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f76f83d)
- Security: Message printout was vulnerable to format string injection.
If specific usernames including "%" symbols can be created on a system
(validated by getpwnam()) then an attacker could run arbitrary code as root
when connecting to Dropbear server.
A dbclient user who can control username or host arguments could potentially
run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts
or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program.
- Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as
the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files
- Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if
particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where
dbclient is used in scripts.
- Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the
running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v
The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with
Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=dropbear
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=dropbear
PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \
http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/ \
https://dropbear.nl/mirror/releases/
PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \
http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/ \
https://dropbear.nl/mirror/releases/
-PKG_MD5SUM:=8d6d78ce60ca52350ec04fcbd711ce9b
+PKG_MD5SUM:=9ad0172731e0f16623937804643b5bd8
PKG_LICENSE:=MIT
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENSE libtomcrypt/LICENSE libtommath/LICENSE
PKG_LICENSE:=MIT
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENSE libtomcrypt/LICENSE libtommath/LICENSE