X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_clnt.c;h=939ad4cf44fab35a839da116546eae61c21f8062;hb=1ee4b98e695cd041da931c10fbdaf82f0ee0f268;hp=23dc8d3363b719f653fb3caf0509c5cd0a5b7a9a;hpb=cfef5027bf27a74098588e48829f0d058b4b0aea;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c index 23dc8d3363..939ad4cf44 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ static int use_ecc(SSL *s) if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) - break; + return 1; } - return i < end; + return 0; } int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, @@ -146,7 +146,6 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ - pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, } /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter + * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether * we should include versions ext.supportedgroups; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; @@ -658,6 +656,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, ret = 1; end: OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); + s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; return ret; @@ -692,6 +691,20 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 +/* + * PSK pre binder overhead = + * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + * 2 bytes for extension length + * 2 bytes for identities list length + * 2 bytes for identity length + * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age + * 2 bytes for binder list length + * 1 byte for binder length + * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the + * subsequent binder bytes + */ +#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) + int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { @@ -702,18 +715,37 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, return 1; /* - * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this - * code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always - * appear last. + * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. + * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but + * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore + * this extension MUST always appear second to last. */ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + /* + * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this + * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 + && s->session->cipher != NULL) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + + if (md != NULL) { + /* + * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder + * length. + */ + hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + + EVP_MD_size(md); + } + } + if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { - /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */ + /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; /* @@ -751,6 +783,12 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY; + /* + * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single + * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length + * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. + */ + /* * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume * so don't add this extension. @@ -766,7 +804,15 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); if (md == NULL) { - /* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */ + /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */ + return 1; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request && md != ssl_handshake_md(s)) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so + * we can't use it. + */ return 1; } @@ -932,24 +978,6 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_early_data_info(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) -{ - unsigned long max_early_data; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA_INFO, - SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; - - return 1; -} - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) @@ -1015,7 +1043,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ - if (s->ext.status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; @@ -1023,7 +1051,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in - * the chain. We ignore any other repsonses. + * the chain. We ignore any other responses. */ if (chainidx != 0) return 1; @@ -1300,7 +1328,6 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, } /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ - pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; @@ -1384,6 +1411,22 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { + if (context == EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + unsigned long max_early_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; + + return 1; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0;