X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=d56456e14dfdd26c057c81d1f37a2c330eb585c3;hb=7ecd974f5f1bb38de6c47c188c8709b86b809245;hp=05eb2477b51d3830dbbdb2d3ee1b8b8cc99f9698;hpb=725745d1056d616f7aeeee15b84d383bf16c1d58;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 05eb2477b5..d56456e14d 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -174,9 +174,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		ret+=size_str;
 
 		}
-        
-        /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
-        {
+ 
+        /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+        if (s->new_session)
+          {
           int el;
           
           if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
@@ -350,32 +351,17 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-	int need_ri;
 
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-	/* Need RI if renegotiating unless legacy renegotiation allowed */
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
-		|| !s->new_session)
-		need_ri = 0;
-	else
-		need_ri = 1;
 
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		{
-		if (!need_ri)
-			return 1;
-		/* We need to see at least one extension: RI */
-		/* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
-		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
-				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-		return 0;
-		}
+		goto ri_check;
+
 	n2s(data,len);
 
 	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
-		return 1;
+		goto ri_check;
 
 	while (data <= (d+n-4))
 		{
@@ -383,7 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		n2s(data,size);
 
 		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		return 1;
+	   		goto ri_check;
 
 		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
 			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
@@ -446,14 +432,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				switch (servname_type)
 					{
 				case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
-					if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+					if (!s->hit)
 						{
-						if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || 
-							((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
+						if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+							{
+							*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+							return 0;
+							}
+						if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
 							{
 							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
 							return 0;
 							}
+						if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+							{
+							*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+							return 0;
+							}
 						memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
 						s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
 						if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
@@ -466,7 +461,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
 						}
 					else 
-						s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 
+						s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+							&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 
 							&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
 					
 					break;
@@ -525,6 +521,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 						}
 					n2s(data, idsize);
 					dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+					size -= 2 + idsize;
 					if (dsize < 0)
 						{
 						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -563,9 +560,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 					}
 
 				/* Read in request_extensions */
+				if (size < 2)
+					{
+					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
 				n2s(data,dsize);
 				size -= 2;
-				if (dsize > size) 
+				if (dsize != size)
 					{
 					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 					return 0;
@@ -573,6 +575,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				sdata = data;
 				if (dsize > 0)
 					{
+					if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+						{
+						sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+									   X509_EXTENSION_free);
+						}
+
 					s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
 						d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
 							&sdata, dsize);
@@ -595,63 +603,50 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
 		data+=size;		
 		}
+	*p = data;
+
+	ri_check:
+
+	/* Need RI if renegotiating */
 
-	if (need_ri && !renegotiate_seen)
+	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 		{
-		/* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
-		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
 				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 		return 0;
 		}
 
-	*p = data;
 	return 1;
 	}
 
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
 	{
+	unsigned short length;
 	unsigned short type;
 	unsigned short size;
-	unsigned short len;  
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 	int tlsext_servername = 0;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-	int need_ri;
-	/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
-	 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
-	 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
-	 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
-	 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
-	 * absence on initial connect only.
-	 */
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION ||
-		!s->new_session)
-		need_ri = 0;
-	else
-		need_ri = 1;
 
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
+		goto ri_check;
+
+	n2s(data,length);
+	if (data+length != d+n)
 		{
-		if (!need_ri)
-			return 1;
-		/* We need to see at least one extension: RI */
-		/* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
-		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
-				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 		return 0;
 		}
 
-	n2s(data,len);
-
 	while(data <= (d+n-4))
 		{
 		n2s(data,type);
 		n2s(data,size);
 
 		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		return 1;
+	   		goto ri_check;
 
 		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
 			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
@@ -705,15 +700,6 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		return 0;
 		}
 
-	if (!renegotiate_seen && need_ri)
-		{
-		/* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
-		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
-				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
 	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
 		{
  		if (s->tlsext_hostname)
@@ -736,10 +722,30 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		}
 
 	*p = data;
+
+	ri_check:
+
+	/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
+	 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
+	 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
+	 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
+	 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
+	 * absence on initial connect only.
+	 */
+	if (!renegotiate_seen
+		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+		{
+		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -749,13 +755,49 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
 		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
+	switch (ret)
+		{
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 
+			return -1;
+
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+			return 1; 
+					
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+			s->servername_done = 0;
+
+		default:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+	int al;
+
 	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
  	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
- 	 * the certificate has changed.
+ 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
  	 */
-	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+	if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 		{
 		int r;
+		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+		if (certpkey == NULL)
+			{
+			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+		 */
+		s->cert->key = certpkey;
 		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
 		switch (r)
 			{
@@ -779,7 +821,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	else
 		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-	err:
+
+ err:
 	switch (ret)
 		{
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -789,11 +832,9 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
 			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
 			return 1; 
-					
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-			s->servername_done=0;
-			default:
-		return 1;
+
+		default:
+			return 1;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -971,7 +1012,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-	if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
 		goto tickerr;
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */