if (!cert || !CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert))
{
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
#define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID 0x3
#define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN 0x5
#define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE 0x7
+#define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE 0x8
int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void);
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx);
#define sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(CMS_CertificateChoices, (st))
#define sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(CMS_CertificateChoices, (st))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (cmp))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_free(st) SKM_sk_free(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(st) SKM_sk_num(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (i))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (i), (val))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (val))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (val))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (val))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_find_ex(st, val) SKM_sk_find_ex(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (val))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (i))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (ptr))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (val), (i))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (cmp))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, st)
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st), (free_func))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st))
+#define sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, (st))
+
#define sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(CMS_RecipientInfo, (cmp))
#define sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(CMS_RecipientInfo)
#define sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_free(st) SKM_sk_free(CMS_RecipientInfo, (st))
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff