X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_clnt.c;h=939ad4cf44fab35a839da116546eae61c21f8062;hb=1ee4b98e695cd041da931c10fbdaf82f0ee0f268;hp=1e6eddf37334f0b4f7c3b484a46279f0e481eeb0;hpb=b3ad72ce1de399322c4362acc2d4d792f7f14893;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c index 1e6eddf373..939ad4cf44 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" -int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (!s->renegotiate) @@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, return 1; } -int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) return 1; @@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) @@ -102,14 +102,14 @@ static int use_ecc(SSL *s) if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) - break; + return 1; } - return i < end; + return 0; } -int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char *pformats; size_t num_formats; @@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, return 1; } -int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, +int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp; @@ -145,7 +146,6 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ - pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, } /* Copy curve ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) { - if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0]) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, @@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, +int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t ticklen; @@ -191,7 +192,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, return 1; if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL - && s->session->ext.tick != NULL) { + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL + && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { @@ -222,11 +224,11 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, return 1; } -int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t salglen; - const unsigned int *salg; + const uint16_t *salg; if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) return 1; @@ -248,7 +250,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, +int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { int i; @@ -315,8 +318,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; @@ -335,8 +338,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; @@ -359,8 +362,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); int i, end; @@ -399,8 +402,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) return 1; @@ -415,8 +418,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) return 1; @@ -435,8 +438,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { @@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 1; } -int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, +int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; @@ -467,7 +471,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, } /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter + * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether * we should include versions s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; + s->s3->group_id = curve_id; + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + + return 1; +} +#endif + +int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 - size_t i, sharessent = 0, num_curves = 0; + size_t i, num_curves = 0; const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL; + unsigned int curve_id = 0; /* key_share extension */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) @@ -540,68 +589,42 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 0; } - pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { + /* Shouldn't happen! */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For * now, just send one */ - for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) { - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - unsigned int curve_id = 0; - EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; - size_t encodedlen; - - if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) - continue; - - if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - /* Shouldn't happen! */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - /* Generate a key for this key_share */ - curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1]; - key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); - if (key_share_key == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - return 0; - } + if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { + curve_id = s->s3->group_id; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { - /* Encode the public key. */ - encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, - &encodedPoint); - if (encodedlen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - return 0; - } + if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) + continue; - /* Create KeyShareEntry */ - if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - return 0; + curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves); + break; } + } - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're - * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now - * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey - */ - s->s3->group_id = curve_id; - s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; - sharessent++; - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (curve_id == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; } + if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) + return 0; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; @@ -611,11 +634,79 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 1; } +int tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) + return 1; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + /* Extension data sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; + } + + ret = 1; + end: + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); + s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; + + return ret; +} + +int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) { + s->max_early_data = 0; + return 1; + } + s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* + * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the + * extension, we set it to accepted. + */ + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + + return 1; +} + #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 -int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +/* + * PSK pre binder overhead = + * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + * 2 bytes for extension length + * 2 bytes for identities list length + * 2 bytes for identity length + * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age + * 2 bytes for binder list length + * 1 byte for binder length + * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the + * subsequent binder bytes + */ +#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) + +int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned char *padbytes; size_t hlen; @@ -624,18 +715,37 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 1; /* - * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this - * code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always - * appear last. + * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. + * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but + * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore + * this extension MUST always appear second to last. */ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + /* + * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this + * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 + && s->session->cipher != NULL) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + + if (md != NULL) { + /* + * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder + * length. + */ + hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + + EVP_MD_size(md); + } + } + if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { - /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */ + /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; /* @@ -661,11 +771,11 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, /* * Construct the pre_shared_key extension */ -int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 - uint32_t now, ages, agems; + uint32_t now, agesec, agems; size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen; unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; const EVP_MD *md; @@ -674,12 +784,38 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY; /* - * If this is a new session then we have nothing to resume so don't add - * this extension. + * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single + * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length + * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. */ - if (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0) + + /* + * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume + * so don't add this extension. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || s->session->ext.ticklen == 0) return 1; + if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + if (md == NULL) { + /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */ + return 1; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request && md != ssl_handshake_md(s)) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so + * we can't use it. + */ + return 1; + } + /* * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations @@ -688,9 +824,9 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue. */ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); - ages = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; + agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; - if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < ages) { + if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ return 1; } @@ -699,9 +835,9 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be * good enough. */ - agems = ages * (uint32_t)1000; + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; - if (ages != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != ages) { + if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { /* * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If * so we just ignore it. @@ -715,12 +851,6 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, */ agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; - md = ssl_cipher_get_handshake_md(s->session->cipher_id); - if (md == NULL) { - /* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */ - return 1; - } - hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ @@ -767,8 +897,8 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, /* * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ -int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; @@ -825,8 +955,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; @@ -849,8 +979,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned int ecpointformats_len; PACKET ecptformatlist; @@ -884,8 +1014,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #endif -int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), @@ -906,14 +1036,14 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ - if (s->ext.status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; @@ -921,7 +1051,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in - * the chain. We ignore any other repsonses. + * the chain. We ignore any other responses. */ if (chainidx != 0) return 1; @@ -937,7 +1067,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation @@ -990,7 +1121,8 @@ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; @@ -1040,7 +1172,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) } #endif -int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t len; @@ -1077,8 +1210,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; @@ -1131,18 +1264,20 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #endif -int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) @@ -1151,8 +1286,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; @@ -1172,6 +1307,48 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 0; } + if ((context & EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { + unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL; + size_t i, num_curves; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we + * already sent in the first ClientHello + */ + if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { + if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves)) + break; + } + if (i >= num_curves + || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + return 1; + } + if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) { /* * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original @@ -1215,7 +1392,64 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + PACKET cookie; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) + || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, + &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (context == EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + unsigned long max_early_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; + + return 1; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED + || !s->hit + || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) { + /* + * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume + * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it. + */ + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int identity;