Change usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes to RAND_bytes

RAND_pseudo_bytes() allows random data to be returned even in low entropy
conditions. Sometimes this is ok. Many times it is not. For the avoidance
of any doubt, replace existing usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes() with
RAND_bytes().

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

diff --git a/apps/enc.c b/apps/enc.c
index 7b7c70b132d722ccfe9b41c9ac2707c0d550a3ea..8e2ef27aca34f0cfba5458a7d523d4d6f10d2805 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/enc.c
+++ b/apps/enc.c
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
                             BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex salt value\n");
                             goto end;
                         }
-                    } else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) < 0)
+                    } else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) <= 0)
                         goto end;
                     /*
                      * If -P option then don't bother writing

diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c
index 5ff53b5743c6f7edb05cd993790a37260f949ed3..798a6d593616fab4ccb1725658e2b9d0bd1e3b80 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/passwd.c
+++ b/apps/passwd.c
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p,
                 if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL)
                     goto err;
             }
-            if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) < 0)
+            if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) <= 0)
                 goto err;
             (*salt_p)[0] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[0] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
             (*salt_p)[1] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[1] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p,
                 if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL)
                     goto err;
             }
-            if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) < 0)
+            if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) <= 0)
                 goto err;
 
             for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)

diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index a53cadd66052bb1970506494ec53ab10c32b412d..40782bb027fd51ee16e3863af1fd2c50384d8944 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -2968,7 +2968,7 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
 {
     unsigned int count = 0;
     do {
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
             return 0;
         /*
          * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
index 96110c540f3dba9c335953f4128acf829a57a29c..9fd5bef0fc97709d9baa50942dcf6a7de3a9f033 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
     if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) {
         /* We want multipart/signed */
         /* Generate a random boundary */
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) <= 0)
             return 0;
         for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
             c = bound[i] & 0xf;

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
index bdbfdcd67c0727daa2e11af247495e0e81e85521..e2a1def53f1db411095f5f407dca3e06c2fb17e3 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter,
     sstr = ASN1_STRING_data(pbe->salt);
     if (salt)
         memcpy(sstr, salt, saltlen);
-    else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sstr, saltlen) < 0)
+    else if (RAND_bytes(sstr, saltlen) <= 0)
         goto err;
 
     if (!ASN1_item_pack(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), &pbe_str)) {

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
index 73ba4a3d67aaa4501e77dd14d2efc5c481c2e6b1..388053e0a1bfd5439766d714f8beb832a6eeab13 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
     if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
         if (aiv)
             memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
-        else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) < 0)
+        else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) <= 0)
             goto err;
     }
 
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
 
     if (salt)
         memcpy(osalt->data, salt, saltlen);
-    else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) < 0)
+    else if (RAND_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
         goto merr;
 
     if (iter <= 0)

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
index a04f32a008179821ba1b4311332bcebe37f47d2c..4842bb4c82ffdd5c83f31a6a3547eb412436373a 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 
     BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
 #if 1
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+    if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0)
         return -1;
     num = (n & 0x07);
 
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
         num = nt->lwn;
         nt->lwn = 0;
     } else {
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0)
             return -1;
         num = (n & 7);
     }

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index f9fb2e9e45e01b9438a1c0bc5c4fb82311fbe363..2266d22b66aa7a5506d4149e538efbca12b3b781 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -145,13 +145,9 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
     time(&tim);
     RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0);
 
-    if (pseudorand) {
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, bytes) == -1)
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
-            goto err;
-    }
+    /* We ignore the value of pseudorand and always call RAND_bytes */
+    if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
+        goto err;
 
 #if 1
     if (pseudorand == 2) {

diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
index e282c9dd283e0e1625dac1d6e6d99f97064cf602..90b1fcc75075ea473a0669ff7d23b05c6336f0d6 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
         /* Generate a random IV if we need one */
         ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
         if (ivlen > 0) {
-            if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+            if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
                 goto err;
             piv = iv;
         }

diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
index 8631a2eb2b303a5b54c4fdc07b9854e6bb44d9ab..8212560628a9d44da5908dc5396a5a2cd6c43713 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
@@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen,
     else {
         if (!ASN1_STRING_set(rr->signedContentIdentifier, NULL, 32))
             goto merr;
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32)
-            <= 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) <= 0)
             goto err;
     }
 

diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index b91c01691fec2111193c461b698b409a1161556e..5c817caf2f056115900de623bc039b1cdb223708 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
     ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
 
     if (ivlen > 0) {
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
             goto err;
         if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
             CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
         memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
         /* Add random padding to end */
         if (olen > inlen + 4
-            && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0)
+            && RAND_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) <= 0)
             return 0;
         /* Encrypt twice */
         EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);

diff --git a/crypto/des/des.c b/crypto/des/des.c
index 586aed72378cc1ecc8d762b9fbe504c028ae8b97..d7374382d83ac637e84b988c4fdaa6196fc08792 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/des.c
+++ b/crypto/des/des.c
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ void doencryption(void)
             len = l - rem;
             if (feof(DES_IN)) {
                 for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) {
-                    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0)
+                    if (RAND_bytes(buf + l++, 1) <= 0)
                         goto problems;
                 }
                 buf[l++] = rem;

diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
index bfaabde516ae5519c31d97b7eebb82a28e3d3346..c2aaa8e98ca230f3147fb15a799a20728bc05ee1 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
+++ b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
     if (len < 8) {
         cp = shortbuf;
         memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len);
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) <= 0) {
             return -1;
         }
         rnum = 8;

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 34c6113c45e24e90331d4680a4a5092f9eb6c803..ba496b2d5f1d3f685b7ce6236650260a7273d444 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
                 goto err;
 
             if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
-                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
+                if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0)
                     goto err;
                 seed_is_random = 1;
             } else {

diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
index 5c32e35e17b9cf0bf133b42b86fe4ac3bb306f22..16e151f1101700a5f399dec033abc4b4e4dfc094 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int sig_out(BIO *b)
      * FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all,
      * particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured.
      */
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0)
+    if (RAND_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) <= 0)
         goto berr;
     memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->md_data, md->digest->md_size);
     longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->digest->md_size);

diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
index c19648c7329b3bc45246146d83f2462b6a288914..55af31b5734a14a9219a1a2c26b1a685d9aa3464 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts,
     ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
     if (val)
         memcpy(tmpval, val, len);
-    else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0)
+    else if (RAND_bytes(tmpval, len) <= 0)
         goto err;
     if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce,
                          &os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE))

diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index ab45a84fa26596a55c0c6e58a70096329fbece6d..7e598833887e645919a01953a7c389b166263842 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
         }
         RAND_add(data, i, 0);   /* put in the RSA key. */
         OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv));
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */
+        if (RAND_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */
             goto err;
         /*
          * The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt.  It is NOT taken from

diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index a9277827ff2df57792398b5a9d45d93e973f8f69..cbf34da05adadb6790d35b7f578b51e4a8680692 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
     }
     p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
     if (!salt) {
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
             return 0;
     } else
         memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);

diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index 946aaa65435b33c9710cbf4292c194cf0f5469e6..1ab6d5ae71294a45028c669edc8713c78fa68fbc 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
         ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher);
         xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher));
         if (ivlen > 0)
-            if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+            if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
                 goto err;
         if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0)
             goto err;

diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 26ad3e07b4bb3ffad4b91658753d41fe42fdcb4a..986babfd493cc03242e071391179836b5b2e0d4a 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
     if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
         goto err;
 
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+    if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
         goto err;
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
     EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
     }
 
     if (*salt == NULL) {
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
             goto err;
 
         s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
     srp_bn_print(g);
 
     if (*salt == NULL) {
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
             goto err;
 
         salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 19c3da61612233f043fa12697a4b96a9c280fcc9..1614d8857f4a6be082281d11f1a347162322bfb6 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1589,7 +1589,7 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
         memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
         bp += payload;
         /* Random padding */
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
             OPENSSL_free(buffer);
             return -1;
         }
@@ -1674,11 +1674,11 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
     /* Sequence number */
     s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
     /* 16 random bytes */
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0)
         goto err;
     p += 16;
     /* Random padding */
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0)
         goto err;
 
     ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index d659ed428e6dcd8efb2b18b631976ce0a259e58b..ea93a8eee3035a98e219a6ce1591cb15ca0c282e 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -1627,7 +1627,8 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 
     /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
     if (bs) {                   /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
-        RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, bs);
+        if (RAND_bytes(p, bs) <= 0)
+            goto err;
         /*
          * master IV and last CBC residue stand for the rest of randomness
          */

diff --git a/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index f01b8a693f4e0b167d98164b47e556f322cfc703..60af2305b90e86d6136becc36bc298306f61ea92 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -1701,7 +1701,10 @@ int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
                 return -1;
             }
         } else {
-            RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+            if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) {
+                OPENSSL_free(senc);
+                return -1;
+            }
             EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
                                tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
             HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,

diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 2b2855dee4a989d41dfab657a22cd4a7dd7f051f..e93baed43a22180d0943f43f3dd3a93fb3f78ca5 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -290,9 +290,9 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
         unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
         unsigned char *p = result;
         l2n(Time, p);
-        return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len - 4);
+        return RAND_bytes(p, len - 4);
     } else
-        return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
+        return RAND_bytes(result, len);
 }
 
 static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
@@ -460,8 +460,8 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
                 i = ch_len;
             s2n(i, d);
             memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]), 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-            if (RAND_pseudo_bytes
-                (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i) <= 0)
+            if (RAND_bytes (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i)
+                    <= 0)
                 return -1;
 
             memcpy(p, &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i);

diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index b23b083153fb9be0f8c2b88f50f26a38d4526290..736ba1f3ffacd5d34e611d928b1078e49cb8c1fb 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static int client_hello(SSL *s)
         /*
          * challenge id data
          */
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
             return -1;
         memcpy(d, s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
         d += SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
             return -1;
         }
         if (i > 0)
-            if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg, i) <= 0)
+            if (RAND_bytes(sess->key_arg, i) <= 0)
                 return -1;
 
         /* make a master key */

diff --git a/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 07e9df82820a9e67967ca2d73a60edcca12c0f38..d3b243c27e02d58e41cd59007844f197ee54c147 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -526,11 +526,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
      * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
      */
 
-    /*
-     * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
-     */
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
-                          (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0)
+    if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+                  (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0)
         return 0;
 
     i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
@@ -822,8 +819,7 @@ static int server_hello(SSL *s)
         /* make and send conn_id */
         s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH, p); /* add conn_id length */
         s->s2->conn_id_length = SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <=
-            0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= 0)
             return -1;
         memcpy(d, s->s2->conn_id, SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH);
         d += SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
@@ -962,7 +958,7 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
         p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
         *(p++) = SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE;
         *(p++) = SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
             return -1;
         memcpy(p, ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
 

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 6c74caa33d39004089d4db2eefd96f794df24325..591b13ecea2eed4f4fe164ebeea415151091c367 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2279,11 +2279,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
          * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
          */
 
-        /*
-         * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
-         */
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
-                              sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+                       sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
             goto err;
         decrypt_len =
             RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 33c52ac5bf03ae0eed6e486186aaa529fab65996..896b5a35a24da90695e247f562c6e95b65529c41 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
     ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
     ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
     /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
-    if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
+    if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
         || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
         || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
         ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index a97d0602ef4efca8d1dd895a601f7d05b329ea4f..093b534bf98a5feaa8a4ee5acbe79440f48743c9 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
 {
     unsigned int retry = 0;
     do
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+        if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
             return 0;
     while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
            (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 8ed179330565514c75b997e0ce93e11eda7bb919..d961e4afb504e9e705f2fbe3868c5dfa731a4db3 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2595,7 +2595,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
         memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
         bp += payload;
         /* Random padding */
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
             OPENSSL_free(buffer);
             return -1;
         }
@@ -2681,13 +2681,13 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
     /* Sequence number */
     s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
     /* 16 random bytes */
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
     p += 16;
     /* Random padding */
-    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }